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This thesis is a study of Muslim Spain following 
the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate. The events of the 
period are explored within a Zaragozan and Valencian 
context. The thesis examines the main themes that affected 
Muslim Spain. These include: relations between cities and 
their provinces; the mechanics of establishing a Ta I ifa 
state and problems relating to succession; concepts of the 
legitimacy of government; the tools of government; inter- 
province relations; the power of local elites; and the 
evolving idea of reconquest. 
Chapter one explores the framework of the 
relationship between Cordova and the provinces which 
Spanish Muslims believed to have existed prior to the 
'Amirid government and looks at the reality of this 
relationship. Chapter two discusses the changes instigated 
by the 'Amirids, the collapse of the Caliphate and the 
Zaragozan/Valencian reactions to this collapse. 
Chapter three considers the development of 
Zaragoza and Valencia in the early stages of the Ta I ifa 
period. The chapter explores the relationship between them 
and their provinces. Chapter f our looks at the way in which 
these provinces gradually developed into independent 
states. 
3 
In chapter five, some of the changes which took 
place within the Christian states are touched upon, 
including the growing power of Castile. The campaign 
against Barbastro (1064) is examined from a general 
viewpoint and from a Zaragozan perspective. The chapter 
also discusses the involvement of the Almoravids in Spain. 
Chapter six considers the fall of Toledo in 1085 and the 
Cid's capture of Valencia in 1094 within the framework of 
Zaragozan/Valencian politics. 
Emphasis is placed on the use of contemporary 
Arab sources, especially Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira, which 
has recently become available and which includes quotes 
from Ibn Hayyan's al-Matin. These are supplemented by later 
texts, including Ibn 'Idhari's al-Bayan, which have 
traditionally been used for the study of the period. 
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Bism Allah Al-Rahman Al-Rahim 
Introduction 
1. Background. 
The history of Muslim Spain during the Talifa 
period is a particularly unusual episode in the history of 
the Islamic presence in the peninsula. The fall of the 
Umayyad Caliphate, or rather of the 'Amirid dictatorship 
that had come to rule in the Caliph's name, heralded a 
period of disintegration of the state called by Arab 
historians the period of the Berber fitna, al-Fitna al- 
Barbariyva. This period of civil strife and chaos was 
followed by a period lasting for the best part of the C11, 
during which Muslim Spain fragmented into a collection of 
party states, each centred on a main city with its 
surrounding countryside ruled by the city's 'lord'; Muluk 
al-Tawalif. This period was also perceived to be different 
from the one following the collapse of Almoravid rule, or 
the period of disintegration following the collapse of 
Almohad dominion and the rise of the Nasrids which some 
historians call the second and third Talifa periods. 
The era of the Talifas in the eleventh century 
was particularly significant in that it marked the 
beginning of the reconquest of Muslim Spain by the 
Christian north. This push southwards was in part a 
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response to the political weakness of the south during this 
period of disunity. Indeed, for later medieval Muslim 
historians looking back at the period, the link between 
the disintegration of the unity of Muslim Spain under the 
Talifas and the seemingly irreversible Christian advance 
was manifest and obvious. This link served to further 
increase later historians' antagonism towards the Talifa 
rulers. 
To a degree, this assessment was correct; while 
the Christian states in the north had faced a united, 
economically and militarily vibrant Muslim south in the 
Clo, by the C11 it faced a disunited, economically 
weakened south, whose political and military structures 
had suffered severe damage. It f aced a Muslim south, 
moreover, whose political and social structure had been 
destabilised with the advent of large numbers of north 
African Berber troops during the 'Amirid period and was 
suffering further instability due to the absence of a 
framework of legal government that would have instilled a 
sense of order and unity into the peninsula. 
However, some of the reasons behind the northern 
advance were inherent in changes that had taken place 
within the Christian states themselves. This was partly to 
do with the evolution of the power of Castile and the 
charismatic leadership of Alfonso VI. It was also partly 
related to general changes in the north linked with the 
evolution of a reconquest mentality and an increase in the 
vitality, not only of Castilian power, but also of that 
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of other Christian states such as Arag6n. 
What was also of special significance about this 
period was not only the actual independence of the Talifa 
states, as all over the Muslim world provinces were 
exercising independent rule to varying degrees, but that 
many of these states were seen to have become independent 
outside the legal framework of the Caliphate. In theory, 
the rulers of all Muslim provinces, no matter how 
independent, acknowledged the authority of the Caliph. 
The f act that by the C10, the Muslim world was in the 
unusual position of having three Caliphates (the 'Abbasid 
in Iraq, who in theory exercised authority over most of 
the Muslim world; the Shila Fatimids in Egypt who 
controlled parts of north Africa and of greater Syria al- 
Sham and the Umayyads who controlled Muslim Spain) made 
matters awkward, but the principle remained intact that 
all legal authority stemmed from the institution of the 
Caliphate, and that a particular governor or ruler derived 
legitimacy from his acknowledgement of the Caliphate. 
Eventually, the Muslim world reverted to a single 
Caliphate with the fall first of the Umayyads in Spain and 
later of the Fatimids. 
The Talifa states, however, managed to operate 
f or a number of years either on the periphery or completely 
outside such a system, and as they did so, they had to 
grapple with concepts of what in a Western sense can be 
described as 'kingship'. This included issues of 
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succession, 'of the manifestation of central authority, of 
developing a framework for the relationship between the 
ruler and lesser lords, of formulating policies and so on. 
In one sense, this period can be seen as a forerunner of 
the complete disintegration of Caliphal authority in the 
east which became manifest by the mid C13 and lasted until 
the ottomans established their hegemony over a large part 
of the Muslim world. However, even after the Mongols 
killed the Caliph al-Multasim in Baghdad in 1258, there 
were attempts at keeping the office in existence in Cairo, 
where 'Abbasid Caliphs were kept with little real power 
until the office was transferred to Constantinople in 1517, 
where it remained until the early part of this century. 1 
The revulsion of later Muslim medieval historians looking 
at this period was partly linked to this factor and to what 
they perceived to be the arrogance of such rulers in 
assuming such a mantle of independence. This arrogance was 
seen to be reflected in the adoption of Caliphal titles by 
the Talifa rulers which became the object of scorn by these 
later historians. 
Although concepts of Islamic legitimacy do not 
properly f orm a part of this study, it is worth briefly 
touching on the subject because of the ramifications it has 
on the understanding of the period. In theory, the entire 
Muslim community formed a single nation or ummah. This 
nation was seen to be a single entity ruled by the 
1 For a short history of the of f ice of Caliph and of the 
theological and political ideology which evolved around it see 
Encyclopedia of Islam: Vol. 4, pp. 937-953, under Khalifa. 
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authoritative statements of the Qur I an and the corpus of 
religious teachings. The nation was ruled in the f irst 
instance by the Prophet according to religious law al- 
shari Ia and, following his death, by his successors 
khulafal or Caliphs, who supplemented the laws in the 
Quraln by reference to the Prophet's statements or actions 
al-Sunna. 
As the Muslim state spread it faced, among many 
others, problems relating to the ability of central 
government to control the outlying provinces, problems 
relating to the integration of the increasing non Arab part 
of the population, whose resentment at times found 
expression in anti-Arab movements Shulubivya, and problems 
relating to the practicalities of the enforcement of 
government while keeping within the bounds of religious 
law. 
In dealing with these problems, 4 compromise 
seems to have been reached, where there was a theoretical 
acknowledgement of the ideal, in modern terminology the de 
lure aspect, of the. sharila, but also an acceptance that 
day to day government demanded some flexibility in 
practice, which resulted in a de facto breaking of the 
sharila. The tension between the ideal and the 
practicable, is reflected in various aspects of Muslim 
society in the C10 and C11. One example can be seen in the 
provinces that clearly exercised independence from the 
Caliphate, de facto, such as the Hamdanid dynasty in C10 
Allepo or even the Almoravids in Cil north Africa, but who 
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nonetheless felt the need to acknowledge the authority of 
the Caliphate in a theoretical, or de lure, sense. 
Another example can be seen in the issue of salb. 
The sharila clearly does not specify crucifixion, salb, 
as a punishment other than for highway robbery resulting in 
murder. 2 Yet this punishment seems to have been widely used 
in the Muslim world for political crimes (for example, the 
punishment of rebels such as some of Ibn Hafsun's officers 
in 7 Ramadan 315/ 5 November 927,3 or of the Commanding 
Officers responsible for the failed campaign against 
Galicia in the summer of 939 mentioned in chapter one ') as 
well as for civil crimes. Indeed, the power of 
maintaining law and order was often executed by an official 
sahib al-shurta who, although often trained in 
jurisprudence, does not seem to have exercised his 
authority within the bounds of the sharila (there was even 
one case of a highway robber who was appointed by the 
'Abbadids in Seville as a sahib al-shurta while still on 
the croSS5) . 
Yet another example was the issue of taxes. 
Muslim governments clearly collected taxes not specified in 
religious law to pay for the expenses of government. Ibn 
Hazm raised this issue in his al-Muhalla 6. However, this 
2 Qurlan, 5: 33-34. 
3 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, vol 2, p. 194. 
4 Chapter 1: p. 72. 
5 Al-Maqqari: Nafh al-Tib: Vol. 4, p. 128. 
6 Ibn Hazm: Al-Muhalla, 'Kitab al-Zakat', vol. 5&6. 
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did not stop jurists from ignoring the dichotomy of having 
parts of their salaries paid out of illegal taxes and 
continuing in government service. 
Perhaps one factor which helped make this issue 
of legitimacy so central to Muslim government during the 
C10 and C11 was that the majority of those in governmental 
service Silk al-Khidma were trained in Figh or 
jurisprudence. Although these individuals formed the core 
of the educated 'men of the pen' who ran the affairs of the 
state, their education and outlook was essentially 
religious. Indeed, Figh involves both law and theology, 
7 
and for the jurists there was no de lure separation between 
religion and the state, although they could, most of the 
time, accommodate themselves to the state acting outside 
religious legality on a practical basis. For these 
jurists, there seem to have existed a proverbial 
'Mulawiyah's lock of hair' 8 which gave the world, as they 
seem to have seen it, cohesion ; this involved the belief 
that whatever the shortcomings of the practice of 
government, an acknowledgement of the ideal of the Muslim 
system in all its varied facets was essential. To break 
this mould and go beyond the Muslim world view, as it was 
seen to exist, on a de lure basis, would have therefore 
7 For a good discussion of figh see Encvclopedia of Islam: 
vol. 2, pp. 886-891 under Fikh. 
8 It is commonly attributed to Mu I awiyah, the f irst Umayyad 
Caliph, to have said that a single lock of hair linked him to his 
people, ummah; if they pulled, he would loosen his hold, and 
if 
they loosened, he would pull, so that that single lock [holding 
the state together] would never break. 
I 
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been seen as a shattering, highly disruptive, as well as 
theologically unsound, action. 
Despite the significance of the period of Muluk 
al-Tawalif, it had not, until fairly recently, received 
the same degree of attention as other episodes in the 
history of Muslim Spain. 9 The aim of this study is to trace 
the history of two inter-linked Talifa states, those of 
Zaragoza and Valencia from their emergence as two 
independent Talifa states through to their eventual fall. 
By looking in detail at the history of these two states, 
one would be able to examine aspects of Talifa history 
which might be of use in helping understand the development 
of the history of the other Talifas. In a sense, the 
study aims to look at these two Talifas as a microcosm of 
the general history of the peninsula in the period and some 
time is therefore spent examining the early origins of the 
formation of the Talifa states in the period preceding that 
of Muluk al-Tawalif before going on to examine the Talifa 
period proper. 
For this study much reliance has been placed on 
the use of contemporary or near contemporary Spanish Muslim 
sources, notably those by Ibn Hayyan, Ibn Bassam, Ibn 
9 The most recent full study of the period is 
D. Wasserstein: The Rise & Fall of the Party Kinqs. Politics & 
Society in Islamic Spain 1002-1086. Also R. Fletcher The Quest 
for El Cid. For a recent general history of the confrontation 
between the Muslim states in the south and the Christian states 
in the north in this period see B. F. Reilly The Contest of 
Christian and Muslim Spain 1031-1157. In all of these studies, 
however, the major contemporary Spanish Muslim source, al- 
Dhakhira, is barely used. 
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'Alqama, Ibn al-Kardabus and al-Turtushi (the various 
sources used are discussed in more detail in the third 
section of this introduction). It is particularly 
fortunate that the great work of Ibn Bassam, al-Dhakhira, 
written circa 1105, is now available edited and published 
in full by Dr. I. 'Abbas, 10 especially since this work 
gives one access to Ibn Bassam's own account of events in 
the latter part of the century and to some of the earliest 
excerpts from Ibn Hayyan's lost 'History', which formed 
the basis of much later histories of the period such as 
that by Ibn 'Idhari. 
Chapter one aims to examine the background to 
Zaragoza and Valencia highlighting the difference in the 
geographical structure of the countryside surrounding them 
as well as in the makeup of their populations and the 
differences resulting from one being the centre of a march 
while the other was further south, nearer to central 
government and protected from the hostilities of the north. 
Because Spanish Muslims of the C11 tended to believe that 
the 'Amirid dictatorship had instigated major changes in 
the government of the peninsula, some time is spent 
examining what could have been seen to be the theoretical 
framework that governed the relationship between the 
provinces, especially the more independent march area, 
and the government in Cordova prior to the 'Amirid period. 
10 The f irst full edition became available in March 1979. 
The 1979 edition is in four parts divided into eight volumes. 
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The chapter then goes on to look briefly at the reality of 
that relationship during the final stages of Umayyad 
government. 
Chapter two aims to follow the process that led 
to the disintegration of the Cordovan government which led 
in turn to the rise of the Talifas as independent states. 
Central to this collapse of Cordovan government is the role 
played by the 'Amirid dictatorship which had usurped the 
Caliph's power preceding the collapse. Because of the 
tarnished image of the Talifa rulers, later Muslim 
historians have tended to be sympathetic in their treatment 
of Ibn Abi 'Amir. However, contemporary and near 
contemporary Spanish Muslims held a more critical view, 
and chapter two tries to re-examine the history of the 
dictatorship from their perspective, in particular the 
changes which he instigated and which they viewed as 
destabilising. The chapter then goes on to examine the way 
in which both Zaragoza and Valencia reacted to the collapse 
of the government in Cordova and tries to trace the reasons 
which explain the differences in their reactions. 
Chapter three attempts to look at the way in 
which the states of Zaragoza and Valencia developed in the 
early stages of the Talifa period. In particular it 
examines the way in which power was transferred to 
particular groups within these provinces (the ascension of 
the Hudids in Zaragoza and of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia). 
The chapter also tries to look at the way the main cities 
of these states were attempting to develop their 
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relationship with their Almal or provinces, as well as 
with other provinces and how that latter behaviour became 
elevated to the sphere of 'foreign policy'. During these 
early years one also begins to gain an impression of the 
power of the ahl or 'people' of the major cities. The 
power of the 'people' of the major cities can be seen at 
certain main points of the history of the peninsula (for 
example, the 'people' of Toledo seem to have had the power 
to expel their ruler and later to enter into negotiations 
with Alfonso VI, as will be discussed in chapter six). 
Chapter four traces the development of the states 
of Valencia and Zaragoza as they began to be transformed 
from being provinces which had an increased degree of 
independence, but still operating within the political 
ideology of a Spain that it was thought should be ruled 
under an over-all Caliphal order, preferably emanating 
from Cordova, to a situation by the 1060's where they had 
come to behave, on a practical and ideological basis, as 
totally independent states. The chapter also tries to look 
at some of the issues related to independent rule, 
especially those relating to succession, which the Talifas 
were unable to resolve satisfactorily. A dichotomy that 
can be clearly seen in the reign of the Hudids in Zaragoza 
was that on the one hand, they exercised power as 
independent rulers, adopting Caliphal titles, but on the 
other, they continued to regard their state almost as 
personal property to be divided among their heirs as 
opposed to being passed on to a single successor. The 
21 
chapter also looks at the rise of the power of the north 
and its increasing dominance as reflected in the reversal 
of roles with the south, with the Christian states in the 
north beginning to force the Muslim south to pay tribute. 
Chapter five touches upon the changes that took 
place within the northern Christian states, in terms of 
the rise of Castile to prominence, their increased contact 
with the rest of Christian Europe and the development of a 
mentality of reconquest and tries to relate that 
development to the growing ideal of the Crusade. With 
reference to this last point the campaign for Barbastro is 
examined both from a general viewpoint but also from a 
local 'Zaragozan, perspective. At the same time, the 
chapter aims to look at the growth of what in modern 
terminology could be called the fundamentalist, Almoravid 
movement in north Africa and their increasing involvement 
in the peninsula as well as the changes in perspective to 
the north/south confrontation which their involvement 
inevitably brought, at the same time looking at the way in 
which both Zaragoza and Valencia were reacting to the 
changing larger picture in the peninsula. 
Chapter six attempts to examine the two major 
events of the latter half of the century in Muslim Spain. 
The fall of Toledo in 1085 represented a watershed both 
symbolically since it was the old Visigothic capital of 
Spain and f rom a practical point of view since it broke the 
back of the march def ence system of Muslim Spain and marked 
the beginning of the retreat southwards (halted for a time 
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by the defeat at Zallaqa). However, on a more localised 
level the fall of Toledo represented a major set back for 
Zaragoza and that is also examined. The chapter also 
traces the reasons behind, and the events leading to, 
Rodrigo Diaz's campaign against and capture of Valencia in 
1094 with the help of Zaragoza. 
The study has tried throughout to use evidence 
now available through al-Dhakhira, so that often accepted 
versions of events are renarrated and supplemented by 
information provided by that source. At other times, there 
has been an ef fort to use material which is to be found 
only in al-Dhakhira. In both cases, the new information 
from al-Dhakhira has been used to analyse the events of the 
period in a fresh light. 
Throughout the study, while the main themes that 
affected Muslim Spain are explored, an attempt is made to 
situate these themes and events within the context of a 
Ilocalised' Zaragozan or Valencian viewpoint. The close 
link between the two states, dictated by their proximity 
as well as by Zaragoza's increasing need to have Valencia 
within its sphere of influence, both in the context of 
inter-Talifa politics as well as in that of Zaragoza's 
attempts to withstand the increasing pressure from the 
north, is a theme that can be seen to run throughout the 
history of this period and one which is followed 
throughout the thesis. The way in which Zaragoza attempted 
to deal with its strong Talifa neighbours, such as Toledo, 
with the northern Christian states, as well with the state 
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of Valencia offers a glimpse into the workings of Talifa 
politics as whole and an opportunity to look at the way in 
which the rulers of these states reacted to their 
independence and to the major changes that followed in the 
peninsula. 
2. Arabic Terms 
The aim throughout this thesis has been to use, 
as far as possible, the earliest extant Arabic sources. 
The study has therefore involved at times a translation of 
terms from Arabic into English. Some of these translations 
(in some instances) are not literal but aim to convey what 
the original source is perceived to have meant by the term. 
At other times a literal translation has been used. 
However, in both cases, the English terms used 
have historical connotations of their own which perhaps 
were not intended either by the original source or by the 
translation. A good example of this would be the term 
'lord' to describe the ruler, sahib, of a province. The 
term 'lord' although useful in describing this office, has 
in addition certain connotations in European history which 
were not necessarily intended to apply to their usage in 
the context of C11 Muslim Spain. To clarify the meanings 
of English terms as used in the thesis, I list below the 
main Arabic terms involved and the reasons behind the 
choice of the English equivalent. The list also includes 
some terms which are generally problematic as well as an 
explanation of certain concepts. 
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Almal : Power in ClO/C11 Muslim Spain clearly rested in the 
cities. The cities controlled the surrounding countryside, 
including, at times lesser or smaller cities (for example 
Zaragoza clearly controlled Ldrida, while Valencia 
controlled Uativa) .A good translation for Almal would be 
'province'. However, since the Muslim Spanish state as a 
whole disintegrated into its component provinces, the term 
could lead to some confusion. I have therefore tried to 
use the Arabic term when describing the countryside 
controlled by a city-state. The dictionary of Ibn Mandhur 
Lisan al-'Arab (died 711/ 20 May 1311-8 May 1312), lists 
one meaning of the verb 'Amala as: 'receiving authority to 
rule (wilava) from the ruler. " 
Ahl: The term can be literally translated as 'people of I as 
in, for example, ahlu kent, meaning the people of Kent 
(and this indeed seems to be the main meaning put forward 
by Ibn Mandhur). However, its use in the Arabic sources 
seems to have wider connotations. When used to describe 
ahlu Tulaitula, the people of Toledo, or ahlu Balancia, 
the people of Valencia, it clearly was not referring to 
the total population of the city involved. The way in 
which the term was used suggests that it was meant to refer 
to the influential part of the population. Who this 
segment of the population included is not clear, although 
one can guess that it included members of the important 
local families, senior members of 'local' government and 
11 Muhammad ibn Mukkaram ibn Mandhur: Lisan al-Arab. 
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influential members of the merchant class. In translation 
the term 'people of' has been used, but has been placed in 
inverted commas to emphasise its special meaning. This 
influential segment of the population is also referred to 
at times as the elders, shuyukh, of a city. 12 
'Ammah: By contrast, this can be translated as commoners 
(which is one of the meanings put forward by Ibn Mandhur) 
and were at the other end of the social structure from the 
Khassa. It is used mostly, but not exclusively, when 
describing events in Cordova that seem to have involved 
elements of popular uprisings. For this reason, the term 
commoners has been used as a translation. 
Caliphal Titles: The 'Abbasids started a tradition of each 
new Caliph adopting a title by which he would be known 
after taking office. These titles were particularly grand 
and it was generally acknowledged that they remained the 
exclusive prerogative of Caliphs. Examples of such titles 
include al-Multasim and al-Mustalin. The Talifa rulers' 
adoption of such Caliphal titles was seen to be a 
12 Dr. T. A. Makki in his Dirasat 'an Ibn Hazm wa Kitabihi 
Tawa al-Hamamah, pp. 23-26 lists the following class structure in 
Cordova at the end of the Umayyad period: 1) al-Khassa who were 
made up of those Arabs related to the ruling family; 2) Abnal al- 
Buvutat who were members of the important families and who 
inherited the important positions in government. These also 
included Abnal al-Khlalif Slavs (or their sons) who were freed 
and held important posts including Ibn Abi 'Amir; 3) al-Tabaqa 
al-Wusta who were members of important and rich families in 
various provinces, also called al-Alvan; and 4) al-Tabaaa al- 
Dunia who were made up of craftsmen and labourers and were also 
known as al-'Amah. The Ahl in the provinces would therefore 
probably refer to the second and third of these groups. 
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particularly unusual and vainglorious act. 
Declaration of Alleqiance to a Caliph: There were at least 
two ways in which a ruler of a province could show 
allegiance to a Caliph (declare for him) publicly. The 
most commonly used method was to have the Caliph's name 
mentioned in the Friday prayers, which was a way of 
informing all levels of the community of this allegiance. 
In the Talifa period, when the different states minted 
their own coins, the Caliph's name was stamped on the 
province's coins, in addition to those of the ruler. 
fitna: The best translation of the term fitna is sedition, 
yet the term denotes much more. It conjured up in the 
medieval Muslim mind images of civil war and lawlessness 
and wilful disruption of the orderly life which he should 
have been able to expect within Muslim territory (Dar al- 
Islam). Ibn Mandhur gives one meaning of the word as 
erring (dalal) and sin (ithm) ; the devil is described by 
him as the propagator of fitna: fattan. The threat of 
accusing a non-obedient subject of fitna was quite a 
powerful weapon in the hands of rulers. The Fatimids, 
for example, denounced the Ibn Ziri governor of Qairawan 
as an inciter of a fitna when he changed allegiance to the 
'Abbasids in 1048. The term is also infused with this 
strong negative image, partly because of the importance of 
order in the medieval Muslim mind, and partly because of 
its historico-religious connotations. During the siege of 
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Yathrib by the alliance al-Ahzab in 627, some of the 
Prophet's followers doubted his ability to win. They 
asked to be excused from fighting and to return and defend 
their homes which they claimed were in danger. They are 
referred to in the Qurlan as hypocrites who would allow a 
fitna with little hindrance (33: 12-14). A fitna would 
therefore carry the stigma of being something sinful and 
anti-Islamic instigated by hypocrites. 
Hal ib: The literal meaning of the noun is veil. In the 
west, it was a title taken by the most influential member 
of government after the Caliph, such as for example, 
Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir. The term therefore describes the 
office of chief wazir. However, in the early part of the 
Talifa period, the title was adopted by some Talifa rulers 
as a form of self aggrandizement, while they continued to 
show in the early stages titular allegiance to certain 
Caliphs. 
Hisn: The term is used in the sources to describe a town 
which seem to have had fortifications and an element of 
military personnel stationed in it. The best example of 
this usage is in the description of Barbastro. The term 
has therefore been translated as fort or fortified town. 
This is a separate term from Oal'a which seem to refer to 
a purely military fortified structure and which has been 
translated as castle (Ibn Mandhur lists one meaning as a 
fortified structure which is built in a prominent 
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position) . There is at least one reference to al-Oila I 
(the plural of the term) as a country which is taken to 
mean Castile. 13 
Ifranj: The term literally means Franks. In medieval 
Muslim usage it came to denote most Europeans and indeed in 
common modern usage the term means 'western foreigner'. 
However, in Muslim Spanish usage the term is used 
specifically to describe Christians from Catalonia and also 
to Catalan and other western Christians present in other 
regions, as for example in Toledo. 
Mawali/Fitvan: Fata literally means young man, but Ibn 
Mandhur lists one meaning as slave. Mawla is derived from 
Milla meaning religion. In its origin it referred to 
children of free Arabs from slave mothers. However, in 
CIO/C11 Muslim Spain it clearly meant slave. Both these 
words refer to slave soldiers. 
The institution of slave soldiers was a feature 
of the medieval Muslim world. 14 In Muslim Spain, it is 
clear that the core of the professional army was made up of 
such slaves. Ibn Hawqal in his Kitab Surat al-Ard claims 
that at the time of his visit most were of Slav, Catalan 
(Ifranjja) or Galecian origin brought to Spain by Jewish 
13 For a recent general study of forts(Husun) in the south 
east of Spain see Bazzana, Cressier and Guichard: Les Chfteaux 
Ruraux d'Al-Andalus: Histoire et Archdoloctie des Husun du Sud-Est 
de 1'Espagne. 
14 For a general study of slave soldiers in Islam see P. 
Crone: Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of Islamic Polity. 
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merchants. 15 However, his claim that most of these 
slaves were castrated has to be treated with caution. 
Ghalib, one of their more famous commanders who was 
dispatched to the upper march had a daughter whom Ibn Abi 
'Amir married. 
Mahalla: Literally camp site. The way in which the term is 
used during the description of the failed Almoravid attack 
on Valencia suggests that it was meant to refer to the 
central encampment or body of the army and this is 
confirmed by the sense of the loan word almofalla in, for 
example, the Poema de Mio Cid. 
Muluk al-Tawalif: The term can be literally translated as 
'party kings'. However, the use of the term I King I in 
this context is problematic. De las Cagigas believed that 
the term Muluk is best translated as governors, while the 
reference to their Allat al-Mulukivva or kingly 
paraphernalia, referred to their use of distinctive 
insignia of government such as banners and coinage. 16 The 
problem with using the term king is that it has 
implications f or the way in which these rulers perceived 
themselves and their states and although later sources do 
ref er to them in this way, it is not clear that they 
themselves used the term muluk. 
15 Ibn Hawqal: Kitab Surat al-Ard, p. 106. 
16 De Las Cagigas: Los Mozcirabes, pp. 421-423. 
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In addition, the term muluk would imply that one 
describes their states as kingdoms. One can argue that it 
took the various rulers a long time to come to terms with 
their independence and that there were aspects of their 
government, particularly the issue of succession, which 
they failed to resolve. one also needs to take into 
account the fact that the term might have been used by the 
later sources in an attempt to discredit their 
"vainglorious" rule further and deny them legitimacy. For 
example, two civil servants who were using the term by the 
end of the century were Ibn Bassam and Ibn al-Qusayra. 17 
However, both these men had declared their allegiance to 
the Almoravids and the use of the term (malik) by them 
reflected their official antagonism to these Talifa rulers. 
This is particularly notable in the letter written by Ibn 
al-Qusayra referred to above, were he describes the 
ascendancy of the Christian enemy and blames it on the 
lords of the Tawalif: 
Because the majority of the muluk of this 
region used to have dealings with the 
Tawalif of the Rum, and each used to buy 
soldiers with some money which he would then 
use against his [Muslim] enemies. 
The letter then goes on to describe how Yusuf Ibn Tashfin 
heeding the call of people of the peninsula crossed over to 
stop the Christian advance. 
A much less problematic term would be to describe 
17 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira part 2, pp. 253-255 quotes a 
letter by Ibn al-Qusayra attacking the weakness of the Talifa 
rulers before the Christians in which he describes these rulers 
as (Muluk). 
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them as 'lords' or 'governors'. In the same way, rather 
than describe their domains as 'kingdoms', it might be 
more accurate to describe them as city-states. 
Numbers: The use of numbers by contemporary writers such as 
Ibn Hayyan poses some problems. It is not clear whether 
Ibn Hayyan used a number which he believed to be an 
approximation of the reality, or whether, especially when 
he used very large numbers, he simply wished to convey the 
feeling of enormity. An argument can be made that a civil 
servant familiar with the tax revenue of the Caliphate in 
Spain would be familiar with sums of this magnitude. When 
describing armies, Ibn Hayyan's numbers seem to be mostly 
reasonable. For example, to say that the upper and middle 
march could muster between them 10,500 horsemen at the turn 
of the ClO/C11 seems reasonable, although it need not 
necessarily be accurate. However, when he talks of the 
cost of the 'Amirid campaigns (500,000 dinars per 
campaign18) or of an estate in Valencia in the early 
stages of the fitna (100,000 dinars), the numbers, 
especially the latter, seem particularly large. Either he 
was simply trying to say that such costs were prohibitively 
high, or he was reporting figures which were in 
circulation, which might in turn indicate that by the 
reign of 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir and in the period of 
the fitna, Muslim Spain was suffering from severe 
inflation. There is no other evidence to clarify the issue 
18 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn al-natib, Almal al-Almal, pp. 114-115. 
32 
and it would therefore be reasonable to assume that the 
large numbers used were meant to convey 'enormous' 
amounts. 
Rum/Roma: The term Rum strictly speaking means Romans. 
However, in its eastern usage, it came to mean members of 
the Byzantine Empire. Ibn Hayyan uses the term Roma when 
describing the siege of Barbastro and the argument is put 
forward in chapter five that Ibn Hayyan clearly meant it to 
mean the city of Rome. 
Silk al-Khidma: Literally 'the Thread of Service'. I have 
chosen to translate this as the civil service. There is 
some debate over whether one can talk of a civil service 
when discussing medieval kingships, or whether the concept 
of a ruler's agents is more appropriate. During the 
Umayyad period, the size and diversity of civil matters 
attended to by this service strongly argues for the 
appropriateness of using the term civil service to describe 
it. one has to be careful, however, in that the civil 
service in Muslim Spain was not concerned solely with civil 
administration as per the modern English usage, but was 
also involved in military administration. 
We find that in the reign of al-Nasir (912-961) 
it was not unusual f or the Caliph to have nine or ten 
wazirs, 19 or ministers. That these in turn would employ 
19 A good example of this can be seen in Ibn Hayyan: al- 
Mugtabas, vol. V, pp. 314,390. 
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a fair number of clerks to cover most aspects of the 
bureaucracy is shown by the f act that the government was 
housed in the large complex of al-Zahra I palace. Under 
'Abd al-Rahman al-Mustadhhir, there is a record of 
fourteen ministries. 20 These were: the ministry 
responsible for the Administration of the two palace 
complexes, 21 Khidmat al-Madinatavn al-Zahira wa al- 
Zahra I; the ministry for Accounts Khidmat Kitabat al- 
Ta'aaaub wal-Muhasaba (literally the investigation and 
accountS22) the ministry for the retinue Khidmat al- 
Hasham; the ministry f or Food and Water (literally for 
apportioning water when it is scarce and of food) Khidmat 
al-Out' bi al-nadd wal TaIaM 23; the ministry dealing with 
the Inheritance of the Notables Khidmat Mawarith al-khassa; 
the ministry for the Embroidery24 Khidmat al-Tiraz; the 
20 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: Part 1, p. 51. 
21 The palace complex in Cordova housed not only the caliph, 
but also the ministerial staff and some Slav guards. The 
excavation of the al-Zahral palace complex a few miles outside 
Cordova shows it to have been the size of a village. 
22 Ibn Mandhur gives several meaning for the word 'Acfib, but 
this seems the most appropriate given its coupling with the word 
Muhasaba. Another possible meaning could be: to retain something 
under one's control. Ibn Mandhur gives an example of a seller 
Iltaaaba a good until the buyer pays him for it. 
23 Another possible meaning for al-Nadd might be gold and 
silver, but given that the ministry was concerned with food, 
water seems more logical. It might be that the ministry was 
concerned with distributing water and food in Cordova, or for 
coordinating rationing at times of scarcity. 
24 This is not as absurd as it might seem. In his Kitab 
Surat al-Ard, Ibn Hawqal, the C10 traveller mentions that Muslim 
Spain was an exporter of embroidered linen to Egypt and even 
. Khurasan p. 105., as well as of wool, flax and rain proof material. It also had a silk dyeing industry p. 109. 
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ministry for Buildings Khidmat al-MaBani; the ministry for 
Weaponry and Related Items Khidmat al-Asliha wa ma yajri 
mairaha; the Treasury Khidmat al-Khizana lil gabd wal daf I; 
The ministry dealing with Food Supplies for the Ruler: 
Receipts and Payments Khidmat al-Hiraya wal gabd wal dafl 
25 
1 the ministry responsible for Documents and the 
Submission of Complaints Khidmat al-Wathailia wa Rafl al- 
Madhalim; the Treasury of Medicine Khidmat Khizanat al - 
Tibb wal Hikma; The ministry for the Care for Guests 
Khidmat al-Anzal wal Nazalil; the ministry for the 
Regulations of Commerce Khidmat Ahkam al-Su . Ibn Bassam 
adds to his quote f rom Ibn Hayyan saying: "And f or each 
title of the types of this service there existed subgroups 
Jama 'at whom Ibn Hayyan named in his book", a reference to 
the layer of bureaucracy which supported the ministers in 
their office. 26 The overall size of this apparatus can be 
seen in Ibn al-Khatib in Almal al-Allam who quotes the 
charter that declared 'Abd 
al-Rahman, son of al-Mansur Ibn Abi 'Amir, a successor to 
the Caliphate in 1008. He states that it was witnessed by 
the Chief Judge in Cordova (Oadi al-Jamala) Ahmad Ibn 
Abdullah Ibn Dhakwan, followed by 29 wazirs, then 180: 
men from Ashab al-Shurta and the rest of the 
25 Ibn Mandhur lists under the verb(Hara) a noun (Hurivu) 
which he describes as a large house where the food of the ruler 
(sultan) is gathered. I have therefore taken that Hirava is 
derived from that meaning. 
26 Ibn Hayyan quoted by Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: Part I, p. 51. 
In this instance the power of the caliph al-Mustadhhir 
was very weak and Ibn Hayyan recorded that non of the ministers 
appointed actually held office. 
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people of the service from commanders 
Hukkam, judges Ouda, jurists Fuaahal, 
councillors Mushawirun and others. 27- 
However, the civil service in Umayyad Spain 
relied on the jurists to legitimise their actions. An 
example of this can be seen in the early part of Ibn Abi 
'Amir's assumption of authority. It seems that he 
attempted to exert his influence over the independent 
jurists. When these refused to comply, he imprisoned them 
and sent a wazir to bully them but the jurists responded by 
effectively threatening to stage a strike, which would 
have brought the functioning of the entire State to a halt 
since they would not conduct any legal or religious 
business which included signing declarations for war and 
peace (to give them legal validity), helping commerce (by 
resolving disputes), accepting donations sadaqat to the 
poor or condemning any offender to imprisonment. Ibn Abi 
'Amir eventually backed down. This incident is interesting 
because it shows a separation between Silk al-Khidma or the 
civil service and the Fuaahal or jurists, although 
evidence shows (not least in the case of Ibn 'Amir himself) 
that wazirs were often trained in jurisprudence. The 
incidence also shows the need of the service to obtain 
sanction for its functions from jurists who therefore had 
28 much influence. 
27 Ibn al-Khatib: Alinal al-Allam, p. 108. 
28 Al-Turtushi: Sirai al-Muluk: p. 56-57. See the discussion 
of al-Turtushi below. 
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The civil servants in C11 Muslim Spain seem to 
have been recruited from those trained in figh or 
jurisprudence. The career of Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, who 
was originally a civil servant, was particularly well 
documented because of his later seizure of power. it 
provides a fascinating insight into the progression of the 
career of a well connected high ranking civil servant in 
C10 Spain. At times he served as a civil servant (f or 
example, he held the ministry of the mint al-Sikka in 967), 
and at others, as a jurist (for example, he became Chief 
29 Justice Oadi al-Oudat in north Africa) . Not only does 
this underline the fact that members of the service were 
often trained as jurists, but it also points to an 
intermingling of the personnel of both these 
establishments. 
Medieval Muslim society produced an enormous 
amount of written material. Many of the books produced do 
survive. What is intriguing is that the vast majority of 
what did survive is in the form of 'published' books, 
whereas very little of original 'letters of government', 
jurisprudence rulings and title deeds seem to have come 
down to us. However, there is strong evidence of the 
extensive use of written material (whether in terms of 
records or correspondence) by the civil service. This is 
seen in the large amounts of civil service letters as well 
29 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, pp. 268-253. Interestingly, 
as Chief Justice, he also held the right to be consulted over 
military matters. 
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as occasional treaties quoted in literary works such as Ibn 
Bassam's al-Dhakhira, which were no doubt intended in part 
to provide examples to be emulated by other civil servants. 
Given the literary nature of medieval Muslim society 
(evidenced by the large quantities of books produced and 
the large public libraries such as the one in Baghdad used 
to house them), the large complexes used to house the 
civil service (part of which must have been used as storage 
facilities for records) as well as the references to 
SMils or records in capitals such as Cordova, one could 
strongly argue that the Caliphal civil service in the 
ClO/C11 was essentially one which operated on a written 
basis. 
However, the question remains whether the term 
would be continue to be appropriate when discussing the 
Talifa states, where the governmental establishment would 
have been much smaller. Two factors argue for continuing 
to use the term. First, there seems to have been a 
distinction in the minds of contemporary or near 
contemporary historians between a clerk, Katib, and a 
minister or wazir (although some ministers were known as 
al-wazir al-katib, perhaps implying a duality of function, 
or a record of their promotion) . The Ta I if a rulers seem to 
have tried to build up smaller versions of the service 
which had existed in Cordova, in the first instance 
employing members of that service who had fled the turmoil 
in the capital, and thereafter educated 'men of the pen' 
to fulfil the same role. These men and their successors 
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were recognised as wazirs in the accounts of Ibn Hayyan and 
Ibn Bassam and clearly saw themselves as such, whatever 
the reality of the reduced apparatus within which they 
worked under the Talifas. Secondly, in the C12/C13 al- 
Mughrib fi hula al-Macfhrib, 30 most provinces include a 
section entitled al-Silk which covers the wazirs of that 
province. This would suggest that within each province 
there was seen to be a local silk al-khidma or civil 
service. 
Sahib: Governor of a province. In the Talifa period, I 
have opted f or the term Lord to indicate the ruler of a 
city-state. 
Thaghr: Ibn Mandhur lists one meaning as: an area which is 
a clear divide between the lands of the Muslims and the 
lands of the non-believers (Kuf far) ; in other words a 
march. 
The Arabic Sources 
Until recently, the most important Arabic source 
used by historians looking at the period was al-Bayan al- 
Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wal Maqhrib by Ibn I Idhari al- 
Marrakushi. The work was particularly valuable because it 
quoted f rom earlier sources such as the history by Ibn 
Hayyan and that by Ibn 'Alqama. The literary al-Dhakhira 
30 See below p. 47. 
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fi Mahasin Ahl al-Jazira by Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini was 
known about but not widely used as it existed only in 
manuscript form and was quite long. It is an invaluable 
source as it contains the earliest extant extracts from the 
lost text by Ibn Hayyan as well as some accounts of the 
events of the latter part of the century composed from 
eyewitnesses accounts. The complete edition of the book by 
Ihsan 'Abbas has made the text much more accessible. In 
this thesis, the al-Dhakhira is the most important primary 
Arabic source used. I list below, by author, the major 
primary Arabic sources with brief commentaries on each 
a) 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri, Lord of Granada: Kitab al- Tibyan: 
The discovery of this manuscript in a false wall in a north 
African mosque in 1932 has allowed modern scholars a rare 
glimpse into the thoughts of the ruling class of the 
period. Almost all the texts that survive were written by 
professional men of letters, while this was, unusually, 
written by a deposed ruler. In terms of the information it 
contains, it is much more related to Granada. However, 
it does offer a valuable insight into views of the general 
history of the period. 
b) 'Ali Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini: Al-Dhakhira fi Mahasin 
Ahl al-jazira: Part one of the book was published between 
1939 to 1942. Sections of part four were then published in 
1945 by a committee headed by Dr. Azzam of the University 
of King Fuad in Cairo. It was then neglected until 1975, 
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when a section of part two was published. Finally Ihsan 
'Abbas edited and published the entire book between 1976 
and 1979 in Beirut. In this, he used the f ive extant 
manuscripts and corrected some of the errors he saw in the 
earlier editions. 
Ibn Bassam (d. 542/2 June 1147- 22 May 1148), 
from the town of Santarem in-what is now Portugal started 
work on his major project in Cordova in 493/17 November 
1099-6 November 110031 and was still writing in 500/2 
September 1106- 22 August 1100.32 The book is in f our 
parts (the modern edition is in eight volumes). Ibn 
Bassam's original 'aim seems to have been to compose a 
literary work containing the contribution of Muslim Spain 
to Arabic literature. one assumes that his aim would have 
been to produce a book resembling al-'Iad al-Farid. As a 
civil servant, Ibn Bassam's concern with literary 
composition (Adab) was a normal one, although the scope of 
his ambition set him aside from his contemporaries in the 
service. 
one can argue that Ibn Bassam failed in producing 
an outstanding work of literature, despite the very 
subs7tantial amount of poetry included. His book has too 
33 many quotes from Ibn Hayyan's history. However, I would 
argue that the qualities that might be seen as making the 
31 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira : Part III, p. 654. 
32 ibid: Part II, p. 452. 
33 For a more sympathetic assessment of al-Dhakhira, see 
Dr. H. Y. Kharyush: Ibn Bassam wa kitabahu al-Dhakhira. 
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work so lacking as a work of literature make it invaluable 
as an historical source. Ibn Bassam was clearly awed by 
the scholarship of Ibn Hayyan, although he also disliked 
the historian's harsh judgemental attitude towards people 
he wrote about . 
34 one of the problems of the book as a 
source, is that Ibn Bassam in an attempt to be as 
inoffensive as possible deliberately deletes names of the 
subjects of some of the letters he quotes from 
(substituting the Arabic Fulan, equivalent to the English 
'so and so' or Ix') so that often his book reproduces 
certain letters f rom a particular Ta I ifa to another unnamed 
party. It may be that his aim was to universalise the 
material, but in this he differs from Ibn Hayyan's 
practice, to the extent of doctoring the passages he 
copies from Ibn Hayyan, removing individual names from 
them. 
Nevertheless, part of his stated aim was to 
report on the events that had taken place in the peninsula 
over the preceding century and for that he quotes at great 
length from the now lost work of Ibn Hayyan. This arguable 
weakness in the composition of al-Dhakhira gives one access 
to some of the earliest and longest extracts from Ibn 
Hayyan's lost 'History'. The relationship between Ibn 
Bassam and Ibn Hayyan is quite intriguing. One can detect 
a sense of admiration for the historian and at times an 
effort to imitate him. Ibn Bassam called Ibn Hayyan the 
perfect scholar al-Adib al-Kamil. The result was that 
34 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 586. 
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despite Ibn Bassam's aim to write primarily a literary 
work, he continues to pay special attention to recording 
history, even for the period after Ibn Hayyan's death. 
Ibn Bassam also managed to befriend Ibn Tahir, 
one-time ruler of Murcia, who provided him with eyewitness 
accounts of events in Valencia leading up to, during and 
following Rodrigo's occupation of the city. He in f act 
composed a book about Ibn Tahir's letters. He also 
contacted members of the civil service collecting not only 
examples of their literary work, their governmental work 
and general anecdotes, but also accounts of major 
political events they had experienced in the later part of 
the century. 
The audience Ibn Bassam was addressing was 
varied. on one level, he clearly had ambitions for his 
work to be read in the east so that scholars there might 
learn of the literary achievements of the west. On another 
level, the book was addressed to contemporary Spanish 
Muslim men of letters, aiming to provide them with a 
collection of history and literature. Finally, the work 
was also addressing an audience of the Almoravids who had 
come to dominate the peninsula politically by the time Ibn 
Bassam was writing. It is this last category of audience 
that colours the politics of the book in the most obvious 
manner. The cautious Ibn Bassam tried very hard not to 
offend the Almoravids and to present the history of the Cil 
in a manner which would show off their positive 
contribution as defenders of the faith, and which was 
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theref ore by def inition unsympathetic to the Ta I ifa rulers. 
The work is also subject to the limitations of the author's 
outlook as a Spanish Muslim of the late C11/early C12. 
However, whatever the shortcomings of the work, it 
contains some of the earliest and most detailed accounts of 
the period, and that in itself makes the book truly a 
treasury or Dhakhira. 
The thesis differs from other studies of the 
period in its heavy reliance on the work of Ibn Bassam, 
using it as the primary source for information. Studies of 
C11 Muslim Spain, even the most recent works, have 
tended to under-utilise the. al-Dhakhira as a source. This 
was partly the result of the full edition not being 
available until 1979. Another reason might be the 
perception of the work as essentially a literary one, 
rather than an historical work, and its length (the modern 
edition is in eight volumes). Moreover, becuase the book 
was designed to be a literary work, the historical material 
in it is not particularly easy to use. However, despite the 
literary nature of the work, it provides an invaluable 
source for the study of the period. First, because it 
contains long extracts from Ibn Hayyan which is discussed 
in more detail below. Secondly, the book contains 
anthologies of civil service letters, which while not 
forming 'chancery' type evidence in the western sense, 
give, nonetheless, a feel for the general outlook of the 
educated classes towards the major political issues of the 
period. Finally, Ibn Bassam witnessed the final stages of 
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the Talifa period and his work contains his own record of 
those decades. 
c) Hayyan Ibn Khalaf Ibn Hayyan: Al-Matin: It is arguable 
that Ibn Hayyan was one of the greatest historians of 
Medieval Islam. Born into a civil service tradition in 
Cordova, he lived through the f itna and died in 469/5 
August 1076 - 24 July 1077. Ibn Bassam refers to his 'long 
History' and it is not clear whether his other work al- 
Muatabas, parts of which survive was meant to be a shorter 
version of his longer history. His work does not seem to 
have been simply a chronology, but also contained analysis 
of the events which he recorded. 
In the introduction to his main work (part of 
which is quoted by Ibn Bassam), he says that God, in the 
Holy Qurlan taught Man about past nations and their 
tribulations; the implication being that to pursue this art 
of relating history is to follow in a theological 
tradition. The introduction also touches on his concern 
for 'scholarship' in the pursuit of this art. 
Interestingly, he also states that not many scholars in 
his time or among those who preceded him pursued this art 
or regarded it highly. 35 
Ibn Bassam clearly stated that he relied on Ibn 
Hayyan's book for much of his historical material. 36 one 
35 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: part I, pp. 575-578. 
36 ibid: p. 18 
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can find sections of the al-Matin which were lifted by Ibn 
Bassam being quoted in the later history al-Bayan and even 
in Ibn al-Khatib's Almal al-Alvan. What does survive of 
Ibn Hayyan's work is impressive scholarly work, although 
his masterpiece, the al-Matin, seems lost, other than the 
sections which survive in al-Dhakhira. When using Ibn 
Bassam's quotations from Ibn Hayyan, I have tended to 
attribute them to the original author. 
Ibn Hayyan seems to have been among the earliest 
Muslim scholars to concentrate on the study of history; a 
tradition which was eventually established and found its 
most famous proponent in Ibn Khaldun. Because Ibn Hayyan 
saw history as a way of recording God's trials of Man, it 
is arguable that he tried to be f air in his reporting 
(although whether he succeeded is another matter) . one can 
see this in the way he describes the courage of Crispin in 
the siege of Barbastro for example. In any event, he was 
the most important scholar engaged in the recording of the 
history of the peninsula until his death at the beginning 
of the last quarter of the eleventh century. His work is 
valuable on two levels. It provides a contemporary account 
of many of the events in the Ta I if a century. Second, 
given his background, it also provides some insight into 
the political outlook and world view of Ta I ifa Spanish 
Muslims (or at least that of their educated elite) , and 
this helps redress the bias inherent in most of the later 
sources tackling the period (and often probably using Ibn 
Hayyan as the source of their information). While modern 
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historians have used Ibn Hayyan, much of his work is 
accessable only through quotes in much later histories. 
Again, the recent availability of al-Dhakhira allows one 
access to some of the earliest quotes from Ibn Hayyan's 
work. 
d) Ibn 'Idhari al-Marrakushi: Al-Bayan al-Mughrib: This is 
essentially a chronology of the western part of Islam meant 
to cover the period up to 667/10 September 1268 -30 August 
1269. It is a much later source, written primarily for a 
north African audience. Parts of this work were published 
in the 19th century by Dozy. Three volumes of the book 
were then edited and published by Ldvi-Provengal in 1948. 
Finally Huici Miranda published the last part in 1960. The 
edition used also contains a fragment of a history by an 
unknown author about the Cid in Valencia which quotes Ibn 
'Alqama as well as one dealing with the Talifa period 
generally. 
For a long time this work was the main source 
used f or the study of the period, as it relied on and 
quoted from earlier sources. However, its shortcomings as 
a source lay in the great time difference between its 
composition and the events in Spain in the C11, and in its 
essentially north African perspective. Although it has 
been superseded by al-Dhakhira with its quotations from Ibn 
Hayyan (and which was composed at the turn of the C11/C12) 
the al-Bavan retains its importance, partly because it set 
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out to be a chronicle. 
e) Ibn al Kardabus: Kitab al-lktifal fi Akhbar al-Khulafal: 
Ibn al-Kardabus lived in the second part of the C12. He 
used earlier sources for his history of Talifa Spain, but 
did not specify what these sources were. Mendndez Pidal 
believed that he used the lost work of Ibn 'Alqama, which 
would argue that his account of the history of the upper 
march and of Valencia is particularly valuable. 37 
f) Ibn Salid: Al-Muqhrib fi Hula al-Maqhrib: This is perhaps 
one of the most unusual books ever written in Muslim Spain. 
In 530/11 October 1135-28 September 1136, Abu Muhammad Ibn 
al-Hijari, a well known literary figure visited 'Abd al- 
Malik Ibn Salid's castle near Granada. He was then 
commissioned to write a book about the poets of Muslim 
Spain. Ibn Salid who commissioned the work, liked it so 
much that he himself added to it. The book was then added 
to by his two sons, by his grandson and by his great 
grandson. From start to finish, the -book took one hundred 
and fifty one years to complete. 
The book is divided into chapters (called books) 
each dealing with a particular city. Each city is then 
dealt with under the following headings, each heading 
37 Parts of this book has been recently edited: Historia de 
al-Andalus: ed. F. Maillo Salgado. Madrid, Akal, 1986. The 
edition used is the Arabic, published under the title Tarikh al- 
Andalus li Ibn al-Kardabus wa wasfihi li Ibn al-Shabbat. 
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corresponding to a part of a bride Is dress: al-Manassa 
dealing with the geography; al-Tai dealing with the 
governors or lords; al-Silk covering the notables, wazirs 
judges and clerks; al-Hulla: covering those people who were 
neither poets nor civil servants but who were important 
enough to be mentioned and finally the al-Ahdab covering. 
those engaged in the composition of the Jezel and 
Muwwashahat (forms of poetry) as well as men of wit. 
Clearly, not every city yielded enough subjects to fill all 
categories, so that in some cases a book looking at a city 
would only cover the first three topics. In terms of 
historical information, the book provides what seemed to 
be the accepted version of main events within the context 
of Muslim Spain. 
g) Al-Turtushi: Siraj al-Muluk: Al Turtushi who died in 
Alexandria in 520/ 27 January 1126-16 January 1127 was a 
scholar born and educated in the Talifa period who studied 
in Seville with some of the most famous scholars in Muslim 
Spain at the time such as Ibn Hazm and the Judge Abu-al- 
Walid al-Baji. 38 It would therefore be reasonable to 
assume that his views as well as his historical knowledge 
came from these sound and rather conservative scholars. 
His main book Siral al-Muluk was written after he had 
immigrated to the east in 476/21 May 1083-9 May 1084.39 
The historical material in it concerning Muslim Spain was 
38 Al-Turtushi: Kitab Siral al-Muluk, p. l. 
39 ibid. 
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that which was accepted and known by other scholars of the 
Talifa period. Unlike them, however, al-Turtushi was 
able to put down his opinions and knowledge freely without 
being influenced by the pressure of Muslim Spanish politics 
which would have influenced the works of scholars such as 
Ibn Bassam. The picture that al-Turtushi paints of Ibn 
Abi 'Amir is therefore particularly interesting. The work 
was completed in Fustat in Egypt on 14th Rajab 516/ 18th 
September 1122. 
The other Arabic sources used are well known and 
may be used in conjunction with the above main sources. In 
essence the first three of those listed above are the ones 
that have been used most extensively. Among the other 
sources used are Ibn Hazm's Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab and 
Nagt al-'Arus, Al-Hulal al Mawshivya by an unknown author, 
Ahmad al-'Udhrils Tarsil al-Akhbar, Ibn al-Abbar's al- 
Hulla al-Sivaral, Ibn al-Athir's al-Kamil fil Tarikh, Ibn 
Darraj Is anthology of poems or Diwan, Ibn al-Khatib Is 
Almal al-Allam, al-Marrakushils al-Mullib and Ibn Hawqal's 
Kitab Surat al-Ard. 
The main problem f or this study is the lack of 
extant sources dedicated to the history of particular city- 
states (the only exception, perhaps, being 'Abdullah's 
memoirs and which relate specifically to Granada). The 
texts that do survive from the period or later ones dealing 





Muslim Spain as a whole, touching on the various provinces 
only when these provinces interacted with the general 
schema of the history of the peninsula. Even al-Dhakhira 
which tries to cover the literary contribution of the 
different parts of Muslim Spain and which has within it 
elements of an historical work, tends to fall short in 
this respect, although it does provide some 'local' 
histories, but again, the book is a general work and 
these local accounts are brief and told within the context 
of the general history of Muslim Spain. 
one is therefore left with the situation where 
the general history of Cli Muslim Spain is fairly well 
documented in extant sources, but where the histories of 
provinces provide one with more of a problem. It is 
possible, however, to extract information about the 
history of these provinces by studying the general 
accounts, although this route is clearly far from 
satisfactory. 
It is perhaps significant that it appears that no 
lord of a city-state commissioned a work on his Talifa or 
its history (although it could simply be that such works 
did not survive). More importantly, perhaps, no attempt 
seems to have been made by a 'man of the pen' to write a 
history of a particular province. This may lead one to 
argue that in the minds of the educated elite, C11 Muslim 
Spain remained, despite its disintegration into city- 
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states, a single entity. 
From the perspective of this study, it means 
that information on Zaragoza and Valencia is available only 
when these states interacted with the more general events 
in the peninsula. Very little information survives about 
their 'internal' affairs, the inter-province relationship 
or even the exact mechanics of local government (no Muslim 
legal documents or deeds survive) . The information that is 
available is glimpsed through a window in more general 
works when these city-states are mentioned within a 
discussion of the general history of the period. 
A brief word should be said about the tradition 
in Islamic culture of copying and relaying information 
provided by earlier scholars. The origins of this 
tradition are rooted in the jurists' pre-occupation with 
preserving the sayings of the Prophet, Hadith, which 
formed, after the Qurlan, the second main source of 
religious law and conduct, al-Sunna. The Quraln, being 
the word of God, was in the eyes of these jurists, 
protected by God. The reports of the Hadith, however, 
had to be authenticated. For this reason a whole branch of 
investigative literature grew which dealt with the 
authenticity of each Hadith. The way in which a Hadith was 
authenticated was by tracing it back through the various 
people who related it to its original source, usually one 
of the Prophet's companions (the format would normally be: 
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I copied from so and so who copied from so and so who heard 
so and so say that he heard the Prophet say) . Hadiths were 
then divided into a spectrum with those which could be 
traced back via several different sources being the most 
accepted to ones which could only be traced back through 
one source which were treated with more caution. The 
relevance of this to the study of non-religious works is 
that this methodology of tracing the source spilled over 
into other forms of scholarship, so that in al-Dhakhira 
one often comes across the phrase "Ibn Hayyan" said (Oala 
Ibn Havyan). At the end of such a quote, one often finds 
the phrase "Here ends what Ibn Hayyan said" (Intaha Oawl 
Ibn Havyan) , or alternately the next phrase starts "So and 
So said". This format was followed in later sources, so 
that one can often, but not always, determine the earlier 
source or sources used by later authors. Interestingly, 
this pre-occupation with setting down the pedigree of what 
was being related continued to be expressed as if it were 
a recording of an oral tradition in the manner of the study 
of the Hadith, even when the medium was clearly the 
written word, so that, for example, the very beginning 
of the surviving manuscripts of al-Dhakhira start with the 
phrase 
Abu al-Hassan Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini 
al-Andalusi, 
40 
May God have mercy on him, 
said (Oala): 
one can therefore argue that in Muslim scholarly tradition, 
the reference to oral sources should not be seen as 
40 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, part I, p. 11. 
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secondary to written sources. If anything, it reflects a 
greater concern f or authenticating the related material 
(although that does mean that such a process necessarily 
resulted in an accurate account). 
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1- Before the fitna 
I Introduction 
This thesis is mainly concerned with two Talifa 
states, those of Valencia and Zaragoza. Although the 
independent rulers that emerged over the different states of 
Muslim Spain in the f ifth century A. H. /eleventh century A. D. 
are collectively known as Muluk al-Tawalif, or party Kings 
(talifa meaning party and malik often translated as meaning 
king) , it would be clearer for 
the purposes of this study to 
divide them into two rough categories. On the one hand, 
there are those rulers who reigned over cities that evolved by 
roughly mid-century into centres of power. As discussed in 
the introduction, one can call these either governors 
(although they held their of f ice independently from any higher 
authority) or perhaps more accurately lords, and their 
domains city-states. Examples of such city-states include 
Zaragoza and Valencia in the upper march, Toledo in the 
central march, Badajoz in the lower march, Seville, Cordova 
and Granada in the south. On the other hand, there are 
those rulers who reigned over cities and provinces that were 
clearly in the sphere of influence of the greater states. 
Properly speaking these cities belonged to the AI mal, that is 
the area, including lesser towns, under the control of a 
major city of the greater city-states. The rulers of such 
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lesser cities, although belonging to Muluk al-Tawalif were 
more akin in terms of real power to governors than to lords. 
These are referred to as lesser lords or simply as rulers of 
a particular city. There were also cities which did not 
conform to the clear cut definition above, falling somewhere 
in between these two broad types. Such were the city-states 
that were at times independent and at other times within the 
sphere of influence of larger city-states, even after the 
larger states had established themselves by the second half of 
the century. Among these in the upper march was Ldrida, 
which will be examined later in the context of Zaragoza. A. 
study of the states of Valencia and Zaragoza has to look not 
only at the major cities, but also the lesser cities within 
the Almal, as well as the neighbouring states. 
The major Tawalif established themselves in cities 
and extended their control into the countryside and neighbour- 
ing lesser towns. A rather unusual characteristic of this 
structure, though, was that a particular party-state did not 
have to originate in the city in which it established itself 
but might move in from elsewhere. Examples of this include 
the Bani-Hud who were in L6rida and in 1039 took over Zarag- 
oza, 41 and the Bani-Ziri, who were recent immigrants from 
North Africa, brought over by Ibn Abi 'Amir to form part of 
his standing army in the three decades prior to the f itna, 
and who established themselves f irst in Elbira and then in 
41 The Hudid takeover of Lerida and their later move to 
Zaragoza will be looked at in Chapter 3. A description of this 
part of their career is in Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan: vol. 3, pp. 221- 
222. 
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42 Granada. The cities controlled the Almal, and the centre 
of each state was clearly the city. A takeover of another 
state involved taking over the major city which brought the 
victor control over the Almal. It must be kept in mind, 
however, that the Almal formed the economic foundation of a 
state, hence the majority of inter-Ta I ifa wars involved raids 
on these Almal. Examples of conquest involving the takeover 
of major cities in the fifth century A. H. / eleventh 
century A. D. include the conquest of Cordova by the Bani- 
'Abbad of Seville in 462/20 October 1069 -8 October 1070.43 
1.2 Geographical Background 
The two states with which this thesis is concerned 
44 lie in areas of differing geographical formation. These 
differences influenced to some extent the political role of 
these cities immediately prior to, and during, the Talifa 
period. In a general sense, Muslim Spain's frontier with 
the Christian north was along three main thughur (singular 
thaghr), or marches. The upper march centred around 
Zaragoza, the central march around Toledo and the lower march 
centred around Badajoz. Prior to the fitna, the evidence 
suggests that the thugur were centred around Zaragoza, 
42 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Kitab al-Tibyan, describes the Zirid 
immigration to Muslim Spain pp. 16-17. He also describes the Zirid 
move from Elbira to Granada pp. 21-22. 
43 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: Part I, pp. 610-611. 
44 See Maps (A) and (B) above. 
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Medinaceli (also in the north of Spain) and Toledo. 45 
However, it seems that during the fitna Badajoz emerged as a 
centre of a march in its own right46 while Medinaceli lost 
its importance. Ibn Hayyan, refers to Badajoz as the thaghr 
of the West of al-Andalus. 47 
The most obvious geographical difference between 
Zaragoza and Valencia is that Zaragoza is further north. Its 
Almal which formed the upper march were the northernmost 
Muslim settlements in the peninsula. The Zaragozan march 
occupied the Ebro basin. This forms a more or less 
triangular shape (see map A) bordered by the Pyrenees in the 
north, the Iberian mountains in the west and south, and the 
Catalan hills in the east. The triangle of the basin comes 
to a point in the north-west where the Pyrenees approach the 
Iberian mountains, the widest area being in the east where 
the Catalan hills nearly join the Iberian mountains. 
The basin is isolated from the Mediterranean coastal 
plain by the Catalan hills, except for a gorge where the Ebro 
forces its way between them and the Iberian mountains, and 
where Tortosa is situated. The northernmost borders of the 
zaragozan province were where the Pyrenees came down in 
gradual steps. There Huesca and the fort of Barbastro were 
situated. The Ebro basin itself is not simply one lowland 
area, but properly speaking two. An upper portion, roughly 
45 Prieto y Vives: Los Reves de Taifas: p. 42. 
46 ibid p. 51. 
47 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: al-Dhakhira, Part II, p. 650. 
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af ifth of the area is on a higher level, averaging 1100 
feet, and a lower portion on a lower level averaging 750 
feet. The two sections meet near Tudela where the valley is 
greatly constricted. Despite the general lowland charac- 
teristics of the Ebro valley it does not offer good facilities 
for easy movement. The fertile soil in the valley is along 
the flood plain of the Ebro, the rest being steppe-like and 
with severely restricted vegetation. 
The valley has two main fertile areas. The most 
important is in a narrow ravine belt around Zaragoza and 
stretching along the Ebro to the valley of Jalon in the west. 
This area has been irrigated since Roman times. The second 
most important fertile area is near the city of Ldrida where 
the rivers Cinca, Noguera and Segre floW. 48 Away from the 
fertile areas or huertas (gardens) the climate is scorched in 
the summer and often frozen by bleak winds in the winter. 
The overall geographical picture of the march, 
then, is that of a rough steppe hemmed in by mountains with 
communication within the area being difficult. This would 
affect the ability of the main city in its attempts at 
controlling the Almal. The climate is harsher than in the 
south, with the f ertile area concentrated mostly in two 
areas, near Zaragoza and near Ldrida. This may help explain 
why these two cities developed into being the main centres of 
48 For a good description of the geographical characteristics 
of the area see W. B. Fisher & H. Bowen-Jones: Spain: A Geographical 
Background. Also of interest is Naval Intelligence Division: Spain 
& Portuqal. This book was prepared as part of the war effort and 
therefore the description of the geography of the area around 
Zaragoza and Valencia was made with a military use in mind. 
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power in the region. It is also worth noting that Zaragoza 
with its wider belt of fertile land was the more dominant 
political centre of the two. The march's lines of 
communication southwards towards the rest of Muslim Spain were 
made difficult by the Iberian mountains. An alternative 
route, the sea route, was made difficult by the Catalan 
hills, so that the only viable access to the sea was via the 
Ebro through Tortosa. Al-Idrisi in his 'Geography' mentions 
this link. 49 However, the difficult terrain within the 
province, combined with the mountainous terrain which 
surrounded it on all sides, combined to create a natural 
defence against any military advances from the south as well 
as from the north. 
As a whole, the province seems to have been 
underpopulated, at least at the turn of the 10/11 century. 
Ibn 'Idhari, quoting Ibn Hayyan records how 'Abd al-Malik Ibn 
Abi 'Amir (1002-1008) 50 son and successor to al-Mansur, 
on his first campaign'north against the fort Hisn of 
Mommagastre de Meya, in the province of Barcelona, " having 
besieged and taken the fort offers his troops the choice of 
settling in that area promising each a hearth, land to plough 
and two dinars per month. 52 That such an offer was made to 
49 al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p. 191. 
50 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, pp. 3-7. 
51 J. Vallve identif ies the fort mentioned by Ibn I Idhari and 
contends that although it was loyal to the County of Barcelona, it 
belonged geographically to the Almal of Lerida: La Agricultura en 
la EsT)afia Musulmana: p. 231. 
52 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 7. 
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the troops suggests very strongly that there were not enough 
settlers in nearby Ldrida to move into the vacated area. 
That the offer was so generous (a monthly salary plus a house 
and land) suggests that the area was not very tempting. This 
is hardly surprising considering its difficult terrain and the 
close proximity to the hostile border. One would assume that 
some soldiers took up the offer. As for the population of 
the main cities of Zaragoza and Ldrida we have no concrete 
evidence of size. Vicens Vives accepts Torres Balbas' 
estimate of 17,000 for the population of Zaragoza at the 
turn of the century, which is based on the walled area of the 
medieval city. 53 This figure is, at best, an educated 
guess, and we can only make a reasonable assumption that the 
population of Ldrida was probably less than that of Zaragoza. 
The second point to be made about the population of 
the upper march concerns its ethnic make-up. Vallve believed 
that the march was populated mainly by Spanish MUSliMS'54 
that is to say indigenous Spaniards who had converted to Islam 
at some earlier stage. It is noteworthy that f or a long time 
after the Muslim conquest, the upper march was ruled by the 
Bani Oasi (Oasi being an Arabisation of Cassius5s) who were 
members of the indigenous aristocracy. The time of the 
53 Jaime Vicens Vives: An Economic History of Spain, p. 106. 
R. Fletcher in The Quest for El Cid, p. 20 puts the population at 
12,000-15,000. 
54 U. Vallve: La Agricultura en la Espafia Musulmana, p. 232. 
55 J. F. O'Callaghan believes that the banu Qasi were descend- 
ants of Fortun, the son of Count Casius, A History of Medieval 
Spain, p. 112., while R. Collins is more cautious, Early Medieval 
Spain, p. 180. 
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conversion of the majority of the population is hard to 
discover. The Bulliet method of tracing conversions by 
looking up the first generation to have used Arab names and 
assuming that that represented second generation Muslims 
founders in Muslim Spain as there is some evidence that 
Christians used Arabic names without converting. There were 
also, of course, members of the Arab aristocracy (or those 
claiming to belong to it) descended from those who arrived 
with the Muslim conquest in the first century A. H. /eighth 
century A. D. There also seems to have been a considerable 
population of Jews, in parts of the province. Al-Idrisi 
records that Tarragona was a city of Jews along with a few 
Christian Rum. 56 There also seems to have been a Christian 
or Mozarab population which had not converted, but which 
preferred to remain in the province despite the close 
proximity of the Christian domains. This can be seen in the 
above mentioned example in al-Idrisi, as well as in at least 
one legal document involving the Christian population. 57 
Among other things, the document shows a certain amount of 
legal independence given to the Christian population, which 
would suggest that the population was large enough for the 
Muslim authorities to court its loyalty. It also shows 
members of this population adopting Arabic names suggesting 
that these Mozarabs felt integrated into Zaragozan society. 
56 Al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p. 191. 
57 R. Collins, 'Visigothic Law and Regional Custom in Disputes 
in Early Medieval Spain, in Davies and Fouracre ed: Settlement of 
Disputes, pp. 96-97. 
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other examples of Christians adopting Arab names without 
converting include a Bishop, with the singularly Muslim name 
of 'Abd al-Malik, who had a translation of canon Law into 
Arabic dedicated to him in 1049-1050,58 as well as C10 
Mozarab immigrants to Castile and whose Arab names are 
reflected in the surviving latin versions such as the monk of 
Berlangas called Abogaleb . 
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Perhaps this mixture of ethnic groups, as well as 
the dominance of the Spanish Muslims in the province, along 
with the close proximity of Christian domains, helps explain 
the apparently more tolerant attitude in the north to Dhimmi 
(non-Muslim) communities. This was reflected in the ease 
with which military commanders in the march employed Christian 
troops. It was also reflected in the fact that following 
the upheavals of the early years of the fitna in Cordova, 
part of the Jewish population of that city chose to emigrate 
to Zaragoza, 60 and reached a rather sizeable community of 
1200 . 
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In contrast to Zaragoza, Valencia was not a march 
(although al-Idrisi describes it as a base Oalida among the 
bases of al-AndalUS62) and as such did not suf f er f rom the 
close proximity to potentially hostile Christian domains. 
58 R. Fletcher, The Quest For El Cid, p. 52. 
59 ibid. p. 60. 
60 E. Ashtor: The Jews of Muslim Spain: Vol. 2, p. 238. 
61 ibid., p. 254. 
62 Al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p. 192. 
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The city itself was situated about three miles from the 
sea. 63 The Almal of Valencia occupied a crescent shaped 
coastal plain facing the sea (see Map B) . It is bordered from 
the north by the Iberian mountains, except in the north-east 
where the coastal plain continues past where the Ebro forces 
its way to the sea and then onwards east of the Catalan hills. 
In the west it is bordered by the edge of the central Meseta. 
In the south it is bordered by the Betic Cordillera, also 
known as the Andalusian highlands, which are an irregular 
series of mountain ridges. In the south-east the coastal 
plain continues south in a narrow wedge where Denia and 
Alicante are situated, then on to where it opens up into the 
plain around Murcia. Finally, the Valencian Almal were 
bordered by the sea from the east. 
This crescent-shaped plain bordered by hill country 
is, properly speaking, part of the levant, the extreme 
north-east of the Valencian plain being the edge of southern 
Spain. It is a lowland, with the characteristics of lowlands 
as regards easy communication, - unlike the Ebro basin. 
moreover, it is a very fertile plain being irrigated by the 
streams of Mijarras and the rivers of Palencia, Mogro, 
Turia, Jucar (with its tributary the Cabriel) and Serpis. 
Inland north and south of Valencia there is a zone of continu- 
ous cultivation extending some fifty miles where the soil is 
black and rich. The province of Valencia also has the 
63 ibid. For a good guess at the description of the city at 
the end of the century see R. Fletcher: The Quest for El Cid, 
pp. 166-171. 
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advantage of a favourable climate. The summers are cooler than 
those of the south, while the winters are almost as mild, 
and warmer than those of the neighbouring Ebro. The rainfall 
is not abundant, but is more evenly spread throughout the 
year, no month being entirely without rain. 
These ideal conditions contributed to making 
Valencia a prosperous province. The fertility of the plain 
ensured rich harvests, while the easy communication routes 
north and south as well as seaward made Valencia ideally 
placed for trade. Moreover, although the crescent-shaped 
province is bordered by highlands from its western side, it 
is not as cut of f westward as one might believe at f irst 
glance. The valleys of the Jucar and of its tributary, the 
Cabriel provided access from the central Maseta, while the 
valley of the Turia provided access down f rom the Iberian 
mountains. In general then, the Valencian Almal were rich, 
bordered, but not cut off, by highlands, with the coastal 
plain extending north and south. In peacetime'this would 
ensure a prosperous economy based on the export of native 
produce 64 and on the prof its made because of the province Is 
position as a crossroads f or trade routes running from the 
north-east to the south-east of Muslim Spain and f rom the 
central Maseta to the sea. The terrain gave the province a 
degree of protection but did not detract f rom its acces- 
sibility, unlike the terrain of the Ebro basin. In politi- 
64 For a brief discussion of the agricultural base of Valencia 
see A. Huici Miranda: Historia Musulmana de Valencia v su Reqi6n, 
Vol. 1, pp. 58-61. 
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cal terms, this along with the province's relatively close 
proximity to Cordova insured that its governors were not too 
independent f rom the wishes of the government there. Nor was 
there a need to keep Valencia well fortified; by the early 
part of the eleventh century A. D. the city Is fortif ications 
needed repair. 
one would assume that such ideal conditions made for 
a well-populated province. There is no direct evidence to 
support this, but then, unlike the upper march, there is no 
evidence to the contrary. There is, however, the point 
that the population of the city of Valencia was not very 
large. Vicens Vives quotes Torres Balbas in estimating the 
population of Valencia at the turn of the eleventh century 
A. D. at 15,500.65 Is one to assume, then, that since the 
population of the city of Valencia was less than that of 
Zaragoza, the population of the province of Valencia as a 
whole was less than that of Zaragoza as a whole? Keeping in 
mind the difference in the geography of the provinces, an 
argument can be made that ta smaller population of the city of 
Valencia does not lead to such a conclusion. The geography of 
the Ebro basin would suggest a high concentration of 
population around Zaragoza and another less dense 
concentration around Ldrida. The majority of the rest of the 
, 
65 J. Vicens Vives: An Economic History of Spain, p 106. 
R. Fletcher The Quest for El Cid, p. 20. estimates the population of 
Valencia at 15,000-20,000. It has to be said that both Fletcher's 
numbers and those quoted in Vicens Vives are no more than educated 
guesses. I tend to agree with Vicens Vives I guess, if only because 
the general f eel of the evidence seems to suggest that Zaragoza was 
a bigger and more important city than Valencia. 
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province's population would be settled along the banks of the 
Ebro. Given the political geography of the province, that 
is, its position as a frontier and its close proximity to 
potentially hostile Christian states, one can also reasonably 
assume that outside the two main cities, the majority of the 
population lived near fortified towns or castles. 
on the other hand, the province of Valencia did not 
suffer from such political or geographical handicaps. The 
province as a whole was rich and fertile, with the most 
fertile area within fifty miles of the city of Valencia. 
However, unlike the Ebro basin, agricultural communities 
could settle along the banks of several rivers. Moreover, 
because of the province's political geography, that is, its 
relative protection from direct hostilities, settlers did not 
have to be concentrated in the shadow of major cities, 
fortified towns or castles. In other words, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the relatively low population of 
the city of Valencia reflected a pattern of relatively higher 
population dispersion within the province, rather than a 
lower overall population, compared with that of the Zaragozan 
province. 
If one accepts the probability that the population 
of the province of Valencia was at least as great as that of 
the province of Zaragoza, possibly greater, but more widely 
dispersed within the province, a question relevant to this 
study comes to mind. Which of the two provinces could 
produce a higher percentage of males with military experience? 
on one level, it would be reasonable to assume that Zaragoza 
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because of its role as a march under constant threat of attack 
from the hostile Christian states would have, not only men 
skilled at warfare in the employ of the commanders of the 
cities, fortified towns and castles recruited locally, but 
also that the average male member of the population would have 
been more skilled with weapons than one from the more pro- 
tected south. In general, some of the male population of 
Muslim Spain tried to join as volunteers Mutawwala 66 at 
least once a lifetime to perform the duty of Jihad, but it 
seems likely that because of the constant raids from the 
north, an average male living in the march found himself 
involved in military situations more often than one from the 
south. 
There is evidence to suggest that some of the 
settlers in the upper march in the final decades of the tenth 
century A. D. and f irst decade of the eleventh, were ex- 
soldiers. There is the case of the soldiers of fered a 
hearth, land and two dinars a month referred to above. 
There is also the case of the army of the Slav commander 
Ghalib stationed at Medinaceli which was defeated by that of 
Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir in 370/17 July 980 -6 July 981.67 
66 Evidence for people joining as Mutawwala can be seen in 
'Abdullah ibn Ziri, Kitab al-Tibyan, p. 17 when he mentions that Ibn 
Abi 'Amir abolished the system, substituting a tax for the 
religious duty instead. Later in the century, the letter by Ibn al- 
Qusayra describing the battle of al-Zallaqa (Ibn Bassam al- 
Dhakhira, part II, pp. 241-244) clearly shows that he, despite being 
a civil servant, had participated in the battle (suffering a small 
wound). One assumes that he had joined because it was a jihad 
rather than because it was expected of ministers to undertake 
fighting duties. 
67 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan: Vol. 2, pp. 378-379. 
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It would be reasonable to assume that some of the survivors 
would have chosen to remain as settlers in the area in which 
they were stationed. Some would have remained at Medinaceli, 
others would have settled in Calatayud further north or 
possibly in Guadilajara southwards. 
In general terms one would assume that the Zaragozan 
province had a higher percentage of men skilled in the use of 
arms than southern provinces. / Presumably, this may help 
explain why Zaragoza found it easy to put effective armies in 
the field in the first two decades of the eleventh 
century A. D. 
Valencia, on the other hand, probably had a lower 
percentage of its male population skilled in warfare. There 
were the volunteers referred to above, but a Muslim male who 
joined the professional soldiers of the Caliphate in an 
expedition to perform a once in a lifetime religious duty 
(rather like pilgrimage) would probably not have gained much 
military skill during his short service. Moreover, those 
living in the province of Valencia did not feel as threatened 
as those living in the province of Zaragoza; nor were they 
subjected to the raids constantly suffered by the Zaragozans. 
So that while f or the average Zaragozan male volunteering for 
military duty would have been at times a necessity, and the 
acquisition of military skills important for survival, for an 
average valencian male fighting was a non-urgent duty 
performed, perhaps, once a lifetime for religious purposes, 
and not linked with the pressure of living in direct 
confrontation with the enemy. However, even this limited 
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experience in military training was denied them with the 
introduction of the so-called military reforms by Muhammad Ibn 
Abi 'Amir. He decreed that the people of Muslim Spain would 
68 be excused from volunteering, effectively abolishing any 
form of militia and denying the population of the non-march 
provinces any form of military experience. 69 This, presumab- 
ly, would help explain why the people of Valencia acquired a 
reputation in the eleventh century A. D. for military feeble- 
ness, exhibited on such occasions as the battle of Baterna, 
which will be discussed later. 
1.3 The province's relations with Cordova: I: Theory 
Whatever the historical reality of the nature and 
the reasons leading to the disintegration of Umayyad power in 
the peninsula, it is clear from the writings of Ibn Hayyan 
that for the educated Spanish Muslims, there existed in their 
minds a period, or even an ideal, of a legitimate govern- 
mental structure prior to the fitna, and more generally, 
prior to the period when Ibn Abi 'Amir was in power. They saw 
the changes forced on this system as leading to the calamities 
of the fitna and the ensuing disintegration of the state. It 
is also clear that in the turbulent period during and fol- 
lowing the fitna those involved in the political arena, 
68 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 17. 
69 Huici Miranda argues that the province had (Ribats) , manned by volunteers, and which were abolished by the 'Amirids. Historia 
Musulmana de Valencia v su Regi6n, vol. l, p. 145. 
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whether on the level of governors or even civil servants, 
were not clear of the parameters of the new political frame- 
work which was evolving in the peninsula, responding to 
events in a reactive manner. However, there was a constant 
attempt to place their relations with one another (on an inter 
city-state and intra provincial basis) as well as the founda- 
tion for their authority within each city-state, within the 
bounds of a political framework, or system of government, 
which could be understood and accepted by them and which was 
based, in part, on their understanding of what the pre 
'Amirid system of government consisted of. 
This has two important implications. First, in 
their relations with central authority, whether in the midst 
of the f itna or later in response to the advent of the 
Almoravids, the various lords of the provinces tried to 
define this relationship with reference to what they believed 
to have been the norm prior to the collapse of the Caliphate 
(although this ideal of a governmental system might not have 
existed in reality) . In the case of Zaragoza, the treaty 
which will be looked at below might be seen to represent only 
a reflection of the results of a particular confrontation with 
central authority. However, this treaty provides the basis 
of what can be seen as the ideal, or the theory, governing 
the relations between the provinces and Cordova in the minds 
of the civil servants who formulated it, and the protagonists 
who required it. The provinces and the Caliphate may not have 
adhered to such parameters, but there was a belief in the C11 
that such theoretical boundaries forged under the Caliphate in 
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the C10 f ormed the basis of legitimate government. Even after 
the state disintegrated into a collection of city-states, the 
theoretical framework for the relationship between Cordova and 
its provinces would have provided the basis on which the newly 
emerging city-states would have liked to develop their 
relationship with their AI mal, although whether such theories 
were ever put into practice under the Caliphate or within 
city-states is a matter for debate. 
Secondly, because the Spanish Muslims came to 
believe that such an ideal existed under the Caliphate, they 
tended to respond with antagonism to changes made to the 
Umayyad system. As will be discussed later, an argument can 
be made that for the f irst three decades of the C11, the 
peninsula was trying to revert to what it believed to be the 
legitimate Umayyad system. One could even argue that the 
f ailure to bring about this reversal resulted in a general 
disillusionment which added to the sense of chaos and division 
which characterised the period. 
The main point to be made, however, is that this 
theoretical framework of government and the adverse changes 
which Spanish Muslims believed were introduced by Ibn Abi 
'Amir (and which will be looked at in the following chapter) 
formed a very important part of the political outlook of those 
in power throughout the C11. It is therefore useful to 
examine in some detail this system of government as they 
believed it had existed as well as the events which they 
believed had led to its collapse. This dictates, however, 
that one looks at a period which properly speaking precedes 
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that of this study. 
The geographical positions of both the province of 
Valencia and that of Zaragoza coupled with the political 
connotations of these positions were among the important 
factors that helped shape the relations of these provinces 
with Cordova. The relationship between the government in 
Cordova and the provinces influenced to some degree the way in 
which the various provinces evolved into independent city- 
states during the collapse of the government in Cordova at the 
end of the 'Amirid dictatorship -a period which the people of 
Muslim Spain called al-fitna. In particular, it is useful 
to look at the way in which the relationship between Zaragoza 
and the Cordovan government differed from that between 
Valencia and the Cordovan government during the reigns of the 
three Caliphs preceding the collapse: those of al-Nasir, al- 
Hakam and Hisham al-Mulayyed. 
In general, the government in Cordova did not 
practise direct control over the provinces, although its 
civil service seems to have been developed enough to deal with 
a fair amount of direct rule. However, the Caliphs lacked 
the other essential tool that would have helped them exercise 
constant direct control over the provinces: the Cordovan 
government did not have a large standing army. Ibn Hawqal, 
the merchant-turned-traveller who visited Muslim Spain during 
the reign of al-Nasir, found the people of that country 
lacking in strength, courage and horsemanship as well as 
having weak characters and intellect. He expressed surprise 
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that they retained control over their land. 70 In his book, 
Kitab Surat al-Ard, he concludes that the Muslims in Spain 
conducted their war with trickery and cunning (al-Kaid wal 
Hila). He also expresses surprise that the Caliph kept only 
five thousand horsemen in his pay, thus putting himself at 
the mercy of the lords of the marches (Ashab al-thugur) for 
warding off the Christians (al-Rum) . 
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This standing army, or rather palatine guard, was 
mostly made up according to Ibn Hayyan from Slav Saalab 
72 slaves. Their duties included guarding the Caliph in his 
palace-city, although there are suggestions that the city 
itself was in part policed by the men of the wazir Sahib al- 
Medina, best translated as governor of the city, as well as 
those of Sahib al-shurta (not to be confused with the modern 
Arabic meaning of I shurta I which is police) whose men kept 
public order and meted out punishment for civilian crimes. 73 
There are suggestions that these latter, among other duties, 
carried out the nastier punishments ordered by the Caliph such 
as the crucifying of the senior officers whom al-Nasir blamed 
for the disastrous campaign of Ramadan-Shawwal 327/July - 
August 939 against Galicia. 74 
70 Ibn Hawqal: Kitab Surat al-Ard: p. 104. 
71 ibid. pp. 108-109. His use of the word Rum to describe the 
Christians is a reflection of the fact that he was from the east 
where it was in common usage. 
72 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 61. 
73 For a brief study of the Shurta in al-Andalus, see IAvi- 
Provengal, Histoire 1'Espaigne Musulmane, Vol. 1, p. 259. 
74 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Mucitabas: vol V: pp. 445-446. 
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Besides their duty as a palatine guard, the Slav 
corps was used by the Caliph to exert pressure and bring into 
line rebellious governors by mounting military expeditions 
against them - the most famous rebel of the period being Ibn 
Hafsun in his fort of Bobastro. Moreover, the Slav corps 
were formed into the nucleus of the expeditions which the 
Caliph conducted against the Christian states in the north to 
weaken them and maintain the defence of the marches. To this 
nucleus was added the corps of volunteers joining to perform 
the duty of Jihad, and more importantly (from the Caliph's 
point of view) the experienced military contingents from the 
marches. 
Clearly, the Slav corps could not deal with all 
these duties at once. The Caliph had to tackle each problem 
separately. Nor could the Caliphs, in the early part of the 
tenth century, spare an army to be permanently posted in the 
marches to protect the realm. When trying to subdue rebels 
within Muslim Spain, al-Nasir had to rely on the frontier 
lords to protect his borders. It was quite common for these 
lords to rebel themselves and form alliances with their 
Christian neighbours. When the Caliph was in the march 
forcing the march lords to join his expeditions against the 
Christian states, the rebels in the south often re-declared 
their rebellion. Hence Ibn Hawqalls comment that the Caliph 
relied on the lords of the thuqur for the defence of Muslim 
Spain. The limited size of the Caliphal army may also help 
explain why the Caliphs preferred to reach some form of 
negotiated peace with the rebels even when they seemed to have 
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the upper hand militarily. Examples of this include the 
negotiated peace al-Nasir concluded with Omar Ibn Hafsun - 
despite the rebel's notorious record- in 303/17 July 915 -4 
July 916 75. They also include the peace al-Nasir forced 
on Muhammad Ibn Hashim al-Tujibi, lord of Zaragoza, after a 
long siege of the city in Muharram 326/November 937 76. The 
government in Cordova knew that it could rule its most distant 
provinces only with these provinces' active consent. 
Because al-Nasir had a standing army of only five thousand 
horsemen, he needed to reach a form of accommodation with the 
lord of Zaragoza. The caliphate did not possess the means to 
garrison permanently the rebellious province. Zaragoza 
offered the Caliphate additional difficulties which will be 
examined later. 
The treaty drawn up at the end of the above men- 
tioned siege, and quoted in full by Ibn Hayyan in his book 
al-Muqtabas, of fers a very good picture of what the political 
relationship between Cordova and the provinces entailed, at 
least in theory. Much of the document is concerned with 
offering safe conduct (Aman) to Muhammad Ibn Hashim and his 
followers and with the implementation of this specific truce 
(that Muhammad was to leave Zaragoza for a period, that he 
was to present himself in Cordova and that he was to surrender 
hostages for his continued loyalty). However, within the 
document are clauses defining the services that Muhammad owed 
75 ibid: pp. 112-116. 
76 ibid: pp. 404-406. 
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the Caliph and what the Caliph owed in return. Some of these 
services are specific to Zaragoza as a centre of a march and 
will be looked at later in the context of the specific 
relationship between Zaragoza and Cordova. Other services 
were more general and would probably have been demanded by the 
Caliph from all the provinces. Starting with the second of 
these services, the document reads: 
And that he (Muhammad Ibn Hashim] is to 
deliver the tax revenue (j ibaya) collected 
f rom his district (baladih) at the time it is 
due (bimahalliha), " and is not to withhold 
it beyond its due date, nor is he to deduct 
from its full value (literally Inumberl(lada- 
duha) ], with the exception of the tax revenue 
of an [single] inviolable year which is to be 
withheld, because of what he and the people 
(basit) suffered from the anger (malarrat) of 
the army and the restriction in the payment of 
allowances. Then he is to deliver it after 
the end of the year, complete in full (kamila 
muwaffara), without (the need for] an embassy 
to remind him, nor an agent to exercise 
pressure on him, except for a written 
communication if he were the governor ('Amil) 
or to his son if the Prince of the Faithful 
sees [fit] to use him [as governor]. 
Nor is he (Muhammad Ibn Hashim] to 
harbour (in his province] a freeman rebelling 
8 against (nazil), f nor a slave who is a 
fugitive from, the Prince of the Faithful or 
any of his subjects. And he (Muhammad Ibn 
Hashim) is to arrest whomsoever he should 
capture from this category (tabaaah) and send 
him back to his (rightful) place. 
77 Ibn Mandhur: From the verb Halala. Mahal al-Dain meant the 
time for the repayment of a debt. 
78 Ibn Mandhur records several meanings of the term. A common 
one was immigrant, f rom which the medieval Spanish word enaciado is 
derived. However, given the drive to populate the upper march and 
the tone of the text it seems unlikely that this was the intended 
meaning. A less common usage, but one also recorded by Ibn Mandhur, 
was to 'fight against', which I have opted for. 
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Nor is he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] to 
persecute any over whom [his lordship] is 
recorded (sujJila lahu lalavh) or will be 
recorded in future, who fought against him 
(Muhammad] alongside the Prince of the 
Faithful, having abandoned him [Muhammad] for 
him (the Caliph], in his days of loyalty to 
him (the Caliph], during the days of his 
[Muhammad's] rebellion. 9 
And he (Muhammad Ibn Hashim) is to renew his 
allegiance (baila) to the Prince of the 
Faithful, and keep by its conditions and be 
faithful in his obedience to him [the Caliph] 
and give [the allegiance] its full due. 
And he (Muhammad] is to undertake raids with 
the Prince of the Faithful, becoming an enemy 
of whomsoever he (the Caliph] becomes an enemy 
to, and make peace with whomsoever he [the 
Caliph) makes peace with, [whether they be] 
lords [literally people who reign 
(ahl al-mulk)] or others. 80 And he [Muham- 
mad] will withdraw his favours (literally cut 
his share (yaqtal nasibahu)] from any who 
lifts his hand against his [the Caliph's] 
obedience, even if it were his (Muhammad's] 
son or brother, adhering to all that the 
Prince of the Faithful holds him to, in his 
manifest speech and hidden will. Nor will he 
[Muhammad] lessen [by] interpretation the 
desired [end], nor will he deviate from 
reform by [giving] excuses (ie Muhammad is not 
to escape his obligations through a 
reinterpretation or because of a technical 
defect of drafting). The Prince of the 
Faithful has bound (himself] in settling what 
Muhammad asks from that (covenant], and makes 
it a duty upon himself, with -his [Muhammad's] 
attainment of this position with honest obedi- 
ence, to give him in governorship (vuwal- 
ivahu) the city of Zaragoza together with all 
the benefits accruing to him in his record 
(sillil) [this might refer to Muhammad's 
rights over the Almal], permanently, nor is 
79 The Arabic in this paragraph is awkward but I have tried to 
keep to a literal translation. 
80 Ahl al-Mulk presents a problem. It could be argued that 
since one only made peace with acknowledged constitutional units 
(by necessity ruled by lords) this phrase referred to those within 
the Caliphal realm as opposed to Muslims living outside it, 
possibly in the marph areas. 
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he (Muhammad] to be deposed from it in his 
lifetime (literally length of his days]. 
Then he (the Caliph] will not reproach him 
(Muhammad] with a fault, nor is he [the 
Caliph] to hold against him [Muhammad] the 
committing of a crime, whether as a result of 
a mistake or intentionally, nor will he (the 
Caliph] lend an ear to the sayings of a secret 
enemy or the stabbing of an envier. 
And he (the Caliph] is to make that (the 
treaty] a will for those that come after him, 
forcing them to maintain it (literally to stop 
at it (yaqifu 'alayha)], in the manner of 
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the 
Caliphs in their past eras, God willing. 
It is clear from this document that the foremost 
concern of the government in Cordova (keeping in mind that the 
first clause concerns Zaragoza specifically, and will be 
looked at below) was revenue. The Cordovan government could 
not control the provinces beyond sending out governors (in the 
case of the nearer cities)-or appointing a local man (in the 
case of the more distant cities). However, the Caliphate 
needed the revenue from all its provinces. The document does 
not specify the percentage of the total tax collected to be 
sent to Cordova, suggesting that such a percentage had been 
agreed, which in turn might suggest that such a percentage 
representing the share of central government was well known 
and accepted. In the case of non-march provinces, sending 
the tax revenue to the Cordovan government must have been the 
most positive aspect of their loyalty. Within the city and 
its Almal, the governor seem to have had complete control. 
He would not have had a large chancery such as the one in 
81 ibid. pp. 406-407. [] contain words added to make the text 
clearer. 
79 
Cordova, but a smaller one to help him run the province, 
possibly headed (as in the case of Zaragoza in this period) by 
a chief clerk Katib. 82 In the case of the march provinces the 
governors would have command over an armed corps (the ease 
with which they could raise a fighting force and the need to 
guard the border and fortify the various castles strongly 
implies the existence of such a force as well as later 
evidence relating to the 'Amirid period), and in that of the 
southern provinces, over city watchmen. The Caliphate, by 
and large, left the governors to their own devices in running 
the provinces. At times, a governor was deposed and another 
sent to replace him. one would assume that beyond enjoying 
the power inherent in the office of governor, those sent out 
made some money -by keeping for themselves a portion of the 
tax-revenue collected. 
Had the Cordovan government shown less diligence in 
procuring its revenue, the governors might have become even 
more independent, acquiring a larger portion of the provin- 
ces' income, and the power of the government diminished as 
its economic resources (the revenue from which it paid the 
army, the civil service and equipped its military expedi- 
tions)lessened. 
The clause giving the lord of Zaragoza a year's 
grace for paying the revenue due from him also throws light on 
Cordova's dependant position in its relations with its 
provinces. Al-Nasir could have asked for a year's revenue 
ý32 ibid. p. 406. The name of the chief clerk of Zaragoza was 
Ibn al-'Asi. 
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immediately, to help pay for his two-year campaign against 
Zaragoza. Had he done so, Muhammad Ibn Hashim - having been 
defeated - would probably have had to pay. However, al- 
Nasir wanted to ensure that Muhammad continued to pay after 
the besieging army left the province. Hence the clemency 
shown towards the governor and people of the province (the 
Caliph had also to insure that the Cordovan government did not 
give the local population reason to hate it, nor to turn the 
possibly rebellious governor into a saviour figure as was the 
case with Ibn Hafsun). 
The rest of the clause concerning the amount to be 
paid reflects further difficulties that the Cordovan govern- 
ment faced in collecting its dues. In two sections of the 
clause there is insistence that Muhammad Ibn Hashim pay the 
tax-revenue in full. This would suggest that some governors, 
while acknowledging the theoretical right of the Cordovan 
government to receive the tax revenue, might have sought to 
lessen the burden of the obligation on themselves and their 
provincial administrations by sending Cordova a lesser sum 
than the one they were obliged to send under the 'terms' of 
their office. To use a modern phrase, the concern shown by 
the Cordovan government suggests that one of the problems 
facing it in its collection of the tax revenue was that some 
governors "fiddled the books", cheating the government of its 
rightful share and, no doubt, increasing their own, and 
their administrations' revenue. 
Having made the province acknowledge, and pay the 
tax-revenue due in full, the Cordovan government still faced 
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one last major hurdle. Twice the clause mentions that 
Muhammad is to pay the tax revenue due at the time it was due. 
This would suggest that some governors even if they did pay 
the tax-revenue in full, delayed their payment. For the 
Cordovan government, whose-income depended on this revenuel 
such delays would have been harmful, affecting the smoothness 
of the flow of their balance of payments, or again to use 
modern terminology, such delays would have harmed the govern- 
ment's cash flow. The remainder of the clause reflects the 
administrative difficulties that such delays would create. 
Muhammad was to pay the tax revenue owed without an embassy 
prodding him or an agent pressuring him. One can imagine the 
difficulties faced by the Caliph's treasury if many of his 
provinces were reluctant to pay on time (when reminded by a 
letter, the clause states) and had to be almost coerced into 
doing so. The delay itself represented an economic loss; as 
were the effort, time and expense of sending out agents to 
prod the governors into paying. 
The third clause in the treaty (second in the 
translation) covers two aspects of Caliphal rule over Muslim 
Spain. The loyal governor owed the Caliph the duty not to 
harbour a rebel against the Caliph, nor an escaped slave of 
his. This hardly needs comment as it is a case of straight- 
forward loyalty ensuring that the enemies of the Caliph found 
no refuge in the whole of Muslim Spain and assisting the 
government in Cordova in controlling sedition and revolt. 
However the clause extends the ban to enemies or escaped 
slaves of any of the Caliph's subjects. Although the clause 
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is demanding a service from Muhammad, it reflects a benefit 
that the governors would receive f or their loyalty. The 
Cordovan government acted as a cohesive force for all the 
provinces ensuring that despite relative freedoms for each 
governor, they still remained within the context of a single 
entity. 
Once Muhammad Ibn Hashim became a loyal subject of 
the Caliph, he strengthened his own position against any 
possible rebel. Such a rebel would not have been able to 
escape Muhammad by fleeing into another province, for the 
governor of such a province would have been duty-bound by his 
loyalty to the Caliph to assist and hand back any such rebel 
or enemy to Muhammad. The same applied to escaped slaves. 
The clause therefore strengthened the positions of both the 
Caliph and the governors -the Caliph within Muslim Spain as a 
whole, the governors within their province - by protecting 
the status quo. 
The next clause was inserted to protect those over 
whom Muhammad Ibn Hashim had lordship and who had chosen to 
abandon him during his rebellion against Cordova and side with 
the Cordovan government. On one level, this particular 
clause was the product of the Zaragozan rebellion and the two 
year campaign that had ensued. on another level, it offers 
insight into the formation of political hierarchy within 
Muslim Spain in the tenth century A. D. The clause suggests 
that Muhammad, as governor of Zaragoza, would have had the 
right to punish any over whom his lordship was recorded (that 
is, registered at Cordova) had they rebelled or sided against 
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him in an inter-provincial f eud. However, Muhammad Is rights 
of lordship ceased when he rebelled against the Caliph. In 
other words, a lesser lord owed allegiance and loyalty to his 
overlord except in circumstances when such allegiance was in 
conflict with the lesser lord's allegiance to the Caliph. At 
all times, allegiance and loyalty to the Caliph superseded 
all others. This position of the Caliph as the supreme 
overlord, either indirectly if all stages in the hierarchy 
were loyal, or directly if a part of the hierarchy rebelled, 
contributed to the function of the Caliphate as a cohesive 
force in Muslim Spain. 
The fifth clause of the treaty (fourth in the 
translation) involved the public renewal of allegiance by 
Muhammad to the Caliph. Public declaration of allegiance was 
important in that it made visible the bonds between the 
province and the government in Cordova. A normal way for a 
province to show its contrived allegiance to the Caliphate was 
to include the Caliph's name in the Friday prayers. 
The final clause of the treaty, has two aspects. 
First, Muhammad's obligation to join the Caliph in his 
campaign against the enemies of the Caliphate reflects 
Zaragoza's position as a march and its governor's command over 
experienced soldiers. The Caliphate needed such men with 
military experience to supplement the palatine guard who 
formed the core of its armies and the relatively inexperienced 
(and probably unreliable) corps of volunteers joining to 
perform the religious duty of Jihad. Such an involvement 
formed the second positive manifestation of loyalty by a lord 
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to the Caliphate. 
Secondly, the governor of a city had to be an enemy 
of the caliph's enemies and a friend to his friends. This 
was probably a more general obligation, demanded from all 
governors, not just those of the march provinces. Again, 
it re-emphasises the position of the Caliph as the supreme 
overlord, loyalty to whom supersedes even family ties, 
traditionally strong in medieval Muslim societies. It also 
reinforces the position of the Caliphate as a cohesive force 
channelling the political direction of all Muslim Spain in any 
particular direction it chooses, whether against rebels 
within its boundaries or against neighbouring states. The 
list of services demanded ends with yet another indication of 
the Caliphate's concern that the subdued rebel's loyalty may 
not have been completely reliable. This is reflected in the 
efforts made to ward off any future attempt on Muhammad's part 
to lessen his full obligations by finding loopholes within the 
agreement or offering individual excuses for particular 
actions, or failures to act, that might have gone against 
the treaty. 
There then follows a set of duties that the Caliph 
owes in return, with a final reminder that these are tied up 
with true loyalty on the part of Muhammad. First and fore- 
most, the Caliph gave Muhammad the governorship of the city 
of Zaragoza along with the area or Almal surrounding it as 
recorded in the archive in Cordova. In some ways, the 
Caliph was simply reinstating the status quo. At the beginning 
of the document the Caliph promises to let Muhammad's brother 
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keep Ldrida 83 as part of the treaty with him. The Caliph 
went on to reinstate Muhammad over domains he already ruled. 
However, this gift of the Caliph's was very important in 
that the Caliph, as the overlord of Muslim Spain was the 
source of all legitimacy. One could rule a province as a 
rebel successfully, but in the end one would be outside the 
bounds of legality. This would mean that the rebel's own 
position was constantly under threat from those over whom he 
had lordship in that he had no legal right over them: the only 
right he did have was that of military might. 
Although the importance of legality in the medieval 
Muslim mind is outside the bounds of this thesis, the 
importance of legitimacy needs to be emphasised. Going back 
to the concept of the Caliphate as a cohesive force mentioned 
earlier, we can see that in the final analysis this force was 
derived from the position of the Caliphate as the source of 
all legitimate government. It may have been that Muhammad 
held Zaragoza while his brother Yahya held Ldrida. However, 
once Muhammad rebelled against Cordova, he lost the right to 
hold the march de lure, even though his military might gave 
him lordship de facto. That the ruling hierarchy of Muslim 
Spain in the tenth century A. D. held such legality of pos- 
session to be of importance is testified to by the fact that 
despite many rebellions, the fabric of Muslim Spain as a 
cohesive whole was not torn apart, with the governors choosing 
for the most part to acknowledge the Caliphate and derive 
83 ibid. p. 405. 
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their own legitimacy f rom that relationship. Had all the 
governors chosen to ignore such legitimacy collectively, 
Muslim Spain would have disintegrated into many small entities 
with the Caliphate probably powerless to stop the disintegra- 
tion. Such a disintegration did occur when the Caliphate's 
own legitimacy was called into question in the second and 
third decades of the eleventh century, and which will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
However, to return to the document, the Caliph by 
his gift, imbued the governorship of Muhammad with legitimacy 
by including it in the record in Cordova thus protecting (at 
least in law) Muhammad from the insurgency of those below him 
and from the attacks of greedy neighbouring governors. The 
clause went on to say that this appointment -of Muhammad as 
governor was for life. This might indicate that the 
appointment of a governor for life was something of an 
exception. To a large extent this was due to the special 
position of Zaragoza as a centre of a thaahr, as well as its 
distance and the established power of the Tujibids there. 
There is evidence to suggest that in less sensitively placed 
provinces, nearer to Cordova the governors could and would 
have been changed periodically by orders from Cordova (for 
example, once al-Nasir established his authority over 
Valencia, he changed the governor there four times in as many 
years- see below pp. 95-96). That Zaragoza was a special 
case is further shown in the indications in the document that 
Muhammad's son might have been accepted by the Caliphate as a 
successor to his father. Making Zaragoza into an almost 
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inherited province reflected more the special difficulties 
Cordova faced in dealing with Zaragoza than a general practice 
of the cordovan government in dealing with its provinces. 
Interestingly, the next duty the Caliph owed a 
loyal subject was that of not reproaching the subject, nor 
accepting the stabs of enviers or secret enemies of the 
distant governors in the court of Cordova. The same problem, 
it seems, was faced by loyal vassals of the Castilian 
monarchy: King Alfonso VI in the eleventh century allowed his 
opinion of his vassal Rodrigo Diaz to be influenced by enviers 
and court goSSipS. 84 
Finally, the Caliph gave a guarantee that this 
agreement between Muhammad Ibn Hashim and himself would be 
honoured by al-Nasir's successors. This ability of the 
Caliphate to offer continuity in its relations with its 
provinces added to its ability to act as a cohesive force in 
Muslim Spain. Provided the governors in Zaragoza kept their 
loyalty, their agreement with Cordova would not be subject to 
change even if the ruler in Cordova were to change. The 
agreement was between the governors and the Caliph as a head 
of the government in Cordova and not as an individual, so 
that it was binding on the government, no matter which Caliph 
might be the head of government. The reference to past 
practice suggests strongly that this understanding of continu- 
ity and consistency in Cordovan-provincial relations was to 
some degree an accepted practice in Muslim Spain. 
84 El Poema de mio Cid, end of lst section, first cantar p. 23 
and end of 17th section, first cantar p. 37. 
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1.4 Relations with Cordova II: Practice 
Having looked at the theoretical framework for the 
relationship between the government in Cordova and the 
provincial administrations we now come to look at the way this 
was translated in reality in the relations between Cordova and 
Zaragoza, and Cordova and Valencia. We must keep in mind 
the discussion in the introductory chapter about the kind of 
evidence available for Muslim Spain in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries A. D. : that is, that in general we have no extant 
local histories, but rather histories of Muslim Spain as a 
whole. Even in literary works, historical events related to 
a particular province which are mentioned tend to be ones 
relating to the history of Muslim Spain as a whole. For 
instance, Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira concerns itself with the 
localities of Zaragoza or Valencia only when the events there 
affect, or are linked with, the schema of Muslim Spanish 
politics as a whole. Keeping all this in mind, two 
interesting differences appear between the treatment of 
Zaragoza and Valencia in the extant sources. First, there 
appears to have been a difference in kind in the sort of 
problems which Zaragoza presented to the Cordovan government 
f rom those which were presented by Valencia. Secondly, 
there appears to have been a difference in the frequency with 
which Zaragoza presented such problems from that with which 
Valencia did. In the decades preceding the fitna, Zaragoza 
was mentioned relatively often in the general histories of 
Muslim Spain, while Valencia was rarely mentioned. Moreover, 
Zaragoza, when refered to, was often named as part of a 
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major political difficulty faced by the government in Cordova, 
while Valencia tended to be mentioned, f or the most part, in 
connection with the routine changes of governors appointed by 
the Cordovan government. 
In part, these differences derive from the differ- 
ent geographic positions of Zaragoza and Valencia, discussed 
at the beginning of the chapter. Zaragoza was further away 
from Cordova and in close proximity to Christian states. Its 
relations with these states would have been on two levels. 
on the one level, there was the position of Muslim Spain as 
a whole, as dictated by the Caliphate, towards these states 
and which Zaragoza, when loyal to Cordova would adopt. Part 
of the obligation of being an enemy to the Caliph's enemies 
and a friend of his friends involved following Cordova's lead 
in matters of foreign policy. However, Zaragoza was also in 
the front line of Muslim Spain's defence and often suffered 
from marauding raids from the north. Valencia could easily 
accept the 'foreign policy' of Cordova, since it had almost 
no direct contact with foreign powers. The province of 
Zaragoza, on the other hand, was almost surrounded on three 
sides by hostile Christian territory. In such circumstances, 
it would have been perfectly understandable for the governors 
of the province to reach some form of accommodation with their 
(hostile) neighbours. 
Such deviation from official 'foreign policy' was 
clearly resented by Cordova. In the treaty of which parts 
are translated above, the first clause demanded quite clearly 
that Muhammad Ibn Hashim should cease from conducting any such 
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'private' foreign policy. This first clause reads as 
follows: 
And Muhammad Ibn Hashim is to sever his con- 
tacts [literally rope), whether open or 
secret, with the Christians from the country 
of Barcelona to Gardania to Panpelona to Alba 
to Castile (al-Oilal) to Galicia. He is not 
to correspond with them nor have dealings with 
them (vudakhilahum), and let him (Muhammad] 
oppose them in the manner of the Prince of the 
Faithful, and dispatch (military] divisions 
to their country, nor is he to make peace 
with them over any part of the march except 
after [obtaining] the permission of the Prince 
of the Faithful and referring to his (the 
Caliph's] advice. 85 
The implication in this stipulation suggests that 
the governors of Zaragoza did enter into negotiations with the 
various Christian states and did conclude some sort of truce 
with them. The ending of the clause is quite telling. On 
the one hand, it seems to forbid the governor from entering 
into any such individual treaties with the Christians, but on 
the other hand, it almost lamely stipulates that the governor 
should at least consult the government in Cordova before doing 
SO. The geo-political situation of Zaragoza as the centre of 
the northernmost Muslim march continued to be the cause of its 
reaching occasional accommodation with its Christian 
neighbours. This ability to make peace, at times ally, 
with the supposed enemy of Muslim Spain as a whole, and of 
the government in Cordova in particular, characterised the 
policy of Zaragoza towards its neighbours, Muslims and 
Christians, in the years preceding, during and succeeding 
85 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Mugtabas, Vol. v, pp. 406-407. 
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the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate. Such an ability to 
work with its Christian neighbours, and the experience of 
such co-operation even before the Talifas became independent 
in the eleventh century A. D. differentiated the attitude of 
Zaragoza towards the Christians from that of the more souther- 
ly provinces such as Valencia, in that because it was a 
march, the administration and population of Zaragoza tended 
to behave in many instances in a more pragmatic way towards 
the Christian states. 
In the early part of the reign of the Caliph 'Abd 
al-Rahman III, titled al-Nasir li-din Allah (912 - 961) 86 
there seems* to have been little difference between the 
relations of Cordova and Valencia on the one hand, and 
between Cordova and Zaragoza on the other. Al-Nasir had 
succeeded to a Caliphate weakened by open rebellion, even in 
the provinces close to Cordova. His main aim seems to have 
been to establish his authority first over those provinces 
that were supposedly loyal, that is, not in open rebellion, 
before turning his attentions to those provinces that were in 
open rebellion. Within a year of al-Nasir's accession in 
301/7 August 913 - 27 July 914, there appears to have been a 
siege of Zaragoza, 87 although it is not clear who ordered it 
to be undertaken. However, the fact that it was mentioned 
in a general history of al-Nasir's reign suggests strongly 
that it must have been part of his ef forts to secure the 
86 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan: Vol. 2, p. 156. 
87 ibid. p. 164, also Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p. 99. 
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allegiance of the northern province. It also f its within the 
pattern of his campaigns (such as the one against Seville)88 
in the early years of his reign to establish his authority. 
The campaign al-Nasir ordered against Valencia in 
304/5 July 916 - 24 June 917 89 was clearly an attempt to 
ensure the province's loyalty when the main body of his army 
was involved in a campaign against the north. This preemptive 
strike appears to have ensured the province's loyalty until 
Valencia rebelled again in 316/25 February 928 - 13 February 
929.90 Another campaign in the province seems to have re- 
established al-Nasir's authority. This last campaign was 
conducted and won at a time when al-Nasir seems to have 
regained for the Caliphate more control over the provinces 
nearer Cordova, especially since he had managed to capture 
Bobastro , the 'capital' of 
the Bani-Hafsun, 91 'the main 
rebels against the Caliphate in this period. 
The upper march, however, seems to have been a 
source of some difficulty for the new Caliph on two levels. 
on one level, it seems to have been the target of attacks by 
the Christian north, who were taking advantage, no doubt, 
of the Caliph's occupation with internal affairs. These 
included the attack of King Sancho of Navarre on Tudela in 
88 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muatabas, Vol. v, p. 69. 
89 ibid. p. 127. 
90 ibid. p. 228. 
91 ibid. p. 222. 
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303/17 July 915 -4 July 916,92 the ' combined attack of 
Navarre and Galicia against the upper march in 305/24 June - 
13 June 918,93 and the attack of Navarre against the march 
in 311/21 April 923 -8 April 924.94 On another level, the 
authority of the Caliph does not seem to have been completely 
accepted in the upper march. Feuding among the lesser lords 
of the march did occur. In 306/14 June 918 -2 June 919 a 
local lord named 'Amroos Ibn Muhammad attacked and took over 
the governorship of Huesca from his brother, 95 ignoring, it 
seems, the peace expected within the Caliphal domains and the 
right of the Caliph to designate governorships. 
Both these types of difficulties were a threat to 
the Cordovan government. The attacks of the Christian states 
had to be*halted if the borders of Muslim Spain were to be 
protected. The f euding in the upper march also had to be 
halted and for three main reasons. First, the anarchy that 
would ensue f rom such f euding would only weaken the upper 
march, making it vulnerable to attacks when the Caliphate's 
army was absent. Secondly, such feuding challenged the 
legal right of the Caliph to appoint the governors he chose, 
as well as the peace his overlordship over Muslim Spain ought 
to have imposed over his domain. Finally, such strife 
disrupted the collection of taxes and their transmission to 
92 ibid. p. 124. 
93 ibid. p. 143. 
94 ibid. p. 143. 
95 ibid. p. 147. 
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the government in Cordova. 
The response of the Caliphate to both types of 
threat came in a single action; raids against the Christian 
states through the upper march. Such campaigns would weaken 
the Christian states restricting their ability to attack the 
Muslim borders, as well as reinforcing the authority of the 
caliph in the march with the presence of a large Caliphal army 
there f or part of the year, bringing the important local 
families into line. This method of dealing with the dual 
sided problem which the upper march presented was employed by 
the Cordovan government until its collapse in the eleventh 
century. Examples of this include the Caliphal armies I 
campaigns against Navarre and Galicia in 308/23 May 920 - 11 
May 921,96 and against Navarre in 312/9 April 924 - 28 March 
97 925. 
Al-Nasir used this latter campaign not only to 
weaken Navarre, but also to ensure the loyalty of important 
local families in the upper march, notably the Tuj ibids, 98 
established there from the time of the Muslim Conquest. 99 
on the march from Cordova, al-Nasir raided the province of 
Valencia, which was not totally loyal after the campaign of 
304/5 July 916- 23 June 917, to prod its governor into 
96 ibid. p. 159. 
97 ibid. p. 189. 
98 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p. 186, also Ibn Hayyan: Al- 
muqtabas, Vol. V, p. 191. 
99 Ibn Hazm: Jamharat, p. 430. 
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strengthened loyalty. 100 In f act, although al-Nasir man- 
aged to subdue Valencia, more or less by 316 A. H. , he 
still had to forcibly subdue Jativa, the main town in its 
Almal in 317/14 February 929 -2 February 930.101 
The Tuj ibids benef ited from their support of the 
caliphate. Hashim Ibn Muhammad al-Tujibi was succeeded by 
his son Muhammad in 318/3 February 930 - 23 January 931.102 
Muhammad's younger brother received the governorship of Ldrida 
in the following year 319/24 January 931 - 12 January 
932.103 Even their rebellion . (described by Ibn Hayyan as 
the last of the violent rebellions in Muslim Spain) in 322/22 
December 933 - 10 December 934,104 which lasted until Zarag- 
oza was besieged and defeated in 325/19 November 936 -7 
November 937105 did not do them any lasting harm. The 
treaty discussed in the previous section allowed the Tujibids 
to keep their governorship so long as they renewed their 
loyalty to the Caliphate. In fact having proven their loyalty, 
the Tujibids received governorship over the whole of the upper 
march in 330/26 September 941 - 15 September 942.106 The 
geo-political position of Zaragoza as a frontier province 
100 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Mugtabas, Vol. V, p. 1go. 
101 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 201. 
102 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Mugtabas, Vol. V, p. 285. 
103 ibid. p. 315. 
104 ibid. p. 333. 
105 ibid. pp. 393-410. 
106 ibid. p. 474. 
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along with its distance f rom Cordova forced the Caliphate into 
allowing it to become almost an hereditary governorship, as 
long as the family governing it followed the direction the 
Cordovan government advocated in 'foreign policy'. Beyond 
that, the Caliph attempted to curb the power and relative 
independence of Zaragoza by sending a corps of Slav soldiers, 
loyal to him, under the command of a young of f icer called 
Ghalib, to rebuild and occupy the city of Medinaceli in 335/2 
August 946 - 22 July 947.107 Ghalib's presence had a dual 
function. one was to help buf f er the march against the 
northern Christian states thus reducing the reliance of the 
Caliphate on the local governors for defence. The other was 
to be close enough to strike if the Tujibids were tempted into 
rebellion again. 
By contrast, Cordova's control over Valencia was 
more established and more direct once the initial difficulties 
faced by al-Nasir in the early years of his reign were 
overcome. The strength of the authority that Cordova had 
over Valencia is attested to by the ability of Cordova to 
change the governors of . Valencia when it pleased, not allow- 
ing any one governor, or any one local family to become too 
powerful in the province, as in the case of Zaragoza. 
Cordova appointed new governors in Valencia in 321/1 January 
933 - 21 December 933,108, in 322/22 December 933 - 10 
107 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 314. 
108 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muatabas, Vol. V, p. 331. 
97 
December 934,109 in 323/11 December 934 - 29 November 
935110 and in 324/30 November 935 - 18 November 936.111 
Although we have less detail about Cordovals 
relation with the provinces during the reign of al-Hakam Ibn 
'Abd al-Rahman, titled al-Mustansir billah (October 961 - 
112 April 977), the information we do have points to al-Hakam 
pursuing the policies of his father. In Ibn 'Idharils general 
history al-Bayan, Valencia was seldom mentioned during the 
reign of al-Hakam. This perhaps suggests that the control of 
Cordova over Valencia had become so well established that the 
province did not warrant a mention in a general brief history 
of the reign. As for the upper march, al-Hakam continued 
his father's policy of relying on the Tujibids, but trying to 
limit the damage such reliance inflicted on the Cordovan 
government by utilising the Slav corps under the command of 
Ghalib to act as the main defender of the march. Ghalib's 
campaigns against the Christian north are recorded in 356/17 
December 966 -6 December 967,113 357/7 December 967 - 24 
November 968 114 and a campaign against rebels in North 
Africa is recorded in 363/2 October 973 - 20 September 
109 ibid. p. 355. 
110 ibid. p. 377. 
"' ibid. p. 391. 
112 ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, V01- 2, p. 253. 
113' ibid. p. 240. 
114 ibid. p. 241. 
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974.115 on the other hand, Yahya Ibn Muhammad al-Tujibi 
whose succession to his father as governor of the upper march 
was decreed in 330/26 September 941 - 14 September 942,116 
had his governorship over the march reconfirmed by al-Hakam in 
365/10 September 975 - 29 August 976.117 
1.6 conclusions 
The cities in Muslim Spain in the century leading up to 
the collapse of the Cordovan government were the centres of 
provincial administration. The government in Cordova con- 
trolled the provinces by appointing and controlling governors 
in these cities. Muslim Spain in the century preceding the 
fitna thus appears to have had two sets of chains of command. 
There was, on the one hand, the chain of command from 
Cordova to the governors of the various cities, controlled by 
a sizeable civil service housed in the palace complex of the 
Caliph. on the other hand, there was the chain of command 
from the cities to the surrounding countryside or province, 
including, at times, lesser towns. This chain of command 
was headed by the appointed governors who formed the link 
between these two chains. However, this provincial chain of 
command existed independently from the governors, operating 
from the cities to the surrounding provinces. Hence gov- 
ernors could be changed at will without disrupting this system 
115 ibid. p. 247. 
116 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muatabas, Vol. V, p. 490. 
117 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 249. 
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(as for example in the changes of the governors of Valencia 
referred to above). The very existence of these two chains 
of command and the lack of direct control over the provinces 
from Cordova helps explain why when central government 
collapsed in the early part of the eleventh century, local 
government went on functioning, almost independently of what 
was happening in Cordova. It also helps explain why the new 
Ta I ifas were based on the various cities and why a Ta I if a 
moving into a new city f ound it relatively easy to gain 
control over the whole province. The chain of command being 
already in existence, the new Talifa simply had to preside 
over its source in the city. 
Within this system of provincial government, there 
were differences between, broadly speaking, the frontier 
provinces and the ones nearer Cordova. While Valencia had 
the ability to rebel when the Caliphate was weak, it was 
easily brought under control once the Caliphate became 
stronger. Its governor, the link between the local adminis- 
tration and the Cordovan government was a Cordovan appointee. 
The administration in Valencia in the century preceding the 
collapse of the Cordovan government had very little experience 
in military confrontation and no experience in relations with 
f oreign powers - In other words, the experience of the 
Valencian administration restricted its outlook to an almost 
introverted direction, with very little experience of 
independent action. Zaragoza presented a different picture. 
The governors there were local men belonging to the local 
nobility. Although the province could not sustain rebellion 
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against a strong Cordovan government for long, it tended to 
be more independent than provinces like Valencia. The local 
administration in the march had much experience, in the 
century preceding the collapse of the Cordovan government, 
both in military confrontation and in conducting a foreign 
policy towards the Christian north. This latter involved a 
pragmatic accommodation with Christian states, attacking or 
allying with them when it suited the interests of Zaragoza. 
However, Zaragoza remained reliant on the ability of Cordova 
to put a strong army in the field and come to its aid if the 
Christians mounted a concentrated attack. 
These differing characteristics in the administra- 
tion of Zaragoza and Valencia as well as the relationship they 
had with Cordova help explain the way these two provinces 
behaved under the 'Amirid dictatorship and during the collapse 
of the Cordovan government that followed. Some of the traits 
visible in the policy of the Zaragozan administration, 
notably its ability to pursue its own interests even by 
allying with the Christian enemies of Muslim Spain, will be 
traced when looking at the Zaragozan Talifa in the eleventh 
century. Valencia's inexperience in matters of war and 
foreign relations dictated, to some degree, the direction 
that the independent Valencian Talifa took in the eleventh 
century. 
Finally, a considerable part of this chapter has 
been concerned with the theoretical basis of the relationship 
between the Cordovan government and the provinces. The 
101 
importance of this lies in that even after the collapse of the 
Cordovan government, this framework remained the point of 
reference to which the Almal referred when defining their 
relationship with the city and indeed, to which lesser cities 
or even provinces referred when defining their relationship 
with a stronger city-state. There is some evidence in 
Christian texts that in the latter part of the eleventh 
century some Muslim provinces, notably Zaragoza, entered 
into a relationship of vassalage with Castile. When looking 
at these allegations later, one has to refer to the Muslim 
understanding of a bond with an overlord, 
_ 
and base the 
assessment of whether or not Zaragoza did become a vassal of 
Castile (in the Castilian sense of the word) on this Muslim 
definition of a relation with an overlord. This framework 
will also help explain how Zaragoza understood its relation- 
ship with the province of Valencia in the eleventh century as 
it sought to gain control over it and bring it within its own 
sphere of influence. 
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2- Dictatorship and Rebellion 
2.1 Introduction: 
Most of the information we have about the Ta I ifa era 
is derived from sources written either towards the end of the 
period, when the Ta I if as were losing their states to the 
Almoravids or to the Christian kingdoms, or after the end of 
the era. We, therefore, seldom have the Ta I ifa point of view 
about that period or about the period preceding it (the 
exception being what survives from Ibn Hayyan's works). The 
majority of the sources tend to portray the Talifa period as 
one of weakness arising f rom disunity. This perspective 
affects the way in which these sources view the role that the 
provinces played in the period of turbulence that heralded the 
end of the Caliphate and the rise of the city-states: the 
fitna. It also affects the way in which these sources view 
and portray the period immediately prior to the fitna when the 
real power in the realm rested not with the Caliph, but with 
his chief wazir or Hajib Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir and later with 
his son 'Abd al-Malik. 
Because the Talifa period was seen as one of 
weakness, disunity and retreat before the Christian enemies 
of Islam, the period prior to the f itna, that of the 'Amirid 
dictatorship was seen as a period of glorious Islamic rule 
with its strong united government and successful aggressive 
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policy against the Christian north. Such a perception was 
formed in a period of renewed unity and effective hostility 
against the Christian enemy which had grown in power and 
gained seemingly irreversible advantage during the Talifa 
period. However, such post-Talifa views do not necessarily 
correspond to those of the Muslim Spaniards living in the 
early part of the eleventh century A. D. They do not help 
explain why the collapse of the government in Cordova 
occurred, nor why, when it did, the provinces cut them- 
selves off to form independent units. To understand better the 
period of the f itna one has to try to see the pre-fitna period 
from the point of view of the Muslim Spaniards who might not 
have seen it in the same glorified heroic light that later 
generations did. By doing this one might also see why the 
collapse did occur and what the different lords in the cities 
were trying to achieve in the muddled and turbulent two 
decades that led to the official termination of the Umayyad 
Caliphate. The post-Talifa viewpoint tends to paint the fitna 
as a period when governors wrongfully sought independence and 
brought upon Muslim Spain much harm. Although the lords in 
the cities did eventually assume independence and establish 
separate states, that was not what they aimed for from the 
start. To understand their action during those years, one 
has to try to see their perception of the situation and the 
aims they were trying to pursue. 
To their eyes, the 'Amirid dictatorship fundamen- 
tally changed the system of government in Muslim Spain, so 
that to a degree the actions of some of the city-states during 
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the period of the f itna were seen as an attempt to ensure that 
such a wrongful system should not repeated. There were early 
attempts also at restoring what was perceived to be the pre- 
'Amirid Umayyad system of government. As will be shown below, 
these attempts failed. However, the 'Amirid period is import- 
ant to the history of the Talifa period for another related 
reason. The 'Amirids did introduce changes to the political 
system in the peninsula. Some of these changes (among others, 
the strengthening of central government, and the way this was 
achieved; the introduction of military reforms; the invitation 
of large numbers of Berber troops; the changes made to the 
civil service; the discrediting of the Caliphal system; the 
constant northward campaigning and the effects of these 
campaigns, both in terms of economic cost and increased 
Christian resentment) played an important role in the shaping 
and the development of political events in the peninsula, not 
just in the period immediately following the fall of the 
'Amirid government, but arguably throughout the C11. 
2.2 The 'Amirids 
As with the case of the Almoravids, who came to 
play such a prominent role in the history of Muslim Spain in 
the C11, the historical assessment of the 'Amirids, and in 
particular that of their founder, Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, 
has tended to rely on sources which were sympathetic to his 
dictatorship partly because they were written (as in the case 
of Ibn 'Idhari) long after his reign, when it appeared as if 
a period of strong Muslim rule under him was followed by a 
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period of weakness, division and retreat. This sympathetic 
assessment has found its way (as in the case of the assessment 
of the Almoravids) into common modern Arab consciousness. 
Yet, as the discussion below will attempt to show, those 
Spanish Muslims who were contemporary, or who lived just 
after his reign had a much more cynical assessment of his 
career and motives. Their reaction to his rule and to that of 
his successors, their reactions to the collapse of his 
government and their understanding of the changes which he had 
instigated were dependant on their view of the man and the 
motivation driving him. Part of what this section, therefore, 
tries to examine is not so much an historical assessment of 
the 'Amirid period (which has been covered before) but rather 
a discussion of how contemporary Spanish Muslims and those who 
lived in the period following his reign interpreted the events 
and changes that occurred during his dictatorship, since 
these perceptions, as well as the actual events involved, 
played such an important role in the forming of the Talifa 
period. 
The traditional post-Talifa sources of information 
portray Muhammad as a just, strong ruler, working for the 
good of the Caliphate and the glory of Islam. However, even 
these later sources contain information that might suggest 
that although Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir was certainly respected, 
he was not quite as revered by his contemporaries as by later 
generations. This is also born out by the way in which the 
(near contemporary) historian Ibn Hayyan deals with him. Ibn 
Hayyan seems to have respected Muhammad's authority and 
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aggressive policy towards the christian north, but he does 
not seem to have quite seen him as the perfect Muslim, or 
rather Jihad oriented ruler. 118 This aspect is important 
for two reasons. First, the fitna was to a large extent 
seen by the educated among Ibn Hayyan Is generation as the 
result of, and reaction to, the 'Amirid dictatorship. 
Secondly, depending on one's view of Ibn Abi 'Amir's motiv- 
ation, accepted actions of his might be interpreted in a 
different manner. To balance the later image of a strong 
Muslim ruler whose reign was directed towards the glory of 
Islam, two incidents in his career might be worth looking at. 
There is at least one reference in al-Turtushi 119 
to a clash between Ibn Abi 'Amir and the Cordovan jurists who 
attacked his government as nepotistic and corrupt. There were 
also accusations that Ibn Abi 'Amir's advancement owed much to 
his friendship with the Savvida Subh, mother of the Caliph- 
to-be, Hisham. 120 There were further allegations that he had 
been suspected of pilfering from public funds when he was the 
wazir in charge of the mint- a post he was relieved of. 121 
These two incidents would suggest that the contemporaries of 
Ibn Abi 'Amir did not view him necessarily as the honest 
118 See Ibn Hayyan's description of Ibn Abi 'Amir's rise to 
power: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp. 56-73. 
119 See the brief biography and discussion in the introduction, 
pp. 47-48. 
120 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, V01.2, p. 251. 
121 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, V01.2, p. 252. 
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unambitious civil servant turned model Muslim ruler that he 
was later made to seem. With this in mind one can survey his 
career and, in particular, the effects that his reign had on 
the relationship between Cordova and the provinces, between 
Cordova and the Christian north and more generally on the 
credibility and strength of the Caliphate as an institution. 
At al-Hakam's death in Safar 366/October 976, the 
Caliphate was transferred to his eleven year old son Hisham. 
The faction supporting Hisham included al-Mushafi, al-Hakam's 
llajib and Ibn Abi 'Amir's sponsor, and Subh. One of Ibn Abi 
'Amir's first acts upon HishamOs succession was to ingratiate 
himself with the commoners in Cordova by having Hisham abolish 
the hated olive oil tax. 122 Ibn Abi 'Amir then turned his 
attention to weakening the main rivals to the faction he 
belonged to, the palatine guards. He turned the child-Caliph 
against them forcing one of their commanders Jawdhar to 
resign, and having another, Durray, killed. He f urther 
weakened them by extracting f ines f rom them. 123 This left 
Ibn Abi 'Amir with two obstacles to absolute power, his 
mentor the leader of his faction, al-Mushafi, and the Slav 
corps under the command of Ghalib in the upper march. 
His opportunity to establish himself as a more 
decisive leader than al-Mushafi came when Galicia hearing of 
al-Hakam's death began raiding the marches. Al-Mushafi was 
slow to respond, but Ibn Abi 'Amir led a successful expedi- 
122 ibid. p. 259. 
123 ibid. pp. 262-263. 
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tion through the lower (al-jawfi) march to Galicia124 in 
Rajab 366/February 977. As a result Ibn Abi 'Amir was made 
commander of the army in Cordova, 125 while Ghalib - head of 
the Slav contingent 126 and main rival to al-Mushafils 
faction - was confirmed as commander of the army in the march 
area. Ibn Abi 'Amir then arranged an alliance with Ghalib in 
a meeting in Madrid during his second campaign in Shawwal 
366/May 977, which was soon cemented with Ibn Abi 'Amir's 
marriage to Ghalib's daughter Asmal, thus forestalling a 
marriage alliance being arranged by al-Mushafi. 127 
The power of al-Mushafi was thus broken. He was 
dismissed from office in Shalban 367/March 978 and arrested 
soon after. 128 Ibn Abi 'Amir then proceeded to show his 
strength with firm government extracting heavy taxes. In 
368/9 August 978 28 July 979 he began building al-Zahira as 
a rival palace complex and centre of government to the 
Caliph's al-Zahral. He moved into this new complex in 370/17 
July 980 -6 July 981,129 thus showing his hand and declar- 
ing openly that he was the de facto ruler of Muslim Spain. 
He kept the child-Caliph as a virtual prisoner in his palace 
declaring that the Caliph preferred isolation to concentrate 
124 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 62. 
125 ibid. p. 64. 
126 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol-2, p. 265. 
127 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, pp. 265-267. 
128 ibid. p. 267. 
129 ibid. p. 273. 
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on religious contemplation. 130 The f inal obstacle to Ibn 
Abi 'Amir's path to total power was his father-in-law Ghalib. 
Both protagonists put armies in the field in which members of 
the important upper march families (notably the Tujibids)131 
served. The battle was very close, suggesting perhaps that 
Ibn Abi 'Amir's military power was not as strong as it would 
later develop to be. Ghalib was killed and his army 
defeated. 132 
Ibn Abi 'Amir's rise to power is important in three 
ways. First, political changes occurred as a result of his 
struggle to gain power. Secondly, his assumption of power 
brought fundamental changes in the political schema of muslim 
Spain. Thirdly, political changes occurred as a result of 
Ibn Abi 'Amir's efforts to maintain his power. 
By the time Ibn Abi 'Amir had assumed complete 
control of authority in Muslim Spain, symbolised by his 
setting up his government in a palace-complex of his own, he 
had destroyed several important facets of the Umayyad govern- 
ment. He had changed the role and position of the civil 
service from one loyal to, and serving the Caliphate, to one 
loyal to, and serving the ruler. In this way he laid the 
130 ibid. p. 278. 
131 Ibn Hazm: Jamharat, p. 431. 
132 Ibn Hazm: NacFt al-'Arus, Appendix I, pp. 34-36. An interest- 
ing point in this account of the battle is that it clearly referred 
to Ghalib wearing a distinctive signet ring, and said that Ibn Abi 
'Amir accepted reports of his death only after he saw the ring. 
There are other references to the use of signet rings in this 
period in Muslim Spain, although it is not clear how distinctive 
the mottoes on the rings were and whether they acted as a source of 
identity for a family or clan or of a particular individual. 
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foundation for this important tool of the Umayyad government 
becoming accustomed to serving whoever was in power, irre- 
spective of a legitimacy derived from the Caliphate. In some 
ways, Ibn Abi 'Amir's actions set the precedent for the civil 
servants abandoning the Cordovan government during the fitna 
and serving lords whose claim to legitimacy as masters of 
their city-states was, to say the least, suspect. Ibn Abi 
'Amir also destroyed the military arm of the Caliphate. In 
Cordova the Slav corps were discredited, in the march 
defeated and in both cases deeply demoralised. The standing 
army of the Caliph was, as mentioned in Chapter I, not 
large. However, it was large enough to form the core of a 
military corps with which the Caliphate could keep the loyalty 
of its provinces in times of trouble. By destroying this 
corps, Ibn Abi 'Amir deprived any future Caliphs of the tool 
which could have helped re-establish his authority. Finally, 
by destroying the army of Ghalib, Ibn Abi 'Amir undid the 
scheme set up by al-Hakam to control the distant (and there- 
fore more rebellious) provinces not so much by constant 
punitive campaigns, but with the presence of a military 
contingent loyal to the Caliph and serving two purposes, 
first, to reduce the Caliphate's reliance on the march lords 
for the protection of their realm; secondly, to keep a 
watchful eye over, and be a constant threat to these same 
lords, at a lower cost than that entailed in punitive 
campaigns. In other words, Ibn Abi 'Amir dismantled the 
fabric of government which preceded his reign, the ideal of 
which is seen in the treaty discussed in chapter one, and 
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substituted in its place a more centralised military based 
government. The Slav corps was rather small and loyal to the 
Caliph; the Berber troops which Ibn Abi ! Amir imported formed 
a larger corps, loyal to himself and which needed greater 
resources to keep. This new system is bound to have been 
unpopular and one can make the argument that in the early part 
of the Cll, the lords of the various provinces tried to 
return to that pre-'Amirid system. 
If in his rise to power, Ibn Abi 'Amir weakened the 
tools (the bureaucracy and the standing army) which the 
Caliphate used to rule Spain, his final position as supreme 
ruler of Muslim Spain was in itself damaging to the Caliphate. 
Ibn 'Idhari likens his takeover of authority to that of the 
Dylamite commanders in the east. 133 By making it obvious 
that he was the real ruler of Muslim Spain, Ibn Abi 'Amir 
weakened the legitimacy of the Cordovan government by 
demonstrating that it could become a mere puppet of a strong 
ruler. 
However, Ibn Abi 'Amir never quite crossed the line 
dividing what was legitimate (even if just barely so) to what 
was not, and perhaps that had something to do with his 
training as a jurist. Unlike his son, he never tried to 
claim the Caliphate for himself or for his sons after Hisham, 
acknowledging the fact that the general consensus among 
jurists was that the Caliphate could only be held by members 
of certain families (Umayyads, 'Abbasids or descendants of the 
133 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 272. This clearly copied 
from Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 61. 
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Prophet's line from the surviving female side 134) Nonethe- 
less, he came very close to crossing the thin line dividing 
legitimate from illegitimate behaviour by adopting the title 
al-Mansur in 371/7 July 981 - 25 June 982.135 Adopting a 
title was a prerogative of a Caliph, and by calling himself 
al-Mansur, Ibn Abi 'Amir was giving himself a rank approach- 
ing that of a Caliph. It also set the precedent for a mere 
Hajib having the right to adopt Caliphal titles; a precedent 
taken up by his sons and later in the eleventh century by the 
lords of the city-states. It is important to remember that one 
of the most distasteful aspects of the Talifa period to later 
historians was the adoption of Caliphal titles by Talifa 
rulers. Yet this debasement of Caliphal prerogative was 
started by Ibn Abi 'Amir. 
Finally, the steps taken by Ibn Abi 'Amir to 
maintain his position contributed to further weaken the power 
of the Caliphate as well as laying the foundations for the 
instability in the structure of government which contributed 
to the collapse of the Cordovan government during the fitna. 
The most fundamental change that Ibn Abi 'Amir introduced 
into Muslim Spain was to the military structure of the 
Cordovan government. He had weakened the Slav palatine guard 
so that when in power he had to either rebuild or f ind a 
substitute for it. Possibly because of his involvement in 
north Africa under al-Hakam, he turned to the Berber tribes 
134 Ibn Hazm: Al-Muhalla, Vol-1, pp. 44-45, Vol-9, pp. 359-362. 
135 ibid. p. 273. 
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there as a source for his new standing army. At the begin- 
ning he had a modest regiment of around 600 warriors, 136 
which later grew considerably in size. One of the main 
reasons behind this importation of troops was that his 
position as ruler was tenuous. It depended simply on his 
ability to maintain power. To do this he needed a standing 
army, yet, unlike the Caliph whose legal position as head of 
state was secure, - Ibn Abi 'Amir had to trust his troops not 
to turn against him. At first, he used the small Berber 
contingent to counterbalance the Slav corps. However, he 
soon had to import more Berber troops to counterbalance the 
original ones and so on. Prince 'Abdullah understood this 
attitude of Ibn Abi 'Amir. In his 'memoirs'! he describes 
it: 
And his [Ibn Abi 'Amir's] opinion persuaded him 
that his soldiers should be different tribes and 
separate groups: if one of the groups (tawalif) 
intended to disobey, he defeated them with the 
other groups. 137 
Clearly this led to a vicious circle, the more troops he 
imported, the more he had to import to control them. 
The Berber troops crossed over to Muslim Spain 
taking with them their families. By 377/3 May 987 - 20 April 
988 Ibn Abi 'Amir had to expand the main mosque in Cordova to 
accommodate the extra men, while the suburbs overflowed with 
the increased population. 138. By the time'he died the stand- 
136 ibid. p. 279. 
137 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 16. 
138 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2,, p. 287. 
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ing army in Cordova numbered around 10,500,139 yet his son 
and successor faced with the same position and adopting the 
same method had to import even more Berber troops into Muslim 
Spain. 140 
The second military change that Ibn Abi 'Amir intro- 
duced was his attempt to abolish the local militia. Instead of 
the provinces contributing fighting men to supplement the 
Cordovan army as in the time of the Caliphate, they would pay 
a tax instead. 141 The advantage to Ibn Abi 'Amir with such 
an arrangement was quite obvious. By abolishing the local 
militias he insured that no governor would have the military 
ability to oppose him, or to defend his province. The 
provinces would thus be both at the mercy of Ibn Abi 'Amir's 
troops and in need of their protection against invaders from 
the north as well as from inter-provincial feuding. All in 
all, this scheme must have increased the ability of Ibn Abi 
'Amir to control the provinces, this control increasing as a 
new generation grew up with almost no experience in warfare. 
The damage done to Muslim Spain's ability to put trained 
soldiers in the field even as a back up to professional 
soldiers was great, showing in the weakness of the military 
ability of most of Muslim Spain in the eleventh century. 
However, this attempt by Ibn Abi 'Amir to deprive the prov- 
inces of their militias was not entirely successful. The 
139 ibid. p. 301. 
140 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: 
-A1-Dhakhira, 
Part IV, p. 81. 
141 Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 17. 
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march lords could not afford to give up their military men, 
f or that would have weakened their defences against border 
raids by the northern Christians. By the end of Ibn Abi 
'Amir's reign the three frontier provinces had between them 
nearly the same number of soldiers as in the standing army in 
Cordova. 142 
The third military change that Ibn Abi 'Amir 
introduced into Muslim Spain was the concept of intensive 
campaigning. During the Caliphal period campaigns were con- 
ducted at a maximum of perhaps one a year, normally during 
the summer. Ibn Abi 'Amir, however, conducted campaigns both 
in summer and in winter. 143 In his twenty f ive year reign 
he conducted between fifty two to fifty six campaigns, 144 
some like that of Jamada al-Akhira 387/July 997 against 
Santiago de Compostela were spectacular, others less so. 
The'reason behind this intensive campaigning were varied. In 
part, they were directed against the march lords to keep them 
in check. Ibn Abi 'Amir had destroyed and disbanded Ghalib's 
army whose duty was to keep the marches under control. 
Having disposed of this possible threat, Ibn Abi 'Amir could 
not afford to install a commander with another large military 
contingent to replace that of Ghalib, for such a commander 
could have turned against him. In part the campaigns were 
aimed at keeping the Christian states weak and unable to 
142 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 301. 
143 ibid. p. 273. 
144 L. Molina: 'Las Campafias de Almanzor a la luz de un nuevo 
textol, Al-Oantara, 1981, pp. 216-217. 
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attack Muslim Spain, while keeping a firm grip over the march 
provinces. Zaragoza, however, because of its geopolitical 
situation, remained a source of trouble. In Safar 379/May 
989 Ibn Abi 'Amir occupied the march and dismissed its Tujibid 
governor. Interestingly, he needed the co-operation of the 
Tujibids enough to appoint another, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Yahya, 
to replace the deposed one. 145 His son and successor 'Abd 
al-Malik also felt the need to occupy Zaragoza in his first 
campaign as ruler in Shalban 393/june 1003.146 This would 
suggest that this alternative method of controlling the march 
province was probably less successful than the one devised by 
al-Hakam, and certainly much more expensive. 
Another reason for conducting so many campaigns was 
the profit they could bring in. Ibn Abi 'Amir (and his son 
and successor 'Abd al-Malik) imported Berber troops to help 
prop up his authority. He lured them into Muslim Spain 
partly by offering them the opportunity to serve in a Jihad 
against the Christian north and the chance to earn a place in 
heaven. 147 Part of the lure, however, was the offer of 
financial gain. The Berber tribesmen who crossed over to 
Muslim Spain hoped to benefit from the legendary wealth of 
that realm. Ibn Abi 'Amir offered them a better lifestyle, 
one, we are told by Ibn 'Idhari, they never imagined, even 
145 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p. 283. 
146 ibid. Vol. 3, p. 5. 
147 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 16. 
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in their dreams. 148 The campaigns served to satisfy both of 
these demands of the Berbers, spiritual and financial. As 
the cycle of Ibn Abi 'Amir's import of troops speeded up, so 
his need to conduct even more campaigns increased. However, 
campaigns were expensive to mount. In his first campaign of 
393/1003 'Abd al-Malik's expenditure, according to Ibn 
Hayyan, included 15,000 dinars (one assumes gold) distrib- 
uted to the Berbers plus other large unspecified amounts spent 
on preparation, plus 5000 shields, 5000 helmets and 5000 
pieces of head-mail distributed from the government 
armoury. 149 Ibn Hayyan is reported elsewhere as recording 
that a summer expedition under Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir cost the 
treasury 500,000 dinars, while the standing army cost 
between 150,000 - 200,000 dinars per month. 150 One would 
assume that as the 'Amirids mounted an increased number of 
campaigns against the economically poorer north, these 
campaigns must have suffered from decreasing returns, so that 
the more the 'Amirids needed to raid north to pay for their 
imported soldiers, the less they received from these cam- 
paigns, forcing them to spend from the other resources of the 
government, perhaps in the long run harming the Caliphal 
treasury. 
Finally, a third reason why Ibn Abi 'Amir may have 
f elt the need to conduct intensive campaigning against the 
148 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 279. 
149 ibid. Vol. 3, p. 4. 
150 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam, pp. 114-120. 
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north may have been connected to the maintenance of power. 
His prestige originally grew because of the firm stand he took 
against Christian raids following al-Hakam's death. His 
adoption of the title al-Mansur followed a victory over the 
Christian states in the north, so that in part, Ibn Abi 
'Amir derived some justification of his usurpation of author- 
ity from his position as an active defender of Muslim Spain 
and attacker of the Christians in the north in iihads, 
although he was not noted particularly as an outstanding 
horseman (faris) . 
151 This continuous cycle of iihad helped 
lend legitimacy to his position. That it was to some degree 
successful, is testified to by the fact that later sources 
continued to point him on the good Muslim Jihad-oriented 
ruler, glossing over the problematic legal basis of his 
authority and title. However, this constant Jihad while 
helping to lend legitimacy to Ibn Abi 'Amir's reign may have 
had a counter-effect on Muslim Spain in the long run. While 
in the later Umayyad era the Christian states in the north 
occasionally raided the Muslim marches, there was an accept- 
ance (at least a de facto one) of the military superiority of 
Muslim Spain and the futility of fighting it. This superior- 
ity was made bearable because Muslim Spain while keeping these 
states in check never pushed them too far. Ibn Abi 'Amir's 
constant campaigning made the situation politically unbearable 
for the Christian states, the attack on Santiago de Compos- 
tela being almost the proverbial final straw. Economically 
151 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 278. 
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and ideologically, the Christian states were being put in a 
position where they had to start to at least seriously 
consider a counter attack on the Muslim south. What was now 
keeping them in check was not a well maintained march and a 
few campaigns maintaining a sort of status quo, but rather 
the almost constant presence of attacking Muslim troops. 
once this pressure was lifted, the Christian north did not 
fall back into the pre-'Amirid state of affairs, but instead 
moved slowly and steadily into a counter offensive (partly to 
do with changes within these Christian states, which will be 
discussed briefly below), which was to a large extent 
successful. Traditional Christian sources (and many recent 
studies) tend to gloss over this'fact maintaining a myth of a 
continuous reconquest. However, a very strong argument can 
be put forward that the ideal began to develop in earnest in 
the period following (and partly as a result of) Ibn Abi 
'Amir's rule. 
2.3 The Fitna 
Strictly speaking, the term f itna ought to be 
applied to the turbulent years following the death of 'Abd al- 
Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir in Safar 399/October 1008152 to the time 
when the Almoravids brought Muslim Spain under their control 
(and because of their titular allegiance to the 'Abbasid 
Caliphate, into the sphere of that Caliphate) in the last 
152 ibid. Vol. 3, pp. 3-4. 
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quarter of the eleventh century. However, in the eyes of 
the contemporary Muslims, the fitna seems to have stretched 
from the end of the brief reign of 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 
'Amir to the abolition of the Caliphate, a period stretching 
roughly from 1009 - 1030. There seems to have been an 
awareness that the period under the Talifas was unique and 
relatively stable, with a semblance of legality that made it 
something more than a period of fitna. Interestingly, the 
Muslim Spaniards of the time clearly laid the blame for the 
sedition on the shoulders of the Berbers. Ibn Hayyan calls 
it al-fitna al-Barbariyya 153 - the Berber sedition - nor 
does it seem that he was alone in holding this view. 154 
This posed problems for later historians writing for a north 
African audience, for they could not ascribe such a hideous 
crime to north African Berbers. Ibn Bassam sidesteps this 
problem neatly. Writing in c. 1105, he simply does not 
discuss the very beginning of the sedition (Muhammad Ibn 
Hisham's rebellion against 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir) and 
starts his book al-Dhakhira by discussing the reign of the 
next pretender (Sulayman al-Mustalin) when the fitna was under 
way. 155 Later sources such as Ibn 'Idhari, having the 
advantage of time distance between the writing of their book 
and the events themselves, try to lay the blame on the Muslim 
153 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira. Part I, p. 576. 
154 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, V01.3, p. 76. 
155 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 35. 
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Spaniards, exonerating the Berbers. 156 
It is far too easy to lay the blame for the breakup 
of the 'Amirid state and the civil wars that followed on 'Abd 
al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir. He was not entirely an ideal suc- 
cessor to his brother 'Abd al-Malik. For one, he was 
rumoured to be a transvestite homosexual. He also lacked 
political sensitivity to an astonishing degree: he appointed 
a child to a ministry and crossed the fine line that kept the 
'Amirids on the legitimate side of the political scene by 
forcing the Caliph Hisham to appoint him as a successor to the 
caliphate. 157 However, his incompetence as a ruler and the 
uncertain nature of his morals are not in themselves enough to 
explain why in a few months Cordova faced a popular uprising 
followed by a very bloody civil war which led to the collapse 
of the government. The reasons for that upheaval were partly 
to do with the changes that the 'Amirids had made to the 
Umayyad government. 
When 'Abd al-Rahman succeeded his brother, he had 
taken over a state almost on the verge of collapse. 'Abd al- 
Malik had had to continue in his father's policy of importing 
Berber troops, so that he presided over a large standing army 
(mostly Berber, but also partly Slav) which needed to be 
paid. The raids northwards were not very successful finan- 
cially or strategically. When he succeeded his father in 
Ramadan 392/August 1002 he faced hostility from the Christian 
156 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 76. 
157 ibid. pp. 40; 43-47. 
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states in the north kept in check only by constant campaign- 
ing. six years and seven campaigns later, 158 1 he left his 
brother f acing a situation where he f elt it necessary to 
immediately threaten hostilities to keep the Christian states 
within their boundaries. 159 The campaigns were expensive in 
themselves, as were the salaries payable to the troops. 
Much of the cost was raised from taxes which made the Berbers 
understandably unpopular, an unpopularity compounded by their 
overcrowding of Cordova. 
So when Muhammad Ibn Hisham, titled al-Mahdi (the 
guided one -a suggestive title) rose against his cousin the 
Caliph Hisham and 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir during the 
latter's absence on his first campaign in LTamada al-Aula 
399/january 1009160 he found widespread support among the 
commoners of Cordova. He exploited this popularity by 
freeing prisoners condemned by the 'Amirids and offering them 
the chance to join his cause. Much of the anger of the 
commoners was directed against the symbol of 'Amirid power; 
their palace-complex of al-Zahira. However, this anger was 
also directed against the Berber presence, looting some of 
their houses. Al-Mahdi shared the Cordovans' dislike of the 
Berbers, probably partly because he saw them as the source of 
'Amirid power who had usurped Umayyad authority and partly 
because he resented their being a drain on the wealth of 
158 ibid. p. 3. 
159 ibid. p. 39. 
160 ibid. P. 50. 
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Cordova. It is interesting that as soon as al-Mahdi thought 
himself secure in power he released from service no less than 
seven thousand Berber troops. He was trying to deal with a 
situation that had got out of hand - namely that the state 
paid for an exceedingly large standing army which was a strain 
on its resources. Nor was this act of Ide-mobbing' confined 
to the Berbers (although as the largest component of the army, 
they suffered most); al-Mahdi also Banished some of the Slav 
corps which had become loyal to the 'Amirids and who moved to 
the eastern side of the peninsula. Al-Mahdi had the support 
of the commoners as well as the civil servants, such as Ibn 
Hazm and Ibn Dhakwar, who supported him despite his appoint- 
ment of "servants and members of the lowest elements of the 
army" as (Halibs) (here used in the sense of those that 
controlled admittance to his presence) . It was also attested 
to by the fact that despite the unorthodox method with which 
he acquired power, and despite his suspect morality, his 
succession was accepted by scholars such as Ibn Hayyan, while 
they called the movement against him the fitna, while for Ibn 
'Idhari who was writing later and whose sympathy lay with the 
Berbers it was al-Mahdi and not the Berbers who should have 
been accused of starting the fitna 
and this was the doing of the foolish Ibn 'Abd 
al-Jabbar [i. e. al-Mahdi] who was the reason 
for the corruption and the great long-lasting 
fitna, which the people of the al-Andalus call 
the Berber fitna and it would have been more 
truthful if they had called it the f itna of 
Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar. 161 
161 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 76. 
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The people of Cordova, whether commoners, or members of the 
educated elite, had clearly had enough of the 'Amirid 
dictatorship and the heavy burden of its imported troops, 
wishing to return to the Umayyad system of government. 
The Slavs, being relatively few in number and used 
to the system in Muslim Spain, when Banished from Cordova 
tended to try to establish themselves in provinces outside the 
immediate control of Cordova, hoping perhaps to find a profi- 
table accommodation within the "traditional" Umayyad system. 
The Berbers, however, did not know quite what to do with 
themselves. They dared not remain in a Cordova where the 
Caliph's protection was far from enthusiastic. They did not 
immediately think of taking over distant provinces as their 
experience of Muslim Spain was centred mostly on Cordova. 
Furthermore, they and their families relied on the salaries 
the Cordovan government paid out. The option they chose to 
follow was to back another claimant to the Caliphate, 
Sulayman titled al-Mustalin, whom they hoped would keep them 
in employment. The resulting civil war was particularly 
bloody in which several massacres of Cordovans and of Berber 
were committed. 162 Nor was the conflict restricted to the 
two claimants to the Caliphate. At one stage there were no 
less than four claimants in Muslim Spain. 163 
This was highly damaging to the Caliphate in Muslim 
Spain, but would hardly have happened had the Caliphate not 
162 ibid. pp. 56-97. 
163 Ibn Hazm: Ibn Al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam, p. 166-167. 
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been weakened under the 'Amirids. The conflict continued for 
nearly twenty-two years until the elders of Cordova took the 
unprecedented step of suspending the Caliphate'" in dhi 
al-Hijja 422/December 1031.165 It was not simply a case of 
switching allegiance to the 'Abbasid or even the Fatimid 
Caliphate, but simply deciding that Umayyad succession could 
not be maintained and therefore no new Umayyad Caliph could be 
nominated. By not writing to Baghdad to offer'even nominal 
allegiance, the elders were deciding to live outside the 
bounds of a 'Caliphate'. Such a move was momentous; the 
Caliphate was the source of all legitimacy, the corner-stone 
of Islamic medieval order. 166 Ibn Hayyan's account reflects 
the unease at such a move. It seems the elders confined them- 
selves to a discussion of how to govern Cordova itself without 
underlining the "abolition" of the Umayyad line. The account 
also makes clear the political cunning of Ibn Jahwar who as a 
result assumed power in Cordova: 
164 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, pp. 150-152. 
165 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part i, p. 602. The 
quote below is from this reference. 
166 Ibn Hazm in his Al-Muhalla, declares that a Muslim who dies 
without declaring for a Caliph dies as a non-believer. Vol. 9, 
pp. 359-362 & Vol. 1, pp. 45-47. 
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And in the Middle of dhi al-Hijja of the year 
422, after the deposing of Hisham (titled] 
al-Multadid and the murder of his wazir Hakam 
al-Halik, the people of Cordova agreed to 
give the shaikh Abi al-Hazm Ibn Jahwar auth- 
ority over them, recounting his attributes 
which no one disputed. He refused; but they 
insisted until he agreed provided his two 
cousins the shaikhs Muhammad Ibn 'Abbas and 
'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Hassan would share his 
authority. The people agreed to give them the 
right to counsel him without authority. ... And when asked he [Ibn Jahwar) would say "I 
have no authority to give or to withhold; it 
[the wealth of the state] belongs to the 
people Jamala and I am their trustee". If he 
was unsure about a course of action or if he 
decided to act, he would summon them [i. e. the 
senior wazirs] and ask for their counsel and 
they would agree with him, giving him 
authority to act once they realised his 
purpose. When addressed by a formal letter, 
he would only act in response to such a letter 
in the name of the wazirs. 167 
It is noteworthy that Ibn Jahwar was careful in 
involving the other wazirs in his decision. Also that he was 
careful in describing his authority over the treasury as that 
of a "trustee". He was clearly wary of being accused of 
having usurped the power which rightly belonged to the Caliph. 
Ibn 'Idhari writing much later provides a less circumspect 
picture of this event: 
And the people and wazirs gathered in the 
mosque and plotted to remove Hisham who was 
sent to fort(? ) without taking a legal 
decision Khitta to depose him or bearing 
witness against him of failing in his duties 
167 Ibn Hayyan Is description is quoted by Ibn Bassam. However, 
it is likely that Ibn Bassam was careful in his choice of quota- 
tions, so as not to offend his Almoravid audience. This account of 
the suspension of the authority of the Umayyads is important 
because ibn Hayyan was a cordovan civil servant himself, with 
access to the civil servants originally involved in this act. It is 
reasonable to assume that had his book survived it would have 
contained more detail about-this important decision. 
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as a Caliph, thus removing the obligation of 
the people Ummah to bear him allegiance, as 
was customary. This they either forgot or 
neglected to do ... And it was declared in the market place and suburbs that no Umayyad 
might remain in Cordova. 168 
2.4 The Provinces and the fitna 
The evidence we have about the way in which the 
provinces reacted to the fall of the 'Amirids in 399/1009 is 
rather scarce. In part, this was due to the fact that many 
provinces did not react immediately. The governors were not 
sure of the situation in Cordova, especially since the 
changes in Cordova resulted in actual changes in some prov- 
inces. This was especially the case in the eastern part of 
the peninsula where the Slavs exiled from Cordova established 
themselves, as well as in the areas into which the Berbers 
attempted to move. Keeping in mind the discussion in chapter 
one about the historical background of Zaragoza and Valencia, 
especially the way in which the former seems to have had 
experience of some independence from Cordova, in part because 
of its position on a march, it is interesting to note that 
Zaragoza appears as one of the first provinces to react to the 
coup against the 'Amirids, and thereafter attempts to play 
some role in the efforts to rebuild the Cordovan government 
without them. 
As with the ef forts of the Umayyads in the Clo dis- 
cussed in chapter one, Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir had not been 
able to completely overthrow the power of the important 
168 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3 pp. 151-152. 
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families in the upper march. He, like the Umayyad Caliph 
before him, had to use them so that when al-Mahdi conducted 
his rebellion, the upper "march was under the command of a 
local man, promoted from the ranks while serving the 'Amiri- 
ds, but belonging to the Tujibid family. 169 This Mundhir 
Ibn Yahya Ibn Tujib had under his command part of the march's 
military force, which Ibn Abi 'Amir had not been able to 
abolish. ' The military forces in the thugur were said to 
number around 10,000 horsemen, 170 which seems a reasonable 
number as these horsemen would have been spread over three 
frontier provinces - To the southwest of Zaragoza lay the 
march centred on Medinaceli which had been established by al- 
Nasir. Although Ibn Abi I Amir had defeated and disbanded the 
Umayyad army under the command of Ghalib, the 'Amirids still 
needed to have some military presence there. As he did not 
trust the local nobility, Ibn Abi 'Amir installed another 
Slav commander, Wadih, with a probably smaller army loyal to 
the 'Amirids. Between them Wadih and Mundhir controlled the 
largest contingent of military personnel outside Cordova. 
Moreover, they were used to exercising their authority in 
their provinces. 
Both realised that as defenders of the buffer state 
which protected Muslim Spain's borders, their value to 
whatever government ruled in Cordova was high enough for such 
a government to seek their loyalty. This would especially be 
169 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 180. 
170 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 2, p. 301. 
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the case if the government reverted to the Umayyad style. 
Added to this was the f act that neither of those two 
commanders felt any particular loyalty to the 'Amirids. The 
Slav contingent had suffered under them, losing much of its 
prestige and power which was taken up by the imported Berber 
troops whom they resented. Some, like Wadih, served under 
the 'Amirids, but an end to 'Amirid power might have meant an 
end to Berber ascendancy and a reversal to the dominance of 
the Slav corps. The Tujibids, likewise, had little cause 
to be loyal to the 'Amirids. Some of them had served Muham- 
mad and his son 'Abd al-Malik, but that was because their 
power was manifest. The strong 'Amirid dictatorship had not 
ended Tujibid power, but by constant campaigns to the north 
had restricted it considerably. An end to 'Amirid rule could 
have been seen by the Tuj ibids as leading to more independence 
in the province. Both commanders, then, had an interest in 
supporting the coup. The first reference we have is to Wadih 
acknowledging the new Caliph al-Mahdi and supporting the 
execution of 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir in 400/1009.171 
We also have a reference to Mundhir Ibn Yahya actively 
supporting al-Mahdi at the end of Shawwal (May) of the same 
year/1010,172 which would suggest tacit support for the 
coup in Cordova earlier in the year. Both these men probably 
saw in the coup a chance of ending 'Amirid dominance, while 
remaining within the bounds of legality. Muslim Spain, it 
171 ibid. V01.3, p. 76. 
172 ibid. P. 96. 
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seemed, had apparently reverted to an active umayyad Caliph. 
The Caliph al-Mahdi appeared to have been acting in a manner 
which might re-establish Umayyad power and re-organising the 
government on the pre-'Amirid Umayyad style. Both Wadih and 
Mundhir, it seems, supported the claim of al-Mahdi, partly 
to ingratiate themselves with his party (which seemed to be in 
the ascendant) and also because by supporting him they were 
supporting a return to the pre-'Amirid set-up which was 
beneficial to the marches. 
By contrast, Valencia seems to have experienced a 
disintegration in the power of the Cordovan appointed 
governor, not so much in favour of local families, but in 
that of undisciplined possibly Cordovan appointed officials. 
'Abd al-Rahman ben Yasar, either a convert from Judaism, or 
a Jewish civil servant who had adopted a Muslim name (a not 
unheard of practice), who was governing Valencia at the time 
does not seem to have reacted immediately to the coup, or if 
he did, his reaction was not deemed worth recording by Ibn 
Hayyan. He governed a city close to Cordova whose defences 
seem to have been weak. 173 He probably had a small 
contingent of night watchmen to keep the peace but no sizeable 
military force. Mujahid, a Slav commander had tried to gain 
control of Valencia following al-Mahdi's accession. The 
unknown author of the manuscript published as fragment B at 
the end of Ibn 'Idhari's al-Bavan implies that Mujahid 
controlled the city until Mubarak and Mudhaffar (two Slav 
173 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 16. 
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commanders) rebelled against him, 174 but that does not, seem 
likely. Possibly Mujahid appointed Mubarak and Mudhaf far to 
serve under Ben Yasar in a bid to share control of the city. 
Ben Yasar seems to have tried to dismiss these two and regain 
complete control. Ibn Hayyan recorded how in 401/15 August 
1010 -3 August loll he dismissed the two officials from their 
office of the water tolls (al-sigava) , probably accusing them 
of embezzlement. 175 However, he could not enf orce this 
dismissal. This reflects to some extent how Ben Yasar was 
losing his authority. Soon after, the two Slavs took over the 
governorship of Valencia (possibly with the approval of the 
new government in Cordova) and forced Ben Yasar into exile. 
The new governors of Valencia realised that unlike 
the upper march the government in Cordova would woo its 
loyalty only in times of turmoil. Once the situation was 
settled, the government in Cordova would revert to its policy 
of control over Valencia. Mubarak and Mudhaffar probably had 
no idea how long the fitna would last, but planned to benefit 
from it. In some ways, because of this realisation that 
they could exercise some independence only during the period 
of unrest in Cordova, the two Slav usurpers were more 
prepared in the short-run to cope with the situation than the 
upper march. They showed little interest in what was going 
on in Cordova. That was because while the length of the 
174 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 302. 
175 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 14. For a description 
of the takeover of the city by Mubarak and Mudhaffar, see A. Huici 
Miranda, Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Region, Vol. 1, pp. 148- 
151. 
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period of unrest was of interest to them, they had no 
interest in contributing to the establishment of an accepted 
government there. Once such a government was established, 
provinces like Valencia would come under its direction and the 
two rulers would go. obviously, the longer the state of 
unrest lasted, the better for them, but in addition, they 
lacked, or rather Valencia lacked, the military ability to 
contribute to the civil strife. To gain some form of legal 
authority for their rule, Mubarak and Mudhaffar declared for 
Hisham but that was as far as their support went. They 
took no steps to reinstate 'Amirid power, nor did they help 
the Berber contingent, hardly surprising considering that 
they belonged to the Slav corps. 
The most pressing problem which Valencia faced at 
the time of their takeover was its lack of military power. 
Unlike the upper mdrch, Valencia did not have a standing 
army. This in a time of civil strife, with groups of dis- 
banded soldiers, Berbers and others, as well as supporters 
of different claimants to the Caliphate roaming the southern 
part of Muslim Spain was dangerous, putting the "governor- 
ship" of the two rulers at grave risk. The steps which they 
took sought to remedy the situation. The longest lasting 
military contribution they made to the city of Valencia, the 
influence of which affected the city until the end of the 
century, was its fortification. As soon as they took com- 
mand of the province, they built up the city's defences and 
fortifications. They also built a wall that surrounded the 
whole city (although the sources are not clear on this point, 
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f or there is a suggestion that the walls might have protected 
only the harbour - with fortified gates 176) . To build up 
their army they invited soldiers of Slav as well as Basque and 
Frankish origin (mawali) to join them. They seemed to 
discourage free Muslims from joining them and there is no 
mention of Berbers doing so. Ibn Hayyan noted that they 
attracted rebellious and escaped slaves. This newly gathered 
army was trained in horsemanship and equipped with the best 
weapons available. 177 
The instability in Cordova could not have been 
easily settled, for although the Umayyads seem to have been 
successful in their coup against the 'Amirids, they did not 
f ind a solution to the problem of the Berber legacy. The 
Berbers themselves reacted to the coup by first approaching 
the new Caliph, al-Mahdi, then as it became obvious to them 
that he was hostile they supported another pretender, Hisham 
Ibn Sulayman in 399 *(5 September 1008-25 August 1009). Their 
move against al-Mahdi failed resulting in a Berber massacre. 
This did not eliminate them as a problem f or Cordova. A 
sizeable number of them survived and they turned to yet 
another Umayyad pretender Sulayman Ibn al-Hakam, titled al- 
Mustalin. 178 This led to a series of claimants and counter 
claimants to the Caliphate, which by 404/13 July 1013 -2 
July 1014 started including not only Umayyads, but also 
176 Dr 'Abbas favours the theory that the walls surrounded the 
whole city, which he records in his main reading of Ibn Bassam. 
177 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, -pp. 14-16. 
178 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, pp. 83-84. 
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Hammudids. 179 The Berbers remained a factor contributing to 
the general instability in Cordova until many of them estab- 
lished themselves-on the mountain where they built 
Granada. 180 
Wadih, having decided to support the re-establish- 
ment of the Umayyads, refused to act as an intermediary for 
peace between the Berbers and al-Mahdi. Possibly he was 
influenced by their sacking of Guadalajara, or possibly he 
simply wanted to take a stand against Berber power. In 
Muharram 400/August 1009 the Berbers defeated a combined force 
of the marches under Wadih. 181 In Shawwal 400/May 1010 al- 
Mahdi defeated the Berbers and reentered Cordova with a force 
which included Mundhir Ibn Yahya as well as Wadih. Both were 
acting in an effort to restore stability. Possibly they saw 
al-Mahdi's claim as stronger than that of Sulayman because of 
its precedence (that is, because he was declared Caliph 
first). Possibly they feared the dominance of the Berbers. 
They may have also feared the consequences of more than one 
claimant to the Caliphate. Up to this stage, the marches 
were merely loyal and supportive to what they believed to be 
the legal authority in Cordova. However, the continued 
ineffectiveness of the Caliph slowly allowed them to be more 
assertive in their relationship. 
In Dhi' al-Hijja 401/July 1011, the Caliphate 
179 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam: pp. 149-154. 
180 'Abdullah ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 22. 
1111 ibid. p. 87. 
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reverted to Hisham with the death of al-Mahdi. This, 
however, did not end the. fitna, for the Berbers refused to 
declare for a weakling now controlled by their enemy Wadih. 
Wadih fearing the ineffectiveness of the Caliph tried himself 
to negotiate with the Berbers, was discovered and executed. 
This left the upper march, including the area centred on 
Medinaceli under the control of Mundhir. Meanwhile, those 
with influence, the Ahl in the thugur, were beginning to tire 
of Cordova Is quarrels with the Berbers and wrote to the 
government in which they demanded either a peaceful settlement 
or a decisive military victory. In Shawwal 403/May 1013 the 
Berbers regained Cordova reinstating Sulayman al-Mustalin as 
Caliph. Mundhir shifted his allegiance to al-Mustalin and 
received legal title to Zaragoza. 182 
2.5 The Provinces and the Weak Cordova 
Although Mundhir had declared for al-Musta I in, receiving 
the title Haj ib 183 as well as conf irmation of title to 
lands he already held, he must have realised that, at least 
for the time, the Caliphate had lost its power. It seems 
that Mundhir started to act in complete independence from 
Sulayman. It was not a case of reverting to the pre-'Amirid 
type of relationship between Cordova and Zaragoza: beyond 
acknowledging al-Mustalin, Mundhir ignored him. This can be 
seen in a letter from al-Mustalin to Mundhir in which he 
182 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, pp. 85-109. 
183 Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 408. 
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almost begs to be kept informed of events in the march, while 
at the same time stating his complete confidence in Mundhir's 
actions without knowing them: 
And We miss hearing your news which is slow 
(in arriving). The fact that we do not doubt 
that you, in all your actions, are doing as 
we would wish. for and desire, reflects the 
esteem (lit. your share] which we hold you in 
and the position you hold in our trust. 184 
The tone of the letter contrasts with the treaty discussed in 
chapter one. The relationship was no longer one of interde- 
pendence with Cordova having the upper hand, but rather one 
of the Caliphate needing Zaragoza's loyalty even if only in a 
titular manner. 
Mundhir Ibn Yahya does not even seem to have 
attempted to help al-Mustalin against the joint Slav-Berber 
force under 'Ali Ibn Hammud which captured Cordova, declaring 
'Ali Caliph in Muharram 407/July 1017. At the beginning of 
the fitna, the upper march believing in the power of the 
Caliphate did attempt to back up its allegiance with some form 
of action. The death of Wadih ended the role of Medinaceli 
as a centre of a march. This was because Zaragoza under the 
command of Mundhir filled the vacuum left by WadihIs death. 
This left Mundhir controlling a city whose influence stretched 
south-west covering almost two thugur. By 1017 this major 
political figure in Muslim Spain decided to take a less active 
part in the struggle in Cordova; perhaps because he lacked 
WadihIs motivation and dislike of the Berbers. Probably, 
184 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 116. The letter was 
composed by the wazir Abi Hafs Ibn Burd, the Elder. 
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Mundhir believed that the succession would sort itself out and 
concentrated on solidifying his position in the upper march. 
He was not hasty in acknowledging 'Ali as a new Caliph, 185 
again an indication of the weakness of the office, but also 
possibly revealing his own views on the legitimacy of 'Ali's 
claim. once he did declare for 'Ali, he not only dictated 
his own t: erms concerning his governorship, which 'Ali 
accepted, but also gave 'Ali advice on how to treat the 
Cordovans which was also accepted. Mundhir, it seems, 
could treat the Caliph in a high-handed manner and get away 
with it. The weak position of 'Ali in his relations with 
Zaragoza is made clearer by the third of the letters quoted by 
Ibn Bassam. 186 'Ali talked of co-operation and his right to 
Caliphship, but the letter's tone aimed to convince, not 
order. Zaragoza under Mundhir was distancing itself from the 
political turmoil in Cordova. Yet, this is not to suggest 
that it sought to break off relations. Like all provinces, 
Mundhir kept up at least a facade of political cohesiveness, 
in always declaring for a Caliph, trying to work within a 
system that had clearly begun to fall apart. All the same, 
Zaragoza was beginning to form, through necessity, a 
political identity beyond the one of an important march in an 
Umayyad system. 
Ironically, this evolving political personality was 
best illustrated in Zaragoza's last serious attempt at ridding 
185 ibid. pp. 117-118. 
186 ibid. pp. 119-120. 
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Muslim Spain of the Berber problem and restoring the Umayyad 
Caliphate. In 409/20 May 1018 -8 May 1019 a force made up 
of Slav and march soldiers sought to attack the Berber 
presence in Cordova, then under the rule of al-Qasim, 
brother to 'Ali Ibn Hammud. On the way to Cordova, they 
diverted to Granada to fight with the Berbers settled there. 
The Slav-Zaragozan force was defeated in the ensuing battle 
and in their retreat Khairan, commander of the Slav forces, 
and Mundhir, commander of the Zaragozan forces, ordered the 
Umayyad pretender, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad, titled al- 
Murtada, whom they had sought to establish in Cordova, to be 
killed. 187 In some ways this act symbolised the abandonment 
of the Umayyad system. Viguera sees this year of 1018 as 
marking the beginning of Mundhir's reign in Zaragoza as head 
of a Talifa, 188 and in a way it was. On the other hand 
Mundhir's reign could be seen to have started much earlier, 
during the reign of Sulayman al-Mustalin. One could also 
argue that Mundhir and his successors never became independent 
Talifa rulers in the way in which their successors the Hudids 
became. 
However, in this campaign of 409/1018, there is 
evidence of Zaragoza starting to operate as an independent 
political unit. Mundhir came into the field not only with 
his own troops, but it seems with others who were semi-inde- 
pendent, but operating within Zaragoza's sphere of influence 
187 ibid. pp. 453-455. 
188 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulmdn, p. 136. 
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and whose relationship to Zaragoza seemed to be not dissimilar 
to Zaragoza's relationship with Cordova under the Umayyad 
system. Among them were the forces of Sulayman Ibn Hud, 
lord of Tudela which he held f rom Mundhir, 189 but as I hope 
to show below, that did not mean that Mundhir's control was 
total. Sulayman had not only his own men but some Christian 
troops as well identified by Ibn Hayyan as Franks 
(if ran! ) . 
190 These do not seem to have been a section of 
the troops under the control of Khairan, but men controlled 
by Sulayman directly. Mundhir's relationship with Sulayman 
and the Christian troops reflects the establishment of a 
system of political dependence centred on Zaragoza. 
The question that comes to mind is: given the 
situation in Cordova and Zaragoza's geo-political position, 
why did Zaragoza continue to adhere, at lest de lure, to the 
Caliphate? Why did it try as late as 409/1018 to re-establish 
the Umayyad system? one would have expected Mundhir to have 
been more forceful in seeking independence, like Valencia 
which will be examined below. There was of course the 
importance of legality. Mundhir's power could not have 
emanated from a vacuum, it had to be derived from a legal 
source, and the only legal source of authority was the 
Caliphate. Mundhir, therefore, had always to acknowledge a 
Caliph if only in a titular way. Mundhir and his successors 
faced a situation when the very geo-political position of 
189 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 183. 
190 ibid. pp. 454-455. 
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Zaragoza which allowed it to be independent from Cordova could 
become counter-productive if Cordova were too weak. Although 
the upper march could stand up to occasional raids from the 
north, it needed in the final analysis the back-up of the 
full might of Muslim Spain represented in the armies raised by 
Cordova. These expeditions north served to keep the Chris- 
tian states subdued while the march kept them at bay. As 
mentioned above, the 'Amirids took the principle of northward 
raiding to an extreme, which was resented by the local powers 
in the march, but the principle itself was sound and 
accepted. To some extent a less domineering Cordova would 
have led to a stronger Zaragoza, but a powerless Cordova and 
a fragmented Muslim Spain would leave Zaragoza without the 
prospect of reinforcements. 
The situation was particularly dangerous because 
some Christian forces were involved in the fitna and experi- 
enced Muslim civil strife at first hand. In Shawwal 399/ 
August 1009, a Christian force under the command of Sancho 
(III) son of Garcia, King of Navarre, helped the Berber 
force of al-Mustalin to attack and occupy Cordova, 191 an 
engagement during which many Cordovans were killed. The 
psychological effect of this episode cannot be stressed 
enough. For many years the Christians had been dominated 
militarily by the Muslim Spaniards. Cordova was the symbol 
of the military, cultural and economic superiority of Muslim 
Spain. It was a city that contained twenty one quarters, the 
191 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan , Vol. 3, p. 51. 
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ditch surrounding it on three sides stretching for 47,500 
dhiral, the river running on the fourth. 192 Yet this vast 
metropolis, with its palaces and gardens, its markets and 
wealth, fell before the might of a partially Christian army. 
It was not quite a revenge f or Santiago, but it would not be 
too unreasonable to assume that those Christians involved in 
the attack felt some satisfaction. The story of the fall of 
Cordova probably spread back into Navarre and possibly to 
neighbouring Spanish Christian domains, as well as stories of 
Muslim in-fighting. The idea of Muslim military superiority 
probably began to crumble and the morale of the Christian 
soldiers must have received a boost. 
The image of Muslim military dominance received 
another blow when Wadih recruited some Christian soldiers to 
f ight against Sulayman al-Musta I in in the following year, 
allowing them into Medinaceli where, some sources claim, 
192 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam: pp. 120-121. 
Ibn Mandhur in Lisan al-Arab defines a dhiral as the length from 
the elbow to the tip of the middle finger, or roughly equal to 0.5 
of a yard. This suggests that the overall size of the city was 
somewhere in the region of 36 square miles. Two arguments can be 
put forward to support the view that such an overall size is not 
improbable. First, Cordova had a large population. The suggestion 
is that the population of the city could have been between 100,000 
(Fletcher, The Quest for El Cid, p. 20) and 250,000 (Vicens Vives, 
Economic History of Spain, p. 106). Secondly, if for the sake of 
mathematical convenience we assume that Cordova was built in the 
shape of a circle (which it was not), the above mentioned circum- 
ference would suggest a radius of about 3.4 miles. It is interest- 
ing to note that the distance from al-Rasafa, a suburb at the edge 
of the city limits, to the river is about 3.5 miles. The distance 
between the Caliphal palace complex, al-Zahral, which was built 
outside the city, and the main mosque is about 6 miles. 
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they turned the mosque into a church. 193 Medinaceli did not 
have the same symbolic value as Cordova, but it had been for 
a time the centre of the middle march. Again, the psycho- 
logical and moral value to those f rom the northern Spanish 
kingdoms who were involved, if only for a while, in control- 
ling one of the centres of Muslim Spain's buffer zones, must 
have been immense. The image of the buf fer zones, the 
marches, as impregnable, was severely dented. One would 
expect this to have been a factor influencing the north 
Christian states to be bolder in their attacks on Muslim 
Spain, especially if unchecked by some form of punitive 
expedition from Cordova. The Christian north, first under 
Sancho Garcia III of Navarre and later under Fernando I of 
Ldon-Castile, then under Alfonso VI of Castile did become 
bolder; the eleventh century saw a gradual southward advance 
of Christian Spain, an advance influenced, it would be 
reasonable to assume, to some degree, by this denting of the 
Muslim military image. 
Mundhir Ibn Yahya of Zaragoza faced three Christian 
states on his borders: Castile, Navarre, and the County of 
Barcelona. Of these three, Navarre under King Sancho 
Garcia III, known as el-Mayor (1008-1035), presented Zaragoza 
with the strongest threat. Sancho who had been kept in check 
by the 'Amirids, took the opportunity of the fitna to 
retrieve lands lost to Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir including Buil 
193 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 94. The reference might 
be read to imply that the mosque was, in turn, originally a church, 
which when converted to a mosque had kept its belfry, so that when 
the Christian troops took it over they rang its bells. 
143 
and lands from the Cinca to Penarrvia. He also re-occupied 
lands lost to 'Abd al-Malik, Muhammad Is son, including 
Ribagorza and Roda de Isabena. 194 Under him Navarre grew to 
be the most inf luential of the Spanish Christian states. 195 
Mundhir tried to check the growing power of Navarre with 
punitive expeditions. There is reference to at least one 
campaign in which Mundhir occupied Pamplona, Navarre's 
capital, sometime between 1018-1022, as well as another 
campaign in which Sancho Garcia III was defeated. 196 
However, without the support of reinforcements from 
Cordova, Mundhir did not have the ability to mount major 
expeditions northwards regularly enough to keep the Christian 
states weakened. He had to find an alternative method for 
protecting his borders from Christian excursions. This he 
did, the alternative method being a combination of limited 
military operations and diplomacy. This policy of diplomacy 
as well as its positive results was recorded by Ibn Hayyan, 
who notes that Mundhir treated with the leaders of the 
Christians ('Udhamal al-Ifranj), while perhaps raiding the 
lesser counts (Asaqhir al-oawamis). He goes on to note that 
the march was "blocked up with no gap in it, nor did it 
become weakened in its state". 197 
Mundhir's policy against Navarre was twofold. 
194 M. J. Viguera: Arag6n Musulmcin, pp. 136-137. 
195 J. F. O'Callaghan: History of Muslim Spain, pp. 134-135. 
196 Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 119,126. 
197 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, pp. 181-182. 
144 
First, he exploited the resentment caused by the vigorous 
rule of Sancho Garcia III whose expanding power weakened, and 
at times dislodged, local counts. 198 There are at least 
two references to local counts who came to Mundhir for 
support. The first was a count identified only as Ferdinand, 
whose power was restored to him. 199 The second was al-amir 
Ibn Miro who is identif ied by Makki 200 and Viguera 201 as 
the count of Pallars and who also received aid from Mundhir. 
Secondly, Mundhir tried to exploit the resentment caused by 
Navarrese strength to its Christian neighbours of Castile and 
Barcelona. There is a reference to the count of Castile 
coming to Mundhir for aid, 202 one assumes against Navarre. 
Even if the aid was not specifically against Navarre, the 
fact that the count came to Mundhir demonstrated how the 
latter was working on dividing the ranks of his Christian 
neighbours. He went as f ar as to organise a marriage 
alliance between the Count of Castile and the Count of 
Barcelona. 203 Viguera 204 sees this arrangement as having 
as its main purpose the checking of Navarre's power. Ibn 
198 M. U. Viguera: Aract6n MusulmAn, p. 138. 
199 Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 123. 
200 ibid. poem 50: p. 168. 
201 M. J. Viguera: Arag6n Musulmdn, p. 138. 
202 Ibn Darraj: al-Diwan, p. 128. 
203 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, pp 182-183. 
Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 177. 
Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, poem 44, p. 130. 
204 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulmdn, p. 138. 
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Hayyan writing in Cordova, and basing his narrative, in 
part, on information he received from a Katib named Abu 
Umayya Ibn Hashim al-Qurtubi, who had left the Cordovan civil 
service at the time of the fitna, settling in Tudela, gives 
this reason for Mundhir's dealing with the Christian states: 
And it was said that Mundhir Is opinion in this 
matter was wiser than the opinion of those who 
spoke against him, for he considered the 
matters of his time and the weakness of the 
Muslims (lit. the cracking of the staff of the 
people of his word], and so chose friendship 
(with the Christians] to protect his realm. 
(In this way] he tricked Raymond and Shanjah, 
the two Galician leaders ('Udhamal), who were 
talking in those days of attacking the people 
of al-Andalus, and distracted them from war. 
.. And in this manner Mundhir gave the people 
of the march peace and stability, which 
enabled them to build and prosper, until he 
died, by which time all had acknowledged (the 
(wisdom of his) policy. 205 
Mundhir's son and successor Yahya (414/1023 - 420/1029) 206 
continued his father's policy towards the north. There is a 
reference, for example, to him aiding an Ibn Ferdinand, 
identified by Makki as the Count of Castile. 207 Unlike his 
father, however, Yahya lacked the ability to mount any major 
expeditions northwards, partly because Navarre was becoming 
stronger and partly because he faced trouble within his 
province. 
Both Mundhir and Yahya realised that to be able to 
check the northern Christian states, particularly the Navarre 
205 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 182. 
206 A. Turk: I El Reino de Zaragoza I, RIEEI, Vol. 17 & 18, p. 49. 
D. Wasserstein:, Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 91. 
207 Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 128. 
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of Sancho Garcia III, the march needed the help of a Cordovan 
army. To some extent this may help explain why Mundhir 
continued to attempt to re-estabýish the Umayyad system up to 
409/1018. Even after his participation in the murder of the 
pretender, al-Murtada, Mundhir does not seem to have totally 
cut his ties from the Caliphal system. He asgumed the titles 
al-HaJib and Dhu al-Rilasatvn 208 : neither denotes a wish to 
imitate Kingship by assuming Caliphal titles. His son Yahya, 
it appears from numismatic evidence also called himself 
Halib, 209 as well as adding the title al-Mudhaffar. 210 it 
could be argued that this assumption of a Caliphal title by 
Yahya was in itself a. declaration of independence. For by 
this act, Yahya could be seen as clearly showing that he had 
broken off from the Caliphal system, setting himself up as an 
independent lord. However, two objections can be put 
against such an argument. First, that the title was al- 
Hajib al-Mudhaffar. Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir titled himself al- 
Halib al-Mansur while in the service of the Caliphate, thus 
setting up a precedent for a non-Caliph to assume a title; one 
that was taken up by his son 'Abd al-Malik, so that this 
assumption of a title by Yahya, while obviously meant to 
pronounce his authority did not necessarily mean an assumption 
of a status of a completely independent ruler. Secondly, 
Yahya, like his father before him, continued to show at 
208 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulmdn, p. 136. 
209 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reves de Talifa, p. 197. 
210 M. J. Viguera: Arag6n Musulmdn, p. 142. 
147 
least titular allegiance to a Caliph. Numismatic evidence 
shows allegiance to the Caliph al-Qasim, then later to 'Abd 
Allah al-Mu I ayyad (their names are f ound on coins minted in 
Zaragoza during Yahyals reign). 211 
Internally, Mundhir and Yahya needed to strengthen 
their hold over the province. In a sense, the absence of a 
strong Caliphate made their task harder. one of the advan- 
tages of holding a province from a Caliph was that one 
possessed the legal right to exercise one Is authority over all 
of it. If local lords rebelled, they outlawed themselves. 
At times, Cordova gave a province's governor military as 
well as moral aid to help uphold his authority. The absence 
of a Caliphal system robbed the governor of the upper march of 
both these aids, although the continued declaration for a 
Caliph must have been, in part, an attempt at maintaining 
some sort of legal basis for their authority. Be that as it 
may, Mundhir and Yahya do not seem to have had complete 
control over their province. They controlled Calatayud, 212 
but there is no evidence to suggest that they controlled the 
213 other main centre in the Ebro basin, Ldrida, in this 
period. Zaragoza also controlled Tudela through Sulayman Ibn 
Hud, but his loyalty was not absolute. He disagreed with 
Mundhir's plan to create a marriage alliance between Castile 
and Barcelona (possibly fearing the consequences of any 
211 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reves de Talifa, p. 197. 
212 D. Wasserstein: Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 82. 
213 ibid. p. 85. 
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alliance between the northern Christian states), and it 
appears as if he cut himself off from Zaragoza at this stage 
(c. 1017). 214 one of Yahyals main successes was to bring 
Sulayman back into the Zaragozan fold. 215 Zaragoza also 
had no control over Tortosa (its main outlet to the sea) which 
216 up to 452/1060 was under the rule of Slav commanders. 
Huesca, Zaragoza's advance post against the north, was under 
a relative of Mundhir, Muhammad Ibn Malan al-Tujibi. His 
loyalty to Mundhir was also not total. After the death of 
Sulayman al-Mustalin in 407/May 1016, Muhammad tried to 
achieve independence from Zaragoza. Mundhir responded with 
a campaign in which Huesca was captured from Muhammad, who 
f led. 217 
Valencia, on the other hand, did not face the 
pressure of being a neighbour to hostile Christian states. 
It lacked the position that made Zaragoza more prone to be 
independent, but then it also lacked the problems that such 
a position would bring. Mudhaffar and Mubarak, having taken 
over the military steps discussed above to defend the city 
against military attacks, seem to have concentrated to 
amassing as much wealth as possible during their period of 
office. Perhaps this would suggest that they believed that 
their position was tenuous, and that as soon as a strong 
214 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 183. 
215 Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, poem 60: p. 203. 
216 D. Wasserstein: Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 93. 
217 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 173. 
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government was established in Cordova, their authority would 
go. They had no reason to suppose that the difficulties in 
Cordova would continue for a long time or that the government 
there might disintegrate, and probably saw their reign as 
being of short duration and hoped to make the best of it. 
Their actions in Valencia do not seem to have been aimed at 
building up a strong position in preparation for bargaining 
for power with a reinstated Umayyad system, but rather at 
securing their position during the fitna, while reaping as 
much profit as possible during their reign. As will be 
discussed below, they took little interest in the changes in 
Cordova and the taxes which they collected seem to have been 
punitively high. However, they like the Tujibids in Zaragoza 
took steps to strengthen their authority within the province. 
The province of Valencia offered less of a problem for this 
end than that of Zaragoza. In the triangular plain, there 
was only one other centre, iativa. Jativa was under the 
control of another Slav called Khaira. Following a visit to 
Mubarak and Mudhaffar he died (there was suspicion of poi- 
soning). Khaira was succeeded by his second in command lAbd 
al-lAziz Ibn Aflah al-Sultani, who seems to have accepted 
being in Valencia's sphere of influence. At the same time, 
Mujahid, lord of Denia seemed to have been pursuing a policy 
more akin to that of Zaragoza and was intent on expanding his 
domain. He therefore attempted to take over iativa. This, 
in fact was to set a precedent for the rest of the century, 
when Denials northward ambitions continued to represent a 
threat for the province of Valencia. Mubarak defeated him, 
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then beat of f another attempt at the city, this time from 
Mundhir Ibn Yahya of Zaragoza, who had attempted to take 
advantage of this turbulence. 218 Again, this can be seen 
as a precedent, as the attempt to bring Valencia within 
Zaragoza's sphere of influence, whether directly or through 
forging alliances with its rulers, was to develop into on of 
the major thrusts of Zaragozan policy in the C11. It is not 
clear exactly when these events took place, but by 409/1018 
there is evidence that Jativa was not under the control of 
Valencia. 
once established in Valencia, Mubarak and Mudhaf far 
seem to have taken little interest in the upheavals in 
Cordova. There is numismatic evidence that they declared for 
219 'Ali Ibn Hammud in 407/10 June 1016 - 29 May 1017, in 
that coins minted in the province bearing their names also 
acknowledge the Caliph. So it appears they thought it 
necessary to acknowledge the Caliphate. However, there does 
not appear to be any evidence of them taking part in the 
strife in Cordova by supporting any particular faction. In 
409/20 May 1018 -8 May 1019, *the forces trying to install 
the pretender al-Murtada found the gates of Valencia shut 
220 against them . This seems 
to be the only participation 
of Valencia in the political struggle in Cordova recorded in 
this period. 
218 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam, pp. 259-260. 
219 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reyes de Tali-fa, p. 182. 
220 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 456. 
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Mubarak and Mudhaf far concentrated on increasing 
their wealth during their reign. Ibn Hayyan recorded that 
the monthly income from the tax which they managed to collect 
from the province came to 120,000 dinars at the beginning of 
their reign; 70,000 from Valencia and 50,000 from Jativa. 
These sums appear to be substantial but Ibn Hayyan seems to 
have accepted them, perhaps because he believed that the two 
rulers were bleeding the province dry. Ibn Hayyan, quoting 
an unnamed eyewitness, goes on to describe how Mubarak and 
Mudhaffar extracted these taxes mercilessly, the situation 
becoming so bad for the population that many dressed in rags 
and ate grass (although the extent of the suffering of the 
population of Valencia might simply reflect Ibn Hayyan's 
hostility towards what he would have seen as adventurers). 
Many could not sustain this pressure and left their villages. 
Their property was simply confiscated by Mubarak and 
Mudhaffar. 
on the other hand, Valencia was seen as settled and 
stable enough to attract the wealthy citizens of Cordova who 
were dislodged from the troubled capital. They settled in 
Valencia investing huge sums (up to 100,000 dinars) in 
building residences there. Again, the quoted cost for a 
villa (presumably with land) seems inordinately high and might 
reflect either an attempt by Ibn Hayyan to convey a feel of 
excessive spending by the well-off Cordovan immigrants in 
Valencia. Alternatively, the figures might well reflect a 
period of high real estate inflation. If one accepts that 
Valencia was seen as a safe and settled city, where many of 
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the wealthy of Cordova moved to, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that this increase in demand for large villas over a 
short period might have resulted in real estate bubble. 
Such af orm of government could not be tolerated for 
long. Following Mubarak's death in a riding accident, the 
people of Valencia rebelled. They invited Labib, the ruler 
of Tortosa to rule them. Labib found this offer attractive, 
but could not hold the province. Sulayman Ibn Hud of Tudela 
then tried to extend his control in the province. However, 
he was stopped by the forces of Mujahid of Denia also trying 
to extend his authority there. 221 Finally, the people of 
Valencia sent to the grandson of Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, 'Abd 
al-'Aziz, then living in Zaragoza, asking him to come and 
rule them. 'Abd al-'Aziz left Zaragoza secretly and arrived 
in Valencia 412/17 April 1021 -5 April 1022. Little is 
known about his previous career, but he seems to have arrived 
with the notion of a longer reign - perhaps influenced by what 
he saw in Zaragoza. one of his first acts was to acknowledge 
the caliph al-Qasim. He then tried to strengthen his posi- 
tion by building up a small civil service capable of running 
the province. It is noteworthy that this chancery was made up 
of four men holding the lesser rank of Katib, rather than 
Wazir- although some were to earn the rank of wazir later. 
The four were: Ibn Talut, Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (who 
was later to establish his own rule over Valencia) and Ibn al- 
221 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 14-20 for 
the earliest extant description of the reign of Mubarak and 
Mudhaffar. 
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Takirni. This perhaps reflects the fact that at that early 
stage 'Abd al-'Aziz was unable to attract more established 
civil servants to his service. 222 
The position in Muslim Spain was changing: while 
Mubarak and Mudhaffar do not seem to have behaved as if they 
believed that the fitna would last (they did not try to build 
support within the province, but rather to extract as much 
wealth as possible as quickly as possible), there are indi- 
cations that other provinces were beginning to expand and 
consolidate, in preparation for an indefinite period of 
unrest in Cordova. The attempts by Denia to extend its 
control over Valencia in 409 and 412 were not the acts of a 
governor building up his position in preparation for a return 
to the Umayyad system, but rather of one preparing to build 
up a state that would be large enough and strong enough to 
survive. Nor was Denia alone in its attempts to expand. 
Tortosa tried to expand southwards as did Tudela. In other 
parts of the peninsula the same was happening with the 
provinces trying slowly to expand beyond the limits of a 
traditional city-province. This seems to have been the 
emerging current in Muslim Spain (although it does not 
necessarily imply a conscious abandonment of the Caliphal 
system), a current which Mubarak and Mudhaffar did not go 
along with, but to which the new governor of Valencia, 'Abd 
al-'Aziz Ibn Abi 'Amir seems to have belonged. 
222 ibid. pp. 249-251. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The 'Amirid dictatorship was a period when fundamental 
changes were integrated into the governmental structure of 
Muslim Spain. These were tolerated because of the military 
might of the dictator, and possibly because of his active 
pol icy against the northern Christian states. There is some 
evidence to suggest that contemporary Spanish Muslims did not 
view it as the period of ideal Muslim Jihad-oriented rule that 
it was later made out to be. Many of the changes the 
'Amirids brought about were resented by various sections of 
Spanish Muslim society. The increased power of the Cordovan 
government in relation to the provinces although by no means 
complete, especially with regards to the march provinces, 
was resented. The heavy-handedness of the many north-bound 
campaigns, designed in part to keep the marches in check, 
was resented. The weakening of the status of the Caliph, by 
turning Hisham into an invisible puppet, was resented. So 
was the act of turning the civil service into an apparatus 
separate from the Caliphate. 
Once the 'Amirid system started collapsing, it 
found no natural supporters among the Spanish Muslims 
(although the Berber contingent, whose economic well-being 
was linked to the government were natural supporters of the 
system). At the same time, the changes forced onto the 
Umayyad system of government were such that they made a 
reversal to a pre- I Amirid f orm of government very dif f icult to 
achieve. They had not only ripped the fabric of that 
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government (destroying the Slav standing army and discredit- 
ing the civil service) but had also introduced elements which 
added to the instability of the region during the period of 
turmoil following the collapse of the 'Amirid government, 
which included the introduction of the Berbers, the economic 
drain on Muslim Spain and the increased resentment of the 
northern Christian states, brought about by the intensifica- 
tion of hostilities under their reign. The changes in these 
northern states will be looked at in more detail in chapter 
five, but one can see in the eleventh century a change which 
resulted in a more expansionary Navarre. As Ldon-Castile 
became more prominent from the mid 1030's, it was Castile 
which followed this gradual expansion southwards. 
Amidst this confusion, the lords of the provinces 
tried to adapt to what they perceived to be the changes 
affecting the peninsula. In this, many of them started with 
their resentment of the 'Amirid system and a wish to revert to 
the Umayyad system (or at least what they believed a Caliphal 
system entailed) as a first point of reference. However, in 
the fluid conditions of the first two decades of the century, 
these lords found it impossible to revert to a system that 
combined elements of autonomy for the distant provinces with 
a strong central government that brought all the provinces 
together in a political unity. They also became aware that 
the Umayyad system had become discredited with a number of 
pretenders representing various factions vying f or power. 
The resulting change to the world view of the Spanish Muslims 
was underlined by the extraordinary decision to abolish the 
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Cordovan Caliphate altogether. This effectively rocked the 
foundations of legitimacy on which the government of the 
various provinces was based. It also took away the only 
viable central government that could have coordinated Muslim 
Spain into something approaching a single political entity, 
especially when it came to facing threats on its border 
provinces from external powers. 
What was perhaps the most unusual aspect of what 
followed was that no representative of the 'Abbasid Caliphate 
was invited to hold, if only titular, authority in Cordova 
and bestow a sense of legitimacy on the governments in the 
peninsula (although some independent lords did acknowledge the 
'Abbasid Caliph, while others, notably the lords of Seville, 
continued to acknowledge the Umayyads) . The lords of the 
provinces had no experience of a situation so separate from 
the mantle of Caliphal legitimacy and their efforts to come to 
terms with the situation, made worse by the increased 
pressure from Navarre and later from Ldon-Castile, did have 
the feel of a reactive set of actions. An important factor 
which must have influenced the behaviour of these emerging 
rulers was the distance of Muslim Spain from the rest of the 
Muslim world. The two centres of alternative Caliphal 
authority in Cairo and Baghdad were too distant (and in the 
case of Baghdad too weak) to be able to fill the vacuum left 
with the abolition of the Umayyad Caliphate. One can also 
conjecture that this perception of distance and perhaps even 
isolation from the rest of the Muslim world (reflected to some 
degree in the attempts by Ibn Bassam in al-Dhakhira to prove 
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that Muslim Spain was not a provincial backwater and could 
produce men of literary and ministerial ability equal to any 
who lived in the east) was further stressed by the fact that 
Muslim Spain was seen as an island (jazira) . Both the lack of 
any decisive interference from an alternative legitimate 
government in the politics of Muslim Spain and its distance 
f rom the rest of the Muslim world might be seen as having 
prodded further the various lords of the provinces into pat- 
terns of behaviour where they became independent to a degree 
where they crossed the line from being simply governors of 
city-provinces within the Caliphal state to being independent 
lords of city-states, although as discussed in the introduc- 
tion, whatever their actions, it does not appear as if they 
formally adopted the title (malik) or king, preferring to 
continue to use the less problematic title (sahib) or lord. 
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3. Talifas Emerging 
1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I have attempted to 
highlight some themes in the period preceding the age of the 
Ta I if as and which inf luenced the political development in 
Spain in the C11. The peace treaty, discussed in chapter one, 
marking the end of the Zaragozan rebellion suggests that the 
framework of government in Umayyad Spain was one in which 
legitimacy, rooted in and emanating from the caliphate, played 
a very important part. A lord of a province derived his legal 
title to his province and hence his authority over the lesser 
lords in the province from Cordova. This foundation of 
legality supported a structure where at least the march lords 
enj oyed a great amount of independence, but where Cordova 
continued to play a Vital practical role: first; in providing 
sanction against any lesser lord who might rebel; secondly, in 
coordinating the resources of the whole of Spain to support 
the marches militarily when the marches failed to contain the 
attacks from the northern Christian kingdoms through a 
combination of diplomacy and military action. This framework 
was, as discussed above, dismantled by the 'Amirid dictators 
who with the symbolic assumption of Caliphal titles and 
creation of a new government centre in al-Zahira diluted the 
legality of the government in Cordova. The 'Amirids also 
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changed the relationship between Cordova and the marches in a 
military sense with their constant, and arguably 
unnecessary, campaigning as well as destabilising the military 
establishment in Cordova with the introduction of new Berber 
troops and the weakening of the Caliphal palatine corps. The 
new Berber emigres proved a strain both on the economy of 
muslim Spain and on the social set up in Cordova. 
Chapter two attempted to discuss the way in which 
the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship was seen by Spanish 
Muslims as an attempt at a return to pre-'Amirid normality. 
The blame for the ensuing civil war in Cordova was laid firmly 
by contemporary Spanish Muslim scholars on the Berbers 
imported by the 'Amirids. There seemed to be, however, a 
belief that the state of chaos was to be short-lived. The 
behaviour of Mubarak and Mudhaffar, who took over Valencia, 
suggested an attempt to amass as much wealth as possible in a 
short period, as opposed to an attempt at consolidating a 
kingdom. The 'Amirids, however, had fundamentally changed 
the fabric of government in Muslim Spain so that a return to 
the Umayyad system was impossible. The attempt to reestablish 
a "legitimate" framework for the political system continued to 
be an important theme throughout the C11. This can be seen in 
the continued importance of declaring for a Caliph, even when 
the Caliphal institution in Spain had so obviously 
disintegrated. In fact, the legal justification for the 
Almoravid's occupation of Spain towards the end of the century 
was that they declared for, and therefore represented, the 
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'Abbasid Caliph. 223 Given that the political system in 
Muslim Spain, both in the sense of internal provincial 
relationships between lord and overlord and inter-provincial 
relationships, was reliant on the existence of, at least de 
lure, Caliphal authority, the situation in the first half of 
the C11 where Spain had four caliphs 224 in addition to the 
existence of an orthodox Caliph in Baghdad and a shilite one 
in Cairo must have added to instability within provinces and 
between provinces. 
It is this instability which allowed lords to jockey 
for positions within provinces and to expand into neighbouring 
ones. The assumption, fairly early on, by Talifa rulers of 
Caliphal titles provoked attacks on them by later authors. 
Yet, as discussed above, this was a concept first introduced 
by the 'Amirids. Moreover, a distinction must be drawn 
between the titles assumed in the early part of the C11 where 
there was an attempt to present them as ministerial titles in 
the 'Amirid sense(for example dhu al-Rilasatayn or al-Hajib 
al-Mustalin) and titles were all attempts at a pretence of 
adhering to ministerial rank were given up as in the latter 
part of the C11 (f or example, al-Mu I tamin) ;a distinction 
which is made by Ibn 'Idhari. 225 There was, however, a 
gradual shift towards real independence and what perhaps can 
be termed 'kingship' (although the evidence suggests that the 
223 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bavan, Vol. 4, p. 23 
224 Ibn Hazm: Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 244 
225 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 168 
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Talifa lords while using words like Sahib (Lord) as well as 
Caliphal titles, never actually used the title king; they did 
however use so called 'Kingly paraphernalia' (Alat 
Mulukivva). 116 
This chapter will try to look at the development of 
Hudid power and in particular the evolution of Sulayman Ibn 
Hud into the lord of Zaragoza. It will also look at the 
evolution of an independent power in Valencia under the 
grandson of the 'Amirid dictator al-Mansur, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn 
abi 'Amir. The fortunes of Zaragoza in the C11 became closely 
tied with those of Valencia to the south and to a lesser 
extent to those of Toledo, the middle march, to the south 
west. The politics of these three states concerned both their 
relationships with each others and with the Christian powers 
to the north. By the fourth decade of the C11, the Talifa 
states had reached a position where their power was, 
mostly, equal so that an equilibrium was reached. The only 
way for the major Talifas to impose their will on their 
neighbours was either to ally with other Talifas or with a 
Christian kingdom. An extension of this state was the 
attempted expansion by the major Talifa states of their 
spheres of influence over lesser ones. However, this 
equilibrium led to a situation, particularly with the 
increased unity in the north, where no single Talifa could 
match the growing power of the northern Christian kingdoms, 
and especially Castile in the second half of the century. 
226 For a discussion of the term "Malik" in the Talifa 
period, see I. de las Cagicas: Los Mozdrabes, pp. 419-423. 
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3.2 Sulayman Ibn Hud - Lord of Tudela and L6rida. 
The Bani Hud were an established family in the upper 
march who claimed descent from an aristocratic Arab 
lineage. 227 One assumes that the relationship between 
Sulayman Ibn Hud and the Tujibids in Zaragoza followed the 
pattern suggested in the peace treaty discussed in chapter 
one. That is to say, he passed on part of the tax collected 
in Tudela to Zaragoza and, in theory, followed Mundhir I's 
policies. In return, Mundhir offered Sulayman support to 
maintain his lordship over the city against internal and 
external dangers. Sulayman had been the lord of Tudela from 
the time of the 'Amirids which is the main reason for 
believing that his relationship with Mundhir I followed the 
pre-fitna pattern between lord and overlord. That Sulayman 
was a local man suggests that he had a local power base and 
family influence. Ibn Hazm mentions in his Jambarat that the 
Bani Hud were an old Arab f amily long settled in the area. In 
the sense that Sulayman held Tudela as part of Zaragoza's 
Almal, he was in the pre-'Amirid set-up Mundhir's man. 
Tudela, on the Ebro, to the northwest of Zaragoza, commanded 
the approach from the Rioja. It was not as rich as Ldrida and 
its surrounding Almal nor was it as advanced a post as Huesca. 
Both these important cities were in the hands of relatives of 
Mundhir I. A symbolic indication of Tudela being in Zaragoz- 
a's sphere, and therefore part of Zaragoza's greater Almal 
227 Ibn Hazm: Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab, p. 431. 
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concerned the chancery which was established in Zaragoza (and 
which, like the chancery of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia, seemed 
to have employed only Katibs at this stage, among whom were 
Abi al-'Abbas Ibn Marrus, Abi 'Amir Ibn Arzak and Ibn 
228 Wajib). It clearly would not have been as sophisticated 
as the Caliphal chancery, but its presence in Zaragoza marked 
the city as the administrative centre of the whole march. 
Indeed, the creation and development of chanceries was one of 
the main ways in which rulers established their power centres 
in cities, as for example, in the case of 'Abd al-'Aziz in 
Valencia, which will be looked at below). 
There is also clear evidence that Zaragoza started 
striking its own coins from the very early stages of the 
f itna, thus transferring fiscal power in the province to 
itself In time, all city-states came to mint their own 
coin. However, the Tujibid ruler of Zaragoza must have had 
the Caliphal coinage replaced or demonetized to make the 
zaragozan coin effective. Control over coinage (including 
occasional replacement of the currency in circulation) was an 
effective method for central authority to exercise control, 
and to be seen to do so, in the ClO/C11 and has its parallels 
229 elsewhere in Europe. Whatever the outward manifestation 
of the independence of the emerging city-states, this develop- 
ment of the power of the local chanceries which eventually 
228 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p. 183. 
229 See J. Campbell Essays in Anglo -Saxon History, chapter 10, 
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metamorphosed into small scale civil service apparatuses, and 
the control of the currency in circulation in each city-state, 
indicate that from an early part of the C11, some of these 
states were exercising effective independence and operating as 
integral political units. 
Another indication of Sulayman being in the sphere 
of Mundhir's influence was his participation in the latter's 
failed bid to reinstate the pre-'Amirid system in Cordova and 
establish al-Murtada as Caliph in place of the Hammudid 
al-Qasim in 409/20 May 1018-8 May 1019. During that 
campaign, Sulayman commanded a Christian corps among his 
troops. The command of Christian forces in the field, as 
opposed to simply allying with them was to become a feature of 
Hudid rule in the C11. While the forces of Mundhir and his 
ally Khairan the Slav fled before the forces of Habus Ibn Ziri 
of Granada, Sulayman held fast until told to retreat by 
Mundhir I. This he thought shameful and it might have been 
the beginning of his losing his respect for his overlord. Ibn 
Hayyan recorded how the forces of Mundhir and Khairan were the 
first to break. As Mundhir passed by Sulayman with his 
Christian troops holding fast, he shouted: 
Seek saf ety, you son of a harlot, for I 
shall not stand by you. Sulayman then 
retorted: you have committed a calamitous deed 
and shamed the people of al-Andalus. He then 
withdrew. 230 
230 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 455. 
I have used "You have committed a calamitous deed" to convey the 
sense of Sulayman Is reply. In f act his reply was an old saying 
of -11. 
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That Sulayman was willing to stand against what was 
after all an inferior force suggests that he was not privy to 
the developments in the planning of the campaign by Mundhir 
and Khairan. The two allies had turned against al-Murtada when 
the latter' refused to pressure Mubarak of Valencia to join 
their campaign. They decided to divert their combined forces 
to Granada where they planned to betray the pretender. 
Further, Sulayman does not seem to have been involved with 
the murder of al-Murtada after the battle had been lost(due to 
the allies' forces retreating) . 
231 The importance of this 
incident to the relationship between Tudela and Zaragoza 
concerns again the concept of legitimacy discussed earlier. 
What bound Sulayman to Zaragoza was not only the practical 
necessity resulting from Tudela being part of the greater 
Almal of Zaragoza, but also the legal framework of both lords 
acknowledging, and therefore deriving their authority from, 
the Caliphate. Sulayman was willing to help his overlord try 
to install an Umayyad Caliph. As a member of an established 
Spanish Muslim family, Sulayman's allegiance would have 
naturally veered towards the Umayyads and the pre-, Amirid 
system. His loyalty to Mundhir stemmed partly from a politi- 
cal perspective where he saw himself as owing allegiance to, 
and deriving legitimacy from, Mundhir who in turn owed 
loyalty to, and derived legitimacy from, the Caliph. it 
would be reasonable to assume that the existence of several 
pretenders would have strained this political perspective. 
231 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, pp. 453-455. 
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This political perspective would have been strained 
further by 
. 
Mundhir having the Caliph he declared for, killed. 
After all, in the overall power structure of umayyad Spain, 
the Caliph was to Mundhir what Mundhir himself was to 
Sulayman. - In other words the civil war that followed the 
collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship produced a situation 
where relations between a major lord and the lords of the 
lesser cities within his Almal became a purely practical one 
and not bound by a recognised legal framework. This would 
strongly suggest that the loyalty of the Almal to the main 
city must have been weakened. Because of the future importance 
of Sulayman and the important role Mundhir played in the civil 
war, their relationship is better documented than that between 
other lords and the lesser lords in the Almal. However, this 
blurring of what is legally correct and what is not was 
probably echoed in other Almal and might help explain the 
ensuing weakness and political volatility in the various 
provinces even after the establishment of relatively strong 
Talifas. A dependency built solely on practical consider- 
ations and unsupported by any moral (or at times practical) 
authority from the caliphate could have been and frequently 
was severed when the weakness of the main city of fered an 
opportunity to the lords of the lesser Almal to exercise their 
independence. An example of this can be seen in the relation- 
ship between Valencia and Almeria which will also be looked at 
below. In the case of Zaragoza and Tudela, this legal frame- 
work and Sulayman's loyalty were further strained by the habit 
Mundhir was developing of killing Caliphs he did not particu- 
I 
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larly like. Besides al-Murtada, Mundhir was responsible for 
the death of Hisham in Cordova and Muhammad Ibn Sulayman, the 
latter while he was staying as a guest in Zaragoza. 232 
The f ailed campaign to install al-Murtada can be 
seen as marking the beginning of the development of the Hudids 
as a separate Talifa. It certainly marked the beginning of a 
period when Sulayman as lord of Tudela did not follow the 
policies of Zaragoza. The first major departure from Zarag- 
ozan policy was in 1017, when Sulayman refused to cooperate 
with the plan to arrange a marriage alliance between Castile 
and Barcelona. Sulayman went to the extent of closing the 
gates of Tudela to the marriage party. Viguera sees this 
alliance as directed primarily against Navarre. 233 The 
incident is interesting from Tudela's point of view for 
several reasons. First, there is an indication in Ibn Hayyan 
that the "people" Ahl of Tudela opposed allowing the party 
into the city. Ibn Hayyan recorded the following quote from 
the Katib Abu Umayya Ibn Hashim, who had settled in Tudela: 
234 The Count Shanjah Ibn Garcia, lord 
(sahib) of Castile passed by Tudela at the 
beginning of the rule of al-Hajib Mundhir, 
and at the time we were ruled by Sulayman Ibn 
Hud, his friend and whom he had set to govern 
US. (The count] was passing to the upper 
reaches of the march to meet Count Raymond, 
the ruler of Barcelona, to arrange a marriage 
between them, with the female from Shanjah. 
He was passing our territory with the knowl- 
232 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 181. 
233 M. J. Viguera: Aract6n Musulmcin, p. 138. 
234 Garcia Sdnchez (1017-1029). Ibn Hashim seems to have used 
Garcia's second name without the deminutive to identify him. 
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edge of, and a safe passage from, Mundhir, 
our governor (Walina). The people of Tudela, 
then strong and powerful, denied him passage 
thus disobeying their prince (Amirahum) Mund- 
hir. Shanjah, on hearing this, sent for 
some of [Tudela's] elders, and I was among 
those who went. ... And when we reached 
where he was sitting, we found him dressed 
like a Muslim, bare headed, old and balding, 
his hair not yet completely grey, dark 
skinned and handsome. He spoke gently to us 
and we told him of the objection of the city 
to his passing through. .. He reminded us of 
war and its ef fect and so we left him and 
reported what he said, but the commoners 
('Awwam al-Nas) did not accept this. .. and 
wanted to rob his baggage train disobeying 
in this the elders (Mashvakha). 
95 
Whether this was at the instigation of Sulayman or 
whether Sulayman followed the wishes of the Tudelans is 
unclear. It does suggest that a lord of a city had to rely on 
the support of its populace or perhaps the lack of support 
from Zaragoza forced Sulayman to rely on popular support. The 
power of the citizens of a city played an important role in 
the eventual coming to power of Sulayman in Zaragoza and in 
the coming to power of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia. Secondly, 
it marked a new era in Muslim policy towards the Christians. 
prior to the f itna, a lord would only oppose the foreign 
235 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, pp-183-184. It 
is interesting to note that Ibn Hashim describes Sulayman as well 
as the Counts of Castile and Barcelona as Lord, (Sahib), but tries 
to differentiate Mundhir by describing him as governor (Waii), 
which is a title used under the Cordovan government, and prince 
(Amir). There is also a clear division between the commoners and 
the elders of Tudela. Finally, Garcia Sdnchez was dressed like a 
Muslim, and the text implies that he spoke directly to the 
delegation. Either, they all conversed in Romance, or Garcia spoke 
in Arabic. Such a proposition is not entirely improbable. Fletcher 
in The Ouest for El Cid (between pp. 77 and 79) shows a charter 
issued by Pedro I of Aragon in 1100 with the king's signature in 
Arabic. 
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policy of his overlord if he believed that that policy was 
opposed to the policy of Cordova. This insured a more or less 
uniform approach to the northern Christian kingdoms, 
coordinated by Cordova. A local deviation from such a policy 
could occur, but was generally limited. The significance of 
the closure of Tudela's gates lay in the fact that it simply 
represented the policy of Tudela. This incident symbolised 
the end of a coordinated policy towards the north, as each 
lord devised his own. Indeed, Ibn Hashim mentions that the 
calamity faced by the Muslims was that they experienced the 
fitna and disunity in the presence of the leaders of the 
Christians, especially that of the "enemy of God" Sancho III 
el Mayor. 236 This disunity towards the north characterised 
the Talifa century until the Almoravids brought back a 
semblance of a unified policy in the last two decades of the 
century, although Zaragoza remained outside its bounds. 
There is evidence to suggest a rift, between Tudela 
and Zaragoza in the years following 1018. The main evidence 
for the AInal politics of the Tujibid period comes from the 
poems of their court poet Ibn al-Darraj. It seems that 
following the death of Mundhir and the succession of his son 
Yahya I in 1021/22, there was an attempt at a reconciliation, 
with Sulayman visiting Zaragoza. 237 However, this recon- 
ciliation was relatively short lived. Sulayman's attempts to 
236 ibid. p. 185. Ibn Hashim calls him (Shanjah ibn Ferdhaland) , 
presumably because Sancho III was succeeded by Fernando I and Arabs 
tend to call their first born by their father's name. 
237 Ibn al-Darraj : al-Diwan, poem 60, p. 203. 
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expand his influence in Valencia following the death of 
Mubarak in 1019/20 could not have been welcomed by the 
government in Zaragoza. It was in ef fect, a declaration by 
sulayman of his independence and an attempt to establish his 
own Ta I ifa. In 1028, Yahya IIs campaign against Navarre was in 
part directed against the Almal of Tudela-238 Two incidents 
in particular reflect the growing independence of Tudela. 
The first was the capture of Ldrida, the second city 
in the upper march. This city was governed by a cousin of the 
Tujibids in Zaragoza, Abi al-Mutarrif al-Tujibi. Sulayman 
attacked Ldrida and captured it killing abu al-Mutarrif. This 
gave him command of the second wealthiest centre in the march. 
Furthermore, with the Almal of Ldrida, including Monzon, just 
south of Barbastro and halfway between Huesca and Ldrida, 
Sulayman now controlled two of the main approaches to Zaragoza 
from the north. This served to increase his importance to 
Zaragoza and hence his power base. That the Tujibids allowed 
this expansion and the killing of their relative points to 
their decreased power within the provence. It also helped 
boost Sulayman's prestige within the march since it was a 
clear signal that his power was beginning to equal if not 
exceed that of the Tujibids. 
The date of Sulayman's takeover of Ldrida is 
unclear. Ibn al-Khatib records that this event took place at 
the relatively late date of Muharram 431/23 September- 
238 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulmdn, p. 142. 
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22 October 1039.239 This seems to agree with the earlier al- 
Bayan by Ibn 'Idhari, 240 who simply gives the year 431/23 
September 1039-10 September 1040. However, this date seems 
unlikely. Al-Marrakushi in his al-Mu1jib states that the 
Caliph Hisham III fled from Cordova soon after 8 dhi al-Hijja 
420/18 December 1029 to Ldrida in the upper march where he 
stayed with Sulayman Ibn Hud. 241 Ibn 'Idhari himself records 
that Hisham III died and was buried in Ldrida in Safar 428/24 
November-22 December 1036, having fled from Cordova 12 dhi 
al-Hijja 422/30 November 1031,242 although he makes no men- 
tion of who ruled Ldrida at the time. However, the earliest 
extant source, Ibn Hayyan, records that Sulayman Ibn Hud the 
lord of Ldrida sent a letter to Hisham declaring allegiance at 
the latter's assumption of the Caliphal title in Cordova in 
243 420 (1029). It is reasonable to assume that Hisham chose 
not to go to a city controlled by Yahya I, otherwise he would 
have gone straight to Zaragoza. This would suggest that 
Ldrida was under the control of Sulayman Ibn Hud by 1029. 
The second incident which reflects the growing 
independence of Sulayman was his harbouring of and declared 
allegiance to Hisham al-Multadid in Ldrida. The boost to his 
prestige from having a Caliph (albeit one of several 
239 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam, pp. 197. 
240 vol. 3, p. 222. 
241 Al-Marrakushi: al-Mullib, p. 58. 
242 Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 145. 
243 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 517. 
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pretenders) in his own City must have been tremendous. 
Muhammad Ibn 'Abbad, lord of Seville produced a man claiming 
to be Hisham al-Mulayyed in an attempt to increase his 
prestige and power among the other Talifa rulers in Muharram 
427/ November 1035.244 Needless to say, Sulayman was not 
one of those offering allegiance to the pretender in Seville. 
The divergence in policy between Sulayman and Yahya occurred 
over Hisham III. Coins struck in Zaragoza in 1029 show that 
Yahya was acknowledging the authority of the 'Abbasid Caliph 
in Baghdad. 245 This might have been the result of Yahya 
finally giving up all hope of the possibility of 
reestablishing the Umayyad system in Spain. It allowed him to 
keep his 
independence while remaining within the framework of 
legitimacy by acknowledging a Caliph de jure who could never 
have any authority over him de facto. In some ways this was a 
somewhat introverted move. It allowed the Tujibids to 
concentrate on the affairs of Zaragoza while removing 
themselves from the arena of pan-Spanish politics. 
However, it must have been very awkward for Yahya to 
have one of the main lords of the Almal of Zaragoza not only 
declaring for a different Caliph, but actually harbouring him 
in the Almal. It is at this stage that one can see the Tujibid 
power retreating to Zaragoza and Huesca. By 1031, Sulayman Ibn 
Hud was, in all probability, an independent lord in his own 
244 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p. 18. Also 
Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 190. 
245 M. J. Viguera: Arag6n Musulmdn, p. 142. 
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right and not simply the lord of a city within the greater 
Almal of Zaragoza. The Hudids had therefore become established 
as a separate Talifa, sharing the power within the upper 
march with the Tujibids and acknowledging a more "Andalusian" 
Caliph. This was important as the jurists of Muslim Spain and 
in particular the highly respected Ibn Hazm believed that the 
Umayyads were the only house entitled to hold the Caliph- 
ate. 246 Within the upper march the Hudids' prestige was 
firmly established through the twin facets of actual visible 
power (their control of Ldrida and Tudela and the extra 
economic resources which ensued from that control) and moral 
or legal authority derived from having Hisham III in Ldrida. 
These two factors laid the foundation for Sulayman's eventual 
take-over of Zaragoza and control of the whole of the upper 
march at the end of the third decade of the C11. 
3.3 The fAmirids in Valencia 
The struggle for the control of Valencia following 
the death of Mubarak provides an interesting insight into the 
politics of the early part of the C11; in particular the way in 
2461bn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 169. "And what 
added to his [ibn Hazmls] anger was his support for the cause of 
the Umayyads, past and present, in the East and the Andalus" 
'Abbas in a footnote points out that Ibn Hazm in several texts 
attacked Marwan Ibn al-Hakam (684-685)- who had established the 
Marwanid line within the house of Umayya- and supported the claim 
of the pretender Ibn al-Zubayr. From a theological viewpoint, Ibn 
Hazm believed that certain descendants of Quraysh, including non- 
Umayyads could become Caliphs (Al-Muhalla, Vol. 9, pp. 359-362. ), but 
I believe that Ibn Hayyan was referring to Ibn HazmIs Political 
stance. 
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which the various lords were trying to expand and consolidate 
their domains as the dust settled on the ruins of both the 
Umayyad and the 'Amirid systems in Cordova. Valencia was a 
particularly rich city which had attracted both a large 
contingent of 'Amirid Slav soldiers fitvan and the rich 
emigrds from Cordova. Its political distance from the civil 
strife allowed a: t least the rich to prosper, their palaces 
driving the prices of land higher, although the poor suffered 
under a government dedicated solely to the material advance- 
ment of its two leaders. The contribution of Mubarak and 
Mudhaffar, however, was not wholly negative. They had 
preserved the wealth of the province. Furthermore, they had 
rebuilt the walls of the city making it a more viable military 
base supported by a strong economy and containing among its 
citizens a trained corps of horsemen who could be very useful 
to an ambitious ruler. 
Interest in Valencia came from three quarters. 
Mujahid, lord of Denia,. was the obvious predator. Denia, to 
the south of Valencia was close enough to make unification a 
viable proposition. With Jativa, the second city of the 
Valencian Almal, a province could be created which controlled 
the whole of the coastal plain as well as the stretch of 
coastline between Valencia and Denia. Denia, moreover, like 
Valencia was a maritime power with an interest in, among 
other places, Sardinia. Finally, Mujahid himself was a Slav 
fata of the 'Amirid forces and therefore had something in 
common with the other professional soldiers who gathered in 
Valencia under Mudhaffar and Mubarak. 
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A less obvious predator was Labib, lord of Tortosa 
to the north of Valencia. Tortosa was much more distant from 
Valencia than Denia and belonged more properly to the Almal of 
Zaragoza. However, a link along the coastline was a possibil- 
ity and would have given Labib control over the whole of the 
costa del Azahar. Labib, like Mujahid was also a Slav com- 
mander and would also have had connections with the soldier 
contingent within Valencia. 
Finally, Sulayman Ibn Hud was the last and least 
likely contender. It is unlikely that he controlled Ldrida at 
that time. His power base of Tudela was too f ar inland to 
make a joining with the Almal of Valencia a sensible proposi- 
tion. He could, of course, have been acting on behalf of 
the Tujibids, but that period in 1018-1020 was one in which 
he seemed to have been estranged from them and in any case the 
extant sources mention him specifically as opposed to the 
Tujibids. His involvement seems to have been the result of 
the Valencians inviting him following an earlier invitation to 
Labib of Tortosa, who had formed a close alliance with a 
Christian state, probably Barcelona. 247 
And that is because when Mubarak died, the 
people (Ahl) of Valencia agreed to advance 
Labib the Slav, who treated them harshly and 
asked the tyrant ruler of the Franks 
(al-Taqhia Amir al-Ifranj) for aid until he 
became like one of his men (ka-baldi 
lummalih). They attacked him (Labib] and 
called on Ibn Hud for aid (Istasrakhu Ibn 
Hud). (Ibn Hud] came and the horizon darkened 
between him and Mujahid for what occurred with 
Tortosa. Wars ensued between them, and 
people were worried about the effect of this 
247 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 164. 
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conflict on the thuqur. This carried on until 
that area decided to give authority (Talmi 
to 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Abi 'Amir. 
The most interesting aspect of this episode, as far 
as the upper march is concerned, is not so much that Sulayman 
failed to make any impact beyond neutralising the effects of 
Mujahid's campaigns or eventually being responsible for 
Labib's withdrawal from the Almal of Valencia. Rather, it is 
the fact that the Ahl of Valencia chose to call upon Sulayman 
for help when they discovered that Labib was acting like a 
governor ('Amil) appointed by the Count of Barcelona. This 
suggests that even as early as 1020, Sulayman's reputation was 
well established outside the upper march as a powerful lord 
and one who is seen as a defender of the Muslims against the 
Christians. From Sulayman's point of view, his involvement 
may have been in part an attempt to establish himself as a 
Talifa lord in a new domain. Had this been partly his 
objective, he clearly failed, possibly because Valencia was 
too distant from his own power base. His reputation as a 
possible ruler was, however, fairly established and he built 
on this base over the following two decades which eventually 
enabled him to take over Zaragoza. 
The main weakness in the legacy of Mubarak and 
Mudhaffar was that they left no clear successor. This lack of 
succession was made more difficult by the fact that the power 
in Valencia seemed to rest largely with the professional 
'Amirid soldiers. one of the more striking aspects of the 
strife which followed Mubarak's death in dhi al-Hijja 408/ 
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20 April-18 May 1018 or 409/10 April 1019-8 May 1019,248 was 
that there seemed to have been no local lord capable of taking 
over the government of the city. The details of that strife 
are unclear. one source suggests that Labib was the first to 
take over the city. He then seems to have shared his authority 
with Mujahid, eventually leaving Valencia entirely in the 
hands of the latter. 249 This seems to agree with Ibn 
Hayyan's version which simply records Mujahid as the last 
ruler of Valencia before the take over by 'Abd al-'Aziz. 250 
Ibn Ijdhari recorded that the people of Valencia first called 
upon Labib, who then became unpopular. Labib asked for the 
help of the "Prince of the Franks", which led the Valencians 
to call upon Sulayman Ibn Hud to aid them. Labib then left 
Valencia and Sulayman and Mujahid entered into a war over it 
which drove the people of Valencia to invite 
'Abd al-'Aziz. 251 
The choice of 'Abd al-'Aziz as the best candidate 
for the governorship of Valencia fulfilled several criteria. 
As the grandson of the dictator al-Mansur, 'Abd al-Aziz would 
248 Anon: Fragment B published at end of Ibn I Idhari Is Al-Bavan, 
Vol. 3, p. 302. When the third section of Al-Bavan was published by 
L6vi-Provengal, he came across an incomplete manuscript of a 
history of the Ta I if a kings in Spain and north Africa, by an 
unknown author. He published this at the end of the Al-Bavan as 
fragments A&B. In print they constitute 28 pages. The length of 
the original text and the identity of the author is unknown. 
249 ibid. 
250 Ibn-Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 249. 
251 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, pp. 163-164. 
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have been a legitimate leader to the 'Amirid contingent in 
Valencia. Moreover, his authority would have extended, at 
least in theory, over Mujahid and even Labib. However, a 
major reason for choosing him as opposed to his cousin, an 
252 equally legitimate choice, was probably his youth. He 
was only fifteen when he was given allegiance in Valencia in 
dhi al-Hijja 411/28 March-15 April 1021.253 The 'Amirid 
party in Valencia must have believed that he would prove to be 
a manageable ruler. The extent of their power was reflected 
in the fact that they invited Labib, then tried to replace 
him when his policies became unpopular. 'Abd al-'Aziz was 
informed of their choice while residing in Zaragoza under the 
hospitality of the Tujibids. He was informed of his being 
chosen in secret and left Zaragoza in secret. 254 The 'Amirid 
party in Valencia was obviously wary of the possible interest 
of the Tujibids and any possible influence they might have 
over 'Abd al-'Aziz. This shading of openion is only now 
available through al-Dhakhira. In fact, he turned out to be 
a particularly good choice. Although represented by Ibn 
Hayyan as a bland character, he consolidated the power of 
Valencia and became one of the longest ruling Talifa lords. 
His actions following his ascension to power were, 
however, fairly uncontroversial. He acknowledged the Caliph 
252 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassain: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 249. 
253 Anon: Fragment B. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 301. 
254 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 249. 
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255 al-Qasim in Cordova, receiving the title al-Multamin dha 
al-Sabiaatavn 256 in return. He also managed to extend his 
257 
authority over Denia, where Mujahid recognised him. 
Internally, he concentrated on extending the fortification 
programme started by Mubarak and Mudhaffar, 258 including the 
building of the East gate (Bab al-Qantara)259 which played 
an important part in the defence of Valencia. The main plank 
of his internal policy was the establishment of an efficient 
chancery made up of four famed Katibs. 260 An efficient 
chancery would have allowed 'Abd al-'Aziz to control his 
domain politically and economically, ensuring that the state 
received its due share of taxes collected, as well as 
controlling the parties within the city. The chancery also 
meant that 'Abd al-Aziz received advice independent from any 
faction. It also provided him with the tools to conduct 
diplomacy with other powers, whether Muslim or Christian. The 
link made between 'Abd al-'Azizls rule and this chancery by 
the sources attests to the importance of chanceries in the 
mechanics of governing provinces in the C11. 
255 ibid. 
256 Huici Miranda claims that unlike his grandfather, 'Abd al- 
'Aziz did not earn the title! Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su 
RpcLi6n, Vol. 1, p. 168, which perhaps reflects his unsympathetic 
attitude to the Talifas. 
257 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 302. 
258 Al-'Udhri: Tarsit al-Akhbar, p. 17. 
259 
1 
ibid., p. 18. 
260 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 250. Cf p. 
151-152 above. 
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Much of Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira is a record of 
various sorts of correspondence between the wazirs of the 
chanceries of the different Talifas. The collapse of the 
Caliphate led to the disbanding of the Cordovan civil 
service, but they generally found work with the Talifa rulers 
creating miniature versions of the highly developed Caliphal 
civil service. The demands made on these chanceries as a 
result of the development of the provincial centres into city- 
states in their own right must have led to the development of 
the provincial chanceries of the pre-fitna period(mostly 
concerned with tax collection and correspondence with Cordova) 
into more sophisticated apparatus. These had to cope with the 
government of the province, coordinating action with lords of 
the Almal as well as conducting foreign policy with the 
neighbouring Talifas. Bad ministerial advice could have 
disastrous consequences as can be shown by the case of Zuhair 
of Almeria which will be looked at below. That 'Abd al-'Azizls 
chancery was a particularly successful one is reflected not 
only in his long and successful reign but also in the fact 
that the wazirs were recognised as being especially good by 
261 the rest of the intellectuals of Muslim Spain. 
However, 'Abd al-'Azizls honeymoon period was to be 
short-lived. Mujahid of Denia rebelled against the authority 
of Valencia. It could be that as it became apparent that 'Abd 
al-'Aziz was consolidating his authority within the 
province, Mujahid decided that it was had been a mistake to 
261 ibid. See also Huici Miranda: Historia Musulmana de 
Valýncia v-su Regi6n, vol. 1, p. 168. 
181 
accept his authority. The efficient chancery might have also 
been a source of alienation for Mujahid, in that the four 
wazirs would have shielded the young ruler from Mujahid's 
influence. An efficient chancery probably also meant more 
persistent demands for a higher percentage of the income of 
Denia. Moreover, as 'Abd al-'Aziz consolidated his authority, 
Mujahid must have felt in danger. The young ruler would 
remember that Mujahid himself had been a contender for the 
Valencian throne. Mujahid probably thought that as soon as 
'Abd al-'Aziz felt able, he might decide to replace him as 
lord of Denia. The weak governmental legacy left by Mubarak 
and Mudhaffar meant that the bond linking Valencia with its 
wider Almal was quite weak. This allowed Mujahid the opportun- 
ity to rebel. 
Interestingly, Mujahid seems to have lacked the 
military muscle to launch a full attack on Valencia. There is 
no surviving evidence of any such direct confrontations with 
the forces of 'Abd. al-'Aziz. However, in a letter f rom 
Habus, lord of Granada, (composed by the wazir Abi 'Abd 
Allah al-Bazalyani) to Yahya, lord of Zaragoza, and quoted 
262 by Ibn Bassam, there is reference to the on-going con- 
frontation between Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz (involving also, 
it seems, Yahya). One therefore assumes that such confronta- 
tions took the form of border raids, rather than all-out 
assaults. In his efforts to tilt the balance of power in his 
favour, Mujahid used Christian soldiers. Equally, 'Abd al- 
262 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 627. 
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'Aziz himself was not strong enough to meet Mujahid on his 
own. This is surprising and suggests that his hold over 
Valencia and its Almal was not complete. He too had to resort 
to the use of Christian troops to aid him. Although Chris- 
tians were used in the civil war that followed the collapse of 
the 'Amirid dictatorship, this must have been one of the 
earliest instances when Christians were involved on both sides 
in a Muslim conflict in the C11. The letter suggests that the 
use of Christian allies in inter-Muslim f ights was still 
viewed as unacceptable, although the whole of Muslim Spain 
had already gone down the path of disunity and separate Ta I ifa 
states. For 'Abd al-'Aziz, the rebellion served to weaken 
him further, as he lost his brief ly-held control over the 
gulf of Valencia. This must have also weakened him economi- 
cally, in terms both of lost revenue and of increased 
military expenditure, not least to pay for the Christian 
troops. 
3.4. The Campaign for Almeria. 
Almeria, to the south of Valencia and Denia was not 
part of the Valencian A Imal, but belonged rather in the sphere 
of Granada. It was a particularly prosperous town famed for 
its production of marble and luxury goods such as embroidered 
263 264 linen as well as for ship construction. Yet this 
263 E. M. Lopez: 'Algunes Concideraci6nes Sobre la Vida Socio- 
Econ6mica de Almeria en el Siglo IX y primera Mitad del XII Actas 
del IV Coloquio Hispano-Tunecino, ed. M. Marin, pp. 183-4. 
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distant port was the scene of the only attempt by 'Abd al- 
'Aziz at military expansion. 
The policy of 'Abd al-'Aziz seems to have been based 
on an attempt to maintain his authority over the traditional 
Almal of Valencia. The main threat to his domain came from 
Toledo to the north*p1O56XwA9t the vigorous rule of Ismalil 
Ibn dhu al-Nun. Toledo was land bound and shared a long border 
with Valencia. The danger was that Toledo might have been 
tempted to expand eastward into Valencia to gain access to the 
sea; To the south, Mujahid held Denia as a hostile Almal, 
while to the north, Labib in Tortosa formed a buffer on the 
narrow coastal strip between Valencia and Barcelona. Unlike 
the marches, Valencia had no reason at that stage to feel 
pressured by the Christian states, nor the need to try to 
expand its territory. Valencia was not unique in this approach 
to politics in C11 Muslim Spain. The Bani Razin held al-Sahla, 
an area between the upper march and the south. Like Valencia, 
it was a wealthy province, whose prosperity was based on 
265 particularly rich agricultural lands. They chose to keep 
266 out of Talifa feuding, while maintaining their indepen- 
dence (they refused to f all under the inf luence of the Tuj ibids 
267) As a result of this, they managed to remain outside 
the strife that characterised much of the politics of the C11 
264 ibid. p. 187. 
265 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 111. 
266 ibid. 
267 ibid. p. 110. 
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and held on to their power until the advent of Almoravids. In 
this, they were aided, like Valencia, by not being in 
direct confrontation with the Christian states as they were 
protected by the middle and upper marches. 
Valencia's one major departure from this policy of 
maintaining laissez-faire was the Almerian adventure. It was, 
in part, a response to the rebellion of Denia. Control over 
Almeria would have extended the authority of Valencia and 
added to its treasury, enabling it to launch a more concerted 
response against Mujahid. It was, however, a fundamentally 
opportunistic act. 
Almeria had been under the control of Zuhair, a Slav 
commander. 268 His influence extended as far as iativa, the 
second city in the Almal of Valencia 269 
As f or Zuhair, the f ata mentioned earlier, 
his kingdom (mamlakatuh) extended from Almeria 
to iativa and beyond. . to the edge of the 
Toledan state. 
This is, in fact, a very wide area. The reason why Zuhair 
would have held control over Jativa, which quite distant f rom 
Almeria, might have been because the main power there was 
made up of professional 'Amirid soldiers. Meanwhile, the 
proximity of Almeria to Granada had led to an alliance between 
Zuhair and the Berbers who had established their Talifa there. 
At the death of Habus the lord of Granada, Zuhair 
268 Ibn I Idhari: Al-bayan, Vol. 3, pp. 166-167. 
269 ibid. pp. 168-169. 
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went to of fer his condolences to Badis, Habus I son and 
successor, accompanied by his main wazir, Ahmad Ibn 'Abbas 
in 429/14 October 1037-20 October 1038.270 This trip turned 
into a disaster. Prior to the trip the Zirids of Granada were 
fighting another Berber group, the Zanata, who were led by 
Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah, and who had established themselves in 
Carmona. It seems that despite his alliance with Granada, 
zuhair was supporting Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah and sending him 
supplies. Badis Ibn Habus had asked for the meeting to try to 
convince Zuhair to cease his support of Muhammad Ibn 
'Abdullah . 
271 Ibn Hayyan related that despite Badis' 
attempts at treating gently with Zuhair, the latter had 
responded as if he were visiting one his appointed governors 
('Amil), rather than an ally. 272 Ibn 'Abbas, Zuhair's 
wazir, chose to highlight the disagreement between the two 
lords, rather than put a diplomatic gloss over them, at 
least until they departed from Granada's Almal. 273 Ibn 
'Abbas is represented as both arrogant and devoid of military 
experience. 274 He had advised his lord badly. First, he 
misjudged totally the reaction of Badis to a high-handed 
approach. Secondly, he had misjudged the strength of Badis, 
possibly because of the latter's youth. Finally, he chose to 
270 ibid. pp. 166-167. 
271 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 656. 
272 ibid. 
273 ibid., p. 657. 
274 ibid. p. 662. 
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f orce a disagreement while in Granadan lands with mountainous 
terrain between the f orce of Zuhair and Almeria. Even when 
some of Zuhair's commanders sensed danger and advised their 
lord to f lee in the night on his own, Ibn 'Abbas advised 
against them despite having no experience of a single military 
confrontation. The force of Zuhair were cut off in the rough 
terrain and literally annihilated. 275 In an age when Talifa 
lords were adapting to a new situation where each was sover- 
eign in his domain, and where relationships with neighbouring 
provinces entered new and untried realms, sound ministerial 
advice was essential to the survival of Talifa lords. 
The citizens of Almeria on hearing of their lord's 
death invited 'Abd al-'Aziz to govern the city at the end of 
dhi al-Hijja 429/September-2 October 1'037.276 This suggests 
that by that date, seventeen years after coming to power, 
'Abd al-'Aziz had firmly established his credentials as an 
acceptable lord within the south-eastern part of Muslim Spain. 
clearly, his credentials among the 'Amirid party in Almeria 
were greatly bolstered by the fact that he himself was an 
'Amirid. For the second time in his life, 'Abd al-'Aziz was 
being offered a province on a plate. For the second time, he 
277 accepted. This time, however, he arrived with an army. 
His troops included among them his son, 'Abd al-Malik and his 
son in law Malan Ibn abi Samadih. Malan was the son of the 
275 ibid. p. 659. 
276 ibid. p. 663. 
277 ibid. 
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278 Tuj ibid Muhammad, f ormer lord of Huesca. Muhammad had 
moved to Valencia after his defeat by Mundhir I, and his son 
had joined the service of 'Abd al-'Aziz. 
The events that followed 'Abd al-'Azizls arrival at 
Almeria are not very clear. It seems that Mujahid, on 
hearing of this development responded by attacking the Almal 
of Valencia. 279 This might have been the result of his 
fearing the political consequences of Valencia Is expansion or 
perhaps a purely opportunistic attack on the lands of his 
enemy. Interestingly, he chose not to attack 'Abd al-'Aziz 
directly, but rather to attack his lands. This method of 
warfare involving mostly indirect confrontation characterised 
most of the military conflict within Muslim Spain in this 
century. The use of raids, sieges and skirmishes were pre- 
ferred to the use of direct confrontational battles. In fact, 
one could argue that the age of the Talifas saw only one major 
battle, that of al-Zallaqa between the allied forces of the 
Talifas and Almoravids and the Castilian forces in 1086.280 
'Abd al-'Aziz left Almeria taking the treasury of Zuhair with 
him to try and meet this new threat. 281 
278 ibid. p. 730. 
279 ibid. p. 731. 
280 For a study of the place of battles in the strategy of 
medieval warfare, see J. Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of 
War in the Middle Ages', War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. 
J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt, pp. 78-91. Also J. Gillingham, 'William 
the Bastard at War', Studies in Medieval Historv Presented to R. A. 
Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, C. Holdsworth and J. L. Nelson, pp. 141- 
158. 
281 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 663. 
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At least one source indicates that 'Abd al-'Aziz 
left his son 'Abd al-Malik as commander in Almeria in 430/ 
3 October 1038-22 September 1039.282 However, Mujahid's 
rebellion had stirred up the whole of the Almal of Valencia. 
'Abd al-'Aziz faced a general rebellion in the outposts 
(husun) 283 as well as in Jativa and Lorca. In his attempt 
to put down the rebellion at Jativa, 'Abd al-'Aziz was 
defeated and wounded. The 'Amirid forces of the city believed 
284 that they had killed him. It was probably at this stage 
when the power of 'Abd al-'Aziz seemed to have been ended that 
Malan Ibn Samadih, who had been left in Almeria with 'Abd al- 
Malik (probably Malan had exercised real authority in the 
city) decided to rebel against his father-in-law. This seems 
to have been in Rajab 433/24 February-25 March 1042.285 
The Almerian adventure *as therefore a disaster for 
'Abd al-'Aziz. He failed to expand his domain, faced a 
rebellion whose ramifications carried on for at least two 
years and very nearly lost his life. In one respect it had 
been successful and that was in acquiring Zuhair's treasury. 
Eventually 'Abd al-'Aziz managed to recapture Jativa, killing 
282 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, P. 192 
283 As indicated in the introduction, a strict translation of 
the term should read f orts or f ortif ied towns, but it seems that in 
the context of this passage 'outposts' is an appropriate transla- 
tion. 
284 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 302. 
285 ibid. 'Abd al-Malik survived this coup and returned to 
valencia. 
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the f orces that had opposed him there. 286 At the end of this 
affair, 'Abd al-'Aziz probably had tighter control over the 
immediate Almal of Valencia, but while his power was thus 
f irmly established on the Valencia coastal plain, he had 
failed to expand it southwards. Denia remained independent 
and hostile under Mujahid and Almeria became an independent 
state under 'Abd al-'Azizls now estranged son-in-law Malan. 
Thereafter, 'Abd al-'Aziz concerned himself mostly with 
valencian affairs. With the establishment of real control 
over Jativa and its Almal, Valencia reached a form of 
equilibrium with its neighbours. It made no further attempts 
at conquest. 
3.5 Sulayman Ibn Hud - Lord of the upper march. 
The exact mechanics of the takeover of Zaragoza by 
Sulayman Ibn Hud, and therefore his acquisition of control 
over the whole of the Almal of the upper march are also 
unclear. It had occurred, however, after a period of 
preparation in which Sulayman had gradually asserted his 
independence from the Tujibids and established his credentials 
as an "Andalusian" ruler. He was helped in this by the power 
base that his family had in the upper march and by an element 
of luck in having Hisham III choose to seek refuge in his 
domain. Ibn Hayyan presents a picture of Sulayman as an able 
statesman and soldier. certainly the state he established was 
286 ibid. 
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one of the most powerful and successful in C11 Spain. The 
establishment of the Hudids in Zaragoza can be seen as marking 
the turning point, where the Talifas evolved from "provinces" 
to what could be termed city-states; certainly, the 1040's 
seems to have marked the time when Talifa rulers started 
adopting Caliphal, as opposed to "semi-Caliphal" 'Amirid- 
ministerial titles. This issue of evolutions into city-states 
will be looked at in the following chapter. 
The growth in Sulayman Is power with control over 
Tudela, Ldrida and Monzon reflected a weakening in Tujibid 
power. Yahya I had managed to establish friendly relations at 
times with Sulayman, but their relationship no longer 
corresponded to that of a lord and his overlord. 
Interestingly, Sulayman never attempted to extend his power 
to Zaragoza while the Tujibids were there. This might have 
been because he lacked the strength to do so (after all, the 
Tuj ibids were f airly strong in their own domain) or perhaps he 
retained a remnant of pre-Ta I ifa world view, in which the 
Tuj ibids were seen by Sulayman as the legitimate rulers of 
Zaragoza. The Tujibids, on the other hand, continued to 
signify their separateness from the mainstream of Muslim Spain 
by declaring for the 'Abbasid Caliph. They had, however, 
established a matrimonial alliance with their most powerful 
neighbours the dhu al-Nun of Toledo. Yahya I married the 
287 sister of Ismalil, lord of Toledo. In the increasingly 
unstable and untried political arena which characterised the 
287 Ibn I Idhari: Al-Bayan , Vol. 2, p. 178. 
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C11, Talifa lords sought to establish a degree of 
predictability and stability in their relationships with one 
another by the use of matrimonial alliances. Such alliances 
were in use prior to the Ta I if a period (for example the 
marriage of al-Mansur to Ghalib Is daughter), but one assumes 
that with the prolif eration of Ta I if a states and the increased 
tension in the relationship between provinces, the use of 
such marriage alliances, for political purposes, increased. 
Needless to say, these alliances were not particularly 
efficient; for example, Malan turned against his father-in- 
law in Almeria. They did, however, represent a basis on 
which inter-Ta I ifa relationships could be constructed at a 
time when the previous basis of a framework of legal title 
emanating from Cordova had collapsed. 
on the first of dhi al-Hijja 430/24 August 1039 , 
'Abd Allah Ibn Hakim, cousin to Mundhir II and a commander in 
Zaragoza's army entered the palace of Mundhir and murdered 
him. 288 There does not appear to be a clear reason f or this 
murder. It was not really part of a concerted effort to take 
over Zaragoza, as 'Abd Allah does not seem to have had any 
accomplices. The reason he himself gave for the murder was 
that Mundhir II had not declared for the pretender Hisham in 
289 Seville, but rather for the 'Abbasids. It seems that on 
a popular level, the Umayyads still held the primary position 
as acceptable Caliphs. There is clear evidence that 'Abd 
288 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part I, p. 185. 
289 ibid. p. 186. 
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Allah managed to win over the commoners on the back of that 
cause. 290 In the f irst instance, 'Abd Allah called the Qadi 
and the elders of Zaragoza, claimed that he had performed his 
deed for the good of the province and declared that he would 
accept Sulayman Ibn Hud as the new lord of Zaragoza. 291 
Clearly, Sulayman's prestige and his renowned allegiance to 
the Umayyads was well established in the upper march. 
What happened next is not clear. Ibn Hayyan 
recorded that the Qadi and elders turned against 'Abd Allah 
forcing him to flee the palace and the city taking Mundhir's 
brothers and ministers as hostages to the fort of Rueda de 
Ualon. The commoners then looted the palace until Sulayman 
arrived in Muharram 431/23 September-22 October 1039. 
However, in an earlier section of Ibn Bassam, Ibn Hayyan is 
quoted as recording that Sulayman rushed to the gates of 
Zaragoza where he was met by a force led by Ismalil lord of 
Toledo who had come to avenge his son-in-law (and probably to 
take up the opportunity presented by this assassination to 
extend his authority into the upper march) . 'Abd Allah 
managed to hold them outside the gates then retreated to the 
citadel. 292 Probably, 'Abd Allah, having seen the ease 
with which he managed to kill Mundhir and the response of the 
commoners, decided to take power himself. Ismalil lord of 
Toledo arrived as did Sulayman. In a sense, with the 
290 ibid. 
291 ibid. pp. 187-188. 
292 ibid. P. 186. 
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exception of the Tujibids, he had already established his 
claim to be the most legitimate ruler of the Zaragozan march. 
The combined forces of Sulayman and Ismalil forced 'Abd Allah 
out of the city after an initial resistance. No mention is 
made of the fate of Mundhir's brothers or indeed of 'Abd 
Allah. The assumption must be that they were all killed when 
Sulayman eventually conquered the fort of Rueda. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that Sulayman Is 
rush to Zaragoza foiled the middle march's attempt at northern 
expansion. One could argue that this episode marked the 
beginning of a long period of tension between the two ruling 
houses which was to characterise the relations between the two 
city-states, although both still needed to rely on each other 
if the march structure were to function efficiently in keeping 
the Christian states in check. Some of the support which 
Sulayman found in Zaragoza may have been rooted in the fear, 
among the city's elite, that if Ismalil were to take over, 
either directly or through the appointment of an agent, they 
might lose some of their influence, while supporting the 
'local' Sulayman might help preserve it, although there is no 
direct evidence to support this conjecture. 
By Muharram 431/ September 1039, Sulayman had 
established his control over the whole of the upper march with 
his capture of Zaragoza. An indication of his military power 
was his ability to neutralise the military presence of 
Ismalil, then the lord of arguably the most powerful Talifa 
in the peninsula. Unlike 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia, Sulayman 
did not have to go through a long phase of consolidating his 
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power in the city then in the Almal. He had already estab- 
lished his authority over the Almal, so that the conquest of 
Zaragoza marked almost the immediate birth of the Hudid state 
as an established power in the upper march. 
3.6 conclusion. 
The period following the civil war in Cordova was a 
period of flux in the politics of Muslim Spain. For a 
considerable period of time the main lords of the border 
provinces as well as some of those with political influence 
within Cordova tried to reinstate the pre-'Amirid system of 
government. That was because the lords of the marches, in 
particular, but also some of the Cordovan political elite, 
viewed the 'Amirid system as too centralised, having weakened 
the powers of the provinces, and looked to the Umayyad model 
of government as the only workable and legitimate one. The 
'Amirids had, however, so changed the structure of govern- 
ment and society in Muslim Spain during their relatively short 
period in power that a return to the Umayyad system was not 
possible. The Umayyad system itself was a somewhat delicate 
one based on a mixture of legality and militarily imposed 
authority so that it was not surprising that the Spanish 
Muslims found it'hard to reinstate it. It had, after all, 
shown signs of weakness even in the heyday of Umayyad rule. 
The Umayyad system had, however, helped define the 
relationship between the lords of the provinces and the minor 
lords in their Almal by providing a theoretical pyramid of 
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power with the Caliph passing on his authority to the lords of 
the provinces who then passed it on in turn to the lesser 
lords in the Almal. It also provided the lords of the prov- 
inces with a framework for the relationship between the prov- 
inces. Each was clearly defined not only by the geographical 
reality of the area but also by a legal reality emanating from 
Cordova. Weaker provinces were protected from the more 
powerful ones by the overall control of the Caliphate. 
The 'Amirid system destroyed both these frameworks 
without really providing an alternative that would work 
outside the bounds of a vigorous dictatorship. This led to a 
form of breakdown in both types of relationships in the early 
part of the C11. Sulayman's path to independence within the 
Almal of Zaragoza is a good example of this. After the civil 
war, the only bond between him and Zaragoza was simply one of 
convenience. It could be argued that in the final analysis, 
convenience def ined the boundaries of the bond between a 
lesser and a greater lord even before the f itna. The Umayyad 
system, however, provided f or the imposition of overall 
order in the peninsula, so that Sulayman would have been 
unlikely to have developed such independence as he would have 
faced sanctions not only from Zaragoza but also from Cordova. 
Mujahid provides another example of the breakdown of this 
relationship. In practical terms this tended to encourage the 
breakup of provinces. Any lord could rebel provided he could 
hold off the lord of the province. Even if the lord of the 
province established his authority, the fact that he had no 
additional source of support in the event of a rebellion must 
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have led to a political atmosphere of volatility, where each 
lord of a province spent much time and energy in ensuring that 
his province remained loyal. 
The breakdown of the framework governing the 
relationship between provinces was equally damaging. In the 
first instance, it led to a period when each province felt it 
could expand into and occupy the land of neighbouring ones for 
political and economic gain. Prior to the fitna, the fact that 
all provinces belonged within a single system that encompassed 
all of them had led to stable relationships between them. 
Gradually, the newly established Talifas reached a stage where 
they balanced each other out and could no longer expand. This 
naturally occurred - after the lesser provinces had been 
absorbed into the larger ones. However, the political world- 
view of the provinces had undergone irrevocable change. While 
prior to the fitna they viewed themselves as part of a single 
system, the collapse of that system led them to view them- 
selves each as an independent system within itself. The 
ramifications of this change on the politics of Muslim Spain 
vis-d-vis the Christian north was fundamental. A coordinated 
course of action against any external threat became much more 
difficult. This was partly because those not directly 
involved in the conflict saw no reason to become involved, 
since they began to think in terms of the interests of their 
self-contained provinces. The politics of the Bani Razin in 
the province of al-Sahla and of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia are 
good examples of this. 
Another reason was a lack of trust. Since there was 
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no overall order to protect the various components of the 
Muslim State in the peninsula, each province felt threatened 
by its neighbours. An attack on a potential enemy, even by 
the Christians, was not to be discouraged. Finally, in a 
separatist atmosphere, there developed the view that a Muslim 
enemy was as dangerous and to be fought as vigorously as any 
other including a Christian one. Alliances with a Christian 
power against a Muslim neighbour for local gain therefore 
began to gain acceptability. That 'Abd al-'Azizls 
confrontation with Mujahid in which both sides used Christian 
allies, led to contemporary comment, reflected the initial 
unease felt for such a concept. 
The breakdown of the old system was gradual, which 
added to the confusion of the Ta I ifa rulers. Their assumption 
of Caliphal titles was no indication of their assumption of 
kingship, for they followed a tradition established by the 
'Amirids. In any case in the early part of the century the 
titles they assumed had clear ministerial connotations. Both 
Sulayman and 'Abd al-'Aziz at first assumed titles given them 
by Caliphs. 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the Talifa 
rulers tried to establish means to deal with the new situation 
within their Almal and with the relationship with each other. 
These included the upgrading of the previously fairly basic 
chanceries of the provinces into more sophisticated 
apparatuses. In this they were helped by the existence of a 
corps of unemployed civil servants from Cordova, who served in 
the provincial chanceries (among the ministers taken as 
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hostage by 'Abd Allah was the famed Abu al-Mughira Ibn 
HaZM 293) . In the relationship with each other, they sought 
to bring a degree of stability to replace that imposed by the 
Caliphate with matrimonial alliances. Probably, matrimonial 
alliances between members of the leading families of Muslim 
Spain were common before the f itna, but the period under the 
Ta I ifas added a more political dimension to these alliances in 
that they came to represent alliances between states rather 
than between factions within a single state. 
Within this general picture there were differences 
between provinces that had traditionally exercised a greater 
degree of autonomy and ones that were further inland. Once the 
upper march was controlled by a strong ruler, or as in the 
case of Sulayman and Yahya I, shared by two rulers, the 
mechanics were already there for each "state" to function 
fairly quickly as an efficient independent unit. Those 
provinces such as Valencia to whom autonomy was fairly new 
faced a more difficult time of adjustment. Furthermore, 
because the upper march had had a history of relative auton- 
omy, it had developed within it factions whose power was 
locally based. This added to the internal stability of the 
province as a whole. Valencia on the other hand, presented a 
picture where power resided with factions that had little or 
no local power base, whether 'Abd al-'Aziz himself or the 
'Amirid faction in Jativa. Arguably this added to the insta- 
bility of provincial government, although with time the 
293 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p. 188. 
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emigrd factions became locals. 
The Talifas had emerged in a slow evolutionary 
process where the majority of the main players did not seem to 
realise that they were developing independent states, but 
seemed to be perpetually preparing themselves politically for 
the return of the Umayyad system. By the time these lords 
realised that the Umayyad system was never to return, they 
had already established the boundaries and governmental and 
political mechanics of the Talifa city-states. 
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4. The Era of City-States 
4.1 Introduction. 
The last chapter attempted to look at the way in 
which the provinces developed through the period of civil 
war that followed the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship 
into independent states. In the case of Valencia, the 
establishment of the 'Amirid government had been the result 
of fortuitous circumstances that had delivered the province 
to a young man who would have otherwise not been able to 
rule or establish a state. In the case of Zaragoza, a 
local man had established his power in a province already 
used to autonomy. In both cases, the states had not 
developed as a result of a policy specifically aimed at 
creating "kingdoms". Yet, at some stage towards the end 
of the fourth decade of the Cil, the various rulers of the 
Talifas came to realise that the old Umayyad system was 
past reviving and moved consciously towards a system where 
they perceived themselves as rulers of independent city- 
states. This shift was gradual and subtle, but its effects 
were quite profound. By the end of the century, this 
system had already been described as that of the 
muluk al-Tawalif (party kings). 294 This was not necessar- 
ily a compliment, as the title malik was normally associ- 
294 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p. 723. 
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ated with Christian rulers. Moreover, the sources (Ibn 
Bassam and other later chroniclers, such as Ibn 'Idhari) 
show a degree of mockery at the pomposity of these rulers 
who presumed to take on Caliphal titles while ruling states 
that were obviously weak especially in terms of their 
inability to stem the Christian tide. 295 
The effects of the collapse of the Umayyad 
framework of government on provinces both in terms of their 
internal and external policies, which were touched upon in 
the last chapter, became more pronounced. Indeed, one of 
the main reflections of this was the way in which 
provinces' relations with each other came to be perceived 
firmly in the realm of "foreign" policy. 
The decades between 1040 to 1060 certainly saw a 
move towards a more insular outlook by the Ta I ifas. The 
political stage had already been set with the main players 
established by the end of the fourth decade of the C11. 
This period saw the Talifa states continue to consolidate 
their positions vis-d-vis each other, through a mixture of 
diplomacy and war. The period also saw the increased 
interference of the Christian states in the affairs of the 
Talifas. This interference began hesitantly and mostly at 
the instigation of the Talifa states themselves, but 
gathered momentum as the Christian states discovered that 
with the south so clearly divided the balance of power had 
295 ibid. Part I, p. 731- Although Ibn Bassam as well as 
later writers referred to the Christian (Nasara) advance, when 
discussing the events of the second half of the century, the 
reference is clearly primarily to the advance of Castile under 
Alfonso VI. 
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begun to favour them. Eventually, this was to develop 
into a more aggressive attitude towards the south bolstered 
by increased unity under the "greater" Castile and militant 
"Frankish" Christian ideology imported through greater 
contact with the rest of Europe. During this period, 
however, the Christian states mostly acted on an 
opportunistic basis, as they used their newly acquired 
position as power brokers to tap the tremendous wealth of 
the south. After centuries of being militarily dominated, 
the north began to build up confidence on the back of the 
perceived weakness and lack of political vision in the 
Muslim south. This was the period in which the foundations 
for the reconquest were laid. 
It is in this period that the northern Christian 
states began to extract tribute (Parias)296 from their 
southern Muslim neighbours, not simply a payment f or a 
specific act of military alliance, but a regular payment 
to "Protect" the Muslim states from northern attacks. It 
was of course a symbolic turnaround from the situation 
where the Muslim south used to extract tribute (Jizva) from 
the northern states up to the first decade of the century. 
These tributes resulted in a transfer of wealth from south 
to north and helped weaken the Talifa states considerably. 
They also served to blur the relationship between south and 
north further. Whether the Christian north learnt to 
296 For a brief discussion of the theological problems 
raised by the Talifas' need to pay parias, see de Epalza, 'El Cid 
y Los Musulmanes: El Sistema de Parias-Pagas, La Colaboraci6n de 
Aben Galb6n, El Titulo de Cid-Le6n, La Posadita fortificada de 
Alcocer', El Cid en el Valle Del jal6n, pp. 107-125. 
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extract tribute from the example set by the Muslim south is 
arguable. Tribute, however, had different connotations for 
the Muslim mind (payment by a dhimmi (Christian or Jew) 
implying no further bond) than for the Christian Spanish 
mind, where it involved connotations of vassalage. 
Certainly, later Christian sources claim that in some 
cases the Talifa kings became vassals to the Christian 
kings. Whether the Talifa rulers thought of themselves as 
vassals, or indeed even understood this essentially north- 
ern framework of relationship is debatable. 
Valencia was guided through this period by 'Abd 
al-'Aziz whose long reign added to the stability of the 
state's political policy towards its neighbouring Talifas. 
By the fifth decade of the C11, however, his attempts to 
remain outside the field of infighting in the peninsula 
began to come under strain, not so much because of pres- 
sure from other Muslim Talifas, but rather as a result of 
Christian incursions that had begun to strike deeper 
southwards. Zaragoza, on the other hand saw Ahmad, titled 
al-Muqtadir succeed his father Sulayman in 1046. In many 
ways this represented a real as well as a symbolic break 
with the old type of government as al-Muqtadir came to 
represent an ideal of a successful Talifa ruler. 
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4.2 The War for Guadalajara. 
The years between 435/10 August 1043-28 July 1044 
and 438/8 July 1046-27 June 1047 297 saw a major border 
conflict between the upper and middle march. Sulayman Ibn 
Hud decided to take the opportunity of the death of Ismalil 
and the disputed succession of his son Yahya 298 to 
consolidate and expand the territory of Zaragoza south- 
wards. To some degree, what must have lent him confidence 
was Toledo's isolation among the Talifa states. 1043 was 
a time when the Talifas were still behaving as if a 
Caliphate existed at least in theory. The Caliph who was 
widely acknowledged was the pretender Hisham in Seville. 
That this acknowledgement had become meaningless in a 
practical sense was ref lected in the fact that the Bani 
'Abbad in Seville had failed to make as much political gain 
out of having the pretender reside with them as they would 
have liked; although this might partly have had something 
to do with general scepticism as to whether the man in 
299 Seville was Hisham, and if so, how he had managed to 
be resurrected twice. It is possible to glimpse the way in 
which the Spanish Muslim elite viewed this pretender, 
through Ibn Hayyan who wrote 
And in the year (4] 51 [17 February 1059 - 
297 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 282. 
298 Both Yahya and his brother 'Abd al-Rahman tried for the 
succession. Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 281. 
299 See, f or example, Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira. Part 
II, pp. 16-18. 
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5 February 1060], when he [al-Multadid Ibn 
'Abbad, lord of Seville] was victorious, 
we heard in Cordova that his mosques no 
longer declared for his imam, Hisham Ibn 
al-Hakam, he of the resurrection (Sahib al- 
Raj I a) .. and it was mentioned that he Cal: 
Multadid] called the dignitaries of his 
realm and declared the death of their imam 
Hisham telling them that he had died from 
an 
M illness. . This became the third 
death of the bearer of this name, and let 
us hope, God willing, that this should be 
the last, for how often he was killed and 
died to rise from the earth and tear his 
shroud before the coming of the Day of the 
judgement. 300 
Toledo, however, had been the f irst Ta I if a to formally 
break f rom this system Yahya's father, Ismalil, had 
refused to acknowledge any Caliph and Yahya had followed 
suit. "I Sulayman's aggression against the lands of 
another province could be justified, in part, on the basis 
that by not acknowledging the Caliphate, the Bani dhi al- 
Nun had forgone the legitimacy of their authority over the 
middle march. This clearly illustrates that the process 
towards the total renunciation of the Umayyad system was a 
very gradual one. Yahya had to eventually rejoin the fold 
and accept the Caliph in order to meet this threat from 
302 Sulayman, which suggests that up to the beginning of 
the fourth decade in the C11, the idea of total indepen- 
dence (even from the titular acknowledgement of a Caliph 
300 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp. 37-38. 
It is interesting to note that Ibn Hayyan, a believer in the 
Umayyad system, refers to this Hisham as his, that is, 
al-Mustadid's, imam showing his own scepticism on the pretender's 
identity. The tone of the text is also clearly mocking. 
301 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, pp. 278-279. 
302 ibid. 
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who was widely suspected of being a fraud) was still 
unacceptable in the political polemic of Muslim Spain. 
Sulayman started the campaign by sending an army 
to Guadalajara under the command of his eldest son 
Ahmad, 303 in 435 (10 August 1043-28 July 1044) . 
304 The 
position of Guadalajara between the states of Zaragoza and 
Toledo lead to some lack of clarity as to which Almal it 
was meant to belong. It is nearer to Toledo than Zaragoza 
and can therefore be seen as more reasonably part of the 
greater AInal of the former. However, the question of 
where it naturally belonged was debatable in that it used 
to belong to the march centred on Medinaceli created by the 
Caliph 'Abd al-Rahman to counter the power of Zaragoza. 
With the decline of Medinaceli as the centre of the upper 
march, Zaragoza could conceivably see itself as the 
natural inheritor of its AInal. Moreover, Sulayman had 
not embarked on a campaign to occupy a country totally 
opposed to him. There was a faction in Guadalajara which 
believed that the city belonged within the sphere of 
Zaragoza. Following Ahmad's attack on the city, this 
305 faction allowed the zaragozan army into the city. 
Relations between the Talifas had therefore not developed 
into a stage where they behaved as entirely separate city- 
states and where, in times of conflict, one would occupy 
303 ibid. P. 277. 
304 ibid. p. 282. Ibn 'Idhari mentions that the conflict 
lasted from 435-438 A. H. 
305 ibid. p. 277. 
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the lands of another in an act of outright conquest. The 
sanctity of the borders of the provinces, especially the 
clearly defined ones was still relevant, even after the 
system that had guaranteed these borders had so obviously 
disintegrated. 
Yahya mobilised an army which moved under his 
command to Guadalajara. 306 Yahya's campaign was not 
successful and he was forced to retreat into Talbira. where 
he was besieged by Ahmad. 307 Ahmad wrote to his father 
for further orders and was told to lift the siege and 
return to Zaragoza. 3D8 Sulayman's decision not to press 
forward in a situation where the Zaragozan army had the 
upper hand clearly demonstrated the limited objective of 
his campaign. Had he been interested in the outright 
conquest of Toledo, he would have ordered his son to carry 
through the siege and capture or kill Yahya. Sulayman 
could have then either attempted an occupation of the 
middle march or he could have installed Yahyals brother as 
a puppet ruler in Toledo. However, Sulayman's objective 
seemed to have been limited to expanding his domain within 
the march are "two -a. Yahyals response was to ask the 
counts, the sons of Shanjah" for aid . 
309 The campaign 
that followed the intervention of Navarre was somewhat 
peculiar. Sulayman seems to have decided that he lacked 
306 ibid. p. 278. 
307 ibid. 
308 ibid. 
309 ibid. one was probably Garcia III Sdnchez of Navarre. 
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the power to meet them outright and had his forces sit 
within their fortifications (Husun). This seems to have 
been a very early acknowledgement that the forces of a 
single march were incapable of resisting the might of a 
northern force. The Christians on the other hand, 
occupied the fertile area of the upper March for the two 
months of the harvest, collecting the harvest themselves 
and transporting it north. 310 
Despite this successful outcome for Yahya, he 
still felt isolated in the political arena of Muslim Spain. 
lie therefore entered into an alliance with the Bani 'Abbad 
of Seville, acknowledging Hisham the pretender. 311 This 
was a reversal of the policy of his father who had from an 
early stage decided not to acknowledge any Caliph, and it 
represented an acceptance on Yahya's part of the 
continuation of the importance of the Caliphal, institution 
if only on a cosmetic level. The acknowledgement of Hisham 
also had a more practical dimension in that Yahya hoped for 
military assistance from Seville. Seville, however, was 
engaged in hostilities with its neighbour, the lower march 
centred on Badajoz and could offer no help. 312 
Despite the lack of military support, this 
alliance clearly made Sulayman feel vulnerable. One of the 
main weaknesses of Yahya had been his refusal to acknowl- 
31CI ibid. 
311 ibid. PP. 278-279. 
312 ibid. p. 279. 
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edge any Caliphate. The reversal of Yahya's policy on this 
issue combined with his Christian and Muslim alliances led 
to a situation where Sulayman was in a weaker and 
potentially more dangerous situation than before. Sulayman 
responded by calling on Fernando I of Castile-Ldon and 
Ramiro I for aid, and trying to bribe Fernando I to enter 
the conflict. 313 Like the incident with the rebellion of 
MuJahid in Donia, a situation had developed where Christian 
states wore involved on both sides of a Muslim conflict and 
while in the case of the war between Mujahid and 
'Abd al-'Aziz, the involvement of the Christian states led 
to comment from other Talifas, their involvement in this 
war caused no such comment; the idea had gained more 
acceptability, not necessarily as a correct course of 
action but as a credible one for a lord. 
Interestingly, the "people" of Toledo decided to 
settle the dispute themselves. In their representation to 
Sulayman they highlighted the unacceptable consequences of 
allowing Christian troops to weaken and loot Muslim lands. 
The reference to the AU is an intriguing one. The "people" 
of Valencia had invited Labib to govern in 1018-1020. The 
"people" of Toledo played a particularly important role in 
the politics of the middle march, especially with regards 
to Yahyals grandson, also named Yahya. It seems unlikely 
that "the people" referred to were merchants (Tujjar) or 
commoners (cal -I Ammah) , although the inf luence of merchants 
in the city-states must have been quite strong. The term 
313 ibid. p. 279. 
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probably referred to the groups representing the interests 
of the leading families in the city. This group was 
probably made up from a landed, educated elite, some of 
whom would have claimed to belong to the Arab aristocracy. 
This group would have overlapped with the one termed the 
elders (al-Mashvakha) and would have also included the 
jurists of the city. The leading families were the main 
source from which civil servants and jurists were 
recruited. The representation to Sulayman is therefore 
probably a reflection of the views of the body of the 
educated leading members of the community. Given the 
respect and authority accorded to age, the majority of the 
decision making body within this group would have belonged, 
at this stage, in its education and political outlook, to 
the pro-fitna era. 
Sulayman pretended to accept the proposed peace, 
especially since Yahya was advancing on the upper march 
aided by (unidentified) Christian troops. Yahya was 
persuaded to accept the peace which was initiated without 
his participation by the people of his capital, and 
withdrow. 314 Sulayman then directed his Christian allies 
under Fernando I of Uon-Castile to attack the middle march 
and he himself occupied Medinaceli; as well as reoccupying 
forts lost to Toledo. 315 Yahya responded in kind with his 
ally, Garcia III SAnchez of Navarre wreaking havoc in the 
upper march between Huesca and Tudela, eventually taking 
314- ibid. p. 280. 
315 ibid. pp. 280-281. 
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the castle of Calahorra 316 at the beginning of 437/ 
July-August 1045.317 Sulayman's response was again to 
avoid direct confrontation, preferring to sit out the 
attacks in his castles and fortifications. 318 This 
suggests that Sulayman was unwilling to risk battle, 
either because battles were generally perceived to be 
unpredictable, 319 or because he faced an additional 
particular problem to do with a limited number of trained 
fighting men. This conjecture is based on the following 
argument. Although the upper march traditionally had a 
corps of trained troops, it used to rely on reinforcement 
from the troops of the Caliphate. After the fitna, the 
Caliphal and 'Amirid troops were dispersed throughout 
Muslim Spain often, as in the case of Mujahid or the Zirids 
in Granada, having set up their own Talifas. While the 
upper march could, therefore, muster its normal 
contingent for a raid or a skirmish, Zaragoza simply 
lacked the resources to do anything other than sit tight in 
its strongholds in the face of a concerted attack. 
Yahya took the opportunity of the immobility of 
316 ibid. P. 281. 
317 ibid. p. 281. See also Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Alvan for 
a similar description of this conflict. pp. 205-206. 
318 ibid. p. 281. 
319 see J. Gillir 
the middle ages', 
_Wj Gillingham and Ifolt, 
Studies In Medleval I 
Bill, Holdsworth and 
igham: 'Richard I and the science of war in 
ar and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. 
pp. 78-91 and 'William the Bastard at War', 
fistory Presented to R. A. Brown, ed. Harper- 
Nelson, pp. 141-158. 
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the forces of the upper march to reoccupy Medinaceli. 320 
Sulayman again responded by getting Fernando I to raid the 
middle march, 321 this time escalating the fight by 
attacking Toledo itself. With Yahya away in Medinaceli, 
the people of Toledo again responded by attempting to make 
peace, this time with Fernando who refused to treaty. 322 
The confrontation between Fernando and the people of Toledo 
was a particularly interesting one. in refusing to treat, 
Fernando asked for impossible sums of money. When told the 
city could not pay those amounts he responded: 
As for your saying that you cannot pay these 
monies, that is an impossibility; for if the 
roofs of your houses were transparent, they 
would glint with gold because of its abun- 
dance within. 323 
This exaggerated view of the wealth available in the south 
must have acted as a great incentive for the Christian 
states in their southern expansion. 
More interestingly, Fernando I dismissed the 
threats by the Toledans that they would invite the Berbers 
to aid them and continued, according to Ibn lIdhari: 
We only ask for our lands which you wrested 
from us in the past at the beginning of your 
rule Qnmrikum) . You have lived in them for as long as fate allowed and we have now 
defeated you because of your weakness 
(radaltikum) so leave to your country 
320 Ibn Ildhari: M-Savan, Vol-3, p. 281. 
321 ibid. 
322 ibid. pp. 281-281. 
323 ibid. p. 282. 
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('Adwatikun) and leave us our country. 324 
This speech appears to be the earliest reference, in an 
Arab source, to a Christian monarch specifically referring 
to Muslim Spain as occupied land which is to be liberated. 
It articulates the idea that the Muslims, after over three 
centuries of occupation, were outsiders and that Fernando 
had legitimacy as a representative of the authentic 
inhabitants. This particular reference, which sounds like 
propaganda, has, however, to be treated with caution. 
Ibn Ilayyan's record of this border war does not seem to 
have survived, nor does it seem to be mentioned in the 
Latin sources. It could be that some troops from Ldon- 
Castile and f rom Navarre were involved, but that the 
rulers of these states were not present. Ibn 'Idhari, or 
even his source, if it were a later Arab chronicler, 
could have put in the names of these two rulers to add 
weight to the Christian forces involved (in the same way 
that the author of the Poema de Mio Cid wrote that the 
attack on Valencia repulsed by the Cid towards the end of 
the century was led by the Moorish "King yUSUf,, ) . 
325 As 
discussed in the introduction, Ibn Ildhari is a much later 
author who uses Ibn Hayyan extensively. This can be seen 
by comparing passages from Ibn Hayyan quoted in Ibn 
324 ibid. The use of the term 'Adwatikum is interesting. In its Spanish Muslim usage, it clearly meant the other shore. That 
is to say, it meant Spain when talking of north Africa and north 
Africa when talking of Spain. In effect, Fernando was telling the 
Toledan delegation that the Muslims should leave Spain altogether 
and go back over the sea to north Africa. 
325 El Poema-de Mio Cid, Second cantar, 95, p. 113. 
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Bassam's gl-Dhakhira written at the end of the Cil, with 
the narration of the history of the early to mid C11 by Ibn 
Ildhari. Unlike Ibn Bassam though, Ibn 'Idhari does not 
necessarily use long verbatim quotes from Ibn Hayyan and 
often uses his own summary. 
Parts of this speech appear as if they belong to 
the post Ta $if& period. For example, Fernando's dismissal 
of the Tolodan's threat to invite the "Berbers" sounds as 
if it referred to the Almoravids. The Almoravids, how- 
ever, were not an established force in the early 10401s. 
similarly, the reference that the Muslims should leave 
Spain altogether sounds as if it belonged to a later 
period. There is at least one reference to Alfonso VI 
toying with the idea in 1086 of being "The Emperor of the 
Two Faiths". 326 if one accepts that Fernando was 
personally involved in this campaign, as Ibn I Idhari 
claimed (as opposed to some Castilian knights under a 
lesser leader), then one can construct a case where there 
was a reference to a speech by Fernando in which he showed 
an awareness of fighting to dislodge the Muslims. This 
could have then been reported to a Muslim writer. This 
speech would correspond with the sentiment beginning to 
326 For a discussion of whether Alfonso ever used the title 
Emperor of the two faiths al-Imbaratur dhu al-Millatayn see 
articles by Mackay and Benaboud, 'Alfonso VI al-Imbaratur dhul 
Millatayn, BHS, vol. 56,1979,95-102 and Roth 'Again Alfonso 
VI: "Imbaratur dhul-Millatayn", & some new data', BHS, vol. 61, 
1984,165-169. 
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surface in Spanish sources at about this time. 327 In 
other words, one can conjecture that while the speech 
might have been embellished by later Muslim writers, the 
sentiment that Fernando was the representative of the 
indigenous population who were reoccupying their country 
from foreign settlers, was expressed by him at one stage. 
Fletcher expresses some doubts about the authenticity of 
the speech, partly because he sees it as being at variance 
with what is known of Fernando's policies. 328 While I 
share his doubts as to the authenticity of the actual 
speech, I am inclined to believe that the sentiment 
expressed in it might have started to find expression among 
the elite of the Christian kingdoms by the mid 10401s. If 
so, then in copying Fernando's speech, it is likely that 
Ibn 'Idhari would have embellished it to make it sound 
appropriate and in doing so, he would have added elements 
which belong to the political awareness of the C12-C13 
rather than the C11. The earliest record of such a senti- 
ment being expressed surviving in an extant contemporary 
Muslim source belongs to the second half of the century, 
327 Lomax in Reconguest of Spain argues that such sentiment 
began to appear as early as the reign of Alfonso 111 (866-911). 
The Chronicle of Albelda talks of the Asturian Kings as Visigoths 
fighting to recover lost lands. pp. 38-41. Barkai, on the other 
hand, in his 
-Cristianos y Musulranes sees 
the shift in Spanish 
chronicles coinciding with the disintegration of the 
Caliphate, after which tolerance of co-existence begins to 
disappear. Part 2, chapter 1, p. 105. 
328 Fletcher: $Reconquest & Crusade in Spain c. 1050-11501, 
TRHS 37,1987 p. 37. 
216 
after the battle for Barbastro in 1064.329 
The Zaragozan-Toledan conflict eventually ended 
with the death of Sulayman in 438/8 July 1046-27 June 
1047.330 It had been a particularly damaging war both in 
an economic and political sense. It also allowed the IAon- 
Castile and Navarre to weaken two of the main marches that 
protected the south. Lomax argues that Fernando I began to 
change his policy towards the south to one of conquest, 
that is to say aiming to conquer lands as opposed to simply 
exact tribute, from the mid-1050's onward . 
331 Certainly, 
one can see a concerted push by Fernando I into the Duero 
basin, which fell under his control with his occupation of 
Lamego on 29 November, 1057. At the same time, the 
Navarrese kingdom started to exert pressure on the Rioja 
region from about 1045, with the Navarrese kings 
transferring their base of operations from the old 
heartland around Pamplona to Najera in the upper Ebro. 332 
These moves, by Castile and Navarre, must have been 
partly the result of the two states helping to weaken the 
defence of the middle and upper march in the latter part of 
the 1040's. Sula man's death did not solve the issue. The y 
rivalry between Zaragoza and Toledo continued, although it 
329 See the view expressed by a Christian in occupied 
Barbastro, quoted by Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part 
III, P. 187. See P. 265 below for a translation. 
330 Ibn 'Idhari: AI-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 282. 
331 Lomax: Reconquest of Snain, pp. 53-55. 
332 Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031- 
1157, pp. 35-36. 
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tended to take more diplomatic rather than military forms 
especially with regards to influence over Valencia. On a 
more general level, the breakdown of the governmental 
system that defined and protected the borders of provinces 
continued to have an effect on the relationship between 
them. No sooner had Yahya patched up the war with Zaragoza, 
than he entered into a similar border conflict with 
Badajoz, the other march protecting the borders of Muslim 
Spain. 333 
4.3 The now Era: Lords (Ashab-Buldan) or Kings (Muluk) ? 
So far, the rulers of the Talifas have been 
referred to as "lords" , "governors" or simply "rulers". 
The question is really what they called themselves. As I 
mentioned earlier, the period has been known as that of 
Muluk al-Tawallf. If these rulers had used the title malik 
(king), it would imply a particular political outlook. 
There is also the issue of the Caliphal titles that they 
assumed. As discussed above, contemporaries saw a 
difference between the titles assumed by these rulers in 
I the first half and those assumed in the second half of the 
century. 
There are, in effect, three extant contemporary 
sources for the period. First, the memoirs of Prince 
'Abdullah, the last Talifa ruler of Granada. Since the 
discovery of this manuscript, it has provided an insight 
333 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayano Vol. 3, p. 283. 
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into the way in which a Talifa ruler perceived the 
political situation towards the end of the C11 in Muslim 
Spain and the history leading up to it. 334 This source, 
however, was concerned with the fate of one Talifa and was 
written at the end of the period under conditions of some 
duress. Secondly, the Siral al-Muluk (the Lantern of Kings) 
written by al-Turtushi towards the end of the C11.335 It 
was written in Egypt, where al-Turtushi had settled and 
its terminology and outlook could have been influenced by 
the political thought and expectations of its audience in 
the East, although it does show that by then, at least in 
Egypt, the connotations of the title malik were not 
derogatory. Finally, the al-Dhakhira, the most useful 
source because it is in reality a collation made at the end 
of the century of a variety of earlier sources, including 
verbatim quotes from the al-Matin of Ibn Hayyan and, of 
equal importance, verbatim, albeit selected, quotes from 
a great corpus of correspondence of the civil servants of 
the Talifa era, including "official" letters from one 
ruler to another. It therefore provides the best 
indication of the terminology in use at the time to desig- 
nate the Talifa leaders. 
The most common title used by contemporary 
literary men in muslim Spain to describe the rulers of 
these city-states was sahib. Examples of this can be seen 
334 Prince 'Abdullah Ibn Buluggin: al-Tibvan. This has been 
translated as The Tibvan by A. T. Tibi- 
335 Al-Turtushi: Siral al-Muluk. see the discussion in the 
Introduction. 
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in Ibn Hayyan's al-Matin-336 The term was the same one 
used to describe a ruler of a province or a city in the 
pre-fitna period. The best way to translate this term is 
either as governor or lord. I prefer the term lord because 
the term governor carries connotations of ruling in the 
name of a central government and might better reflect the 
usage of the term in the pre-fj= era. After the break-up 
of Umayyad Spain, the term lord conveys more of the 
independent of the authority of each city-state ruler. The 
term (Sahlb) continued to be in use to describe the Talifa 
rulers to the end of the century. It was used by Ibn 
Bassam himself 337 and its usage was taken up by later 
sources. At some stage in the middle of the century this 
term no longer sufficed to fully describe the rulers of the 
Talifas. They still remained Sahib Saracrusta or Sahib 
Ttilaitula, but given their increased and apparent indepen- 
dence, they were something else in addition to being simply 
a sahlb of a province. 
Ibn Hayyan obviously felt this shift in the power 
and political standing of the Talifa rulers towards the 
middle of the century and sought to find a term to reflect 
this position of enhanced authority. The term he started 
to use was RVIX (literally one who commands) which is 
normally translated as prince. It is interesting because 
it was used to describe the Umayyad ruler in Cordova in the 
336 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p. 20 & part 
I, p. 730 as two among many examples. 
337 Ibn Bassam: M-Dbakhira, Part II, p. 257 is one of many 
examples. 
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C8 and C9 when the 'Abbasids had taken over the Caliphate 
and before the Spanish Umayyads declared the new Umayyad 
Caliphate. Ibn Hayyan uses it, for example to describe 
'Abd al-Malik in Valencia 338 as well as 'Abd al-'Aziz, 
his father 339 and even Hisham al-Multadid. 340 In the 
case of Hisham, Ibn Hayyan was clearly using the term in 
the way previous Umayyad rulers were described, especially 
since the claim of the various contenders to the Caliphate 
became contentious. In the case of 'Abd al-lAziz the term 
seems to have connotations of hereditary military command, 
in the sense of 'Abd al-'Aziz being an amir of the 'Amirid 
fltwin (professional or slave inawali soldiers) . The term 
aMjX does seem a fairly satisfactory one. It conveys a more 
elevated position than that of Sahib and is clearly below 
that oflCaliph. 
Towards the end of the century the term malik 
(king) began to be applied to the leaders of the Talifas. 
Ibn Hayyan seems to have used it as well as the term 'Alat 
Mulukiyya (Kingly paraphernalia) . 
"41 It does appear, 
however, that this term began to be more commonly used 
after the Almoravid intervention. Examples of its use by 
Muslim Spanish civil servants after the Almoravid invasion 
can be found in al-Dhakhira. 342 By the time Ibn Bassam 
338 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 732. 
339 ibid., part III, p. 516. 
340 ibid. p. 515. 
341 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, pp-664-665 
342 Ibn Bassam: ibid. part II, p. 254, as one example. 
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was writing, the term had acquired wide usage; he uses it 
frequently to refer to the Talifa rulers. 343 So in all 
probability, the Talifa rulers were seen in the early and 
middle part of the Cli as, ashab buldan, lords of 
provinces or (umaral) princes. The evidence provided by al- 
Dhakhira would suggest that they were not seen nor 
represented themselves as (muluk) kings. 344 
The question is made more comPlicated by the 
Caliphal titles they chose to adopt. It is quite clear that 
in the period of the fitna the use of titles by the Talifa 
rulers was an imitation and extension of the usage 
introduced by the 'Amirids. The step between assuming, or 
indeed being awarded, the title al-Multamin dhu 
al-Sabiqatayn (the first title 'Abd al-'Aziz assumed)345 
and a plain al-Multamin(the title which Yusuf Ibn Hud 
assumed)-346 is a thin one although the second was clearly 
that of a Caliph while the first, while peculiar, could 
have been presented as an extraordinary ministerial title. 
These titles appear to have been the most common form of 
31*3 ibid. Part I, pp. 732-733 as two examples. 
344 Ibn Mandhur in Li.. -; an al-'Arab, which was compiled towards the end of C13 gives one meaning of malik as he who has 
power over a region, which is called namlaka. This is very close to the modern usage of the term. As mentioned earlier, al- Turtushils work implies that the term was in use in the East, but in Spain, it was used to describe the Talifa lords towards the 
end Of the century and mostly by their detractors, which strongly 
suggests that its use by Almoravid propagandists was meant to be derogatory. 
U5 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, part III, p-250. 
346 ibid. P. 464. 
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address in "official" correspondence between Talifa 
rulers. 347 This was no doubt in part because their use 
was flattering for the recipient, but their usage serves 
to illustrate the ambiguity which surrounded the position 
of these rulers; clearly, they never saw themselves as 
caliphs, but equally they found in the use of Caliphal 
titles a reflection of the authority they believed they 
enjoyed. The titles did indeed reflect a sense of divorce 
from the Caliphal system. 
As pointed out above, this separateness mostly 
took the form of neglecting to declare for any caliph. 
There is however, one reference to an explicit declaration 
of independence, from Caliphal authority by one of the 
Talifa rulers; that of Ismalil Ibn dhi al-Nun of Toledo. 
When discussing the various pretenders to the Caliphal 
throne with civil servant Ibn 'Abbas, Isma I il stated, 
much to the surprise of the latter: 
By God, I would not declare for anyone but 
myself, nor would I stand [as a ruler] 
except by my own authority (sultani), even 
if I were challenged by fulan & fulan, and 
mentioned the Virtuous Predecessors (al- 
SOI(Of a]-Salih), whose memory God 
honours. J'5 
347 ibid. pp. 464,468,473 as one of many examples, in this 
case written by the convert Jewish wazir Ibn Hasdai in the 
service of the Hudids. 
-148 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp. 144- 
145. The term a]-Salaf al-Salih and which I translated as the 
Virtuous Predecessors refers to the early companions of the 
Prophet who were looked upon by Muslims with particular vener- 
ation. The term (Fulan) is an Arab equivalent of "so & so" (Cf. 
P. 41). Ibn Hayyan (or perhaps Ibn Bassam) chose to use the term 
presumabely because to have mentioned the names of the companions 
of the Prophet alluded to in this speech would have been 
disrespectful. 
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While Ibn Hayyan recorded that Abu al-'Abbas was aghast at 
this outburst, and reported it to others, Ibn Bassam added 
his own comment that he preferred Ismalil despite his 
boorish manners and peculiar beliefs to those Ta I ifa. rulers 
who came after him, because Ismalil had some ability to 
meet the Christian threat, while later Talifa lords allied 
with the Christians and were unable to defend their 
349 realms. 
The most surprising aspect of this speech was 
that it came relatively early in the period(in the early 
1040's). It was in fact an unsustainable public stance and 
Ismalil's successor Yahya reversed this policy until the 
whole of Muslim Spain had ceased to declare for an Umayyad 
Caliph. The speech does seem to reflect the political 
outlook that was being developed by the Talifa rulers by 
the middle of the century as they developed into indepen- 
dent lords of separate domains. In fact, the best 
illustration of this shift from the Talifa rulers being 
lords in the pre-'Amirid sense of sahib to lords in the 
sense of a totally independent ruler of a province was 
their succession. 
4.4 Talifa Succession: Two Examples. 
By the time Sulayman died in 438/8 July 1046- 
27 June 1047, he had established his authority over the 
whole of the upper march. His war with the Bani dhi al-Nun 
349 ibid. p. 145. 
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had not been entirely successful, especially as it led to 
two major raids by the Ldon-Castile and Navarre into the 
upper march, but he had maintained his supremacy in the 
province. His presence in the political arena of Muslim 
Spain was such that when Ibn Hayyan sought to make sense of 
the jigsaw of separate provinces in 435/10 August 1043- 
28 July 1044, he described the rulers of the peninsula as 
falling into two parties, the first of which included 
_'adhimuhum, 
their great man, Sulayman Ibn Hud. 350 The 
influence of the upper march extended at that time eastward 
to the sea through an allied Tortosa and south towards an 
allied Valencia. 351 In the years since the beginning of 
Sulayman's separation from the Tujibids and his 
establishment as a leader of a Talifa, -around 1018 to the 
time of his death, he had built the foundation of what was 
probably the strongest city-state in the peninsula. He had 
by 1046 a united upper march (with the exception of 
Tortosa) with an established experience in autonomous 
government. Moreover, being a march it had the ability to 
draw upon a tradition of military experience, despite the 
relatively limited nature of the military resources of the 
province as an independent entity. 
Had Sulayman believed he was founding a kingdom, 
i he would have been able to hand on to one of his sons an 
established domain which would have been among the leading 
powers of the peninsula. While Primogeniture was not 
350 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 219. 
351 ibid. 
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established in Islam, the concept of a ruler, that is to 
say a Caliph, being succeeded by a single son (not necess- 
arily the eldest) or a relative who fulfilled the qualifi- 
cations of the right lineage was quite acceptable. Sulay- 
man, however, in accordance with the laws of Islamic 
inheritance divided the march among his five sons. 352 
This, more than any other action of his reflected his 
conviction that he had merely established his authority 
over a province; one which was bound to return, at some 
stage, to the fold of a reestablished state centred on 
Cordova. Such an outlook was not surprising. Sulayman 
was, after all, a part of the pre-Talifa era. Moreover, 
his reputation for championing the Umayyads must have been 
based, in part, on a real belief in the Caliphal institu- 
tion, unlike for example his rival Isma I il Ibn dhi al-Nun, 
lord of Toledo, who also belonged to the pre-Ta I if a period 
in terms of upbringing and formative years, but who had no 
conviction in the Caliphate once its real power disinte- 
grated. I would therefore suggest that Sulayman's action 
was meant to give his sons the power base upon which to 
build once the Caliphate was re-instituted. Otherwise, he 
would have handed over the entire state to a single suc- 
cessor. What this legacy resulted in was to launch the 
353 province into a weakening and long civil war. 
352 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 221. 
353 Interestingly, Navarre had a legal tradition of the 
equal division of the realm among male heirs. Reilly in The 
Kinqdom of Le6n-castilla under Alfonso VI, PP. 14-20, argues that 
while the application of this Navarrese principle is not enough 
as a sole explanation of the motivation behind Fernando I's 
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The legacy of Sulayman was divided as follows; 
Ahmad received Zaragoza, Yusuf, the eldest, received 
Ldrida, the second power centre in the march, Muhammad 
received Calatayud, Lubb received Huesca under the 
nadhar, supervision, of his brother, probably Yusuf in 
Ldrida and Mundhir received Tudela. 354 Each of the 
brothers declared independence, but Ahmad launched a 
campaign to dislodge his brothers, which he managed to do, 
imprisoning some and killing the others, with the exception 
of Yusuf who held out in Ldrida. 355 Clearly, Ldrida had 
maintained its ability to pose a challenge to the authority 
of Zaragoza as it did under Sulayman during the Tujibid 
rule there. Ahmad's authority then faced another 
challenge, this time emanating from the "people" of the 
march, who, disliking what he had done to his brothers 
withdrew their loyalty to him and declared for his brother 
Yusuf. Ibn 'Idhari recorded: 
And when the Ahl of the thaghr saw what 
Ahmad Ibn Sulayman had done to his brother, 
they hated him for it, and rescinded their 
loyalty to him (Khalalu talatahu), then 
gave authority to his brother yUSUf. 356 
Ahmad's writ was pushed back to Zaragoza while Yusuf took 
decision to divide his kingdom among his three sons in late 1063, 
it was a contributory factor. As in the case of Zaragoza, one of 
the brothers, Sancho II, decided to move against the others, in 
the years that followed Fernando's death in 1065. 
354 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 222. 
355 ibid. 
356 ibid. p. 223 
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on the title al-Mudhaffar. 357 This seems to have been a 
declaration on Yusuf's part that he had become the lord of 
the whole of the upper march. Prior to this, while he 
ruled in L6rida, he had assumed the uncontroversial title 
Husam al-Dawla, which could easily have applied to a 
lesser prince. 
The reversal of Ahmad's fortunes reflected 
several underlying factors in the political scene of the 
upper march. It seems that the "people", like their 
deceased lord Sulayman, had not come to fully accept the 
concept of the upper march as a totally independent state. 
Their opposition to Ahmad might have been partly fuelled, 
as mentioned above, by a repugnance at his ruthlessness 
towards his brothers, although the history of the Caliph- 
ate was not entirely devoid of similar examples. It may be 
that Ahmad's attempts at unifying the march by force was 
seen by the Ahl, which as discussed earlier referred to 
the elite and would have therefore included men trained in 
jurisprudence, as contradicting what was seen as a 
legitimate legacy, especially if this elite viewed the 
thaghr, not as an independent state, but as a province 
which legally belonged to a Cordovan-controlled Muslim 
Spain. Alternatively, the elite of the thaqhr might have 
been alarmed at this manifestation of Ahmad's ambition 
which might have been seen by them as encroaching on their 
own influence within the province, and so they supported 
his brother in the hope of protecting their own interests. 
357 ibid. 
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Faced, therefore, with only two remaining powers, the 
Ahl chose to support Yusuf, and presented their actions as 
being a response to Ahmad's unacceptable treatment of his 
brothers. This aspect of finding legitimate justification 
for switching allegiance is in some ways similar to the way 
in which Sulayman found support in his effort to become the 
lord of the whole province as a result of his allegiance to 
the Umayyad cause. That Ahmad was forced to retreat to 
Zaragoza, demonstrated the power that the "people" enjoyed 
in the province. This reflected the parallel influence of 
the "people" in Toledo and Valencia touched upon above. 
Although Ahmad had an established claim to 
Zaragoza and its immediate Almal, he lacked the legal and 
practical support f or such a claim to authority over the 
whole of the upper march which he would have enjoyed within 
the framework of the Umayyad system. The collapse of that 
system seems to have strengthened the power of the 
different interest groups, that is the "people", within 
the province. one can argue that in the new framework 
governing the relationship between a lord and his Almal, 
the lord needed, in order to bind the Almal to a relation- 
ship with him, to demonstrate the cost to them of breaking 
out of his protection. Ahmad's opportunity to demonstrate 
this arose when Tudela faced a failed harvest and sent to 
Yusuf, their overlord for help. Yusuf could not send a 
convoy directly from Ldrida to Tudela as it would have had 
to pass within the immediate Almal of Zaragoza. He there- 
fore paid Ramiro I for free passage through Arag6n. Ahmad 
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-learnt of this and doubled the offer to Ramiro. He then 
launched an attack on the Ldridan convoy in Arag6nese land 
and destroyed it. 
This episode must have demonstrated to the 
"people" of the march that Yusuf was unable to deliver his 
part in a relationship between a lord and his Almal.. Ahmad 
on the other hand had demonstrated the power of Zaragoza 
and the importance of its geographical position within the 
march. If Yusuf could not coordinate aid for those Almal 
which needed it from the resources of the other Almal, or 
protect convoys bearing that aid to the stricken Almal, 
then he would have lost the practical basis on which his 
authority stood. Irrespective of their dislike of Ahmad's 
original vision of the march as a single independent state, 
the "people" decided that their interests would be best 
served if they reverted to their loyalty to Ahmad. Ahmad 
had, with the sole use of f orce, . 
imposed his concept of an 
independent "greater" Zaragoza on a reluctant Almal, while 
yusuf's authority contracted back to Ldrida and its 
358 immediate Almal . The relationship 
between Ahmad and 
his reacquired Almal was based primarily on force. This 
suggests that the new framework of relationship between a 
lord and his Almal demanded that the lord constantly 
reassert his authority. To keep the province from shifting 
back to his brother, Ahmad used a similar tactic in 1064 
to the one described above and which will be looked at in 
the next chapter. As his power became reestablished, 
358 ibid. pp. 223-224. 
230 
359 Ahmad adopted the Caliphal title al-Muqtadir bil-Lah, 
to signify his lordship over the whole of the province. 
Ahmad, however, was not lord of the whole of 
the upper march. Even with the combined-resources of the 
province behind him, Ahmad was still unable to dislodge 
yusuf from Ldrida. To some degree this demonstrated the 
power of Ldrida, which like Zaragoza had a tradition of 
independence, but it also suggests that the military power 
of the upper march was limited. -As shown above, Sulayman 
had been unable to meet the Christian forces that raided 
Zaragoza head on even when they spent two whole months in 
the province. His son seems to have been unable to fully 
extend his authority over the province (in some ways the 
pattern for Zaragoza's inability to do so was set during 
the Tujibid reign when they were forced to concede Tudela 
and Ldrida to Sulayman) The dif f erences between Ahmad and 
his brother had become public, especially as far as Arag6n 
was concerned (and presumably, news of this conflict also 
reached Ldon-Castile). After all, the two brothers had 
involved the north in their disputes. The vulnerability of 
the march must have therefore become apparent to the north 
who took advantage of the weakness resulting from a 
disunited march. 
The march became the target for several Christian 
campaigns. In 443/15 May 1051-2 May 1052, Zaragoza itself 
360 was sieged by a Christian force. In the 1050's Tarra- 
359 ibid. p. 224. 




gona to the north of Tortosa was the subject of a campaign 
by Catalonia. 361 Arag6n attacked Zaragoza in 1057 and 
August 1058.362 The picture was clearly of a Zaragoza 
under an immense amount of pressure. Al-Muqtadir was 
equally clearly unable to stem the Christian tide militari- 
ly with the resources of a united province. It is now 
possible to see from al-Dhakhira that his first strategy 
was to. try to establish a better relationship with his 
brother in Ldrida. We can see that from some corre- 
spondence between them which suggests a "normalisation" of 
their relationship. 363 This was clearly not enough for 
al-Muqtadir who needed to control Ldrida, which he could 
not do as long as Yusuf held out in it. He theref ore 
arranged for a meeting to make peace in Ramadan 450/22 
October-20 November 1058 in neutral territory. The 
proposition of peace stopped Ldrida from joining Barcelona 
in a campaign against Zaragoza in that year. 364 At the 
meeting Ahmad tried to have Yusuf assassinated. 365 The 
attempt failed; al-Muqtadir claimed he had nothing to do 
with it but he had clearly lost any chance for a rapproche- 
361 McCrank, 'Norman crusades in the Catalan Reconquest: 
Robert Burdet and the Principality of Tarragona 1129- 
55', JMH, vol. 7,1981, pp. 67-82. 
362 m. j. viguera: Arag6n Musulir(an, p. 149. 
363 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 468-474. 
364 Ibn Hayyan, ibid., p. 425. 
365 ibid. p. 423. 
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ment. 366 Zaragoza was forced into attempting to 
consolidate its position within, those areas within the 
march over which it already had control. In 453/26 January 
1061-14 January 1062, Tortosa, which had been simply an 
ally became directly part of the Almal of Zaragoza. 367 To 
meet the threat from Arag6n, Ahmad resorted to an alliance 
with the emerging Castile in about 1060.368 
It can therefore be argued that Sulayman's 
division of his legacy led to a situation where fifteen 
years after his death, the upper march was still divided 
and where Zaragoza was expending much energy and resources 
in attempting to bring its authority to bear on the domain 
which Sulayman controlled at the time of his death. This 
civil war also led to an increased involvement of the three 
main northern Christian powers in the political affairs of 
the province. This is not to say that had the province been 
united from 1046, Zaragoza could have challenged Christian 
incursions, as it clearly could not do so under Sulayman 
in the early 1040's, but arguably, a united Zaragoza 
could have met its three main northern Christian enemies as 
well as its Muslim neighbours from a position of greater 
strength had it not been f orced to wage civil war for a 
decade and a half; nor was the situation settled by the 
early 1060's. 
366 ibid. pp. 424-426 for Yusuf's understandably bitter 
, reaction. 
367 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reves de Taifas, p. 38. 
368 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulmdn, p. 149. 
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The succession of 'Abd al-Malik in Valencia in 
452/6 February 1060-25 January 1061 offers a very different 
case from that of Zaragoza. This was partly a reflection 
of its occurrence at a later stage than that of Sulayman's 
sons. By the 1060's any hope for a revival of the Cordovan 
gove rnment was clearly dead. Moreover, 'Abd al-'Aziz, 
the longest reigning of the Talifa lords had his whole 
political experience rooted in the disorder of the C11. 
One can speculate that he might have been even warned by 
the civil war that followed Sulayman's death not to divide 
his domain. The province of Valencia was wealthy, but not 
particularly powerful. Following the suppression of the 
rebellion in Jativa mentioned above, Valencia's authority 
extended over that city. It became weaker further south 
where it clashed with the sovereignty of Denia. Valencia's 
influence extended as far south as Murcia, where Ahmad Ibn 
Tahir ruled from about 1044/1045.369 Ibn Tahir assumed a 
370 wazir's title and declared for Valencia. Murcia, 
however, was not part of Valencia's Almal, simply a close 
ally, in the same way that Tortosa was allied to Zaragoza 
prior to 1061/62. 
Moreover, the power of the 'Amirids was not fully 
established in the province despite its outward appearance 
of loyalty. 'Abd al-'Aziz had remained in residence in 
iativa following the rebellion there in 1042.371 This 
369 Remiro: Historia de Murcia Musulmcin, pp. 102-103. 
370 Ibn al-Abbar: Al-Hulla al-Sivaral, Vol. 2, pp. 116-117. 
371 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 302. 
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suggests that he f elt it necessary to make his military 
authority felt there at all times to keep it from rebelling 
again. The steps which 'Abd al-'Aziz took to bolster his 
authority can now be seen through al-Dhakhira. He arranged 
a marriage alliance between the daughter of his powerful 
neighbour Yahya Ibn dhi al-Nun and his son 'Abd 
al-Malik. 372 This served as a warning to internal as 
well as external enemies that the 'Amirids could draw upon 
the considerable resources of Toledo. Finally, 'Abd al-Aziz 
had established a strong chancery headed by abu-Bakr Ibn 
'Abd al-'Aziz known as Ibn Rawbush. 373 A capable wazir 
was of immense value to a newly appointed lord. Al-Qadir 
of Toledo's failure to use the wazir of his grandfather, 
al-Hadidi, was one of the main causes of his weakness in 
the 1080's and will be discussed below. 
'Abd al-'Aziz died in dhi al-Hijja 452/27 
December 1060-25 January 1061. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the 
wazir insured that 'Abd al-Malik succeeded despite 
the weakness of his support due to the 
absence of money, the scarcity of men and 
the corruption of the majority of the 
Almal. 374 
The absence of money probably referred to a depleted 
treasury. A lord who was not in total command of his 
province would have found it difficult to impose his 
taxation vigorously on his subjects. The scarcity of men 





might have partly been the result of a lack of a full 
treasury, but it could also be partly due to the fact that 
Valencia, unlike the upper march, did not have a corps of 
local professional soldiers. The remnants of the 'Amirid 
corps would have been quite old by then and in any case 
many of them must have perished in the rebellion of the 
1040's. The corruption of the Almal, probably indicates 
that most were loyal to 'Abd al-Aziz in name only. 
The efforts of the wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz were 
not enough. The position of 'Abd al-Malik must have been 
perceived to be weak. Yahya, the lord of Toledo and 'Abd 
al-Malik's father-in-law moved in force to the castle of 
Cuenca at the borders of Toledo and Valencia and sent his 
Katib Ibn Muthanna with a military contingent to protect 
375 'Abd al-Malik from the commoners. This served to 
establish 'Abd al-Malik's succession. The interesting 
question is why Yahya chose to support 'Abd al-Malik. 
possibly, the fact that he was his son-in-law influenced 
his decision, although as was shown in the case of Ibn 
samadih, relation through marriage was no guarantee of 
political loyalty. one can argue that Yahya perceived 
Valencia to be very much within the sphere of Toledan 
influence. By insuring that 'Abd al-Malik succeeded his 
father, Yahya was preserving this situation. The presence 
of his troops in Valencia could be seen as not only 
displaying support in front of the populace, but also 
letting the neighbouring Talifas know that Toledo wished to 
375 ibid. 
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see Valencia remain within its sphere of influence. The 
weakness of 'Abd al-Malik's authority can be seen as a 
source of attraction to Yahya who would have been 
uncomfortable with a stronger and possibly more independent 
ruler. Had Yahya allowed 'Abd al-Malik's succession to 
fail he could not guarantee that the power which took over 
Valencia would keep the province on friendly terms with 
Toledo. In this, Yahya must have been particularly wary 
of his old rivals, the Hudids, in the upper march who had 
been busy with their civil war but who also liked to view 
Valencia as falling within their sphere of influence. 
strategically, if Zaragoza gained control over Valencia, 
they would have surrounded Toledo from the north the east 
and possibly part of the south. 
In the case of Zaragoza, an unclear succession 
had led to several incursions by the Christian north. 
Interestingly, a clear succession in Valencia did not 
protect it from similar raids. This may have been, in 
part, the result of the weakness of the military power in 
Valencia. It also reflected the growing strength and 
confidence of the Christian states. Valencia was situated 
deep within the Muslim south. Towards the end of 455/ 4 
January-24 December 1063, a force of Christians (called 
Rum by Ibn 'Idhari 376 and Ifranj by an several unidenti- 
377 fied Valencian eyewitness, which might suggest that 
376 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 252. 
377 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 854-855. 
Interestingly, 
ibn Bassam states that he could not find a 
reference 
to this battle in Al-Matin, and so had to rely on 
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they were from Barcelona) attacked the lands of Valencia. 
They arrived at the gates of the city at the beginning of 
456/ 25 December 1063-12 December 1064. The Valencians 
refused to fight, preferring to keep within the walls. 
That was, as seen from Sulayman's actions an acceptable 
military option. The Christians then pretended to fall 
back to the hilly countryside around the city. The vale- 
ncians poured out of the gates with much pomp and were duly 
massacred. 378 The eyewitness account of the battle of 
Baterna conveys a feeling of farce (down to the detail of 
two effeminate men leading the Valencian forces into 
battle). 379 Whether the details of the behaviour of the 
Valencian forces in battle was accurate or not is somewhat 
immaterial. What the account manages to convey is the 
total lack of military experience on the Valencian side. 
Remaining within the walls (although scorned by the eyewit- 
ness) was sound military strategy. Falling for 'a basic 
trick of the 
besieging force pretending to fall back was a particularly 
primitive mistake One could argue that the Valencian 
forces were led by someone who had a vague notion of 
military procedure but very little actual experience of 
conflict. 
By the 1060's the shift to total Talifa 
, eyewitness accounts 
which he himself collected. 





independence had been established in the peninsula. This 
incorporated a new framework of relationship between a lord 
and his Almal based primarily on the militarily enforceable 
authority of the lord. This shift also coincided with ever 
increasing military action by the northern Christian states 
who ventured ever deeper south into the heartland of muslim 
Spain. 
4.5 The Payment of Parias. 
As the incursions of the northern Christian 
states into Muslim Spain became more frequent, they began 
to extract tribute on a regular basis. The extraction of 
tribute can be seen partly as an imitation of the Jizva 
which the Muslim south extracted from these Christian 
states up to the beginning of the C11. The payment of 
Parias by the Talifas was the most poignant indication that 
the political situation had changed in the Iberian penin- 
sula and the Muslim presence had begun its retreat. It can 
also be argued that the extraction of Parias came as a 
natural extension to the involvement of the Christian 
states in the affairs of the Muslim Talifas. The step for 
a Christian state f rom attacking one Ta I if a because another 
paid it to do so to threatening a Ta I ifa that it would 
I 
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attack unless paid was a relatively small one. The Chris- 
tian states became involved in what can almost be described 
as "auction" situations with two warring Talifas trying to 
outbid each other for Christian support. A good example of 
this can be seen when Ahmad doubled Yusuf Is payment to 
Ramiro I so that he might attack the Ldridan party. Again, 
the step from being involved in such a situation to 
demanding payment in order not to support the opposing 
Talifa was also relatively small. 
The instance of payment of Parias by the upper 
march started from the fourth decade. In 1048 they paid 
them to the Count of Barcelona and the Count of Urgel, in 
1063 to Ramiro I of Arag6n and Garcia of Pamplona, while in 
380 1060 to Fernando of Castile. The economic 
ramifications of this must have been quite profound. The 
Christian states managed to tap the economic resources of 
the wealthier Muslim south which can be seen as serving a 
dual purpose. It sapped the economic and therefore the 
military ability of the Talifas and it bolstered that of 
the Christian states. This was the reversal of the 
situation that had existed until the turn of the C11, when 
the Muslim state tapped the lesser economic resources of 
the north and insured that the north never developed the 
power to challenge it. The payment of tribute by the 
Ta I if as became such * an established part of the income of 
the Christian states that the right to an area's Paria was 
divided up as part of the estate of a deceased king. An 
380 M. J. Viguera: Aracf6n Musulmcin, p. 148. 
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example of this can be seen following the death of Fernando 
I of Castile in 1065. His sons received not only a division 
of his kingdom but also of the right to tribute from 
Zaragoza, Toledo and Badajoz. 
The payment of Parias was interpreted by later 
Christian sources (for example the chronicle of Alfonso X) 
and some modern historians as indicating a situation where 
some of the Ta I if as became bonded in vassalage to the 
Christian kings to whom they paid these Parias. Such a 
conclusion is questionable. Vassalage was a specifically 
northern Christian framework of relationship which was very 
different to that understood and practised by the Muslim 
Talifas. That is not to say that at some stage some 
Christian states might not have believed that they had made 
a Talifa into a vassal, but that it is highly unlikely 
that the lords of the Talifas would have understood this 
essentially Christian framework or seen themselves as 
falling within it. Their understanding of relationship 
between lord and overlord was based on a framework which 
was either rooted in the legitimacy emanating from the 
Caliphate or, once that failed, in the military power of 
the lord of the Ta I if a. However, it can be strongly 
argued that the lords of the lesser Almal never saw them- 
selves as the "men" of the lord of the Ta I ifa in the feudal 
sense of the north. It is therefore highly improbable that 
the Talifa lords saw themselves as tied to any Christian 
king in a bond of vassalage. 
To the lords of the Talifas, the payment of 
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tribute represented no more than a Political necessity. 
The tributes were af orm, of "protection" payment and 
implied no further relationship than that. It can also be 
argued that this was separate from instances of alliance 
with Christian states such as the one between Castile and 
Zaragoza, although Zaragoza had to pay for the alliance. 
The motivation for the payment of Pýirias by the Talifa 
lords was summed up by al-Multamid Ibn 'Abbad, the last 
Talifa lord of Seville. He believed that the "enemy" could 
not be resisted and had therefore to be placated. The money 
paid was seen as stopping Christian campaigns and protect- 
ing the country under his rule. In a letter to his mili- 
tary commanders he stated: 
The situation with the Enemy -May God break 
them- is clear and does not need exposing, 
and since we cannot meet them with f orce, 
we have to appease them. And he (the enemy) 
-May God scatter his army- had thought to 
attack our country this year with a greater 
number of troops than those used last year, 
and had completed his preparations for this, 
but God Almighty has allowed us to make 
peace. We have therefore agreed to pay him 
a sum of money which will allow us to avoid 
the harm we feared from him. 381 
Nor was the significance of the Christian involvement in 
Muslim infighting as a source of weakness (since it exposed 
the weak points of the Ta I ifas to the north) lost on the 
Muslims of Ta I ifa Spain by the end of the century. Ibn 
Bassam's comment on the above letter was 
381 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp. 252-253. The letter 
was composed 
by the wazir Ibn al-Qusayra, who was sent as an 
ambassador 
to Yusuf ibn Tashfin and whose description of the 
battle of al-Zallaqa 
is quoted in the next chapter. 
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Because the majority of the muluk of this 
region used to treat with the tawa I if of the 
Christians (al-Rum) . And each would buy 
from them (the Christians] military aid 
which he would direct at the lands of his 
rivals out of envy and greed, in the hope 
of gaining control [of these 
neighbouring provinces). For that reason, 
the fires of fitna were constantly inflamed, 
while the flock (ralivva) were ignored, and 
thus most of their produce would perish at 
382 the hands of these tyrants (tawaghit). 
4.6 Conclusion. 
As the provinces tried to come to terms with the 
uncertainties of the political situation in Muslim Spain, 
the concept of independent statehood seems to have begun to 
take root in the political outlook of the Talifas. Arguab- 
ly, this vision of a new order which was leading gradually 
towards a total separation from the whole concept of 
Caliphal government in the peninsula met with resistance 
from those whose political formation and experience 
belonged to the pre-fitna era, including some, like 
sulayman Ibn Hud, who were founding independent city- 
states themselves. This shift towards independence can be 
seen to be reflected in the adoption of outright Caliphal 
titles towards the middle of the century, as opposed to 
titles disguised to look like ministerial ones in the 
382 ibid. p. 254. 
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Amirid fashion. Another indication of the development of 
this concept of independent statehood can be seen in the 
move towards the succession of a single ruler to a particu- 
lar city-state. The lords of the Ta I if as seem to have 
undergone a process, where they f irst came to see the 
provinces over which they ruled as theirs outright (as 
opposed to ones held f rom a Caliph) then decided that 
unlike normal property in Islam, the inheritance of these 
provinces belonged to the realm of state succession. Yet 
even this process seems not to have been universally 
accepted, with some of the stronger Talifas, such as 
Zaragoza, never quite resolving this issue. 
Independence, however, resulted in increased 
problems f or the lords of the Ta I ifas. Within the f ramework 
of Umayyad government, the relationship between the lords 
of the provinces and their subjects, whether the lords of 
the Almal within the provinces or power groups within the 
main cities, was established and well defined. The 
collapse of that system and the framework it supported led 
to a period when these relationships needed to be 
reexamined and redefined. Ultimately, it resulted in 
increased power f or the power-groups (the so called Ahl) 
and the more powerful lords of the'Almal. This was because 
the lords of the Talifas lacked the moral support and the 
military sanction which would have reinforced their 
authority under the Umayyad system. The overall effect was 
of a weaker government in the centre of each province, 
unable to fully utilise the resources of the province 
I 
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against outside threats. 
The Umayyad system had also defined the 
relationship between provinces and with its disintegration 
that also had to be reexamined. It resulted in an increased 
insular outlook on the part of each city-state which not 
only led to occasional wars, but also to a situation where 
the northern Christian states were perceived as one more 
enemy on a par with a Talifa one. Clearly, this destroyed 
the ability of the city-states to coordinate in order to 
pool the resources of the Muslim part of the peninsula 
against the increased threat from the north. While lords of 
a province within the Caliphal state, the rulers of the 
upper march could dabble in the politics of the north with 
impunity, whereas as lords of the Talifa in the upper march 
they were in the much weakened position where the northern 
states interfered in their politics. one can therefore 
suggest that particularly for the traditionally more 
autonomous march lords, the advent of the Talifa system led 
to a reduction of their real authority both within the 
province and towards the Christian states, as compared to 
the power they enjoyed under the Umayyad (although not the 
'Amirid) system. 
In the north, on the other hand, Le6n-Castile 
under Fernando I was developing into a major power with the 
ability to exert pressure on the Muslim states. At the 
same time, other northern Christian states, notably 
Arag6n and Barcelona, also started flexing their muscles 
with relation to the southern Muslim states. As the confi- 
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dence of the Christian states grew with each new involve- 
ment in Muslim civil strife, so their ambition to strike 
deeper must have grown. There are also indications that 
this period saw the tentative emergence of a "reconquest" 
philosophy, particularly from the middle of the century. 
This seems to have f ound support in the dogma of an out- 
wardly thrusting united Christendom which was beginning to' 
seep into the Spanish Christian states with the Cluniac 
reforms and which will be touched upon in the next chapter. 
A sign of this shift in the balance of power to the north 
was the increased demand for regular tribute which the 
Talifas, having lost the ability to coordinate their 
military and economic resources, were forced to pay and 
which financed further Christian aggression. This created 
a downward spiral in which each raid f orced more tribute 
that weakened the stricken Talifa reducing its ability to 
withstand the next raid, while increasing the ability of 
the Christian states to mount even more campaigns. 
Although the reconquest of Spain only started to gather 
momentum by the beginning of the sixth decade of the C11, 
one can argue that by the end of the fourth, it was well 
on its way. 
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5 Holv War 
5.1 Introduction. 
At the same time that the structure of Umayyad 
Spain was pulled apart by the civil war that followed the 
fall of the 'Amirid state and the establishment of a 
separatist Ta I if a ethic, the northern Christian states 
also experienced some far reaching changes that ultimately 
had as profound an effect on the unfolding of the history 
of the peninsula as the changes that occurred in Muslim 
Spain. 383 While it is not the aim of this thesis to exam- 
ine the history of the Christian Spanish states, some of 
the developments that these states experienced, and espe- 
cially those developments that had a particular effect on 
Talifa Spain, will be touched upon. 
of the changes that the Christian states were 
undergoing, one can see two broad themes which had a strong 
impact on the political scene of Talifa Spain. The first 
involved a steady move by the Spanish Christian states 
towards a closer alignment with Europe north of the 
Pyrenees. Through the years of Muslim conquest, these 
383 For a recent study which looks at the changes in 
northern Spain at this time, and the confrontation with Muslim 
Spain, see B. F. Reilly, The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 
103 1157. ý :!. ýI- 
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states had moved slowly away from the political and 
religious mainstream of Christendom. One can argue that in 
a sense, their use of the Mozarab liturgy as opposed to 
the Latin liturgy symbolised this distance from the Latin 
world; a distance which was enhanced by their military and 
political domination by Umayyad Spain. By the C11, the 
northern Spanish Christians sought to bridge that distance 
with the rest of the Latin world by a variety of methods, 
including the establishment of marriage alliances. This 
resulted, among other things, in an increased involvement 
by some of the northern powers, especially those in south- 
ern France, such as Burgundy and Aquitaine, in the 
affairs of Spain. 
At the same time it increased the contact between 
the rulers and the ecclesiastical establishment of the 
Spanish states with some of the ecclesiastical centres in 
Europe, especially Cluny. This contact paved the way for 
the transfer of the Cluniac reform into northern Spain and 
with it ideas of an outwardly thrusting Christendom. 384 
At the same time, the papacy was undergoing a period when 
it sought to strengthen its influence in Europe and showed 
more interest in the affairs of Spain, partly because of 
the ancient papal claims of sovereignty over the peninsula. 
Moreover, as Le6n-Castile began a period of southward 
expansion first under the vigorous rule of Fernando I 
(1035-65), and later under Alfonso VI (1065-1109), this 
384 For a discussion of the increase in Cluniac influence in 
northern Spain in the C11 see Reilly, 
ibid., pp. 66-73. 
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expansion began very gradually to assume the "ideology" of 
a reconquest. Fernando's speech discussed in the previous 
chapter might have contained much later embellishment, but 
seems, nonetheless, to contain an echo of a reconquest 
ideal. This idea of reconquest also seems to have found 
expression in the battle for Barbastro, which will be 
looked at below. At the same time, the involvement of the 
papacy, meant that as the ideal of crusading began to 
develop in the mid 10601s, there was a natural progression 
towards wanting to apply it to Spain. As will be shown 
below, there is some evidence that the papacy was involved 
in attack on Barbastro in 1064. 
The other main theme that can be seen in the 
Christian Spanish states in the C11 involved a move towards 
greater unity, resulting from the expansion of Castile 
under Fernando I and later Alfonso VI. Part of the effects 
of the growing power of Castile was to force Arag6n into a 
closer alignment with the papacy to protect its 
independence. A "greater" Castile was to play an vital 
role in the dismantling of the Muslim occupation of Spain. 
The Muslim Talifas enjoyed a brief period in 
which the system of separate city-states reached its nadir 
towards the third quarter of the century, but even then 
they could not withstand the increasing pressure from the 
north and were being forced into giving up an ever larger 
proportion of their wealth to protect their domains from 
attack. The Talifas also began to become conscious of a 
"militant" Muslim movement developing among the Berbers of 
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north Africa and which they, having experienced the 
"Berber" f itna, perceived as a threat. Their disunity and 
the undoubted wealth of the peninsula eventually led to a 
situation where the Muslim Talifas of Spain became caught 
between two expanding entities, both of whom looked to 
Talifa lands as an attractive area in which to expand. 
This North African movement, the Almoravids, 
was also to play an essential role in the history of Muslim 
Spain. The beginnings of the involvement of the Almoravids 
in Spain will be looked at in this chapter, and in 
particular the possible motivation of the man who usurped 
its leadership, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin. With the exception of 
those sources which Ibn Bassam quotes in his al-Dhakhira, 
including the extracts from Ibn Hayyan, almost the entire 
history of Muslim Spain in the C11 was compiled after the 
conquest of the Almoravids or their spiritual heirs the 
Almohads and it, not unnaturally, presents the Almoravid 
involvement in the peninsula in the best possible moral 
light. one would assume that even the selection of material 
made by Ibn Bassam was also meant to find favour with the 
new masters of what remained of Muslim Spain. Most, 
although by no means all, of the totally unsympathetic 
portrayal of the Talifa lords originated in the propaganda 
assault made by authors writing for an Almoravid or Almohad 
audience. This propaganda campaign was so successful that 
the image of the "pure" Almoravids rescuing a wasted Spain 
from "corrupt" Talifa rulers remains a common one today. 
The friction between Toledo and Zaragoza 
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remained, but continued to f ind expression on the diplo- 
matic f ront, especially with attempts by each to bring 
Valencia firmly within its sphere of influence. Zaragoza 
itself remained divided between the two brothers, although 
al-Muqtadir tried to extend his authority over the whole of 
the Almal of the march and limit the assaults by Arag6n, 
sometimes by allying to King Sancho Garcia IV of 
Navarre. 385 The position of the Hudids, however, 
remained secure. In Toledo, the succession of the young 
Yahya at the end of this period signalled the end of the 
power of the dhu al-Nunids, largely through his incompe- 
tence. This fall from power, which will be looked at in 
more detail below, had a profound effect on the history of 
spain as a whole, but also specifically on the history of 
Valencia. Valencia, on the other hand, witnessed what 
must have been a very unusual transfer of power from the 
ruling family, the 'Amirids, to 'Abd al-'Azizls main wazir, 
Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The lack of "legitimate" rule in the 
city led to a position where it became vulnerable to 
internal political instability and external interference. 
Eventually, this paved the way for the establishment of a 
unique Talifa lord there. 
By the end of the eighth decade of the century, 
only forty years after the consolidation of the Talifas, 
one can clearly see signs of decline beginning to show on 
almost all of them. The exception was Zaragoza which 
continued to entrench its position despite the divisions 
385 ibid. P. 106. 
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within it. It did this, in part, through playing of f its 
enemies one against the other and partly by paying Parias. 
However, the weakness of the other Talifas led to a 
situation where Zaragoza found itself totally exposed not 
only to the threats from the north, but also to the new 
Almoravid threat in the south. As the next chapter will 
attempt to show, this eventually led to a situation where 
it became pincered between the expanding powers of the 
north and south, mirroring, in a sense, the position of 
the whole of Ta I if a Spain towards the beginning of the last 
quarter of the century. 
5.2 changes in the North. 
Cluniac reform was first introduced to the 
peninsula through Catalonia in the late C10.386 Given the 
closeness that Catalonia enjoyed with southern France, it 
is not surprising that the reform should have first entered 
Spain through its territory. Monastic reform, however, 
began to infiltrate into the main kingdoms of northern 
Spain by the first half of the C11. In 1025, Paternus led 
a band of Spanish monks who, like him had spent some time 
at Cluny, to reform the monastery at San Juan de la Pena 
in Navarre along Cluniac lines. This was at a time when 
386 Vicente Cantarino: Entre Monies v Musulmanes, p. 154. 
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SI ancho of Navarre began to bestow gifts on Cluny. 387 
Paternus, as abbot of San Juan then played an important 
role in encouraging the spread of ref orm to other houses in 
northern Spain. In 1030, San Millan de la Cogolla 
accepted the reform; in 1032 Ona followed suit, as did 
Gardena in 1033. Irache, Leyre and San Victoriano de Asan 
all shifted to the Cluniac reforms. 
388 By the 1055, the 
new spirituality had gained such widespread acceptance that 
the council of Coyonza declared that all monasteries should 
abide by the Benedictine rule (although, clearly, not all 
Benedictines were Cluniacs). 389 
The effects of the spread of the influence of 
Cluny permeated the northern Spanish political scene on 
several levels. It can be argued that Cluny played an 
important part in the efforts of bringing northern Spain 
into closer alignment with the rest of Europe by 
encouraging matrimonial links, which will be briefly 
referred to below. Cluniac spirituality also helped shape 
the way in which the Christian north perceived its fight 
against the Muslim south placing it more in the domain of 
a battle between the representatives of God and His 
enemies. Cantarino argues that as the reconquest 
proceeded, God was increasingly represented in Spanish 
chronicles as a direct antagonist, with the saints as His 
387 C. J. Bishko: I Fernando I and the origins of Leon-Castile Is 
alliance with Cluny', Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier 
Higtg. ry, ch. 2, p. 4. 
388 Vicente Cantarino: Entre Monies v Musulmanes. p. 155. 
389 ibid. 
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emissaries and the Christians as the instruments of the 
Divine; and that this change in perception can be 
attributed to the influence of Cluny. 390 One aspect of 
this new perception was to give the Christian north the 
"ideology" to counter that of Jihad as introduced into the 
peninsula by the Almoravids. The ideal of Jihad had, of 
course, been used by Spanish Muslims. It was, after all, 
the ideology that originally drove the conquest of Spain in 
the first place, and although it tended to receive less 
emphasis once the Umayyad state was established, it 
formed, as we have seen, one of the main planks of the 
policy of Ibn Abi 'Amir in the Clo. One can argue, 
however, that the Almoravids brought with them to the 
peninsula in the latter half of the C11 a more dynamic and 
less tolerant interpretation of that same ideal. In the 
same way, one can argue that this view found a parallel in 
the shift on the Spanish Christian side to a less tolerant 
and a more dynamic view of their struggle against the 
Muslim invaders as being a struggle for the supremacy of 
Christianity. 
The spread of the reforms also led to a greater 
amount of involvement in the affairs of the peninsula by 
both the Papacy and Cluny itself. There has been a lot of 
discussion of whether Barbastro formed the first Crusade or 
not and this will be touched upon below. The Papacy also 
increased its involvement in the affairs of the Spanish 
Christians as part of the effort to consolidate its 
390 ibid. p. 179. 
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authority. Gregory VII confirmed the territory of the see 
of Jaca and the church de las Musas de Zaragoza. 391 
Gregory also proposed that whatever territory Ebles II 
(brother-in- law to Sancho Ramirez, king of Arag6n) liber- 
ated, should be held in vassalage to the papacy. 392 This 
can clearly be seen as representing the Papacy's move to 
begin to claim overlordship over the whole of Spain. The 
Papacy's claims were rejected by Alfonso VI, but accepted 
by Sancho Ramirez of Arag6n. Cluny too seems to have taken 
a more active role in the politics of Spain. In 1072, St. 
Hugh helped free Alfonso VI from his captivity at 
Burgos. 393 In 1077-78 Cluny appears to side with Castile 
against claims by Gregory VII for the suzerainty of the 
Papacy over the peninsula. Cluny also appears to have 
encouraged expeditions against the Muslim Talifas, such as 
the one mounted in 1073 by Ebles Count of Roucy against 
Zaragoza. 394 
It can be argued, however, that despite its 
increased interest, Cluny remained, like the rest of 
Europe, largely insensitive to the reality of politics in 
Spain. This can be exemplified by the bizarre attempt to 
convert al-Muqtadir, lord of Zaragoza, in the 1070's. 
391 G. Zurita y Castro: Anales de la Corona de Arag6n., p. 95. 
392 B. F. Reilly The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla under King 
Alfonso VI pp. 80-81., also B. F. Reilly The Contest of Christian 
anýý 
-muslim Spain, pp. 46-47. 
393 B. F. Reilly The Kincrdom of Le6n-Castilla under Kincf 
Alfonso VI, pp. 63-64. 
394 B. F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 
pp. 46-47. 
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While it is not my intention to discuss this incident in 
detail, it stands out as an example of how those f rom. 
outside Spain could totally misinterpret the politics of 
Spanish Muslims. 395 A letter, in Arabic, was sent from 
an unidentified "the Monk of France" to al-Muqtadir calling 
on him to convert. Whether this letter was from St. Hugh, 
as Cutler argues, or simply from a monastery with Cluniac 
connections, it is interesting to see why it was believed 
that al-Muqtadir could possibly convert. The main reason 
must have been al-Muqtadir's various alliances with the 
Christian kings of northern Spain and especially Castile, 
which at this time was particularly close to Cluny. How- 
ever, Al-Muqtadir's alliances were aimed at the protection 
of his domain and were not intended as part of a general 
realignment with the north against the Muslim south. This 
mistaken view that because the Talifas allied with Chris- 
tian states they must have therefore moved closer to them 
and away from the Muslim mainstream was also shared by the 
Almoravids. In the case of al-Muqtadir, the "Monk of 
France" might have been further misled by distorted stories 
of al-Muqtadir's flirtation with more spiritual 
interpretations of religion. 396 
Parallel to the spiritual movement closer to the 
main Latin world was a move by the aristocracy of northern 
395 For a discussion of the letter sent to al-Muqtadir 
see: DM Dunlop: 'A Christian Mission to Muslim Spain in C111 al- 
An. idalus 1952,259-310 and A Cutler, 'Who was the Monk of France 
and when did he write? ', al-Andalus, 1963,249-269. 
396 Al-Turtushi : Siral al-Muluk, p. 39. 
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Spain to form matrimonial links with the aristocracy of 
France. Ramiro I of Arag6n married the daughter of William 
Duke of Aquitaine, Alfonso VI of Castile married Ines 
daughter of the Duke of Aquitaine, while his daughter 
Urraca married Raymond of Burgundy, a union that produced 
Alfonso VII. His bastard daughter, Teresa, married Henry 
of Burgundy, while Felipa de Tolosa, widow of Sancho 
Ramirez of Arag6n married the ninth Duke of Aquitaine, 
whose sister married Pedro I of Arag6n. 397 This long list 
serves to illustrate the close ties that were being forged 
especially with Aquitaine and Burgundy. It is interesting 
to note the similarity with the Talifa states in using mar- 
riages to cement ties with possible allies, although in 
the case of the Christians, the allies were from outside 
the peninsula. The growth of these ties certainly led to 
the increasing intervention of Aquitaine and Burgundy in 
the politics of northern Spain, especially in the fight 
against the Muslims and was reflected in the combined 
campaign against the upper march in 1064. 
Finally, at the time when the south was 
increasingly divided the north was moving towards a greater 
unity, first under Fernando I and later under Sancho and 
Alfonso VI in Castile as that state became the dominant one 
397 V Cantarino: Entre Monies v Musulmanes p. 166. B. F. Reilly 
ristian and Muslim Spain, p. 71 is non-committal 
about the lineage of Ines, Ramiro I's second wife, but states 
that the name suggests a non-Iberian origin. Ramiro's first wife 
was Giselberga, daughter of Count Roger Bernard of Couserans- 
Foix. Ramiro's son, Sancho Ramirez I took as a second wife the 
sister of Count Ebles of Roucy. 
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in the north. 398 In a sense one can argue that the 
situation in Spain had turned full circle. So that while 
prior to the C11, Muslim Spain was united and played off 
the divided Christian kingdoms of the north (the marriage 
alliance arranged by Mundhir I being probably the last of 
the major interventions in the politics of the north), the 
cil saw a progression to a situation where the north became 
increasingly united under the influence of an increasingly 
more powerful Castile and played off the divided Talifa 
states against each other. The growth of Castilian power, 
however, had an equal effect on other Christian powers in 
the north. Arag6n sought to limit the power of Castile by 
allying with Navarre, publicly against the Arabs but pri- 
399 vately against Castile. When it realised that it could 
not guard its independence Arag6n sought protection by 
accepting Papal suzerainty in the 1060, S. 400 In some ways 
one can see the rivalry between Arag6n and Castile being 
conducted very much through their opposing claims to the 
territory of the upper march, in the same way that Zaragoza 
and Toledo conducted their rivalry by attempting to pull 
401 Valencia within their respective spheres of influence. 
However, the move by the northern Spanish states 
398 For a study of the reign of Alfonso VI, see B. F. Reilly 
The Kinqdom of Le6n-Castilla under King Alfonso VI. Reilly notes 
that a study of the internal consolidation of Le6n-Castile under 
Fernando I remains to be researched and written, p. 8. 
399 G. Zurita y castro: Anales de la Corona de Araq6n p. 89. 
400 C. J. Bishko: The Spanish and Portuguese Conquests, p. 403. 
401 For a brief discussion of Aragon in this early period, 
see T. N. Bisson: The Medieval Crown of Aragon, chapter 1. 
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closer to the Latin mainstream clearly had limitations. 
Barkai argues that the Historia Silense, probably written 
in the first half of the C12 exhibits xenophobia especially 
in terms of anti Frankish feelings. 402 There are also 
clearly anti-Catalan feelings in the way the fight between 
the Cid and the Count of Barcelona is portrayed in the poem 
of the Cid. Nor was there a clear shift in spiritual terms 
to the Latin ideal as far as attitudes to the Muslim south 
was concerned. Whether Alfonso VI ever used the title al- 
Imbaratur dhul Millatavn when addressing Yusuf Ibn Tashfin 
after Zallaqa, 403 or whether he simply used a similar 
Latin title in private, 404 one can argue that as late as 
the last quarter of the C11, Alfonso still harboured the 
idea of ruling a Spain which was partly Muslim. Alfonso's 
background and his exile in Toledo (where he went after he 
was freed from Burgos in late May/June 1072 and remained 
under the protection of al-Malmun, its ruler, until he 
heard of the death of Sancho II in October405) would have 
made that idea seem reasonable. He belonged to a gener- 
ation which while gradually adjusting to the shift in the 
balance of power to the north, and while beginning to 
402 R. Barkai: Cristianos v Musulmanes, p. 108. 
403 For a discussion of the use of the title, see A. MacKay 
and Benaboud: 'Alfonso VI: al-Imbaratur dhul Millataynt, BHS, 1979, 
95-102, N. Roth: 'Again Alfonso VII, BHS, 1984,165-169 and 
A. Turki: 'La lettre du I'Moine de Francelletc. 1, al-Andalus, 1966, 
73-153. One Arabic reference is to be found in al-Turtushi, Siraj 
al-Muluk, pp. 88-89. 
404 R. Mendndez Pidal : Espahia del Cid. pp. 223-225. 
405 B. F. Reilly: The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla under King 
Alfonso VI, pp. 64-68. 
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formulate the ideology of "reconquest", arguably did not 
believe at that stage in pushing the Muslim population back 
over the sea. However, if one accepts the speech of 
Fernando I discussed in the previous chapter as genuine, 
one can construct a case that such an idea was beginning to 
emerge. Both ideas could have co-existed for a time, and at 
this juncture it could be argued that the idea was 
developing that the Muslim south could be defeated and 
brought under the hegemony of the northern Christian 
states. In some ways this was an extension of the Umayyad 
"ideal" of government who had after all ruled a Spain that 
was partly Christian, so that one could argue that Alfonso 
was seeking, as the Christian king of Castile, to replace 
(or more accurately fill the vacuum left by) the Muslim 
Caliph in Cordova. 
5.3 Barbastro. 
The fall of Barbastro can be seen as the symbolic 
turning point in the history of Talifa Spain. It can even 
be argued that it marked one of the maj or watersheds in the 
history of Muslim Spain as a whole. The f all of the city 
and the ensuing massacre clearly indicated the shift in the 
balance of power firmly to the Christian north. The 
campaign against Barbastro has been the subject of study by 
historians because of the belief that it could be seen as 
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a prototype crusade. 406 The question of the involvement 
of the Papacy in the campaign is made more intriguing by 
the reference of Ibn Hayyan to the leader of the expedition 
as Oa I id Kha i1 Roma (lit . the Commander of the Horse of 
Rome). The campaign itself had many unusual characteris- 
tics. It was the first full-scale siege to be carried out 
to conclusion against a Muslim town. Unlike the Cid's seige 
of Valencia later in the century, the besieged town put up 
a strong defence and only surrendered when its outer walls 
were breached. The population of the town was first 
evacuated then massacred. Finally the town seems to have 
been recaptured with relative ease after another siege. The 
aim of this section is to look at Barbastro from a Muslim 
Spanish point of view and especially from a Zaragozan 
perspective. 
In 1063 Ramiro I of Arag6n attacked the lands of 
Zaragoza, possibly in an attempt to force it to pay 
tribute407 which led to the interference of Castile in 
support of Zaragoza. This was partly because of an alliance 
f orged with al-Muqtadir in Zaragoza but it can also be 
argued that this partly represented an extension of the 
rivalry between Arag6n and Castile over the upper march. 
interestingly, the Castilian force that came to aid Zara- 
406 For a good discussion of Barbastro, see A Ferreiro: I 
The siege of Barbastro 1064-5; a reassessment', JMH, 1983,129- 
144. Also V. Cantarino 'The Spanish Reconquest: A Cluniac Holy 
War Against Islam? ', Islam and the Medieval West, ed. K. Semaan, 
pp. 82-109. 
407 G. Zurita y Castro: Anales de la Corona de Araq6n, p. 95. 
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goza included Rodrigo Vivar. 408 What happened at the 
ensuing battle at Graus is not clear. The accepted version 
of events is that the combined Zaragozan Castilian forces 
defeated the army of Arag6n and that during the battle 
Ramiro I was killed . 
409 There is, however, one near 
contemporary Arab source that gives a slightly different 
version. Al-Turtushi in his Siraj al-Muluk refers to 
Graus, but claims that al-Muqtadir was losing the battle 
against (Rumil), Ramiro, and as a result sent an assassin 
named saIdada who killed the Arag6nese king. 410 Several 
factors weigh in favour of al-Turtushils version. Having 
emigrated to Cairo, he could afford to record exactly what 
he had heard without taking account of factionalist 
considerations. The assassin is named, although admitted- 
ly if the story were fabricated, the name could have been 
fabricated also. Finally, al-Turtushi seems to have been 
not unsympathetic to the Hudids and yet records an incident 
which did not particularly reflect positively on them. 
However, one ought to keep in mind that he does record at 
least one other story about the march which suggests a 
symbolic rather than factual basis. 411 
The Christian sources do not record an 
4011 m. j. viguera: Aracf6n Musulmdn, p. 149. 
409 ibid. B. F. Reilly in The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla under 
pp. 37-38 questions whether Rodrigo Diaz partici- 
pated in the battle. 
410 Al-Turtushi: Siral al-Muluk, p. 309. 
411 He refers to a story of some march warriors 
cannibalising the bodies of their dead enemies. ibid. p. 297. 
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assassination but simply that Ramiro died in battle. His 
death, whether by the hands of an assassin or in combat led 
to the launch of the campaign against Barbastro. Duke 
William VIII of Aquitaine (referred 'to by Ibn 'Idhari as 
al-Bavtabin, 412 which seems to be an Arabisation of the 
name) Ramiro's father-in-law, became involved in Sancho 
Ramirez's plans for a revenge attack. Possibly he felt a 
sense of duty towards his relation and possibly he felt 
that the 'succession of Sancho Ramirez offered him an 
opportunity to extend his influence into Arag6n. The 
assembling forces also included the Count of Chalon from 
Burgundy and Count Armengol III of Urgel from Catalonia. 
The latter was already in confrontation with the upper 
march and so his involvement was not surprising. What is 
unusual is the presence of a Norman contingent led by Roger 
Crispin. Amato de Montecassino in his Storia dei Normanni 
gives no reason for the Norman involvement. 413 Whether 
this unusual collection. of Spanish and European forces made 
up what amounted to a prototype crusade or not is not the 
subject of this research. 
It was, however, an extraordinary army; one can 
conjecture that what made Sancho Ramirez allow so many 
forces to become involved in what amounted to the affairs 
of his kingdom was that this campaign took place so soon 
after his succession. A further assumption would be that at 
that stage the whole affair was dominated by his uncle 
412 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 225. 
413 Amato de Montecassino: Storia dei Normanni. p. 13. V. 
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William VIII of Aquitaine, although interestingly Ibn 
Hayyan in the earliest extant description of the campaign 
clearly refers to the attacking army as jaish 
al-ardamanivyin 414 (the army of the Normans) . It is clear 
from the description that Ibn Hayyan was in Cordova when he 
heard of the attack. It could be that he found the 
involvement of the Normans so unusual that he deemed it 
worth recording. Alternatively, his informant may have 
been convinced that the attacking army was made up mostly 
of Normans. It is worth noting that he does not seem to 
record the presence of Sancho Ramirez (although that may be 
because he had not heard of his succession by then) nor 
does he seem to mention the Duke of Aquitaine (although one 
can never be sure that Ibn I Idhari was not quoting Ibn 
Hayyan when he mentioned the Duke of Aquitaine referred to 
above). He also recorded that the senior among their 
commanders akbar ru I asa I ihum was the Commander of the Horse 
415 of Rome . 
And the army of the Normans attacked it 
(Barbastro] and continued to besiege it, 
greedy for conquering it, while their Amir 
[that is, the Amir of the people of the 
city] Yusuf Ibn Sulayman Ibn Hud left them 
[the people of the city] to their fate, 
leaving them to their own devices and 
refusing to move to their relief. 
Further on, Ibn Hayyan states 
And they (the Christians] gained untold loot 
from Barbastro. It was claimed that the 
414 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 181. 
415 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 179-190 for the 
full description of the campaign and the reconquest of the city. 
The quotes selected below are on pp. 181-182. 
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share of the Commander of the Horse of Rome, 
the most senior of their commanders, (in 
the loot] included 1500 slave girls (Jar- 
iva) . 
This supports the view that at least in Cordova the attack 
was seen, despite the involvement of Arag6n and Aquitaine, 
as a Norman affair. Why this should be so, and who the 
Commander of the Horse of Rome was, will be looked at 
below. 
Barbastro was not a particularly obvious choice 
for attack. It was a fortified city in the advanced region 
of the upper march, north of Monzon. It was seen as an 
important part of the defence of the upper march. Ibn 
'Idhari's source seems to suggest that the Christian army 
happened on Barbastro almost by chance. At first, the force 
of 1110,00011 horse tried for the larger centre of Huesca, 
which they attacked, then left for Barbastr0416 where 
they arrived on about July 1064. Barbastro, under the 
command of Ibn al-Tawil417 was well equipped to stand a 
siege. The Christian force besieged it for forty days, 
during which supplies ran short. The attacking forces then 
breached the outer walls, while the defenders retreated to 
the citadel where they managed to momentarily halt the 
advance of the Christian forces killing 500. During the 
battle the tunnel supplying water to the citadel 
416 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, pp. 224-225. 
417 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, part III, p. 182 
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collapsed. 418 The lack of water built up into a major 
problem for the besieged, especially the civilians which 
forced Ibn al-Tawil to capitulate accepting safe passage in 
return for surrender of the town. 
ý19 
The events that followed shocked the whole of 
Muslim Spain. As most of the defenders along with the 
civilian population left the citadel(700 continued to hold 
out), the Christians panicked because of their large 
numbers and massacred a large number (Ibn Hayyan mentions 
the figure 6000). They then desisted and ordered the 
survivors to leave. In the panic to leave, a further number 
died. 420 The Christians then ordered them to return to 
their homes where they were made slaves. 421 This appears 
to have been a turning of the Muslim concept of siba 422 
against the Muslims. Three days later, the Christian 
forces allowed the force that held out in the citadel safe 
passage to Monzon. As they left Barbastro, they met 
another Christian contingent that had not witnessed the 
f all of the town and did not know of the saf e passage, and 
were massacred. 423 
418 ibid. 
419 ibid. p. 183. 
420 ibid. 
421 ibid. p. 184. 
422 The institution of Siba predated Islam. When one tribe 
in Arabia defeated another in battle, they carried of f their 
women as loot. This survived to some degree after Islam, when 
some captured women were taken as concubines. 
423 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 185. 
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one further point needs to be made regarding Ibn 
Hayyan's description of the fall of Barbastro. He 
emphasised the loss of honour suffered by the Muslims and 
in particular as related to the protection of female 
honour. There are several references to rape and the 
making of thousands of girls into concubines. In part, 
Ibn Hayyan must have been lobbying for political action and 
was trying to shame the Muslims into avenging Barbastro. 
However, it is clear that he was truly shocked by the 
degree of the massacre and shamed by the subsequent loss of 
honour. Finally, Ibn Hayyan recorded a conversation 
between a Jew sent to ransom a girl and a Christian who 
held her as concubine after the fall of the city. The 
reasons given by the Christian for refusing to give the 
girl back are the earliest extant Muslim record of the 
growth of an awareness among the Spanish Christians that 
the tide was turning in their favour and a wish to extract 
revenge for past wrongs 
For she is the daughter of the owner of the 
house, who is held in high esteem among his 
people. I have chosen her because of him 
(i. e. his position] and because of her 
beauty, as my concubine, in the manner in 
which her own people used our women in the 
days of their power, and now we have the 
upper hand over them (Rudda lana al-karratu 
I alavhum) . 
424 
Besides the unprecedented massacre, what was 
truly extraordinary about this incident was that Barbastro 
fell in the f irst place. The town held out f or f orty 
424 ibid. p. 187. 
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days; enough time to allow a relief force from Huesca or 
even Zaragoza to arrive. It was clear from the way in which 
the attacking Christian force chose not to besiege Huesca 
that they did not wish to confront a larger Muslim one. Had 
a relief force arrived, the besiegers would have probably 
lifted the siege without much fight. Moreover, ' the town 
was recaptured a year later with relative ease. A Zaragozan 
force, backed by 500 Sevillian horse attacked and captured 
Barbastro in Jumadi al-Awla 457/ April- May 1065, killing 
425 about 1000 Christian horsemen and 500 men. Admittedly 
the forces that remained in the city, under the command of 
Count Armengol III of Urgel, 426 were only part of the 
original attacking force. Ibn Hayyan states that after the 
fall of the city, the "king" (malik) of the Rum left 1500 
427 horse and 2000 men, while he returned home. Nonethe 
less, that a relieving army could so easily displace an 
occupier from a fortified town, especially after the new 
defenders had a year to repair its fortification, would 
strongly suggest that this relief army could have posed a 
very serious threat to the full original Christian force. 
Despite the importance of Barbastro in the 
framework of the history of Muslim Spain as a whole, an 
understanding of the incident from a Muslim perspective 
425 ibid. pp. 189-190. 
426 A. Ferreiro: 1 The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A 
reassessment', JMH, 1983,129-144. 
427 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 185-6. 
This is clearly a different personage from the Commander of the 
Horse of Rome. 
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requires that one place it f irmly within the context of 
Zaragozan politics. As pointed out in the last chapter, the 
upper march was in reality divided between al-Muqtadir in 
Zaragoza and his brother Yusuf al-Mudhaf far in IArida. 
Barbastro was a town that had clearly chosen to remain 
loyal to yUSUf. 428 He had been unable to raise a relief 
force and was forced to leave the city to its own devices. 
As demonstrated by his effort to relieve the famine that 
struck Tudela, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, Yusuf did not have the ability to raise a 
substantial military force to carry out his will. 
It can be argued very strongly that al-Muqtadir 
chose not to send a relief force because of Barbastro's 
loyalty to his brother. 429 This would have been similar 
to the tactic he used in punishing Tudela for its loyalty 
to Yusuf, although it is very unlikely that he would have 
realised that the attack would degenerate into such a 
massacre. A year later, with a token force from another 
Talifa, probably to symbolise the involvement of the rest 
of Muslim Spain (because the massacre had so shocked every 
one), he managed to capture the town with ease. This 
would have strengthened his position in the march to a 
tremendous degree,. since it would have demonstrated to all 
the Almal of Zaragoza that Yusuf was unable to fulfil the 
obligation of a lord to defend his domain and was therefore 
unsuitable as a lord to whom the Almal would declare 
428 ibid. p. 181. 
429 ibid. p. 189. 
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allegiance. Al-Muqtadir on the other hand, by recapturing 
the city, demonstrated his ability to defend his Almal and 
defeat the Christians. The power of al-Muqtadir over the 
upper march must have become near complete. Interestingly, 
Ibn Hayyan seems to lay the blame on him for not rescuing 
the town while it was under siege, and indicates that 
there was a degree of hostile gossip against him as a 
result of this. 430 This was probably because irrespective 
of the internal struggle within the upper march, Zaragoza 
was very much perceived to be the centre of government 
there with all the responsibilities to the Almal that that 
would entail. 
Finally, the reaction of the other Ta I ifas to the 
fall of Zaragoza underlined the insular attitude that had 
developed within each. city-state in Muslim Spain. A strong 
Caliphal government in Cordova would have coordinated the 
resources of the peninsula and directed either a relief or 
failing that a force to recapture and avenge the city. This 
would have been partly as a response to the attack itself 
and partly directed at ensuring that similar attacks would 
not be launched in the future. It would therefore have 
represented the most sensible utilisation of the provinces' 
resources to ensure their long-term protection and well 
being. The Talifa rulers, however, reacted by panicking. 
Their first thought was to bolster the fortification of 
their own cities by building their walls higher and digging 
430 ibid. p. 189. 
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moats around them. 431 In the long term such a policy was 
unwise as it demonstrated to the northern powers that each 
Ta I if a did not view the security of any other Ta I ifa as 
related to its own security. In practical terms this 
allowed the northern states to launch attacks on individual 
Talifas in the knowledge that provided they were on "frien- 
dly" terms with the others they would be immune from a 
united defence. As will be shown below this was very much 
the case when Alfonso VI launched his attack on Toledo. 
The main unresolved mystery in the seige of 
Barbastro is the identity of the Christian leader 
identified by Ibn Hayyan as Oalid Khail Roma. It may be 
that the reports which Ibn Hayyan heard in Cordova were 
mistaken and that the title did -not refer to any particular 
leader. The title could also be the result of an error by 
a later copyist and the original text should read Oalid 
Khail al-Rum which would simply have referred to the 
commander of the Christian (or strictly speaking 
'Byzantine'- in the normal eastern usage) cavalry. However, 
the same spelling appears in all manuscripts edited by 
'Abbas which would suggest that Ibn Hayyan meant to 
432 
specifically use the term Roma. 
Further, Ibn Hayyan was aware of, and did use, 
the word Rum to refer to Byzantine Christians (which was, 
as indicated above, the accepted eastern usage of the 
431 ibid. p. 181. 
432 one cannot totally dismiss the possibility that all 
extant manuscripts of the text were copied from a single source 
which contained a copyist's error with regards to this title. 
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noun) . 
433 Nor was this reference by Ibn Hayyan to Roma 
unique among Spanish Muslim scholars of the period. It is 
now possible to see that there is at least one other 
reference in a letter by the wazir Ibn al-Qusayra who talks 
of Sahib Roma, that is the lord or ruler of Rome, which 
probably referred to the Pope. 434 The letter is from 
Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, to the lord of the castle Bani Hammad, 
in which Yusuf blamed Ibn Hammad for allowing Alfonso to 
extend his power (by refusing to co-operate with the 
Almoravids). In one part it reads: 
And if Sahib Roma, who in common with him 
(Alfonso] is covered by the blanket of 
disbelief (Kufr) and polytheism (Shirk), 
and who has taken up the words of falsehood 
(Zur) and lies (Ifk), should be as close to 
us as you are.. his victory would not have 
achieved more (for his side] than you have 
... nor would the damage he would have inflicted on the Muslims be greater than 
that which you have done. 
one is therefore led to the conclusion that the word Roma 
was not the result of a later copyist's misspelling an 
original reference to Oalid Khail al-Rum. Fletcher, in 
common with Ferreiro, dismisses the interpretation of the 
term Roma in Ibn Hayyan as meaning Rome and puts forward 
the argument that it simply meant Christians or Rum. He 
then goes on to argue that one cannot see the campaign for 
Barbastro as a prototype crusade. 435 While I do not wish 
433 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira part IV, p. 86, where 
he ref ers to an ambassador from the Christians of Constantinople 
(Rasul al-Rum min al-Oustantinivya). 
434 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: Part II, p. 260. 
435 R. A. Fletcher: 'Reconquest & Crusade in Spain c 1050- 
1150.1 TRHS, 1987. p. 42. 
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to enter into the discussion as to whether there was a lost 
Papal bull offering indulgence to those who fought in this 
campaign, I would argue very strongly that Ibn Hayyan 
meant to use the term Roma as distinct from Rum and that, 
further, he meant it to signify the city of Rome. As far 
as Ibn Hayyan was concerned, the attack on Barbastro was 
launched by a Norman army led by the Commander of the Horse 
(that is the cavalry) of Rome, although who that personage 
was is not clear. 
The title most probably referred to Roger 
Crispin, the commander of the Norman forces. During his 
career, he became the commander of the cavalry of the 
Emperor in Italy and died in Constantinople. 436 The prob- 
lem with this solution is that Crispin appears to have 
become commander in Italy after the campaign in Barbastro. 
However, it is clear that Ibn Hayyan wrote about Barbastro 
some time after the event, as his narrative includes an 
account of its reconquest the following year, although the 
exact date of his writing is not known. Ibn Hayyan died in 
1076/1077, which means that he could have written, or 
indeed edited, his account of the siege up to twelve years 
after the event. By 1072, Ibn Hayyan would have heard 
that the Byzantine armies were defeated at Manzikert. 
Reports of Manzikert might have included news of Crispin, 
and in this way news of his later career might have reached 
Ibn Hayyan. 
436 Amato de Montecassino: Storia dei Normanni, p. 13, section 
viii - 
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The question that remains is why Ibn Hayyan 
viewed the attacking f orce as being essentially a Norman 
one. I would suggest that the answer to this question is 
related to the issue of Papal involvement in the campaign. 
The Latin sources do not provide conclusive evidence that 
Alexander II instigated the campaign. There are allega- 
tions that Alexander II issued a Bull in 1063 granting 
indulgence for the participants in Barbastro, but such a 
Bull, as Ferreiro points out, is not mentioned by Amato de 
Montecassino. 437 
Reilly, on the other hand, argues that 
Alexander II was instrumental in organising the campaign 
for Barbastro, which he sees as having the aspect of a 
crusade. 438 He sees the campaign as part of a history of 
Papal involvement in the reconquest, and which included 
the attempt by the Pope Gregory VII in 1073 to organise a 
crusade in Spain by the south French, led by Ebles, Count 
of Roucy, and which in the event never materialized . 
439 
For Ibn Hayyan, two aspects of the campaign were especially 
significant. First, the involvement of the Norman forces, 
in what appears to be their first sortie into Spain. He 
would have been well aware of the connection between the 
Papacy and the Norman forces against the Moslems in Sicily 
from 1061. Secondly, news that in some way Sahib Roma was 
437 A. Ferreiro: 'The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A 
reassessment' JMH, 1983,129-144. 
438. B. F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 
69. 
439 ibid. pp. 46-47. 
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involved in or ganising this campaign. Drawing the two 
strands together, Ibn Hayyan might well have concluded that 
the attacking force must have been primarily a Norman one 
acting on behalf of the Pope. This may be why he describes 
their leader, Crispin, as the most senior among the com- 
manders of the campaign, despite the f act that he was 
aware of the presence of another important Christian 
potentate, whom he ref ers to as the king of the Christians 
(Malik al-Rum), and which could have either been William 
of Aquitaine or Sancho Ramirez of Arag6n, although the 
choice of the word Rum would suggest a non-Iberian 
potentate and might therefore be seen as a reference to the 
Duke of Aquitaine. 
There is no other evidence to substantiate Ibn 
Hayyan's description of Crispin as holding the title 
Commander of the cavalry of Rome during the campaign. 
However, I would argue that the use of the term Oa I id 
Khail Roma clearly indicates that Ibn Hayyan believed that 
the Christian forces present at Barbastro were those of the 
Pope. Since he probably connected the Pope with the South 
Italian Normans, and since Normans were present at 
Barbastro, he assumed that the commander of the Norman 
force was the senior military commander of the expedition; 
an expedition which was primarily a Norman one, although 
other Christians also participated in it. 
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5.4 The Almoravids. 
The history of Ta I if a Spain became intertwined 
with the history of the Almoravids especially towards the 
last quarter of the C11. It was the Almoravids who finally 
occupied what was left of Muslim Spain from the lords of 
the Talifas and. who affected, to a large extent, the shape 
of the latter's politics towards the Christian north. 
Moreover, the history of Talifa Spain that came down to us 
was mostly an Almoravid version, and the Talifas as the 
losers in the contest were painted in the least favourable 
light. While it is not the aim of this study to look at the 
wider issues of Almoravid history, it is relevant to look 
at some aspects of their origins and in particular to look 
beyond the myth that they cultivated regarding their sect. 
This is important in trying to interpret their actions in 
the political arena of later C11 Spain. The Almoravid 
presentation of the history of the period is somewhat 
simplistic. 
The Talifas were weak, corrupt states that were 
losing Muslim territory to the Christian north. The Almo- 
ravids selflessly intervened to save that part of the 
Muslim world from ruin. Despite their best efforts, Talifa 
weakness and incompetence lead to a loss of a large part of 
the peninsula before the Almoravids could stop the rot. 
This version of the history of Cil Spain was taken up by 
the Almohads, another north African militant Berber 
movement, who defeated the Almoravids. Their version of 
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history claimed that as the Almoravids became enthroned in 
Spain, they in turn became corrupted by luxury and it was 
up to the puritanical Almohads to save that part of 
Islamdom yet again from the advance of Christianity. 
It is the contention of this study that Yusuf Ibn 
Tashfin, the commander of the Almoravids was driven by more 
selfish motives. Irrespective of the origins of the 
movement, he himself was fond of power and looked at 
Muslim Spain very much as a province. ripe for conquest. An 
acceptance of this view of him as a leader would alter the 
way in which his actions in Spain can be interpreted. It is 
therefore worth looking at the incident early in Yusuf's 
career when he assumed command over the movement. 
Yusuf Ibn Tashfin first came to prominence when 
his cousin Abu Bakr Ibn 'Omar, the commander of the 
Almoravid movement placed him in charge as a commander in 
Marrakesh during his absence to avenge an attack on his 
tribe in the desert. 440 With only a third of the 
Almoravid forces under his command hi-n- bolstered their 
position in Marrakesh, proclaiming his loyalty to his 
cousin. At the same time he increased his personal wealth 
and power, marrying his cousin's divorced wife and 
equipping from his own money a private fighting force loyal 
to him. 441 In 465/ 17 September 1072-5 September 1073, 
Abu Bakr returned to Marrakesh to find Yusuf in total 
control. Yusufls wife had correctly anticipated that Abu 
440 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 4, pp. 20-21. 
441 ibid. pp. 22-23. 
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Bakr was an idealist who would not f ight over personal 
power. Abu Bakr surrendered his authority to Yusuf and 
returned to the desert. 442 Yusuf went on to declare for 
the 'Abbasid caliph but took on the title Amir al-Muslimin, 
which although not a Caliphal title was close enough to the 
Caliphal title Amir al-Mulminin to place it in the same 
category as the titles assumed by the 'Amirids or even the 
lords of the Talifas. 
The relevance of this to the history of Ta I if a 
Spain is in interpreting the motives behind his actions. 
He viewed Spain as a candidate for conquest and despite 
Almoravid propaganda, Yusuf was quite willing to see the 
Talifas weakened by attacks from the north. He was 
interested in stemming the advance of the north only in so 
f ar as it preserved the lands he wanted to conquer but 
viewed both Ta I if as and the Christians as enemies. This was 
most clearly demonstrated in the battle of Zallaqa in 1086 
which will be looked at in the next chapter. During the 
battle he held back f rom aiding the f orce . of his main 
Talifa "ally" al-Multamid Ibn 'Abbad. A non-Almoravid 
source recorded him as saying "leave them to death for a 
while; both parties are enemies". 443 Yusuf almost 
consistently managed to arrive just too late to save the 
Talifas. When Mubashsher of Majorca suffered a 10-month 
siege by the Count of Barcelona, Yusuf managed to arrive 
442 ibid. pp. 24-25. 
443 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p. 94. 
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444 after the island had fallen. The Talifas themselves 
must have been aware of his real motives and that must have 
played a part in their actions when dealing with him. This 
played a particularly important part in determining the 
actions of Zaragoza towards the Almoravid invasion. 
5.5 Changes in Valencia. 
At the same time that al-Muqtadir Ibn Hud 
consolidated his authority over the upper march by the 
recapture of Barbastro, the political situation in Valencia 
underwent a fundamental change that threatened to isolate 
Zaragoza. The rivalry between the upper and middle march 
was very much alive and it must have been obvious to Toledo 
that by extending its control over Valencia it would put 
Zaragoza in a position where it became surrounded on all 
sides either by Toledan or Christian forces. The situation 
would have become more urgent for Toledo as Zaragoza gained 
total control over Tortosa thus gaining access to the sea 
in 452/6 February 1060-25 January 1061.445 Control over 
Tortosa would also have allowed Zaragoza easy access to the 
Almal of Valencia through the coastal plain. The whole 
debacle over Barbastro might have given the impression to 
Toledo that Zaragoza was too involved with internal affairs 
to pose any threat to its expansionist strategy at that 
instant and that the time was therefore ripe to strike. 
444 Ibn Khaldun: al-Tarikh, Vol. IV, p. 355. 
445 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 250. 
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Toledo had already forged links with Valencia 
through the marriage of 'Abd al-Malik to the daughter of 
Yahya al-Malmun of Toledo. Al-Malmun had obviously believed 
that by supporting his son-in-law at the time of his 
succession he would extend Toledo's influence further. That 
policy had apparently not been successful. There were 
allegations that 'Abd al-Malik had treated his wife badly 
and that his sexual preferences favoured boys which angered 
446 his father-in-law. Whatever the declared cause for the 
intervention, al-Malmun launched an attack on Valencia in 
8 Dhi al-Qilda 457/10 October 1065.447 The 'Amirids had 
never established a particularly strong power base in their 
domain, so that their displacement seemed to have been a 
smooth affair. Moreover, al-Malmun had the support of Ibn 
'Abd al-'Aziz who had helped 'Abd al-Malik succeed his 
father four years earlier. The transfer of power to the 
wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz shared some characteristics with 
the succession of 'Abd al-Malik. The army of Toledo 
remained in Valencia to ensure a trouble-free transfer of 
power. News of trouble in Toledo forced al-Malmun to leave 
Valencia. 448 He then left Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in command as 
a reward for his support. 449 
The success of al-Malmun's venture had alarming 
implications for the upper march. Zaragoza was now isolated 
446 ibid. p. 267. 
447 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 303. 
448 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 151. 
449 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, ibid. p. 40. 
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in f acing the Christian north, unable to draw on support 
from the middle march or from Valencia, it's southern 
anchor. one can argue that this incident emphasised for the 
Hudids in Zaragoza the importance of Valencia, to their 
security, whether against a hostile Toledo or the north. 
Unable to exert any pressure against Toledo or change the 
situation in Valencia, Zaragoza spent the following ten 
years trying to limit the damage it suffered by attempting 
to reach an understanding with the Christian north. 
Al-Muqtadir's first concern was to try to stop another 
invasion by non Spanish forces into his Almal. To this end 
he concluded a treaty with Sancho Ramirez I in 1069 in 
which both parties agreed not to ally with French or any 
other foreign force against one another. 450 For Sancho 
Ramirez, it seems that the involvement of -the non-Arag6nese 
forces in the campaign for Barbastro was unwelcome. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that as he established his 
power, he would have wished to see less interference into 
the affairs of his kingdom. Interestingly the treaty did 
not preclude a war between the two powers and indeed they 
engaged in a war 1069-70.451 Al-Muqtadir tried to further 
limit the attacks by his northern enemies with the payment 
of tribute. 
The death of al-Malmun of Toledo in 1075 made for 
substantial change in the situation in north east Spain. 
450 A. Ferreiro: 'Thd Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A 
reassessment', JMH, 1983,129-144. 
451 M. J. Viguera: Araq6n Musulman, p. 157. 
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Al-Malmun had undoubtedly been a strong ruler who ruled 
with the able help of a chancery headed by Ibn al-Hadidi. 
He had by the time of his death consolidated the power of 
Toledo both against the Christians and against Zaragoza. 
His successor, titled al-Qadir, was to prove a different 
kind of ruler. The time of succession and the transfer of 
power to a new ruler was clearly one in which government 
was particularly vulnerable. Al-Muqtadir took this oppor- 
tunity to launch a campaign south towards Denia in 467/27 
August 1074-15 August 1075. His original intentions seem 
to have been to acquire certain forts on the edge of the 
Almal of Denia which he hoped to add to the Almal of his 
son al-Mundhir in Tortosa. 452 This would have added to 
his ability to exert pressure on Valencia and force it back 
within Zaragoza's sphere of influence. In this he would 
have probably been encouraged by the weakening of Denia 
453 following its loss of Sardinia. What followed seems to 
have been something of a fiasco. Al-Muqtadir received the 
forts he asked for and on his way back to Zaragoza 
discovered that 'Ali of Denia intended to double cross him. 
He returned to negotiate further and was surprised when 
Mulizz al-Dawla, 'Ali's son who was sent to negotiate with 
him, seemed to be discussing terms for the surrender of the 
whole province. Al-Muqtadir took this opportunity, adding 
Denia to the Almal of Tortosa. 454 He was, however, unable 
452 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp. 266-7. 
453 ibid. p. 265. 
454 ibid. pp. 266-268. 
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to bring Valencia directly within his sphere of influence. 
This was probably because the force he took with him was 
incapable of enforcing. such a solution on Valencia. Gossip 
in Zaragoza made much of al-Muqtadir's ability to acquire 
Denia but his failure to get the closer and more 
politically sensible acquisition of Valencia. 455 
Meanwhile, the change in government in Toledo 
gave Abu Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz his opportunity to break 
away from the Toledan sphere of influence. 456 Up to then 
he had been regarded most probably as a governor appointed 
by Toledo. By declaring independence, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz had 
in fact established *a new Talifa in Valencia which he 
headed. Al-Muqtadir again tried to extend his authority 
over Valencia and again failed, although Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd 
al-'Aziz did acknowledge his general influence over the 
area. 457 This independence of Valencia marked a period 
when it returned into the Zaragozan sphere of influence. 
Abu-Bakr, however, entered into a relationship with Al- 
Muqtadir that was nearer to that of equals(unlike his 
relationship with al-Malmun of Toledo). 
This new closeness to Zaragoza was cemented with 
marriage alliances. At least one source records a marriage 
between the daughter of al-Muqtadir and Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd 
455 Ibn Hayyan: ibid. Part III, pp. 42-3. 
456 ibid. Part IV, p. 156. 
457 ibid. Part III, p. 43. 
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al-'Aziz in 1075.458 Other sources, recorded a marriage 
between the daughter of Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and 
al-Muqtadir's grandson Ahmad at the later date of 1085.459- 
The first marriage was said to have been organised by 
al-Muqtadir's convert wazir Ibn Hasdai. It is conceivable 
that two marriages took place, although it is also possible 
that the reference is to a single marriage. Whether one 
marriage took place or two, it is clear that Zaragoza and 
Valencia had come closer together politically to the 
exclusion of Toledo. Within a very short time after al- 
Malmun's death, al-Muqtadir and Abu-Bakr had reversed the 
gains that he had made for Toledo so that it was Toledo 
that faced a position of isolation in the north east and 
not Zaragoza. 
5.6 The collapse of the Toledan government. 
The succession of Yahya, inappropriately titled 
al-Qadir (the Able) to Toledo, precipitated a series of 
events that were to influence the history, not only of the 
north east of the peninsula but of Muslim Spain as a whole. 
He had inherited a strong domain, whose influence spread 
eastward to the sea, with its main Christian and Muslim 
enemies(which included both the upper and the lower 
march)held in check. The government he had inherited from 
458 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p. 81. 
459 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn I Idhari, al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p. 304. ; also 
Ibn Khaqan: al-Oalalid al-'Icfvan, p. 184. 
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his grandfather, al-Malmun, had relied in domestic politics 
on the skills of his main wazir al-Hadidi. Before his death 
al-Malmun had asked his grandson to trust al-Hadidi and 
asked al-Hadidi to help insure his grandson's 
succession. 460 Despite the strength of the dhu al-Nunid 
government in Toledo, al-Malmun had faced internal dissent 
from some factions within Toledo and had quelled that 
danger with the help of Ibn al-Hadidi by imprisoning the 
leading dissenters. One of Yahyals first actions after his 
succession was to release the dissenting "elders" from 
prison. 461 His reasons for doing so are unclear. Possibly 
he wished to emphasise his independence from his grandfath- 
er's policies, or he may simply have wished to start his 
reign with a general amnesty. A strong case can be made 
for the former interpretation. Not only did al-Qadir 
release the dissenters from prison, but he slowly turned 
against Ibn al-Hadidi, eventually having him murdered. 462 
The importance of a strong civil service to 
Ta I if a government has been discussed above. Interestingly, 
the gap created in the Toledan civil service with the death 
of Ibn al-Hadidi was interpreted as a sign of weakness by 
Toledo's enemies. It was that event that triggered Ibn 'Abd 
al-'Azizls independence in Valencia. It also signalled the 
general weakness of Toledan government to Zaragoza. 
Al-Muqtadir not only extended his influence south to Denia, 
460 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 151. 
461 ibid. p. 157. 
462 ibid. 
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eventually bringing Valencia out of Toledo Is sphere of 
influence and into that of Zaragoza, but also launched 
direct attacks on Toledo's Almal. Al-Muqtadir's target was 
Cuenca on the Valencian Toledan borders and his object must 
have been to drive a wedge further between the two states. 
In this he was aided by Arag6n. 463 The murder of Ibn al- 
Hadidi was also interpreted as a sign of weakness by 
Alfonso VI of Castile, who had spent a period of exile in 
Toledo and who began now to put pressure on al-Qadir 
extracting further tribute as well as the surrender of key 
fortifications. 464 
Within five years of his succession, the position 
of al-Qadir had deteriorated so substantially that internal 
opposition to him grew openly. This opposition was still 
being led by those whom he had released f rom prison and who 
had advised him to have Ibn al-Hadidi murdered. Al-Qadir's 
control disintegrated so much that he was forced to f lee 
Toledo as the "elders" led the commoners in an attack on 
465 the palace. Yahya retreated to castle Cuenca, which 
al-Muqtadir had failed to occupy. These series of events 
bring into focus several themes relating to the political 
structure of Ta I if a Spain which were discussed in the 
previous chapters. 
one is again confronted with the striking power 
463 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p. 82. 
464 ibid. pp. 83-84. 
465 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 157. 
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of the "people" also referred to as "elders". That this 
term referred to a few is evident from the fact that al- 
Malmun had managed to imprison them to stop their opposi- 
tion. Interestingly, their power remained intact despite 
a period in prison. They also seemed able to mobilise the 
commoners. Further, as in the case of Valencia and 
Zaragoza, they could and did take a very active role in 
determining the political direction of Toledo, although 
their ability to force out al-Qadir was in part aided by 
his own ineptitude. The party which is glaringly noticeable 
by its absence f rom the internal turmoil were the army. 
They appear neither on the "people"' s side nor as defenders 
of the ruler. This may be because Talifa lords maintained 
relatively small armies especially within the main cities, 
so that these forces would have been unable or unwilling to 
participate in political change. Mention of the army was 
also absent in the case of internal change instigated by 
the "people" in Valencia and Zaragoza (except that which 
arrived with Sulayman Ibn Hud). It is possible that in the 
same way the civil service under the Umayyads did not 
involve itself in disputes over succession, preferring to 
remain on the sidelines and congratulating the winner, the 
armed forces of the Talifas also preferred not to involve 
themselves in disputes over government, declaring their 
loyalty to the eventual winner. 
Another theme that is brought into f ocus by these 
events is the importance of a strong civil service as part 
of the supports necessary for government in Talifa Spain. 
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Even the powerful al-Malmun relied on a civil service 
revolving around two main wazirs. When he faced internal 
opposition, it was the civil service which arranged for the 
move against the opposition and their imprisonment. It is 
particularly interesting that Ibn al-Hadidi's murder was 
perceived by others within Talifa Spain, including Alfonso 
vI, as signalling a weakening of the structure of Toledan 
government. Al-Qadir, in having Ibn al-Hadidi killed 
removed an experienced statesman from his government 
without finding an equivalent replacement. His freeing of 
the opposition was another indication of his recklessness. 
Finally, the attempts to establish an alternative 
government to that of the Bani dhi al-Nunids by the vic- 
torious "people" of Toledo provides a fascinating insight 
into the question of the "legality" of authority which was 
discussed in the previous chapters. When al-Qadir fled, the 
people did not advance an alternative ruler. The only time 
that that occurred in Talifa history was when the jurists 
of Cordova abolished the Caliphate and advanced Ibn Jahwar 
as ruler. That, however, was a very special case and those 
jurists that abolished the Umayyad Caliphate were among the 
most respected men of law and civil servants in the penin- 
sula. The people of Toledo elected instead to invite al- 
Mutawakkil Ibn al-Aftas of Badajoz to come to rule 
them. 466 The only reason for choosing him appears to have 
been that one of the leaders of the opposition, Yusuf Ibn 
466 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 159. 
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al-Qallas al-Batliusi, was originally from Badajoz. 467 
Al-Mutawakkil entered Toledo towards the end of 472/Spring 
1080 and remained in the city for ten months. 
one can put forward a strong argument that 
despite the disintegration of the Umayyad system of govern- 
ment that bestowed a legal basis on the authority of the 
rulers of the provinces, that concept of legitimacy had 
remained very much a dominant one in the political ideology 
of the period. Rule clearly was not open to anyone. Despite 
the people of Toledo having the de facto authority in the 
city they*chose not to elect either a council or nominate 
a person to assume power. Such a person or council would 
have had their authority based solely on the power of the 
commoners and that seems to have been unacceptable. Even at 
that late stage "legitimacy" of authority played an 
essential role in the political arena of Talifa Spain, 
hence the need to "invite" a ruler the legitimacy of whose 
authority was established. one could argue that the case of 
Abu-Bakr in Valencia tends to negate this case since he was 
only a wazir. However, he derived his legitimacy from his 
appointment as governor by al-Malmun. Once the legitimacy 
of his authority was established, he could break away from 
allegiance to the original source of that legitimacy, which 
remained acceptable practice in Talifa Spain. 
From his exile in Cuenca, al-Qadir tried to 
regain Toledo by appealing to Alfonso VI and reminding him 
of the help he had received as an exile in Toledo. At the 
467 ibid. 
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same time, al-Mutawakkil seems to have viewed his reign in 
Toledo as a short term affair, probably because he had no 
local power base whatsoever, and decided to flee the city 
as Alfonso advanced on it (having commandeered its 
treasury). Al-Qadir recaptured Toledo ten months after 
being forced to flee, in 473/22 June 1080- 10 June 1081. 
Because al-Qadir was reinstated in Toledo by Alfonso, the 
"people" seem to have taken the view that his legitimacy 
was henceforth derived from Alfonso. This seems to have 
been the reason for their choosing to complain to Alfonso 
about al-Qadir's shortcomings following their rebellion 
against him in 'Id al-Nahr 474/May 1082.468 By that stage 
the outlook of the Toledans had become so Toledo-centred 
that they failed to perceive Alfonso within the wider and 
pre-Talifa context of Muslim Spain versus the north. The 
dissolution of the unity of Muslim Spain as a political 
concept in the minds of its inhabitants was thus complete 
by the beginning of the eighth decade of the century. 
5.7 conclusion. 
While the campaign against Barbastro was an 
exceptional event, it did underline the changes that the 
468 ibid. pp. 159-163. Reilly in The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla 
Und! r King Alfonso VI leans towards dating the episode in 1080 
and sees Alfonso's capture of Coria in 1079 as part of the 
campaign to re-instate al-Qadir. Ibn Bassam, however states that 
al-Mutawakkil entered Toledo at the end ('Aqiba) 472 and stayed 
for ten months, which suggests he left in 1081. 
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Christian Spanish states were undergoing. In particular it 
demonstrated the closer alignment with the mainstream Latin 
world and the strengthening of the belief that the fight 
against the Muslims was not only territorial but also to do 
with the upholding of Christianity against its enemies. 
Whether Barbastro was the first crusade or not, the north 
was moving in the direction where its struggle to regain 
the lands it lost to the Muslims took on more of the 
characteristics of a Holy War. 
This occurred at a time when the Spanish Muslims 
had increasingly moved away from identifying with Spain as 
a unified Muslim state and more towards a segmented 
political view based on the localised identity of their 
city-states. The political weakness that this system 
created insured that the apex of the power of the Talifa 
states marked the beginning of their very quick decline as 
they were ill-equipped to individually stand up to the 
rejuvenated and dynamic north. This was not only in terms 
of inferior military power. It also manifested itself in 
the lack of a political ideology capable of resisting the 
idea of reconquest that was being born in the north. 
The apparent weakness of the Talifa states also 
served to bring them to the notice of a militant Muslim 
movement which was gaining in power in north Africa. The 
Almoravid movement, despite the propaganda it spread about 
itself after its victory, had come under the control of an 
ambitious and expansionist leader, who came to view Muslim 
Spain as the natural area for his movement to expand. The 
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intervention of Almoravids in Spain only started in the 
middle of the eighth decade of the C11, but they managed to 
dominate the political scene there very quickly. They also 
brought with them a more dynamic interpretation of Islam 
and came to see and represent their fight against the 
Talifas and the Christian north not only as a territorial 
conflict but also as a Holy War. 
The actions of the lords of the Ta I if as have come 
to be interpreted and were judged by Muslim historians 
within the context of an "Islamic" political system. 
However, a better understanding of the actions of the 
Talifa lords and in particular those of Zaragoza and 
Valencia would be achieved from looking at them within the 
context of a "Talifall political system. Thus, while al- 
Muqtadir can be judged as criminally negligent in not 
rushing to the aid of Barbastro as soon as it was attacked 
if one is examining the situation from an "Islamic" per- 
spective, his actions seem sensible and even necessary when 
looked at from a "Talifall perspective. It was the only way 
in which he could limit the power of his brother in Ldrida 
and strengthen the power of Zaragoza as a unit. This 
"Talifall perspective will help define the actions of 
Zaragoza in relation to the Almoravids and Valencia towards 
the end of the century which will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
Finally, certain themes that were seen in the 
development of the Talifas such as the increased power of 
the interest groups within the cities, the "people", and 
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the importance of an efficient civil service as a tool of 
Ta I if a government, remained part of the political f abric of 
C11 Muslim Spain. Moreover, despite the total collapse of 
the Umayyad system of government, the Muslims of Talifa 
Spain continued to lay considerable stress on the import- 
ance of legitimate government within the confines of the 
new political system which had come to be established in 
Spain. Talifa Spain began to crumble by the mid 1080's 
under the pressure from both the Almoravid and the Chris- 
tian advance. The Talifa that managed to survive longest, 
Zaragoza, did so by exploiting the Talifa system most 
efficiently. Zaragoza can be seen, in the final analysis, 
as having been the Talifas' ideal of a Talifa. 
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6. The Cid and Zaragoza 
1 Introduction 
The history of (although by no means the events 
in) the Iberian Peninsula during the ninth and tenth 
decades of C11 can be said to be dominated by a single 
figure; a Castilian knight who later came to epitomise the 
spirit of the reconquest and who, having been exiled from 
his native land came to conquer and rule over a Muslim 
city-state. Much has been written about Rodrigo Diaz de 
Vivar, known as el-Campeador (from the Latin Campidoctor) 
and also as el-Cid (from the Arabic al-Savved) not least 
because of the epic poem written about his exploits and 
which is a source of interest not only to historians but 
also to literary scholars. 
The place of honour, which the Cid occupies in 
spanish history is reflected not only in the scholarly 
works written about him, notably Mendndez Pidal's La 
EsPafia del Cid 469 1 but also in popular recognition 
culminating in a Hollywood epiC. 470 And yet, despite the 
important role which the Cid played in the history of the 
469 A more recent study is R. A. Fletcher Is The Quest f or Elý 
cid. 
470 For which Men6ndez Pidal was historical advisor. 
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upper march in the latter part of C11, and which shall be 
looked at below, his role in the general history of Spain 
was much exaggerated by later legend. He is notable by his 
absence from the two momentous events in the latter part of 
the century. He did not participate in the recapture of 
Toledo in 1085, significant both symbolically as Toledo 
was the old Visigothic capital of Spain, and strategical- 
ly, since the capture of the middle march broke the back 
of the Muslim march defences and marked the irreversible 
advance of the reconquest. Nor was he present at Zallaqa, 
where the North African Almoravids inflicted a disastrous 
defeat on the forces of Castile. 471 
Nevertheless, the Cid's role in the history of 
the upper march is deeply entwined with both these events 
and in particular the former. This chapter will try to 
look at the Cid's actions within the context of Zaragozan 
politics and reinterpret them accordingly. Although there 
has been some revision of his role from that of "Castilian 
hero par excellence" as painted by the poem and maintained 
by Spanish historians, especially Mendndez Pidal, the 
general heroic slant still influences the study of his 
history. Why this Castilian knight became the hero of the 
period is not properly part of this research, although one 
471 The prominent place which the Cid occupies in Spanish 
history owes much to Mendndez Pidal's work. Recently, Reilly in 
his The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI has 
presented a reassessment of the history of Castile in this period 
and brings out the role of Alfonso VI. See also Reilly's The ian and Muslim Spain. 
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would hazard a guess that it had something to do with the 
fact that he was the only Castilian to inflict a major 
defeat on the Almoravids. However, it is worth pointing 
out the documentary basis for the divergence in the inter- 
pretations of his action as discussed below from the 
mainstream of Spanish history. 
Men6ndez Pidal believed that the Historia 
Roderici was an account written by a Mozarab cleric who 
accompanied the Cid on his campaigns 1082-1090 and was 
written in 1110.472 He further believed that the Poem of 
the Cid, which in his eyes represented a vernacular 
history, was written around f orty years after the Cid Is 
death. 473 Mendndez Pidal therefore believed that he had 
two main contemporary or near contemporary sources, one of 
which was written by an eyewitness, from which to 
construct the history of the period. This lead him to 
place less emphasis on the Arabic source of al-Dhakhira. 
However, some recent studies place the Historia. at a later 
date. Ubieto Arteta tentatively suggests 1144-47 as the 
date for its composition, although Fletcher has recently 
474 put forward arguments for an earlier date. Recent 
studies of the Poem of the Cid place it around 1201 to 
472. R. Mendndez Pidal: La Espaha del Cid, p. 5 
473. ibid. 
474 A. Ubieto Arteta: 'La "Historia Rodericill y su fecha de 
redaccion' , Saitabi, 1961,241-246. R. Fletcher, The Quest for El 
cid, pp. 93-99. 
A 
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475 1207. In other words these two christian sources were 
written perhaps up to f ifty years and one hundred years 
after the Cid's death, when elements of the folklore myth 
were very much established. In essence this leaves the al- 
Dhakhira as the only near contemporary account476 of his 
it is exploits, although this by no means implies that 
therefore an accurate one, nor that the poem and the 
Historia lose their usefulness. Rather, by placing the 
latter two sources in their historical context, their 
contents could be better assessed and that more weight can 
therefore be given to the account related in the al- 
Dhakhira than has hitherto been the case. 
The 1080's was a decade in which Zaragoza faced 
its greatest challenges as an independent Ta I ifa. The 
decade started with a concentrated attack by IArida as 
Mundhir Ibn Hud in alliance with Barcelona and Arag6n tried 
to oust his nephew from the centre of the march. Zaragoza 
managed to avert this threat only to face a more far 
reaching one as Alfonso advanced on and occupied Toledo. 
Not only did this represent an increased danger f rom the 
middle march which could no longer be viewed even as a 
possible anchor against the north, but as Alfonso placed 
al-Qadir, Toledo's ousted ruler in Valencia, Zaragoza 
475 Anon: The Poem of the Cid ed. I Michael Introduction 
p. 16. Also C. Smith: The Making of the Poema de Mig Cid p. j. 
476 There is no controvery as to the dating of al-Dhakhira, 
while the dating of the Historia, to my mind, still remains 
unsettled. 
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felt itself totally cut off and isolated. 
Finally, the fall of Toledo led to the advent of 
the Alm. oravids, who, notwithstanding their propaganda, 
were clearly perceived by the Talifas as a definite threat 
to their independence. The Hudids tried to meet this 
threat and that of the thrusting Castile by playing off 
one faction against the other. They chose not to get 
involved in Zallaqa nor in Aledo and by helping the Cid 
secure Valencia, Zaragoza ensured that the Almoravid 
advance was checked south of its domain as well as breaking 
the cordon which Alfonso had thrown about the upper march. 
The dynamics of the political scene in Spain were 
undergoing rapid and fundamental changes during this 
period. Zaragoza, by choosing not to get involved in the 
larger political struggle between Castile and the 
Almoravids and by concentrating its efforts on securing a 
dependable ally in Valencia to counteract the threats from 
Castilian Toledo and the Almoravid south, managed to 
prolong its period of independence, although by the tenth 
decade of the C11 it was becoming increasingly apparent 
that the Talifa system could not survive in the new politi- 
cal arena which had developed in Spain. 
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Part I 
6.2 A Castilian Knight in the Service of Zaragoza 
While the reasons leading to the exile of Rodrigo 
Diaz from Castile and his eventual employment by Zaragoza 
are outside the bounds of this research, some aspects of 
the history of his estrangement from Alfonso VI are import- 
ant to this chapter as they may help clarify the background 
to a political arena where these two protagonists who were 
later seen as the main figures in the Christian drive 
southwards in the C11', at times appeared to be on opposite 
and conflicting sides. As mentioned in the introduction, 
there is some controvery as to whether the Historia 
Roderici was composed in the in the middle of the C12, or 
its beginning, as believed by Mendndez Pidal and Fletcher, 
and whether it was therefore written by an eye-witness. 
Nevertheless, it remains an important source for the 
history of Rodrigo's early exploits, although if one 
accepts a later date for its composition, one would assume 
that it was coloured by the politics of the mid C12. This, 
however, provides a good source for what was accepted by 
the time of its composition as the early history of Rodrigo 
Diaz. 
It seems accepted that Rodrigo Diaz was a friend 
of Sancho of Castile. 477 He was, it is also alleged the 
477 R. Mendndez Pidal: La Espaha del Cid p. 133. 
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Alferez or standard bearer of the Castilian army under 
Sancho. 478 This would have been a position of great 
importance and implies a prominence in the Castilian 
court. 479 Whether. he was, or whether this friendship with 
the murdered King and his exalted position in the court 
were a later embellishment and rightly forms part of the 
myth which was built around the man, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo's political 
inclinations were coloured by those of Sanchols court. 
This, one assumes, included an antagonism towards 
Sancho's exiled brother Alfonso. When, following Sancho's 
death, Alfonso became King of Castile, it is again not 
unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo, possibly the Alferez 
of the deceased King, 'was not particularly happy at this 
transition of power. 
It is not appropriate at this juncture to discuss 
fully whether Rodrigo led a faction which accused Alfonso 
VI of being involved in the murder of his brother, f orcing 
him to take an oath at Santa Gadea attesting to his 
innocence. There are elements within this story which 
478. ibid. 
479 Reilly in The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla Under King 
Alf)nso VI, pp. 37-38, questions whether Sancho's Castile, which 
he sees as more primitively organised than contemporary Le6n, had 
an office of Alferez. He further argues that charter evidence 
suggests that Rodrigo Diaz's position at the Royal Court was of 
the second rank at best. In this, I defer to Reilly's study of 
the charter evidence. However, this does not change the argument 
that as a member of Sancho's court (even of second rank) 
Rodrigo's politics would have been influenced by those of the 
court, including an antagonism towards Alfonso. 
300 
perhaps suggest a later date. However, this story and 
other indications in earlier sources do seem to point to a 
tradition that Rodrigo was, if not hostile, then at best 
cool towards the new King. 480 There are other indica- 
tions of friction between the ensign of the murdered King 
and Alfonso VI. When Alfonso, in a move of realignment 
towards the mainstream of European Christianity introduced 
the Roman Liturgy, it appears that Rodrigo led a faction 
which opposed this move. Mendndez Pidal discusses this 
episode and points out that Rodrigo, when in command of 
valencia, himself introduced the Roman Liturgy. 481 What 
is relevant to this chapter in that episode is that again 
there is evidence of a tradition that Rodrigo's relations 
with his new King from the start of the latter's reign were 
not trouble free and that when the break did occur between 
the two, there was perhaps an element of a personality 
clash involved in addition to the "trouble makers" of the 
poem. In the final analysis, the demotion of Rodrigo 
from favour is best illustrated by the fact that the new 
King brought with him a new Alferez, Garcia Ordonez, who 
took this post from Rodrigo. 482 
Interestingly, the episode leading to Rodrigo's 
first exile provides the first instance of divergence 
480 For a discussion of this episode see ibid pp. 71-72. Also 
R. Mendndez Pidal: La Espaha del Cid, pp. 132-134. 
481 R. men6ndez Pidal: La Esnafia del Cid, pp. 163-174 
482 ibid. 
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between the Christian tradition of Rodrigo's early history 
and evidence provided by Arabic sources. The Christian 
tradition has Rodrigo playing a prominent role in the 
Castilian expedition to extract tribute from 'Abdullah Ibn 
Ziri, lord of Granada. However, 'Abdullah in his memoirs, 
clearly recalls the incident. He does not mention Rodrigo 
at all. He states that Alvar FAfiez (who later was to become 
in the Poem in relation to Rodrigo what Oliver is to Roland 
in the Chanson de Roland) was the one sent to collect 
tribute, and that it was Fafiez who fought and defeated 
Count Garcia Ordofiez. 483 It may be that 'Abdullah 
writing in captivity under Almoravid supervision, chose 
not to mention Rodrigo, since his captors might have been 
sensitive about the only Christian commander who inflicted 
a major defeat on their army. Alternatively, Rodrigo 
might have been part of the expedition to Granada, 
although if so, his role was clearly not that of the 
leader; it seems, rather, that as he became the centre of 
a myth, new roles were attributed to him. Whether Rodrigo 
accompanied the expedition to Granada under Fanez's 
command, or whether he was excluded altogether from this 
important expedition, what this incident seems to suggest 
is that Rodrigo's position at the Castilian court had 
weakened. His subsequent fall from favour was not brought 
about simply by trouble markers who misrepresented his 
actions to the King, but rather it seems, that it was the 
culmination of a period where, if he was not pushed gut of 
483 'Abdullah ibn Ziri: Al-Tibvan: (tr. A. Tibi), pp. 130-131. 
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the mainstream of Castilian politics altogether, he 
appears to have been at least marginalised. 
The actual incident which directly led to his 
exile is a particularly interesting one if looked at from 
a Zaragozan perspective. While Alfonso was busy campaign- 
ing in the South in April/May 1081 Rodrigo remained in 
Castile, apparently ill, 484 although one wonders whether 
it was illness which kept him away from Alfonso's side; a 
tendency which was to become a habit with him. During the 
campaign, Alfonso had re-instated al-Qadir in Toledo once 
al-Mutawakkil of Badajoz had evacuated the city (taking 
with him much of Toledo's treasury). That Alfonso then 
chose to remain in the march area perhaps reflects 
something of an uncertainty on his part about the best 
course of action to pursue next. His resolve to occupy 
Toledo seems to have developed gradually. Possibly, he 
did not believe such a move feasible, even when he entered 
Toledo to reinstate its deposed dhu al-Nunid ruler. Such 
a move would certainly have appeared as a momentous one and 
he might not have believed originally in his ability to 
successfully carry it off, although as his sojourn in the 
middle march extended, so his resolve seems to have 
hardened. In any case, Alfonso VI realised that by 
reinstating al-Qadir in Toledo, his grip over the middle 
march had strengthened enormously. 
484 R. Mendndez Pidal: la Esvafia del Cid, p. 184 
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The Castilian thrust southwards must have been 
viewed with alarm by Zaragoza. The dhu al-Nunids were 
rivals, but in theory, at least, they formed the anchor on 
which the upper march rested. Their fall within the sphere 
of Castile, led to a situation where Zaragoza became 
almost surrounded on all sides by the hostile Christian 
north. Zaragoza's only remaining outlet in this situation 
would have been Valencia. The latter, however, was hardly 
a reliable ally. The Bani 'Amir had given Valencia, and by, 
extension Valencia's foreign policy, something of a stable 
nature. The new ruler in Valencia, however, was an unknown 
quantity. The Wazir Ibn 'Abd al IAziz had declared inde- 
pendence from Toledo, but his seizure of Valencia was 
instigated, in the first instance, by an agreement to 
enter Toledo's sphere of influence. The Bani Hud would 
hope to draw him into an alliance, but could not rely on 
his loyalty (someone who changed sides once is not unlikely 
to do so again). Alfonso's move into the middle march 
would have therefore put pressure on Zaragoza, increasing 
its feeling of impending isolation. 
During Alfonso's absence in the middle march, 
Rodrigo Diaz conducted a raid against Toledan lands; lands 
which had come under Alfonso's protection as a result of 
his installation- in modern terminology, his sponsorship- 
of al-Qadir in Toledo. Such an attack would have had the 
effect of weakening Alfonso's influence over Toledo - 
because of his inability to extend his protection against 
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attacks from Castile itself - and, by extension, of 
weakening al-Qadir's own authority over the march, since 
his sponsor was unable to deliver the protection he 
promised even f rom attacks emanating f rom his own domain 
and therefore might not be able to afford al-Qadir support 
against attacks from other sources. Mendndez Pidal tries 
to argue that this attack by Rodrigo was an indignant 
response to an Arab attack on San Esteban de Gormaz, an 
important Castilian oUtpoSt. 485 He further tries to 
argue that Rodrigo did not aim this against Alfonso's 
political manoeuvring in the middle march. However, 
Mendndez Pidal himself also argues that Rodrigo Diaz was 
well acquainted with Talifa politics from the mid 1060's 
when he participated in attacks on the south and was 
present at treaties concluded with the payment of Parias. 
It is therefore highly unlikely that Rodrigo Diaz was 
unaware that his raid, whether it was in response to an 
attack on Gormaz or not, would serve to weaken the net 
which Alfonso was building around the middle march, and 
was therefore to be seen as a direct blow against Alfonso 
himself; which is exactly how Alfonso seems to have inter- 
preted it. 
In an incidental way, this attack by Rodrigo, 
because of its negative repercussions for Alfonso's pol- 
icies in the middle march, would have been interpreted in 
485 ibid pp. 184-5. See also Reilly The Kingdom of Le6n- 
ng Alfonso VI, pp. 128-129. 
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a favourable light by Zaragoza, for whom even a partial 
blow against Castile's drive into the Toledan march, 
helped bolster Zaragoza's position, if only in a marginal 
way. I am not, however, suggesting that Rodrigo con- 
ducted his raid in a way calculated to please Zaragoza as 
a prelude for seeking employment there. Rather, what is 
being suggested is that Rodrigo having been distanced from 
the main arena of Castilian court politics, and possibly 
excluded from the major Castilian expedition south into the 
middle march, chose to respond to a raid on a border 
castle in a manner which was, at least in part, intended 
to show disregard for Alfonso and his political ambitions. 
Possibly, Rodrigo did not intend to bring the tension 
between him and Alfonso to a head. However, when Alfo- 
nsols patience did run out, Rodrigo had under his belt, 
as he went into exile, a military action, which, he 
would have realised with his knowledge of Talifa politics, 
would not have been displeasing to the strongest Talifa in 
the region; even if Zaragoza in no way entered his calcula- 
tion when he conducted his raid. 
A question which has perhaps not received much 
attention when looking at Rodrigo's career, partly because 
the myth of the Cid as a Castilian hero continues to 
influence, if only to some degree, the way in which the 
history of his exploits are analyzed, is why al-Muqtadir 
Ibn Hud chose to give him employment. Possibly, the raid 
which Rodrigo conducted against the Toledan march did find 
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favour with al-Muqtadir. Furthermore the Bani Hud were not 
averse to using Christian troops. However, the Historia 
Roderici seems to suggest that Rodrigo was given a place of 
prominence among the Hudid forces. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the armed forces of the city-states of 
cil muslim Spain were notable by their absence in periods 
of internal strife. It was suggested that the reason for 
this might have been that Talifa lords kept relatively 
small standing armies and possibly had them concentrated on 
the borders (Barbastro for example which was referred to as 
a fort seemed to have far more civilians than troops and 
the final number which continued to hold out in the 
citadel -which presumably represented the core of its 
military contingent- was reported by Ibn Hayyan as only 
700). This may have been the result not only of financial, 
but also of demographic constraints (as pointed out in 
chapter one there is some evidence that the upper march was 
under-populated). The arrival, therefore of a band of 
mounted, disciplined and well trained horsemen would have 
been a welcome addition to the march's defence forces. 
It is tempting to put forward the hypothesis that 
Rodrigo's reputation as a fighter preceded him and that 
therefore the Bani Hud were particularly pleased to have 
him fighting on their side. Ibn Bassam does refer to him as 
the Campeador 486 (although interestingly, never as the 
Cid) and clearly states that he was af amed warrior who had 
486 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part III, p. 95 
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routed with his f ew troops superior numbers of Christian 
foes, including the Count of Barcelona and Garcia "crooked 
mouth" also referred to as head of the Franks. 487 How- 
ever, although Ibn Bassam was writing only ten to fifteen 
years after -Rodrigo's death, he was writing to an 
Almoravid audience and would have been aware of the 
humiliation of the defeat which Rodrigo inflicted on them 
bef ore the walls of Valencia. He might have therefore 
built up Rodrigo's military prowess to lessen the rankling 
of that defeat. Certainly the final part of that 
particular description, where Rodrigo is also portrayed as 
one who liked Arabic books to be read to him, especially 
on the exploits of 
al-Muhallib (Ibn abi Safra -an early Muslim military 
commander] seems to have been a literary embellishment. 
A more pragmatic attraction which the troop led 
by Rodrigo would have presented to the Bani Hud was that 
they formed what appeared to be a heavier cavalry to the 
normal Spanish Muslim troops. There is no early evidence 
directly pointing to Rodrigo's troops using heavier armour. 
However, an eyewitness account of the battle of Zallaqa, 
which took place five years after Rodrigo's exile into 
Zaragoza, clearly describes the Castilians as covered in 
"iron", which probably meant chainmail. 
[they had) fortified themselves with iron 
from their heads (lit. horns] to their 
487 ibid. p. 100 
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f eet. 88 
It would not be unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo, a 
Castilian horseman, leading a Castilian troop would have 
been attired in a similar manner. A heavier cavalry would 
have greatly enhanced the striking power of the lighter 
cavalry traditionally employed by the Spanish Muslims. 
Finally, an argument can be put forward on the basis of 
the Poem of the Cid, laisse 35 that Rodrigo employed a new 
cavalry tactic of charging with lances, the body of the 
horsemen under his command protected by shields and bent 
low over the horses, bursting through the enemy line; 
regrouping and charging through the back of the line just 
pierced 489 
The men clasped their shields to their 
hearts and lowered their lances, each with 
its pennon f lying. With heads bent down 
over their saddle-bows, they dashed to the 
attack courageously. . They assailed the Moorish ranks. .. There were three hundred knights with lance and pennon, and with 
every lance thrust a Moor fell dead. On 
returning to the charge they killed as many 
more. 490 
However, as the poem was written at the turn of the C13, 
this could easily be a description of current Castilian 
488 Ibn al Qusayra: letter written the morning following the 
Almoravid victory and quoted by Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, 
p. 243. 
489 Anon: The Poem of the Cid, lst Cantar, Laisser 35, p. 59 
490 It is worth noting that a cavalry charge with the spear 
clasped under the arm is similar to the methods used by the 
Normans at Hastings. See R. A. Brown, The Normans and the Norman 
Conquest, pp. 146-147, footnote 137. However, the Bayeux tapestry 
does not show the Norman Knights "with heads bent down" as in 
this description. See R. A. Brown, The Norman Conquest, plate 201, 
p. 177. 
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cavalry tactics, and might not have been employed by 
Rodrigo over a century earlier. 
The reasons for the rulers of Zaragoza accepting 
Rodrigo into their service were probably a combination of 
all the points discussed above. Whatever the motivation 
behind the Bani Hud recruiting Rodrigo, he went on to 
prove a valuable asset for the upper march. The tradi- 
tional view of Rodrigo's exile is to see him as allying 
with the ruler of Zaragoza and eventually aiming to put 
Zaragoza under his protection as part of the drive for 
reconquest. However, as Barkai points out, the Chris- 
tian sources do not differentiate between Rodrigo's Chris- 
tian and Muslim enemies. 491 Moreover, they describe 
within a feudal framework his relationship with al-Multam- 
in, lord of Zaragoza during the campaigns against Sancho 
Ramirez of Arag6n and Berenguer Ramon of Barcelona. 492 
This tends to be supported by Ibn Bassam who represents the 
views of near-contemporary Spanish Muslims and who 
describes Rodrigo as an instrument of Hudid political 
strategy: 
And it was the Bani Hud who earlier had 
awakened him from his slumbers ..... 
and directed him against the provinces of 
the Peninsula (lit. island j 493 
This would suggest that he entered the service of Zaragoza, 
491 R. Barkai:. Cristianos Y Musulmanes part 2, p. 128 
492 ibid. p. 130 
493 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, P-95 
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not as an equal hoping to conquer (as portrayed by the 
myth) but as a knight employed by the lord of the upper 
march. 
Zaragoza, under Ahmad al-Muqtadir had estab- 
lished itself as the leading Talifa, having successfully 
kept its independence against invasions from Barcelona, 
Arag6n and Castile, as well as having kept the power of 
Toledo under the dhi al-Nunids in check. As mentioned 
above, the interference of Castile in the politics of 
Toledo had alarming connotations for Zaragoza. Where they 
thought an old *enemy had become a weakened power, they 
faced by 1080 a situation where the danger from Toledo was 
rejuvenated with the added danger from its newly found 
close alignment with Castile. As a result, al-Muqtadir's 
major strategic aim became the securing of Valencia since 
if it fell into the hands-of Toledo or re-entered Toledo's 
sphere of influence -which would have implied that Valencia 
would have entered, via its relation with Toledo, Cast- 
ile's sphere of influence -Zaragoza would have become 
totally surrounded by hostile forces (except, of course, 
its access to the sea via Tortosa). 
Al-Muqtadir had taken the opportunity of the 
Wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz declaring his independence follow- 
ing Yahya's death and al-Qadir's ensuing problems in 
maintaining his authority over Toledo, 494 to launch a 
494 ibid: part IV, p. 156. 
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raid south, possibly aiming to bring Valencia directly 
within Zaragoza's control and linking the area he 
controlled from his capital to Denia via Valencia. Ibn 
Bassam wrote that al-Muqtadir launched his campaign after 
obtaining Alfonso's approval in return for payment of 
100,000 d. 495 For Ibn Bassam, however, the Bani Hud 
were responsible for Valencia's subsequent fall to Rodrigo 
and were, moreover, at the time of his writing the last 
Talifa bastion of resistance to the Almoravid hegemony over 
Muslim Spain, which he, Ibn Bassam, was supporting. The 
accusation, therefore, that al-Muqtadir paid Alfonso to 
attack Valencia should be treated with care. on the one 
hand, it would not have been in Alfonso's long term 
interest to allow Zaragoza to consolidate its power 
southwards. on the other, one could argue that he would 
not have been able to stop such a move and that there is a 
logic in al-Muqtadir consulting Alfonso before this raid on 
the basis that the Wazir Ibn 'Abd al IAziz, despite his 
declaration of independence, had been appointed by Toledo. 
Al-Muqtadir could therefore, have been ensuring that his 
attack was not seen as hostile to the new power which was 
beginning to assert its control over the Toledan 
march . 
496 On balance, given that the raid predated 
Alfonso's re-instatement of al-Qadir in Toledo, the 
payment of a Paria for the privilege of this campaign 
495 ibid: part III, p. 43 
496 ibid: part IV, p. 156. Alfonso had started attacking the 
forts of the middle march putting pressure on al-Qadir by then. 
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sounds as if it might be a late addition, intended in part 
to be a jibe against the reputation of the Bani Hud. 
Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz responded by shifting his 
allegiance to Zaragoza, declaring himself to be al-Muqtad- 
ir's man and the province to be within Zaragoza's sphere of 
inf luence. 497 This assurance was enough for al-Muqtadir 
to desist and return to Zaragoza. In other words, 
al-Muqtadir did not consider it necessary to physically 
occupy Valencia to assure himself of the preservation of 
Zaragoza's strategic aims. It was enough, in his eyes, 
to have in Valencia, a governor who owed even titular 
allegiance to Zaragoza, and who would have had the impli- 
cations of breaking this alliance with Zaragoza spelt out 
by the Zaragozan expedition. This is an important aspect 
of Zaragozan politics and was to play a role when they 
again ensured Valencia's friendliness by helping instal in 
Valencia a Commander who was, if not a Zaragozan "man", 
then at least an ally and who provided both a southern 
anchor on which the upper march could rest, and a buffer 
which would protect the upper march against northward 
attacks from the south. 
Rodrigo therefore entered the service of a 
relatively secure Zaragoza, the main threat against which 
came f rom Arag6n and Barcelona. Zaragoza had met the 
threat of a Toledo which seemed to be falling under 
497 ibid: Part III, p. 43. 
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increasing Castilian influence by applying the soundest 
political and military strategy at its disposal; in modern 
terminology by neutralising Valencia. However, soon 
after Rodrigo's entry into Zaragozan service, the march 
faced a major crisis. Ahmad al-Muqtadir's reign had 
provided the march with thirty five years of internal 
stability. The exception was, of course, his brother 
Yusuf in IArida, but the latter's power was eventually 
contained. The death of al-Muqtadir in 1081/2 precipitated 
the march into another succession crisis. His son Yusuf 
received Zaragoza and overall command of the march. His 
other son Mundhir received Tortosa, Denia and Ldrida. 
Quite clearly, the issue of succession had not been satis- 
factorily resolved by Hudids. This breaking up of the 
march was not as disruptive as the one following the death 
of al-Muqtadir's father Sulayman in 1046, but it 
demonstrated the difficulty which Spanish Muslims had in 
dealing with Talifa states as "Kingdoms" to be handed down 
to a single heir; treating their provinces, at least in 
part, as property or governorships to be dividend among 
the sons of the deceased lord as an inheritance. 
Yusuf Ibn Hud, titled al-Multamin, started his 
reign by imitating his f ather Is strategy when he took over 
Zaragoza in 1046. Using the heavy cavalry which had come 
under his command, he directed Rodrigo against Lerida the 
seat of his brother's government, in an attempt at con- 
solidating his power. Having, thus contained his bro- 
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ther Is power, al-Multamin rebuilt and fortified castle 
Almenar, which was in close proximity to Ldrida, to keep 
up the pressure on his brother. 498 Mundhir responded by 
allying with the Counts of Barcelona and Cardefia. 499 
This cycle of fraternal rivalry in the upper march in many 
ways echoed the earlier struggle between the protagonists' 
father and uncles thirty fiveýyears earlier. For Barcelona, 
this internal struggle in the upper march and the resulting 
alliance with Ldrida, offered a great opportunity to 
extend*its influence southwards. However, the combined 
Catalonian-Ldridan forces were defeated by the Zaragozan 
army, led, it seems, by Rodrigo. It was this decisive 
victory which put a halt to Barcelona Is renewed pressure on 
the march and kept Ldrida very much in check. This victory 
seemed to have secured al-Multamin's power and to have led 
to Rodrigo being particularly honoured in Zaragoza. 500 
With Ldrida thus contained, and the ambitions of 
Barcelona also clipped by the new lord of Zaragoza, 
al-Multamin could direct his attention to other aspects of 
the strategic threats which threatened his domain. It seems 
that Valencia, taking up the opportunity created by al- 
498 R. Mendndez Pidal: La EsDafia del Cid, p. 198 
499 ibid pp. 198-9 
500 ibid p. 200-201. A. Turk in 'Relacion Historica entre el 
Cid y la Dinastia Hudil, in El Cid en el Valle del Jal6n, pp. 28- 
29, sees this incident as resulting in the honouring of Rodrigo 
and his being awarded the title Cid, either from (Savved) meaning 
lord or from (Sid), which Turk translates as lion, but which Ibn 
Mandhur in his Lisan al-'Arab lists as meaning wolf. The origin 
of the title Cid will be looked at briefly below. 
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Muqtadir's death and the internal zaragozan struggle which 
followed, began to renege on the deal they had made with 
al-Muqtadir following the latter's southern campaign. Ibn 
'Abd al-IAziz did not go as far as openly defying the 
authority of al-Multamin - he would have probably been 
aware of his vulnerability to a direct Zaragozan attack, 
but, Ibn Bassam suggests, he became uncooperative with 
al-Multamin's emissaries. 501 
And (dhu al-wizaratayn Abu-Bakr] Ibn 'Ammar, 
when he visited those parts of Ibn Hud's 
realm, used the influence bestowed on him by 
al-Multamin, except that the Bani 'Abd al- 
'Aziz gave him much trouble [lit. made him 
choke on his saliva (kanu yusharrigunahu bi- 
rigihi)] and made his paths, which should 
have been easy, difficult. And he would 
hear of them that which would inflame his 
ribs and bring tears to his eyes. 
It may be that Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz seeing Alfonso's 
influence growing in the middle march as well as feeling 
that the foreign policy of Zaragoza was being neglected 
because of its internal problems, was simply experimenting 
with the degree with which he could remove his city-state 
from the upper march's sphere of influence. His alliance 
with the upper march was, after all, one entered into 
under duress. This experimentation on the part of Valencia 
does suggest, however, the degree to which Zaragoza's 
influence was being counteracted by the succession issue 
and the possibly also by the growing power of Castile in 
the middle march. 
501 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part II, p. 410 
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With this background in mind one can look at the 
unusual "incident" which occurred at Rueda towards the end 
of al-Multamin's reign. Rueda was a castle, 35 km from 
Zaragoza and used by the Bani Hud as a final bolt-hole in 
times of strife. It appears that in January 1083 the 
commander in charge of Rueda sent messages to Alfonso VI to 
the effect that he was willing to change sides and shift 
his allegiance to Castile. Such a move would have given 
Alfonso the opportunity to establish a strategic toehold in 
the upper march, in close proximity to Zaragoza, from 
which he could increase pressure on and eventually, he 
would have hoped, to take over the march. For Alfonso, 
the threat faced by Castile was not only from a strong 
Zaragoza but equally from a Zaragoza which had fallen 
within the domain of either Arag6n or Barcelona. 
Alfonso VI, therefore, suspended his campaign in the 
middle march and moved, with some force, to Rueda. The 
Commander of the castle either reneged on his intention or 
his original plan was to trick Alfonso into a trap. In 
January 1083, he ambushed the Castilian party, killing 
many nobles. Alfonso VI, who decided not to join the 
expedition, escaped the massacre. 502 It is not clear 
whether this was a grand scheme by the Bani Hud to assas- 
sinate Alfonso VI. The explanation could simply be that 
502 R. Mendndez Pidal: La Espaha del Cid pp. 202-203. Also 
B. F. Reilly: The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla Under King Alfonso 
VI, p. 165. The evidence for this massacre appears to exist only 
in Christian sources, including the Cr6nica NAjerense, ed. Ubieto 
Arteta, p. 117 and in a document in Documentos de 
sabagun, ed. Vignau, p. 270. 
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the Commander of Rueda having of fered the castle to Alfonso 
panicked and in an attempt to convince his lord in Zaragoza 
of his loyalty, carried out the ambush pretending that it 
was his intention all along. However, it should be kept 
in mind, that the Bani Hud did use, at least in one 
instance, assassination as a method of ridding themselves 
of a dangerous Christian King. 503 Having done so once, 
it would not be beyond them to employ a similar tactic 
again. Alfonso, having escaped, retreated and 
reconcentrated his efforts on the middle march. 
Al-Multamin, possibly having failed in his 
attempt to rid himself of Alfonso, seemed unable to do 
more to counter the threat in the middle march and concen- 
trated instead on other aspects of Zaragozan politics. 
Valencia remained a source of uncertainty in Zaragoza's 
foreign policy and the solution which al-Multamin eventual- 
ly arrived at in some way acknowledged his inability to 
repeat his father's campaign to force Valencia into an 
alliance. on 27th Ramadan 477/28 January 1085, Ahmad, 
al-Multamin's son and successor married the daughter of Ibn 
'Abd al-'Aziz . 
5" This marriage had been negotiated by 
503 Al-Turtushi: Siral al-Muluk p. 309 - al-Muqtadir sent 
SaIdada to kill Ramiro I. 
504 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan Vol. 3 p. 304 
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al-Multamin's convert Wazir Ben Hasdai. 101 In many ways 
this marriage alliance was very much in the mainstream of 
Talifa foreign policy. It does, however, suggest that 
Valencia was no longer under Zaragoza's control, at least 
not de iure. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was, by this marriage, 
treated as an equal and independent lord of Valencia, with 
whom Zaragoza had entered into an alliance. For Ibn 'Abd 
al-'Aziz, the marriage would have been seen not only as 
desirable in the context of Valencia's foreign policy -he 
too would have been apprehensive of Alfonso's increasing 
influence in the middle march- but it would have also been 
desirable in the context of Valencia's internal politics, 
in that it would have added legitimacy and social standing 
to what was essentially the rule of a usurper. 
This concession on the part of al-Mu I tamin, with 
its implications of his inability to force his will on 
Valencia politically, was probably due to the strain which 
the struggle between Zaragoza and Ldrida was putting on the 
upper march's military resources. The threat from Ldrida 
had been contained but not eliminated. In the summer of 
1084 (four months prior to the marriage alliance) Ldrida, 
this time in alliance with Arag6n, had launched another 
campaign against Zaragoza. The combined forces of Arag6n 
and Ldrida were defeated on that occasion (14th August, 
505 Ibn Khaqan: al-Oalalid al-11cryan p. 184. Ibn Bassam 
reported a rumour that he converted because he fell in love with 
a Muslim concubine (jariva), whom he married. Al-Dhakhira, Part 
III, p. 458. 
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1084) by the Zaragoza forces led by Rodrigo Diaz. 506 
Al-Multamin's reign was a short one, but he was 
able, at his death in 1085, to pass onto his son Ahmad, 
titled al-Mustalin II, a march which had survived several 
major crises. The achievement of al-Multamin was realised 
partly through diplomatic means and partly through military 
action. In this latter, al-Multamin undoubtedly bene- 
fited from having Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar and his troop of 
heavy cavalry in his service. It is difficult to judge, 
given the mythology surrounding Rodrigo Diaz, the extent 
to which Zaragoza's successful campaigns were particularly 
due to Rodrigo's military ability. Nonetheless, as his 
later career attested, Rodrigo was a remarkable military 
figure, whose ability in the field seems to have been of 
an especially high calibre and who perhaps was perceived as 
the Campeador, or the battler, even before he took over 
Valencia. In seeking to re-examine Rodrigo's role in the 
upper march during his first exile, what transpires is not 
so much a divergence from traditional interpretations as to 
his outstanding qualification as a fighter and military 
commander, but rather a new emphasis on the way in which 
he utilised his military capability primarily for the 
service of Zaragoza. The rulers of Zaragoza found Rod- 
rigo's heavy cavalry a helpful addition to their forces. 
In the event, his outstanding ability as a military 
commander meant that his military service was particularly 
506 R. Mendndez Pidal: La Espaha del Cid, p. 207 
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valuable. However, during this period, it was clear that 
Rodrigo was acting neither as an independent adventurer nor 
as an instrument for "Christian Spanish" policy. Rather, 
he was acting as the man of the lord of Zaragoza. His 
service to Zaragoza was important, but he was only one of 
several instruments which the Hudids used to implement 
their policies. 
6.3 The Campaign For Toledo 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
the capture of Toledo formed a watershed both strategically 
and symbolically for Castile. Symbolically, it signified 
the return of the Visigoths (there is at least evidence 
that Asturian chronicles painted the Asturians as 
Visigoths) to their ancient capital. Strategically, the 
capture of the middle march broke the back of the Muslim 
march defence structure. In the long run, it left the 
upper march too isolated and unsupported to be able to 
survive, and indeed the upper march fell to Arag6n less 
than fifty years after the capture of Toledo. The capture 
of the middle march also represented a very deep thrust 
into Muslim Spain, With the exception of Zaragoza, it 
reduced the area which the Muslims controlled to less than 
the southern half of the Peninsula. The middle march gave 
the north a defendable gateway through which to launch 
their attacks, through the central Meseta against the 
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southern Muslim strongholds such as Seville, Cordova and 
Granada. 
Despite the weakness inherent in the Talifa 
system which allowed Castile and the other southern states 
to reverse the political situation of the previous century 
and place Muslim Spain under constant military and finan- 
cial pressure (through the payment of Parias), the fall of 
Toledo cannot be understood solely through the dynamics of 
the political arena of the late Cil and its interplay of a 
more powerful north versus the divided Ta I ifas in the 
south. Another factor which played a very important role 
in the f all of Toledo was the part played by its singularly 
inept Muslim ruler. Al-Qadir had inherited from his 
grandfather an especially vibrant and even expansionist 
march, which could withstand (partly through military 
action and partly by paying Parias) the pressure from the 
north, and which was perceived as one of the stronger 
Talifa states in the Peninsula. Within a ten year period, 
al-Qadir first allowed his authority to weaken internally 
and finally surrendered the whole march to his enemies. 
Al-Qadir has been, naturally, portrayed in a 
very unsympathetic manner by later Arabic sources. His 
ineptitude, however, can be clearly demonstrated by 
examining his record. His release of the Toledan opposi- 
tion, discussed in the previous chapter, and the murder 
of his grandfather's -wazir al-Hadidi, was inept. His 
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flight from Toledo, and also his allowing Alfonso to 
reinstate him (when he could have probably moved on Toledo 
on his own from Cuenca once al-Mutawakkil had left the 
city) was singularly short-sighted. He might not have 
gone as far as walking before Alfonso (while the latter was 
mounted), treating the Castilian King as one would a 
Caliph when they reentered Toledo'507 but he clearly put 
himself under Alfonso's authority and by so doing publicly 
weakened his own authority over his people. Moreover, 
when Alfonso's forces became cut off in the Toledan march 
in the winter, an episode which will be looked at below, 
al-Qadir failed to utilise this opportunity and strike his 
enemy at the moment of the latter's greatest weakness and 
isolation. Finally, given a new governorship in 
Valencia, al-Qadir managed to lose control of his new 
domain within a short span of time. This is not to 
suggest that had Toledo been ruled by a more able lord 
(rather like al-Qadir's grandfather) it might not have 
fallen before Castile's advance eventually, but one 
strongly suspects that its fall might have been delayed. 
I would therefore argue that it seems clear that al-Qadir 
was inept and that his ineptitude, when lord of the middle 
march, was one of the major factors which led to the 
reconquest of the march. 
The other major factor which led to Castile's 
reconquest of Toledo was undoubtedly Alfonso's ability to 
507 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part IV, p. 162 
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take up an opportunity when it presented itself to him. 
The constant pressure on the upper march in many ways 
indicated that the natural way for the north to advance on 
Muslim Spain would have been to roll up the marches 
starting from Zaragoza and advancing south-west through 
Toledo and Badajoz. However, as Alfonso entered a Toledo 
weakened by a year of opportunistic rule, the morale of 
whose people was obviously low (else why would they 
complain to Alfonso about al-Qadir's shortcomingS508) and 
the weakness of whose ruler was so apparent, he must have 
compared it to the more vibrant Toledo ruled by the able 
al-Malmun in which he took refuge during the period of his 
exile, and perceived an almost unimaginable opportunity. 
Having witnessed Toledo's weakness, Alfonso, 
rather than return to Castile, chose to remain in the 
middle march. In return for re-instating al-Qadir, Alfonso 
demanded the dismantlement of certain forts and the payment 
of a Paria. 509 Alfonso then, it seems, refortified these 
castles to use as a base for attacking Toledo. 510 In 
effect, this placed the middle march in the grip of a 
vicious circle. Already weakened by a year of occupation, 
its foreign policy towards Valencia (and therefore 
Zaragoza) in disarray, the middle march was forced to 
weaken itself further by destroying its own defence 
508 ibid. p. 163 
509 ibid. pp. 163-164 
510 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-An-dalus, pp. 83-84 
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structure, while depleting its already depleted treasury, 
which led to its further weakening in a vicious circle. 
Alfonso continued to apply pressure on Toledo, 
and seems to have decided to allow a part of his force to 
spend the winter of 1084/1085 in the middle march, 
encamped in a pleasure complex called al-Munivva 
al-Musawara, originally built by al-Malmun. There the 
winter cut off the Castilian force from any supplies from 
Castile for nearly two months. 511 For some reason, 
neither al-Qadir nor any other of the Talifa rulers chose 
to use this opportunity to attack the Castilian force, 
which was clearly isolated in the heart of Muslim terri- 
tory. Al-Qadir's support in the city, already weak, had 
probably collapsed by this time. Such an assumption is 
supported by the fact that it appears that Toledo (whether 
by order from its ruler or pressure from its elders) had 
decided not to put up a fight against the Castilian forces. 
As the winter ended, they did not mount a campaign, but 
rather sent an embassy which lamely claimed to await relief 
from other Talifa rulers. The scene which Ibn Bassam 
describes when Toledo's embassy met with an uncombed, bad- 
breathed, dirty-f ingernailed Alfonso, was one clearly 
designed to convey a pathetic picture of a weakling Talifa 
511. Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp. 164-5 Ibn Bassam, 
clearly indicated that he believed Alfonso to have been with the 
troops which were cut off. Reilly in The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla 
Under Kincr Alfonso VI, pp. 167-168, points out that charter 
evidence shows the Castilian monarch to have been in Leon by 
December 12th 1084. This would suggest that having established 
the camp, Alfonso moved north with the court. 
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surrendering to an uncivilised barbarian. 512 It also 
conveyed to Ibn Bassam Is Almoravid audience a picture of 
the Talifa embassies sent to Alfonso behaving in a repul- 
sively obsequious way, thus justifying, from an "Islamic" 
point of view, the Almoravid invasion. Although Ibn Bassam 
wrote that all Talifals were represented (presumably 
meaning all major Talifas) in the gathering giving Alfonso 
tribute in front of the Toledan embassy, it may be 
significant that he only mentions that of Ibn 'Abbad of 
seville by name (the significance of this might be no more 
than Ibn Bassam trying to provide the Almoravids with a 
moral excuse for having turned against Ibn 'Abbad, their 
former ally who had originally invited them to cross over 
to the peninsula). 
Al-Mutawakkil of Badajoz had clearly signalled by 
his retreat from Toledo three years previously that he had 
no further interest in the middle march. The upper march 
could have conceivably launched an attack on Toledan 
territory, but, with its pre-occupation with internal 
strife, especially given the recent accession of 
al-Mustalin II and the pressure it faced from Arag6n and 
Barcelona, was unlikely to do so. Conceivably the only 
major military force left was that of the Bani 'Abbad who 
by then controlled Seville and Granada. However, the 
512 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part Iv, p. 166 Alfonso, 
according to Ibn Bassam, was with his f orce at the end of the 
winter. This seems to fit in with the available charter evidence. 
Reilly The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI, pp. 169- 
170, which shows him to have rejoined them. 
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presence of an embassy from them at Alfonso's headquarters 
symbolised for the Toledan elders present the futility of 
expecting relief f rom other Ta I ifa states. The elders 
(and it is highly significant that it was they and not al- 
Qadir who were conducting the negotiations, which suggests 
a breakdown of al-Qadir's authority over Toledo during the 
winter) decided to surrender the city, which Alfonso 
entered three days later on 25th May, 1085. Ibn Bassam 
spoke to a witness who claimed to have seen al-Qadir after 
the surrender of Toledo engaged in calculating the 
astrologically most opportune time for him to travel amid 
513 the derision of the Christians. Alfonso then 
symbolically engaged in converting the main mosque of 
Toledo into a church, in Rabil al-Awal (27 June - 26 
jUly)514 of that year. 
Alfonso's strategy appears to have been, once 
Toledo was secured, to turn his attentions to the upper 
march. In doing so, he employed a strategy which was 
tried and tested by the Bani dhi al-Nunids in their 
diplomacy against the upper march; Alfonso first turned 
his attention to Valencia. 
Although, the Bani Hud had managed to salvage 
their relationship with Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia 
through the marriage alliance negotiated by Ibn Hasdai, 
513 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p. 167 
514 ibid. p. 168 
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the dependability of that alliance rested on several 
factors, among which was the ability of the usurper Ibn 
'Abd al-'Aziz to maintain power in Valencia. The authority 
of the lords of Valencia seems to have been weaker in 
general than that of the march Talifas. Moreover, Ibn 'Abd 
al-'Azizls reign, from the time he declared independence 
from Toledo, was relatively short, lasting only ten years. 
His death in June, 1085, while Alfonso was consolidating 
his position in Toledo, seems to have led to a succession 
crisis. 515 This was resolved in favour of his son 
'Uthman who succeeded his father on 9th Safar 478/6 June, 
1085.516 It is perhaps a sign of Zaragoza's internal 
pre-occupations that there is no mention of their interfer- 
ence to support either faction, although this may be 
because the disagreement between the two brothers was 
resolved fairly quickly. 
The traditional view supported by Muslim sources 
is that al-Qadir in surrendering Toledo to Alfonso was 
promised Valencia in return. Such an agreement would not 
have been unprecedented in Talifa politics. 'Aziz Ibn 
Ishaq al-Barzali seems to have offered Carmona to the Bani 
dhi al-Nunids in return for a safer domain and was given 
the fortified city of al-Mudawwar517 to rule within the 
515 ibid. Part III, p. 93 
516 Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 304. 
517 Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al Allam, p. 273 
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Toledan Almal. Ibn Bassam, when discussing the fall of 
Valencia, states that Alfonso had reached an agreement with 
the deposed al-Qadir to "return" Valencia to him, in return 
for al-Qadir having allowed Alfonso to take Toledo, between 
518 the fall of Toledo and the death of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. 
one assumes that the use of the term "return to him" 
(vulidu lahu) in reference to Valencia referred to the fact 
that Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was meant to be ruling Valencia in 
the name of the Bani dhi al-Nunids and had broken off from 
the Toledan sphere of influence. 
However, this story should be treated with some 
caution. Ibn Bassam's book which contains the earliest 
surviving account of the incident was written twenty five 
to thirty years after the fall of Toledo, although he 
clearly had access to several eyewitnesses of some of the 
major events of the last quarter of the century. 
Nonetheless, the time gap between the fall of Toledo (25 
May) and the death of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (4th June) 
mentioned in the above paragraph was only 9 days, hardly 
enough time to hatch strategic plots, so that the timing 
of such a deal as that, put forward by Ibn Bassam seems 
improbable. This leaves open the possibility that such a 
deal was struck prior to Alfonso's entering Toledo, but 
the account seems to confuse al-Qadir's pressure on 
Valencia when he was in Cuenca (during the rule of al- 
Mutawakkil in Toledo) at a time when he owed Alfonso no 
518 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 93 
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favours, and his advance on Valencia after the fall of 
Toledo to Alfonso. Finally, in part IV of al-Dhakhira, 
Ibn Bassam, when describing the embassy of Toledan elders 
to Alfonso and their capitulation, makes no mention of 
such a deal. 519 Indeed, the tone of that last paragraph 
seems to suggest that the negotiations were more between 
the elders of Toledo (who had forced al-Qadir out of the 
city earlier and presumably remained powerful even after 
his return with the help of Alfonso) and Alfonso rather 
than between the latter and 
al-Qadir. 
Alfonso did use al-Qadir to gain control of 
Valencia soon after the fall of Toledo, but it may be that 
it was an arrangement arrived at after the fall of Toledo 
when Alfonso considered what action he might take with its 
deposed ruler (whom he himself had placed back in power 
earlier) rather than a bargain struck before the fall of 
the city. For those looking back at that episode (even a 
few years later) and having seen al-Qadir installed in 
Valencia by the man who deposed him from Toledo, the logic 
for assuming that such a deal was struck must have been 
very compelling. 
The anonymous author of the history of Valencia 
(published as Fragment B at the end of Ibn 'Idhari's Al- 
Bavan) mentions that 'Uthman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ruled for 
519 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part Iv, pp. 165-167 
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520 nine months, that is until February, 1086. It is then 
that the "people" of Valencia must have realised that al- 
Qadir was advancing on their city with a Castilian force 
led by Alvar Fdfiez. 521 Fearing the wrath of Alfonso, they 
deposed 'Uthman Ibn 'Abd Al-'Aziz. 522 The episode demon- 
strated both the power of the "people" of Valencia, to 
effectively elect to change allegiance to an invading lord 
and oust their ruler, and the lack of support for the new 
dynasty in the city. As al-Qadir entered Valencia with the 
support and protection of Alvar Fdfiez, Alfonso had suc- 
ceeded not only in regaining the ancient Visigothic capital 
of Spain and with it control of the middle march, but he 
also managed to install a puppet regime in Valencia thus 
cutting Zaragoza off from the south. The upper march was 
therefore by the beginning of 1086 totally surrounded by 
hostile forces. The diplomatic efforts of the Bani Hud to 
play off their enemies one against the other while 
attempting to keep open their lines southwards were dashed, 
Alfonso then moved to deliver what he must have hoped 
would be the coun de grace against the upper march and 
launched a campaign against Zaragoza. However, while 
Alfonso was besieging the city, news arrived of the landing 
of the Almoravids in the south and their alliance with the 
southern Talifas. Realising that the greatest threat to him 
520 Anon: Fragment B; Ibn Idhari: al-Bavan, Vol. 3, p. 304 
521 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus p. 84 (although he 
puts the date at 1085) 
522 Anon: Fragment B; Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bavan, Vol 3, p. 304. 
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came from the new Berber invasion, Alfonso lifted his 
siege and moved southwards, giving Zaragoza badly needed 
breathing space. 523 
The arrival of the Almoravids changed the 
dynamics of politics in the Peninsula. They were to 
contain Alfonso's advance and helped save Zaragoza from 
being captured both in the immediate sense (the lifting of 
Alfonso's siege) and in the longer term, by engaging 
Castile's resources in a protracted confrontation and 
diverting them away from the upper march for the following 
quarter of a century. 
6.4 The Advent of the Almoravids 
It is not clear whether the dynamics of Ta I ifa 
politics would have allowed for a unity to be effected 
either by one Talifa, in essence, taking over the others, 
or by a form of a grand coalition; a united front capable 
of withstanding the Castilian onslaught. Judging by the 
Talifals reaction to both Barbastro and Toledo, this 
latter appears unlikely. 
The fall of Toledo did, however, stress f or the 
lords of the Talifas the extent of their predicament. The 
fall of the central march was in itself a major setback, 
523 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus p. 84; Also Alfonso X: 
Primera Cr6nica General pp. 556-557: Also Ibn Khaldun, 
al-Tarikh, vol. IV, p. 382 
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but it also must have appeared as if it were the beginning 
of an unthinkable disaster; namely the takeover of all 
Muslim Spain by Castile. One can argue that such a fear 
could only have been formulated with hindsight once the 
Christian advance became clearly entrenched. However, the 
well known story attributing to Ibn 'Abbad of Seville the 
statement that he would rather be a camel-herd than a 
swine-herd- i. e. that he preferred subjugation by the 
Berbers to subjugation by Castile- when he wrote to invite 
Yusuf Ibn Tashfin to cross to Muslim Spain, implies that 
such a concepthad entered Spanish Muslim consciousness by 
524 the last quarter of the century. 
. 
The decision of the 
Talifas, led by the Bani 'Abbad of Seville, to send 
embassies-to the Almoravids asking for help underlined this 
shift. The Talifa lords, and in particular, the Bani 
'Abbad, had previously viewed the Almoravids as a possible 
525 threat to be guarded against. The attitude of those 
524 Ibn Khallikan: Wafavat al-Alvan, section on Yusuf Ibn 
Tashfin quoted as appendix 1, Ibn Idhari, Al-Bavan, vol. 4, p. 114. 
This short summary of the reasons leading up to the involvement 
of Ibn Tashfin in Muslim Spain was clearly written with hind- 
sight, and forms a very good historical analysis, but sees the 
Talifas as being pincered between the Christians in the north 
(al-Ifran! ) and the Almoravids in the south (p. 112). His source 
was a book titled Al-Mughrib 'an Sirat Muluk al-Maghrib, by an 
unknown author and written in 599/20 September 1202- 9 September 
1203 in Iraq (p. 111) . Presumably, that author used other earlier 
sources, and the story certainly seemed to have been in circula- 
tion in north Africa, for it was quoted by Ibn al-Khatib Almal 
al-Alla p. 281. As to why Ibn Bassam does not relate such a 
quote, it is probably because he viewed it as critical of his 
main audience, the Almoravids. 
525 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p. 40. Al-Multadid, al- 
Multamid Ibn 'Abbad's father, on hearing of the rise of the 
Almoravids in north Africa ordered that Gibraltar be fortified 
on the seaward side. 
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Ta I if a lords, not of Berber origin, to the Almoravids was 
also not helped by their general suspicion of Berbers, 
especially as the f itna and collapse of the Caliphate seems 
to have been viewed as a Berber-induced catastrophe. In 
other words, by calling on the Almoravids for help, the 
lords of the Talifa must have realised that they were, 
giving up some, if not all, of their power. They 
probably hoped that they would be allowed to continue to 
hold office within an Almoravid hegemony. Nonetheless, 
the fall of Toledo seems to have alerted them to the fact 
that they had little choice, as the issue began to take on 
muslim/Christian connotation rather than those of inter- 
Talifa conflict. This was not because the Talifas suddenly 
became aware of a "Christian" identity to the Castilian 
campaign which was different from what they had seen up to 
1085 but simply that the possible outcome of the continual 
inability to withstand Castilian military pressure in the 
wake of the fall of Toledo forced such a perspective, 
since that advance threatened to wipe out Muslim power from 
the Peninsula altogether. 
one of the interesting aspects of the Almoravid 
invasion of Spain was the importance of finding a 
legitimate framework for their interference in Spanish 
Muslim affairs. Not only were they invited to cross and 
aid the Spanish Muslims by the Talifas themselves, they 
also had the added legitimacy derived from their 
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acknowledgment of the 'Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. 526 With 
the collapse of Umayyad hegemony in Spain-the 'Abbasids had 
a valid claim for allegiance from the Peninsula (the only 
rival Caliphate remaining being the Shilite Fatimids of 
Egypt). In some ways the eventual occupation of Spain by 
Almoravids could be seen as the final victory in the 
'Abbasid campaign against the Umayyads which had started 
with the 'Abbasid rebellion over three centuries 
previously. 
Although the Almoravids may have been perceived 
as a threat by some of the Ta I ifas prior to the fall of 
Toledo, it seems unlikely that they would have been able 
to launch a concentrated campaign against the Iberian 
Peninsula prior to the mid 1080's. Not only was Yusuf Ibn 
Tashfin engaged in consolidating his own power base within 
the movement (there was at least one, half-hearted, 
attempt to wrest it away from hiM527) , but he was also 
concentrating on extending the power of the Almoravids in 
north Africa. Indeed, the first crossing seems very much 
to have had the mark of an reconnaissance trip in which 
Yusuf assessed the military situation in the peninsula, 
including, probably, the power base (both military and 
political) of the Talifas. His advantage over them was 
526 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan Vol. 4, p. 28. See also M. 'Abd al- 
Jalil I Kaif a Sa I ada al-Fuqaha I al-Andalusiyyun Yusuf ibn Tashf in 
'ala Khall Muluk al-Tawalif', Actas del IV Colocruio Hispano- 
Tunecino, ed. M. Marin, pp. 7-24. 
527 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 4, pp. 29-30 
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not simply a superior and motivated military force, with 
a wealth of combat experience, but also the fact that, 
aside from those Talifa rulers who acknowledged Baghdad, 
he could claim greater legitimacy (as a representative of 
the 'Abbasids) than the Talifas. 
It is interesting, although perhaps not 
altogether surprising, that the Bani Hud did not seem to 
be represented among those who welcomed Yusuf on his first 
528 crossing to the Peninsula. It was a reasonable enough 
excuse that they were besieged in Zaragoza. However, 
even after Alfonso lifted his siege, they do not appear to 
have tried to join the force of the Almoravid/Talifa 
alliance assembling in the south. Indeed, for the following 
ten years, the attitude of the Bani Hud to the 
Almoravid/Castilian conflict seems to have been one of non- 
involvement. Nor, it seems, did Rodrigo Diaz become 
involved in this conflict. 
When Alvar Fdfiez, with his troops in Valencia 
shoring up the al-Qadir's regime, heard of Alfonso's move 
south to meet the Berber threat, he left the city to join 
his King 529 and made it in time to join the Castilian 
forces before the engagement at Zallaqa. This last point 
is mentioned merely to show that it was logistically 
possible for a military force from the north to make it to 
528 Anon: Al-Hulal al-Mawshivva, p. 67 
529 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus., p. 92. 
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the lower march in time for the conf rontation, and that 
while the absence of both the Bani Hud and of Rodrigo Diaz 
from the battle, could be seen as partly due to their 
concentration on bolstering up the defences of the upper 
march following the lifting of Castile's siege of Zaragoza, 
it surely was also as a sign of their choosing not to join 
the conflict. Having said that, Alvar Fanez's route 
would have been more direct than that of the Bani Hud, as 
he only had to travel west to meet the remainder of Alfo- 
nso's army in the middle march before the march south. 
Nonetheless, one can not but feel that if either Rodrigo 
or the Bani Hud had seriously intended to join either side, 
getting to the lower march in time for the battle would not 
have proved a serious logistical problem. 
one of the earliest extant Muslim description of 
Zallaqa is in a letter written by Ibn al-Qusayra, an 
ambassador of the Bani 'Abbad to the Almoravids, in which 
he describes the battle. This was written on the morning 
of the next day, Saturday, and is partly quoted by Ibn 
Bassam. 530 In essence, it describes, how after appeals 
for assistance from the Bani 'Abbad, carried to him by the 
letter Is author, Yusuf crossed over and met with the 
forces of the Talifas at Badajoz. They then decided to 
move towards Coria, and were intercepted by Alfonso. 
After an initial engagement Yusuf, leading the Almoravids, 
joined the fray in earnest and the Christians were defeated 
530 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp. 241-244 
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with few casualties on the Muslim side. For the rest of 
that day and the following night, the Muslims engaged in 
mopping-up operations. The author was unsure whether 
Alfonso had fallen in battle or not. This version of 
events is echoed by other Muslim sources, although the 
first Muslim contingent to clash with the Castilian army in 
battle is identified as that of Seville under al-Multamid 
Ibn I Abbad. 531 
Ibn al-Kardabus, writing in the second half of 
the C12 and away from the influence of the Almoravids also 
described the battle. He, however, records that Alfonso 
f irst clashed with al-Mu I tamid and his Sevillian f orces who 
acquitted themselves well. Rather than coming to 
al-Multamid's immediate relief, Yusuf is quoted as saying 
$'leave them a while to death, for both parties are 
enemies". 532 Whether this was a later embellishment or 
a genuine quote, Yusuf Is actions in the peninsula very 
clearly demonstrated that his primary aim was to conquer a 
new domain for his movement, and not, as later Almoravid 
propaganda liked to suggest, to selflessly defend a Muslim 
province against Christian invasion. Zallaqa convincingly 
halted the southern advance of Castile and as the 
Almoravids gradually occupied most of the remaining Talifa 
territory, the dynamics of the conflict changed into one 
531 For a fuller description of the battle and the days 
leading up to it see the description in al-Rawd al-Miltar 
published as Appendix 2, Ibn Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 4, pp. 130-140. 
532 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p. 94. 
338 
between two centralised powers with efficient military 
machines. The only exception to this shift to a 
confrontation between two large powers in the last fifteen 




6.5 An Active Policy of Non-Involvement. 
The period immediately following the defeat of 
the Castilian forces at Zallaqa was one of uncertainty, 
not only for Castile, -but also for the Talifas. The 
Almoravids, under the command of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin chose 
not to press their advantage further, choosing instead to 
return to north Africa. A cynical interpretation of their 
actions would be that having seen the state of the Talifa 
kingdoms, they-decided to leave them without further aid 
to increase their weakness, in the hope of finding them an 
easier prey to conquer later. One can certainly see a 
pattern where Almoravid aid always seemed to come too late 
to save a Talifa under threat, but just in time to 
establish their own power (although arguably, this tactic 
f ailed in the case of Toledo, which they were unable to 
reconquer). An example of such Almoravid tactics will be 
looked at when discussing the seige of Valencia. The 
Ta I if as who had cooperated with the Almoravids were lef t in 
a situation where they felt more secure in relation to the 
northern threat, but as the force of Castile was simply 
halted and not actively pushed back beyond the middle 
march, their strategic position remained perilous. For 
Zaragoza, the situation remained a dangerous one with 
Alfonso still in command of Toledo and in control of 
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Valencia under al-Qadir. It was at this juncture that 
Rodrigo chose to leave Zaragozan service and return to 
Castile. Whatever the motivation behind this move, the 
honeymoon with Alfonso was to be a short one. 
The Almoravids returned to the peninsula, 
clearly intent this second time on securing control over 
some of the Talifa kingdoms, and engaged once more with 
the forces of Castile in a minor skirmish at Aledo in June 
1089. once again, there is no mention of Zaragoza among 
those welcoming the Almoravids on their second 
crossing. 533 The Zaragozan forces were notable by their 
absence from this engagement and so was Rodrigo Diaz. 
Mendndez Pidalls defence of Rodrigo and his explanation as 
to why he failed to join Alfonso's forces on the expedition 
to relieve the siege was, to say the least, 
improbable. 534 Alfonso once again fell out with Rodrigo. 
The latter once again left the service of Castile and 
turned towards the upper march. 
Al-Mustalin II in the period immediately 
following the defeat of the Christians at Zallaqa, found 
that the pressure on the upper march had abated to some 
533 Anon: al-Hulal al-Mawshivya. Appendix 3 Ibn Idhari: al- 
Bayan, Vol. 4, pp. 141-3 
534 The argument is put forward that Rodrigo did come to 
Aledo, but failed to meet up with Alfonso's forces. Mendndez 
Pidal: La Espaha del Cid pp. 257-9. Huici Miranda did not accept 
those arguments: Historia Musulmana de Valencia v su Regi6n, 
Vol. 2, pp. 19-20. 
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degree. With hindsight, one can perhaps deduce that the 
withdrawal of the Almoravids following their victory was 
partly because the expedition, from their point of view 
was to some degree one of reconnaissance. One can further 
speculate that their reasons for not pressing their 
advantage had something to do with Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's 
ambition to take over as much of Muslim Spain as possible 
so that part of what he hoped to do was to exert enough 
force to halt the Castilian advance but at the same time 
leave the Talifa lords weak enough to be in constant need 
of Almoravid aid. This, however, is speculation although it 
is based on the history of the Almoravid movement's 
involvement in Muslim Spain as it was to develop in the 
last two decades of. the century. Al-Mustalin II, could 
probably guess at Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's motivation, but he 
could not possibly judge the full extent of the latter's 
ambition in the peninsula. 
Zaragoza Is distance f rom the south, in some ways 
a source of weakness when it came to confronting the 
Christian north, af f orded al-Musta I in II the option not to 
form an immediate policy vis-a-vis the Almoravids. He 
could speculate as to the reasons for their return to north 
Africa following Zallaqa; he undoubtedly felt relief that 
they did so, but he could choose to ignore them. If they 
returned to the peninsula and started moving north in a way 
which he perceived to be threatening, he would have time 
enough to f ace that threat by the time they neared his 
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domain. The lords of the southern Talifas, on the other 
hand, had no such option. When Yusuf returned on his 
second crossing in the campaign against Aledo, they had to 
make the choice of either meeting him and joining his 
force, and thus in some way accepting that his authority 
was expanding over the peninsula, or refusing to meet him 
and thus leaving themselves open to his wrath and to 
allegations that they were not committed to fighting the 
Christians. In fact, neither option offered any protection 
from the expansionist Almoravids. Abdullah Ibn Ziri of 
Granada, a kinsman of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, suffered the 
same fate as that of Ibn 'Abbad of Seville who had 
originally invited the Almoravids as well as that of minor 
lords who had accepted their authority. They all lost 
their city-states in time. Al-Mustalin II, on the other, 
hand chose simply neither to welcome Yusuf on his second 
crossing nor to join the campaign; nor does it seem did he 
chose openly to speak out against them. 
For Zaragoza, the advent of the Almoravids and 
their defeat of Alfonso VI diverted Castile's attention 
away f rom the upper march at a time when, with Toledo 
under their control and Valencia owing allegiance to them, 
the march was completely surrounded and vulnerable. This 
afforded the march some breathing space. Zaragoza, under 
al-Mustalin II, did not possess the military and economic 
resources to mount a campaign against Castile or even 
Toledo. Nor apparently did it have the more limited 
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resources needed to repeat the successful campaign against 
Valencia to wrench it into its own sphere of control. 
Al-Mustalin II therefore concentrated on consolidating his 
power within the march. 
At the same time, the defeat of Alfonso VI and 
his preoccupation with the Almoravids sent a different 
signal to other northern Christian powers, including 
Arag6n and Barcelona.. They saw this as an opportunity to 
reassert their claims over the upper march. Arag6n in 
particular which had in the course of the C11 viewed the 
upper march as rightfully forming part of its area of 
influence, had witnessed its old rival Castile almost take 
this prize from it. The defeat of Castile at Zallaqa and 
the implication of Castilian weakening which this defeat 
signified, however, allowed Arag6n to resume its old 
ambitions in the upper march. In 1087 Sancho Ramirez I 
took Estuda and followed it up two years later by taking 
Monzon 535 (where the besieged population of Barbastro had 
fled after its fall) . Arag6n was therefore driving a wedge 
through the middle of the upper march in an attempt to 
consolidate its southern thrust. In the same year 1089, 
Sancho Ramirez built A fortress, el-Castellar, to keep up 
the pressure against Zaragoza itself. 536 That Al-Mustalin 
II could not stop this advance or indeed hinder the 
building of al-Castellar was a sign of Zaragoza's 
535 C. J. Bishko: The Spanish & Portuguese Conguest p. 403. 
536 ibid. 
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increasing weakness and its inability to mount a convincing 
defense against the north. Part of the reason for 
Zaragoza's weakness was that the march remained split with 
al-Mustalin's uncle, al-Mudhaffar, holding out in IArida. 
By 1091, both Zaragoza and Ldrida were forced to pay 
tribute to Count Armengol IV of Urgel. 537 
At the same time, Rodrigo Diaz had also, for 
reasons of his own, not been involved in Castile's great 
forays against the Almoravids. His disagreement with 
Alf onso VI persisted and he again went into exile. This 
exile, after the battle for Aledo, was different for 
Rodrigo Diaz from earlier ones. This was partly because 
the Almoravids had entered into the political arena of 
Muslim Spain. However, part of the difference lay in the 
apparent weakening of the political power of the upper 
march. While one is reluctant to see Rodrigo being treated 
as an equal by al-Mustalin II, their relationship in this 
later exile was somewhat different from that of his first 
exile. In the first exile, while Rodrigo seems to have 
acted as the commander of several Zaragozan expeditions, 
he and his men seem to have f ormed part of a Zaragozan 
force made up in part of Muslims of the upper march. He, 
however, was clearly acting then as Zaragoza's man. The 
tone of both Muslim and Christian sources suggest that by 
the last decade of the Cll, Rodrigo's force consisted 
537 G. Zurita Y Castro: Anales de la Corona de Araq! ýn, p. 125. 
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entirely of Christian followers. 538 While he seems to 
have continued to act in accordance with the interests of 
the upper march, the tone of the texts suggests a change 
in the way in which his relationship with Zaragoza was per- 
ceived. This change seems to be related to the fact that 
he appears to have had more independence in his actions 
culminating in his ability to occupy and maintain his own 
city-state. 
6.6 The Founding of the Last Talifa. 
The advent of Rodrigo Is heavy cavalry to the 
upper march gave al-Musta I in II the opportunity to again 
direct his attention south towards Valencia. While Alf ohso 
VI had been subdued to an extent by the defeat at Zallaqa, 
al-Mustalin II must have been aware that any respite which 
the upper march received was in danger of being temporary. 
Zaragoza remained locked in a strategic vice with its only 
outlet being east along the Ebro valley to Tortosa and the 
sea. Al-Mustalin II needed to reopen his lines south as a 
means of countering the pressures from the north and from 
Castile. He would have also been aware that the Castilian 
force under Fdfiez sent to bolster al-Qadir were withdrawn 
prior to Aledo which gave him a window of opportunity to 
try to shift Valencia back into Zaragoza's political sphere 
538 Ibn al-Kardabus in his book records that in his f inal 
siege of Valencia, the Cid's band was joined by Muslim renegades, 
many of whom had renounced Islam. Tarikh al-Andalus, p. 103. 
However, it is clear that these renegades were not part of a 
Zaragozan f orce, but f ormed part of the Cid Is independent troops. 
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either by treaty or by force if need be. 
Furthermore, the political uncertainty in the 
south increased the strategic importance of Valencia to the 
upper march. Al-Mustalin II might not have realised the 
full extent of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's expansionist ambitions, 
but he would have been at least suspicious of the new 
Berber influx into the peninsula, especially if one 
considers that Ibn Hayyan's view of the fitna being the 
fault of the Berbers (which was discussed earlier) 
reflected to some degree a wider consensus among Spanish 
muslims on the subject. Valencia therefore came to 
represent in Zaragozan political thought not only a 
potential anchor against the north (which was the 
traditional way in which the upper march viewed its 
southern neighbour) but also a potential buffer against any 
possible danger from the south. Al-Mustalin II might have 
chosen to pursue a policy of non involvement, but if he 
could secure Valencia, either directly or indirectly, by 
having it placed in friendly hands, he would have 
established for the upper march what in modern military 
terminology might be called an early warning system and a 
line of first defence against any possible Almoravid 
attack. 
With this Zaragozan political perspective in 
mind, one can turn to Ibn Bassam's description of the 
events leading to the campaign against Valencia: 
And when Ahmad bin Yusuf bin Hud, who rules 
to this day the march of Zaragoza, f elt the 
armies of the Emir of the Muslims coming 
from every quarter ... he lionised a dog from 
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among the Galecians named Roderic and called 
the Campeador .... and it was the banu Hud who in the past had revived him from his slum- 
ber ... and directed him at the states of the 
peninsula ... and this man among them (i. e. 
al-Mustalin II] thought fit, when he was 
frightened of the demise of his rule and 
f elt the ending of his line, to put him 
[i. e. Rodrigo] between himself and the 
armies of the Emir of the Muslims and so 
made easy for him (watta Ia lahu) the land of 
Valencia and gathered money for him. 539 
Clearly Ibn Bassam was writing f or an audience which was 
antagonistic to the Hudids and his language (abusive about 
Rodrigo, dismissive about al-Mustalin II) betrays his 
political stance, yet one can see that for a near- 
contemporary audience there was at least one view that saw 
the campaign against Valencia as part of a Zaragozan 
foreign policy which was aimed at creating a buffer against 
the advance of the Almoravids. If one then looks at the 
earlier Zaragozan foreign policy and the Hudids' use of 
Rodrigo in implementing it, one can arrive at the 
conclusion that such an interpretation also fitted a 
Zaragozan perspective of march politics and suited the 
military and strategic purposes of the upper march. 
What Ibn Bassam fails to mention at this juncture 
was that the Hudids were by the early 1090's trying to 
build bridges with the Almoravids. Al-Musta I in II seems to 
have moved away from his original policy of non-alignment 
and was trying to negotiate with Yusuf an agreement similar 
in principal to the agreements reached between the upper 
march and the Caliphate in which the upper march 
539 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 94-95. 
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acknowledged the central authority but in return f or acting 
as a bulwark against the north was allowed to maintain its 
autonomy. 540 However, any such agreement was short- 
lived. In a letter replying to correspondence from 
al-Mustalin, 541 Abu Bakr Ibn Abu Marwan (a Cordovan civil 
servant-working for the Almoravids) claimed that 
al-Musta I in II had reneged time and time again on his 
original promises and further asserted that had 
al-Mustalin II been able to defend the march he would have 
some support to his argument (this no doubt being a dig at 
the loss of certain forts to Arag6n). The letter goes on 
to say that Yusuf was not interested in personal power but 
in the defence of'Islam. What the letter implies is a 
breakdown in negotiations between the upper march and the 
Almoravids (carried it seems via the Cordovan civil 
service) and reasserts in no uncertain terms Yusuf's claim 
to the region for the defense of Islam. one could 
therefore argue that having seen the growing power of the 
Almoravids in the peninsula, al-Mustalin II at first tried 
to negotiate with them. However, given the tone of this 
later letter, he would have become keenly aware that the 
Almoravids did not seem interested in reaching an accommo- 
dation with him. This would have made the issue of Valencia 
and its importance as a buf fer against the south all the 
more urgent for Zaragoza. 
540 Anon: Al-Hulal al-Mawshivva; Appendix 3 in Ibn Idhari: 
al-Bavan, Vol. 4, pp. 144-145. 
541 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part II, pp. 545-548. 
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Moreover, the failure to reach an accommodation 
with the Almoravids was not the only factor which made the 
securing of Valencia a matter of urgency and importance in 
Zaragozan foreign policy. If the strategic importance of 
Valencia to the upper march was apparent to the lord of 
Zaragoza, it was no less apparent to the enemies of the 
upper march. There seems to have been at least one attack 
on Valencia by al-Mundhir. 
542 This attack was repulsed by 
Rodrigo as was the attempt on Valencia by the Count of 
Barcelona 543 In a sense, by intervening to protect 
Valencia against such attacks, Zaragoza was declaring that 
it had an interest in the city; one which it was willing to 
fight to protect. The tone of the various sources suggests 
that the forces of Zaragoza, represented by Rodrigo, not 
only protected Valencia from the attentions of non 
zaragozan parties, but also sought to maintain a constant 
pressure on the city, either to weaken it as a prelude for 
a takeover or in an attempt to force it into Zaragoza's 
camp. Indeed, the anonymous author of al-Hulal_ 
al-Mawshiyva attributes Yusufls second crossing to the 
peninsula in part to the continuous harassment by Rodrigo 
of the City. 
544 What brought the crisis to a head, how- 
ever, was al-Qadir's inability to govern his new city- 
542 Alfonso X: Primera Cr6nica General p. 559; the chronicle 
identifies the attacker as the king of Tortosa and Denia. 
However, Tortosa seems to have been within the Almal of Zaragoza 
and the reference is probably to al-Mundhir of Lerida. 
543 ibid p. 561. 
544 Anon: al-Hulal al- Mawshivva, p. 81. 
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state'and the coup against him by the judge Ibn Jihaf. 
The catalyst for the rebellion against al-Qadir 
seems to have been that he instigated unspecified changes 
in customary laws (Ahka ) which led to resentment, one 
presumes on the part of the "people" or the influential 
element in Valencian society, against the new ruler. 
There was also an element of disquiet about his allegiance 
to Alfonso VI and a fear that al-Qadir might hand over 
Valencia to him as he had handed over Toledo. 545 No doubt 
such grievance and resentment could find expression more 
freely once the force of Castilian cavalry which had 
propped up the regime of al-Qadir had left the city. 
Finally, there was an element of a carry-over of Toledan 
politics and grievances f inding expression in the Valencian 
political arena. Presumably, al-Qadir was accompanied on 
his transfer to Valencia by an element of the Toledan 
influential class who must have carried with them the 
remnants of Toledan factional politics. Ibn Jihaf might 
have represented the "people" of Valencia, but al-Qadir was 
assassinated on the night of the coup on 23rd Ramadan 485/- 
27 October 1092 546 by a member of the Toledan al-Hadidi 
clan, seeking revenge over the death of the wazir al- 
Hadidi547 who was killed by the al-Qadir when he had 
first assumed power. It is ironic that this first of al- 
Qadirls blunders would come to haunt him at the end of his 
545 Anon: Fragment B; Ibn Idhari: Al-Bavan Vol. 3, p. 305. 
546 ibid. 
547 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 96. 
351 
lif 
The rebellion of Ibn Jihaf, or rather his coup, 
against al-Qadir had another dimension. It was conducted 
with the assistance of a troop of Almoravid horse, 
seemingly sent to Valencia for this purpose. 548 The 
presence of this troop had two implications. First, it lent 
legitimacy to the rebellion since it would appear that Ibn 
, 7ihaf was acting on 
behalf of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin. It is 
interesting to note that even during the last part of the 
century, when political power was very fluid and when no 
clear central authority existed, it was still important for 
Spanish Muslims to cling to references of legal authority 
for their framework of political power. Yusuf himself 
claimed that he represented the 'Abbasid Caliph, and in 
the more local context of Valencia, Ibn Jihaf represented 
not so much a rebellious populace, but the authority of 
Yusuf and therefore by extension of the 'Abbasids. Second- 
ly, the presence of the Almoravid horse made it clear that 
the coup had wrenched Valencia from the Castilian sphere of 
influence and placed it with the Almoravid political 
sphere. This was a blow directed partly against Castile, 
548 ibid. pp. 96-97. Ibn al-Khatib: Almal al-Allam p. 234 names 
the commander of this troop as Ibn 'Alisha, who was of Valencian 
origin and who figures in the later Almoravid involvement in 
Valencian affairs. Huici Miranda accepted Mendndez Pidal's 
argument that the Cid saw al-Qadir as the legitimate ruler of 
Valencia Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Regi6n, vol. 1, 
p. 261. He believed that al-Qadir wrote to the Cid asking for aid. 
Vol. 2, p. 52. This seems to be based on the Primera Cr6nica 
General. However, Ibn Bassam, whose friend Ibn Tahir was in 
Valencia at the time, makes no mention of such an appeal, and on 
balance, it seems like a later addition, and rightly forms part 
of the myth of the Cid. 
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but was also an aggressive move against Zaragoza, since it 
denied Zaragoza the chance to secure Valencia. 
Ibn Jihaf, however, appears to have been as 
incompetent a ruler as al-Qadir, and the Almoravid troop 
soon left hiM549 It is not clear why they did so. 
Nonetheless, this withdrawal fits within a wider pattern of 
Almoravid political behaviour in the peninsula. Like 
Yusuf Is first campaign, this limited involvement served to 
weaken Castile's grip on Valencia, but the Almoravids 
chose not to remain long enough to allow Ibn Jihaf to 
consolidate his power base in the city-state. One can 
conjecture that they hoped to leave him weak enough to 
allow them to physically take control of the city at a 
later date with minimal resistance from the "people" of 
Valencia. 
The deposing of al-Qadir and the involvement of 
the Almoravids in the coup led to an intensif ication of 
political activity in the region. Alf onso VI, having seen 
Valencia thus slip out of his control seems to have 
launched a campaign after the Almoravid cavalry had left, 
aiming to bring Valencia back within Castile's sphere 
again. In the meantime, Zaragoza acted to stop him from 
again establishing a cordon around the upper march. While 
Alfonso VI was besieging Valencia, Rodrigo Diaz conducted 
a campaign against Castile itself forcing Alfonso to lift 
his siege and return to defend his own domain. Ibn 
al-Kardabus mistakenly places this campaign while al-Qadir 
549 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 97. 
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was still in power: 
And when Alfonso advanced on Valencia, the 
Campeador was angered, for he was preparing 
its submission to him, with al-Qadir acting 
as his agent ('Amilahu), and so he gathered 
af orce and attacked Castile, where he burnt 
and destroyed. This was the main reason why 
Alfonso's 
550 
army lifted the siege from 
Valencia. 
Despite Ibn al-Kardabus' apparent mistake as to the timing 
of the siege of Valencia and Rodrigo's actions to lift it, 
it is clear that his actions were perceived to be directed 
against Alfonso and to protect the Cid's own plans for 
controlling the city. Interestingly, the Mendndez Pidal 
school of thought would point out that Rodrigo never acted 
against Castile and in particular against Alfonso VI 
directly. This incident, however, is an example of such 
direct action. It was accepted military conduct that to 
relieve a besieged city one either attacked the besiegers 
or their domain thus forcing them to lift the siege and 
return to defend their own territory. In this action, 
Rodrigo clearly intended to harm and succeeded in harming 
Castile's policy in the east of the peninsula and in so 
doing was acting in the best interests of Zaragoza. Once 
the Castilian siege was lifted, Rodrigo intensified his 
campaign against Valencia for the best part of two years, 
now clearly intent on outright conquest. 551 
Ibn al-Kardabus records that Rodrigo's campaign 
against Valencia lasted for twenty months. This seems to 
550 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, pp. 99-loo. 
551 ibid. p. 103. 
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agree with a contemporary account by Ibn 'Alqama who 
records that Rodrigo resumed his campaign against Valencia 
in 486/1 February 1093-21 January 1094. It is now accepted 
that part of . the reason for such a long siege was that 
Rodrigo was not interested in taking the town by force and 
sacking it in the manner of the campaign for Barbastro. 
Rather, he aimed to take it over as a "going concern", 
which meant that he wanted to force his will on its people 
without damaging the infra-structure of the town or of the 
surrounding Alinal. Nor did he want the population to 
leave. The main reason behind such a strategy was that he 
wanted to establish himself as ruler of a populated and 
wealthy city-state; in other words, he was establishing 
himself as a ruler of a new "Talifall. The concept of a 
Christian lord ruling a Muslim city-state would have been 
novel, to say the least, and the "people" of Valencia 
were' not willing to comply, despite Rodrigo's close 
association with Zaragoza. 
Rodrigo's strategy was to lay a complete and 
tight siege around the city cutting it off from its 
surrounding province and from the rest of Muslim Spain in 
an attempt to force the city to its knees through economic 
hardship. one interesting aspect about this campaign was 
that Rodrigo did not conduct it under the banner of 
political expediency, but rather he followed the 
convention of Muslim Spain in the C11 and found a legally 
acceptable reason (or at least a legally passable excuse) 
for launching a concentrated attack on the city itself. 
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Ibn 'Alqama, whose contemporary account or history of 
Valencia is lost except for fragments quoted by other 
sources, records that when Rodrigo left the area of 
Valencia in Shalban 485/6 September-4 October 1092, he 
left in Valencia some supplies and the city, it seems, 
also owed him the payment of a Paria. 552 When he returned 
to the city once Ibn Jihaf had conducted his coup he 
demanded the return of supplies and the payment of monies 
owed. 
There are some interesting differences between 
the account given by Ibn 'Alqama and quoted by Ibn lIdhari 
and the account given by Ibn Bassam, who had access to the 
eyewitness account of his friend Ibn Tahir who also lived 
through the siege and the occupation by Rodrigo. The 
account in al-Bavan records that after Rodrigo demanded his 
stores and money, he increased the pressure on Ibn Jihaf, 
who, confident of the Almoravid support, did not comply. 
Rodrigo even apparently threatened to avenge the death of 
al-Qadir. The source then suggests that Rodrigo changed 
tack, promising support if Ibn Jihaf expelled the 
Almoravid force. These exchanges are not mentioned by Ibn 
Bassam. more significantly, al-Bavan records that 
following appeals from Valencia an army from the Almoravids 
led by Abu Bakr ben Ibrahim did try to relieve the city, 
but for some reason retreated. 553 Ibn Bassam, writing 
earlier and for an Almoravid audience records no such 
552 Ibn 'Alqama; quoted by Ibn Idhari: Al Bavan, V01.4, p. 31. 
553 ibid p. 33. 
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attempt. In fact he tries to make excuses for Yusuf Is 
inability to relieve the city because of its distance and 
the lack of resources-554 The most likely explanation for 
the difference between the two sources is that Ibn 'Idhari 
starts the section on Valencia by quoting the contemporary 
account of Ibn 'Algama, then shifts to another later 
account which refers to the later Almoravid attempt to 
retake the city from Rodrigo after his occupation and 
mistakenly attributes that attempt to the time when 
Rodrigo was still laying siege to the city, although the 
second Almoravid campaign against Valencia is recorded by 
Ibn 'Idhari in some detail a few pages later. 
If one accepts that Ibn Bassam's account is the 
more accurate one, one could construct an argument which 
places the Almoravid refusal to help within the wider 
pattern of their policy of minimal interference whereby the 
ultimate aim of their limited help was to take over the 
distressed provinces themselves. (A similar case is that 
of Majorca, which suffered a ten-month siege by the Count 
of Barcelona, but despite repeated calls for help by its 
ruler Mubashsher, Yusuf's relief managed to arrive after 
the island had fallen, 555 so that the ensuing liberation 
did not give Majorca back to its ruler, but placed it 
within Almoravid control). 
Both accounts agree as to the severity of the 
siege. The people of the city were not allowed to leave to 
554 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 98. 
555 Ibn Khaldun: al-Tarikh, Vol. IV, p. 355. 
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the surrounding countryside on pain of mutilation or even 
death. This kept up the economic pressure on the city 
which ran out of f ood so that people ate rats, skins and 
liaram meat (it is not clear what this refers to; 
presumably, the city could not have had many pigs, so that 
the reference is probably to eating dead, as opposed to 
slaughtered, animals) . one of the interesting points about 
this siege is that f or it to be so ef f ective against a port 
city, one presumes that it included a naval element 
(otherwise the city could have had access to supplies via 
the sea route) No reference is made in the Arabic sources 
to the naval element of the siege. Moreover, since 
Rodrigo's force seems to have been composed mainly of 
mounted troops, it is unlikely to have had direct control 
of any naval forces. Two solutions suggest themselves to 
this problem. The first is that the besieging army somehow 
gained control of the port-although there is no reference 
to this action either. Alternatively, that Rodrigo Is 
siege was assisted by Zaragozan naval forces. Given the 
proposition that Rodrigo's siege was made as part of 
Zaragozan foreign policy, a sound argument could be made 
for the second alternative. Zaragoza had a naval f orce 
based in Tortosa which it could have made available for 
this purpose, although this second proposition remains a 
matter of conjecture. 
The long siege finally weakened the city enough 
(by then it was suffering from spreading disease as well as 
famine) for its "people" to ask Ibn Jihaf to surrender. At 
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first Ibn Jihaf asked for a truce at the beginning of 
Jamadi al-Awla 487/19 May- 17 June 1094 to call for help 
from Zaragoza and Murcia. None arrived and the city 
surrendered at the end of the month, Ibn Jihaf having 
extracted several conditions for himself and the 
populace. 556 Rodrigo then put Ibn Jihaf on trial. Ibn 
'Algama stated that the charge was Ibn Jihafls rebellion 
against al-Qadir. Ibn Bassam on the other hand only 
mentions that Ibn Jihaf was executed for keeping back a 
part of al-Qadir's treasure which Rodrigo had asked for. 
Whatever the specific reason for the execution, it is 
clear that Rodrigo sought to find a "legal" basis for 
ridding himself of the deposed ruler of the city. 
Ibn Bassam's witness (presumably Ibn Tahir) also 
reported hearing Rodrigo exclaiming : "A Rodrigo helped the 
conquest of this island and a Rodrigo will save her". 557 
if one accepts this quote as genuine and not a later 
embellishment by Ibn Bassam, it would indicate that 
although Rodrigo was working within the framework of 
Zaragozan foreign policy, he was aware of the 
Christian/Muslim dimension of the conflict and was 
expressing a sentiment relating to the ideals of the 
reconquest. This ties in with sentiment of Alvar Fanez 
reported by 'Abdullah, the prince of Granada, as well as 
556 Ibn 'Alqama; quoted by Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bavan Vol. 4, 
pp. 38-39. Ibn Bassam states that the city fell in 488, i. e. the 
following year (Part IIIsp. 98), which is presumably an error on 
the part of a later copyist. 
557 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 99. 
359 
the sentiment of the unnamed Christian in Barbastro with 
whom a Jewish emissary was trying to negotiate the release 
of captive Muslim women, and would suggest that by the end 
of the century there was a transition towards a "mentality" 
of reconquest. However, the politics leading to the 
conquest of Valencia would also suggest that such a 
mentality managed to evolve and coexist with the older 
pattern of alliance with Muslim rulers within a framework 
of regional politics which was not necessarily bound by the 
Christian/Muslim dimension. In other words one can see a 
transition towards a new politics of religious 
confrontation, but also that the transition was gradual 
and that during the time it evolved the lines separating 
the old political world-view and the new were not 
rigorously defined. 
The Almoravids reacted to the f all of Valencia in 
the same way they had reacted to the fall of Majorca. 
Within two months of Rodrigo's victory they had managed to 
amass a large army to advance on the city. Interestingly, 
Ibn Bassam does not mention this episode as his Almoravid 
audience would have found it embarrassing. All that he 
would say was that the f all of the city became the main 
concern of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin who sent forces, the war 
being undecided until the city was liberated. This was one 
way of glossing over the only major defeat the Almoravids 
suffered in the peninsula. Ibn 'Alqama's account, however, 
is more detailed. The Almoravid army, commanded by yusuf1s 
nephew advanced on the city in Shalban/16 August-13 Septem- 
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ber having gathered in Murcia. Rodrigo responded to the 
news of the impending attack by confiscating all weapons 
from the population of the city. Significantly, the 
Almoravid army was joined by forces from IArida (hoping no 
doubt to benefit from the defeat of Rodrigo by 
extending Ldrida's authority over the whole of the upper 
march) and from Tortosa which seems to have turned against 
Zaragoza and joined what must have been perceived as the 
winning side. Clearly, even at this stage the inter-march 
politics still played a major role in shaping the response 
of a march to outside events. Equally, the importance of 
Valencia to Zaragoza must have been very clear. Both the 
lords of Ldrida and Tortosa seem to have thought that the 
defeat of Rodrigo at the hands of such a large army (said 
to contain four thousand horse) was inevitable and that 
with the fall of Valencia, al-Mustalin II would also fall, 
opening the way for new deals with the Almoravids to agree 
a new lord to rule the upper march. 
Rodrigo, however, defeated the attacking army, 
partly through ruse (releasing the women of the city into 
the lines of the besieging army, where they were then 
attacked and raped by the "lower elements" of the attacking 
army -without the commander knowing, naturally- thus 
causing confusion among the support element of the 
attacking force as well as causing resentment among the 
Muslim inhabitants of Valencia against their saviours) and 
partly through a daring military manoeuvre. On 8 Shawal/21 
October, he circumvented the main body of the Almoravid 
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army and attacked the heart of its encampment. The 
Almoravids thus attacked f rom the rear assumed that they 
were being attacked by a relieving Christian force, 
possibly that of Arag6n (Rodrigo had spread rumours to the 
effect that Arag6n would come to his aid) or even Alfonso. 
Fearing a flanking movement they fell back in confusion 
retreating to Denia then to Jativa. 558 Intriguingly, 
Alfonso is recorded as having been halfway to Valencia when 
he heard of this victory and changed course towards Gran- 
ada. It is not clear whether his aim was to help Rodrigo 
repel the attack, or whether he was employing a tactic 
similar to that of the Almoravids and hoping that by 
repelling the attack on Valencia he would be able to take 
over the city himself and thus realise his strategy of 
extending his control east cutting Zaragoza off, a 
strategy which had been thwarted by Rodrigo a few years 
earlier. 
The resounding defeat of the Almoravid army 
established Rodrigo Diaz as the ruler of Valencia. He did 
not hold Valencia as part of any Christian kingdom. At the 
same time, his connections with Zaragoza continued and 
placed him as an ally of the upper march, but his rule was 
independent of al-Mustalin II. He was in effect an 
independent Talifa lord himself -the last to be established 
in the peninsula in the C11. 
At this juncture it might be profitable to 
558 Ibn 'Alqama; quoted by Ibn Idhari and Ibn Idharils own 
account; -Al-h-aY-ant 
Vol- 4, pp. 40 and 34-37 . 
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examine briefly his unusual title el-Cid. The title is 
derived from the Arabic al-Savved. 559 In modern usage the 
term now denotes an equivalent of the German Herr although 
as late as the middle of this century, it was a title 
reserved for the gentry . 
560 In the C11 the title would 
have been reserved for members of the Arabic lordly class. 
For a non-Arab Christian to hold such a title would have 
been highly irregular. The two contemporary Arab sources 
never refer to him with this title. Ibn 'Alqama simply 
calls him Rodrigo (Ludhrict), while Ibn Bassam acknowledges 
his title Campeador (Kanbiatur) . Both would have considered 
it ridiculous that he should be called (al-Savved) . Two 
possible explanations for this title present themselves. 
one is that he was awarded the title while in the service 
of Zaragoza, possibly during his f irst exile when he 
helped save the Hudid dynasty f rom being overrun. One 
could make out an argument that the Hudids to reward him 
made him an honourary Savved, rather in the way in which 
the British Empire awarded titles to members of its col- 
onies who had served it well. The connotation of the title 
would also imply a linkage to the Bani Hud as they them- 
selves were Asvad. This would have been highly unusual, 
but in a sense it could be seen as an upgrading and exten- 
sion of the Mawla system whereby non-Arabs were allowed to 
559 There is a possibility that the term Cid was based on 
the Arabic word Sivved meaning wolf, but this seems unlikely. 
560 one of the first edicts of the 1952 military coup in 
Egypt was to give every citizen the right to call himself al- 
gjyye! ft . 
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associate themselves with certain "sponsoring" Arab tribes 
and which was in use f rom the early days of Islam. The 
other explanation was that the title was used by his 
Christian followers to describe an unusual situation. 
Rodrigo held no formal high noble title from Alfonso, nor 
did he hold Valencia as a fief from Castile. Yet, he 
clearly was the absolute ruler of a fair sized city-state. 
At the same time he could not be called a king. This lack 
of formal title to describe his power might have led his 
followers to adopt an Arab title to describe his lordship 
over what was in essence a Muslim city-state. Both these 
suggestions are conjecture and it may be that the title was 
added later on as an element of the myth, although that 
does not explain the unusual usage. 
6.7 conclusion 
It is clear that the power of the upper march was 
in decline from the mid 1080's. The fall of Toledo, with 
the resultant shift of Valencia into the Castilian sphere 
of influence were major blows to Zaragozan security as was 
the intervention of the Almoravids. The pressure against 
the march which had always been present was thus 
intensified with the introduction of two new dynamic forces 
into the political arena. This decline can be seen in the 
way in which the upper march had to increasingly resort to 
diplomacy, as opposed to military action, to safeguard 
its interests. In a sense, the fact that by the 109ols 
Rodrigo was no longer acting as part of a Zaragozan army, 
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but as an autonomous ally was indicative Of this decline. 
Al-Musta I in also seemed unable to meet the pressure from 
his traditional enemies in Arag6n and Barcelona. 
In addition, the upper march had been unable to 
resolve the issue of succession effectively. Each time the 
lord of Zaragoza died, the march was divided, presenting 
each successive heir with the difficult task of reuniting 
it through military action or diplomacy or both. Like the 
other Talifas, the Bani Hud never resolved the issue of 
kingship, despite their use of Caliphal titles. This lack 
of cohesion was an in-built source of weakness for the 
march which became exacerbated as the political and 
military pressures on it grew. 
overall, one has the feeling that al-Mustalin II 
was having to conduct his policy within increasingly 
narrowing parameters which placed the upper march in the 
grips of a vicious circle. The weaker it became, the 
harder it was for Zaragoza to exercise proper economic and 
political control over its Almal which led to further 
weakness. In some ways directing Rodrigo towards Valencia 
and allowing him to become lord of the city was an act of 
desperation. Nonetheless, al-Mustalin had managed to 
respond to the crises facing his city-state with the 
maximum effectiveness possible given the ever decreasing 
resources at his disposal. 
The conquest of Valencia did break the cordon 
placed around Valencia and the resounding defeat of the 
Almoravid army did act as a successful buffer against their 
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expansion northwards. This allowed Zaragoza to re-enter 
negotiations with the Almoravids with a stronger hand and 
to reassert its authority -to a very limited degree- over 
parts of the march. However, the situation in 1094 was 
far from promising. Although Rodrigo controlled Valencia 
and part of the countryside around it, his control did not 
extend over the whole of the state. The Almoravids may have 
failed to capture Valencia, but they controlled Jativa (the 
other main city in the Almal) and its surrounding country- 
side. The Almoravids also controlled Denia, thus taking 
over this city-state, and the revenue it had provided, 
away from Zaragoza. So that, although the state of Valencia 
did offer the buffer which Zaragoza hoped for, it was a 
weaker and smaller buffer than that which had existed under 
the Bani 'Amir a quarter of a century earlier. 
Zaragoza itself suffered territorial losses, 
partly as a result of a reversal of the expansion south 
(with the loss of Denia) but also partly as a result of a 
steady loss of territory to the north, especially to 
Arag6n. Moreover, the apparent inability of Zaragoza to 
meet the challenges from the north and its vulnerability to 
advances from the south weakened the hold of the city over 
the main centres in its Almal as was demonstrated by the 
moves of Ldrida and more significantly of Tortosa against 
Zaragoza's interests during the Almoravid attack on 
Valencia. Nevertheless, through the resourceful use of 
diplomacy and warfare, including the use of Rodrigo and 
his heavy cavalry, the lords of Zaragoza did Manage to 
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survive the major crises which faced them in the last two 
decades of the century. At a time when the power structure 
was shifting against the Talifas and towards the two new 
major centres of power in the peninsula (Castile and the 
Almoravids), Zaragoza managed to remain, against all 
odds, an independent Talifa. The success of their policy 
in Valencia, although limited to a great extent, did 
allow them to establish a buffer against the expanding 
Almoravids and broke the Castilian cordon which had begun 
to strangle the upper march. 
Despite being outflanked by the fall of the 
middle march in 1085, and with some help from Rodrigo Diaz 
de Vivar, the Bani Hud managed to become the only Talifa 
to survive, albeit briefly, into the C12. 
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conclusion 
The study of medieval Spanish Muslim history is 
restricted by the lack of charter evidence. What survives 
of such evidence is normally through copies in literary 
anthologies. The bulk of extant historical sources tend to 
have been compiled at later dates and were attempts at 
writing complete "histories" of Muslim Spain, so that, the 
information which they do provide is more concerned with 
the general history and events of the peninsula as a whole. 
However, the period following the collapse of the 
Umayyad Caliphate in the second decade of the eleventh 
century provides a window through which some of the 
structures of Spanish Muslim society can be glimpsed. This 
is not because the nature of the evidence changed but 
because the history of the peninsula following the 
fragmentation of the Umayyad state was, necessarily, 
determined by the actions of its component provinces. 
studies of this period have previously tended to rely on 
later sources, such as Ibn 'Idhari. These later sources, 
tended to try to relocate material from earlier sources 
within a narration of a general history of Muslim Spain 
which was very much influenced by the political outlook 
formulated after the start of the Spanish reconquest. 
This thesis, by contrast, has made greater use of 
eleventh century sources, notably Ibn Bassam's literary 
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work al-Dhakhira. The structure of al-Dhakhira (the 
division of the work into books looking at the literary 
achievements of each of the regions within Muslim Spain) as 
well as Ibn Bassam's use of long quotes from the 
contemporary Ibn Hayyan's lost work, al-Matin,, provides an 
insight into some of the workings of the regional elites of 
Spanish Muslim society outside Cordova. By using these 
earlier sources, the study has tried to re-examine the 
events in Muslim Spain during the Talifa period, especially 
those relating to Zaragoza and Valencia, from an eleventh 
century perspective. 
It has been argued in the thesis that the Spanish 
Muslim elite of the eleventh century believed that Umayyad 
government had provided a framework for the relationship 
between the government in Cordova and the provinces. This 
was a framework in which the legitimate ruler of Muslim 
Spain appointed (or in some cases, confirmed) a provincial 
governor. The appointment extended legitimacy to the 
governor, both in terms of his relationship with the Almal 
and with other provinces. In return, a governor declared 
allegiance to the Caliph and sent Cordova a portion of the 
tax revenue collected. It was further suggested that 
whether such a theoretical system corresponded with reality 
or not is less significant than the fact that it was 
believed to have existed. Furthermore, the proposition has 
been made that there was a belief among the Spanish Muslim 
elite of the period that the rule of the 'Amirids had 
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destroyed this legitimate structure. 
The thesis puts forward the proposition that an 
understanding of this theoretical structure has direct 
bearing on understanding the history of the Talifa period 
because many of the actions of the Ta I if a rulers were 
concerned with establishing an alternative to this 
structure in a period when Cordovan central power 
disappeared. 
It has been argued that the fact that the 
majority of the Ta I if a rulers continued to acknowledge some 
form of Caliphal rule for much of the century, at least in 
theory, demonstrates that they continued to believe that 
legitimacy derived from such an acknowledgement was 
important. It was also shown that the relationship between 
each city and its Almal clearly became more unstable during 
the Talifa period. Several examples to support this view 
were examined including the almost constant rebellion of 
L6rida, as well as the occasional rebellion of Jativa. It 
has been suggested that in the absence of a legitimate 
Cordovan government, ' the relationship between the lord of 
a province and lesser lords in his Almal became 
increasingly defined by the ability of the main cities 
forcibly to maintain their authority over the Almal. 
The Umayyad system was also seen to have provided 
the basis for the legitimate appointment of rulers for each 
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province. In the years immediately following the collapse 
of the Cordovan government, groups of disbanded soldiers 
such as the Zirids established themselves as lords of 
provinces, while elsewhere, members of the local elite such 
as the Tujibids took over the reins of government. Even 
when some form of stability returned to the Muslim Spain 
towards the middle of the century, it seems that new 
dynasties could be established with relative ease, through 
a combination of force and support from the local elite. 
Examples of such take overs have been looked at including 
the establishment of the Hudids in Zaragoza as well as the 
establishment of the 'Amirids in Valencia. 
The study has also tried to demonstrate that the 
relationship between provinces became increasingly 
unstable, as each behaved as an independent entity. 
Rivalries between provinces had existed previously, but the 
Umayyad government had ensured that such rivalries did not 
degenerate into constant feuding. As the century 
progressed, the Talifas increasingly involved the Christian 
states in their inter-provincial wars. It was shown that at 
the beginning, there was clearly some disquiet at such 
involvement, but that gradually, Christian involvement 
became more frequent and gained greater acceptance. In such 
an uncertain climate, the lords of the Talifas tried to 
elevate marriage alliances to a new level of importance in 
an attempt to introduce an element of stability in their 
relationship with one another. There is evidence that such 
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matrimonial alliances did not always work. Nevertheless, 
that the Talifa lords saw some value in such alliances, 
seems clear from the fact that they remained a feature of, 
for example, Zaragozan/Valencian politics until the end of 
the century. 
The methods used by the Talifa lords to 
consolidate their power within each city-state have been 
explored. The case has been made that these reflected the 
tools used by the Cordovan government to extend its 
authority over the whole of the peninsula in the previous 
century. Even before the extent of the disintegration of 
the spanish Muslim state became fully evident, governors 
were issuing new coinage to replace that of the Caliphate. 
This was the earliest positive action taken by the emerging 
Talifa lords as a result of their independence. 
The Ta I if as also developed their local provincial 
chanceries into more complex bureaucratic apparatuses in 
the image of the civil service that had served the 
government in Cordova. Perhaps one can question whether it 
is appropriate to see these chanceries as a civil service. 
They were clearly much smaller in size than the Cordovan 
civil service. However, the men who established those 
chanceries were originally the product of the Cordovan 
civil service, and it was shown that they clearly saw 
themselves as ministers (wuzaral). Their chanceries dealt 
not only with the pre-Ta I if a provincial problems related to 
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the collection of the tax revenue and the exercise of 
provincial government, but as the century progressed, they 
had to deal with relations between the different Talifas, 
which had by then started behaving towards each other as 
independent states. In this sense, it is argued that they 
can be seen as smaller versions of the Cordovan civil 
service. It has also been argued that good ministerial 
advice was seen to be an important tool of Talifa 
government. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the military element was 
shown to have had very little involvement in domestic 
provincial politics during the Ta I if a period. A distinction 
has to be made between the period immediately following the 
collapse of Cordovan government when the disbanded armies 
of the 'Amirids, whether Slavs or Berbers, participated in 
the politics of the peninsula, in the sense that some 
established themselves as independent Talifas, and the 
period following that, by which time the leadership of 
these groups were behaving as independent Ta I if as. There is 
little evidence that, once the Talifas were formed, the 
military element within each province played an important 
role in internal or domestic politics (the main exception 
being the rebellion of iativa against 'Abd al-'Aziz). It 
does not seem, for example, that in the rebellions in the 
upper march, the military formed an independent force to be 
reckoned with within the internal politics of the Zaragozan 
state. It has been suggested that this may be related to 
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the f act that Ta I if a lords (rather like the Umayyad Caliphs 
before them) kept relatively small standing armies. 
What the study has attempted to show is that the 
element in society which, by contrast, clearly enjoyed a 
considerable amount of power in the cities were the elite, 
mostly referred to as the Ahl. It has been suggested that 
these included members of locally important families as 
well as members of the local judiciary and civil service. 
The power of this stratum is evidenced by the fact that 
they could help local figures or even outsiders to become 
Talifa lords (as in the case of Sulayman Ibn Hud in 
Zaragoza). Equally, this group could engineer the removal 
of a Ta I if a lord, as seen in the cases of * Valencia. and 
Toledo. In the case of Toledo, it was the Ahl and not al- 
Qadir who seemed to have conducted the negotiations f or 
surrender with Alfonso VI. While little direct evidence 
about this group survives, it is probably correct to assume 
that they were made up of factions and did not consist of 
a single coherent group within each city. 
The power of this group continued to play an 
important role in Talifa politics right Up to the fall of 
the f inal independent Ta I if a in the second decade of the 
t welfth century, when the constant advance of Aragon into 
the upper march led to their asserting their power over the 
Hudid dynasty. Despite accepting the legitimacy of the 
succession of 'Abd al-Malik while his father was alive in 
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503/31 July 1109-19 July 1110,561 'Abd al-Malik needed 
to renew the allegiance of the -Ahl 
following the death of 
al-Mustalin II in a campaign against Alfonso I of Aragon to 
relieve the pressure on Tudela562 in January 111o. 563 
When 'Abd al-Malik tried to revive relations with Aragon in 
an attempt to counter the increasing threat from the 
Almoravids, the Ahl of Zaragoza, in a move that paralleled 
those of the Ahl of Valencia and Toledo in the second half 
of the previous century, removed their allegiance from him 
and invited a new ruler, the Almoravid commander of 
Valencia Muhammad Ibn al-Haj, 564 while 'Abd al-Malik fled 
to Rueda. 565 This marked the final defeat of the Hudid 
Talifa, although they continued to play an important role 
in the history of Muslim Spain, especially in the period 
following the collapse of Almoravid rule later in the 
century. 
566 
561 Ibn Idhari: Al-Bavan, vol. 4, p. 53. 
562 ibid. 
563 B. F. Reilly: The Contest of Christian and Muslim 
gRjý: jn, p. 131. 
564 It is perhaps a further indication of the growing 
strength of 'Ali Ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, that Ibn 'Aisha seems to 
have been removed from the post of governor of Valencia by this 
time. cf footnote 566 below for reference in al-Mughrib. 
565 Ibn Idhari: Al-Bavan, vol. 4, pp. 53-55. This agrees with the 
information in Ibn Salid: al-Muqhrib fi Hula al-Maqhrib, vol. 2, 
p. 438. However, Ibn al-Kardabus 
in his book mistakenly records 
that 'Imad al-Dawla lost Zaragoza to Alfonso I of Aragon, Tarikh 
a, -Andalus, pp. 117-119. 
566 Ibn Salid: Al-Muqhrib fi Hula al-Maghrib, vol. 2., p. 438. 
Interestingly, Ahmad, 'Imad al-Dawla's son, surrendered Rueda to 
Alfonso VII of Castile in 1131, in return for a fief in Alfonso's 
territories. Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, pp. 120-121. 
375 
It is the traditionally held view that the Ta I ifa 
lords following the collapse of the government in Cordova 
worked at, and were successful in, establishing themselves 
as rulers of independent units that functioned completely 
outside the framework of traditional or legitimate Spanish 
Muslim government. The evidence advanced for supporting 
such a view relies not only on the actions of these lords 
during their period of rule, both towards each other and 
towards the northern Christian states, but also on the fact 
that they chose to adopt Caliphal titles; an action which 
later Muslim historians viewed as preposterous. The case 
against the Talifa lords for adopting such a practice was 
put forward by Ibn al-Kardabus in a speech which he 
attributed to Alfonso VI: 
How can I spare (such] a degenerate people, 
each of whom awards himself the titles of 
their Caliphs and kings (Mulukihim) and 
princes (Umaralihim); al-Multadid, 
al-Multamid, al-Multasim, al-Mutawakkil, 
al-Mustalin, al-Muqtadir, al-'Amir and 
al-Malmun, while none can lift a sword to 
defend themselves. 567 
, 567 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, pp. 88-89. There are 
several reasons why I 
doubt the authenticity of this quote. 
Firsti it is unlikely that Alfonso would have felt outrage at the 
adoption of Caliphal 
titles by the lords of the Talifas - such 
a feeling 
is a product of a Muslim education. Secondly, in an 
earlier passage, 
he calls the Talifa lords rebels which would 
i. ply that Alfonso believed the legitimate government of Muslim 
Spain to have been that of the Umayyads. Finally, the listing of 
the dif f erent titles adopted by the Ta I if as and the general tone 
of the quote seem 
to suggest a Muslim perspective formed after 
t1le start of the Spanish reconquest. Ibn al-Kardabus does not 
provide a source 
for this quote. Interestingly, it is in this 
section that Ibn al-Kardabus makes reference to Alfonso VI 
calling himself 
the Emperor of the two Religions (al-Inbaratur 
d Ayn)-see p. 252 above. jýh. jal-mjýjilat 
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However, as this study has tried to demonstrate, the 
adoption of Caliphal titles was a gradual extension of a 
practice first started by the 'Amirids and in its early 
form signified no more than an attempt by the Talifa lords 
to bestow upon themselves grand ministerial titles in the 
manner of the 'Amirids. Even when the Talifa lords dropped 
the ministerial (Hajib) from their titles and called 
themselves simply al-Mustalin or al-Muqtadir, they 
continued to acknowledge, at least de jure, some form of 
Caliphal authority, be it that of the pretender in Seville, 
or of the 'Abbasid in Baghdad. 
By looking at the development of the Talifas in 
Zaragoza and Valencia in the eleventh century, it has been 
argued that there was no clearly def ined break between a 
unified Spanish Muslim state and a conscious move towards 
independent regional entities. The Spanish Muslim elite 
believed that the reasons leading to the collapse of 
Cordovan hegemony were the result of changes instigated by 
the 'Amirid rulers. Much of the actions of this elite, at 
least in the upper march, during the early part of the 
century was related to an attempt at reversing these 
changes. Even when the Umayyad Caliphate was abolished 
altogether, there was (with the single exception of al- 
Malmun of Toledo) no expression of a political outlook that 
viewed regional rule as existing outside the framework of 
a caliphate. However, the lords of the Talifas were at the 
same time also reacting to the political situation in the 
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peninsula where there was a vacuum in central authority. 
The relationship of each ruler with his Almal, with his 
Muslim neighbours and with the Christian states had to be 
moulded within this new political reality and the Talifa 
rulers, therefore, increasingly, exercised independent 
authority. 
By the middle of the century, as a new generation 
born after the collapse of the Caliphate came to power, the 
memory of the Cordovan government became dimmer in the 
minds of the Spanish Muslim elite, but there continued to 
be a dichotomy in their outlook, so that while the lords 
of the Talifas seemed to exercise completely independent 
authority within their city-states, they continued at the 
same time to acknowledge, even if in a weak and titular 
manner, an allegiance to a Caliphal Political system. It 
has been argued that this dichotomy in outlook played an 
important role in shaping the Political actions of the 
ruling elite during the century, both in terms of 
"domestic" issues and in matters related to their relations 
with other states in the peninsula. 
This might help explain why the Hudids continued 
to divide their realm after the death of each ruler of the 
Zaragozan state among several successors, thus weakening 
the political structure previously created and launching 
the march into civil strif e, as each tried to oust his 
brothers and gain control of the whole march. Such a 
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division must be seen as unusual, given that there was a 
clear precedent in Muslim Spain of the succession to the 
throne by a single ruler, established and practised by the 
Umayyad state. The case has therefore been put that while 
on the one hand the Hudids can be seen to have clearly 
behaved as rulers of an independent state in almost all 
aspects of government from the early part of the century, 
one can argue that on the other hand, in terms of 
establishing a method of succession, the Hudids 
failed to resolve the question of whether what they ruled 
was, in law, a state to be banded down to a single 
successor, or a thaghr, to be viewed as a legacy, which was 
to be divided among several sons. At the same time, other 
Talifa rulers, such as the dhi al-Nunids in Toledo seemed 
to have been comfortable with the concept of handing over 
the state to a single successor. 
The difference in the way in which the issue of 
succession was resolved by the Ta I if as demonstrates that 
there was no clearly defined division between the two 
political world-views in the minds Qf the Spanish Muslim 
elite during the century. Rather, that both, a theoretical 
belief, even if only a weak and tenuous one, in the 
necessity for all authority to exist within the framework 
of a Caliphal government, and a practical exercise of 
authority, completely independent from any such framework, 
continued to co-exist and to help shape the political 
, -actions of the Spanish Muslim elite throughout this period. 
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A good example of this can be seen in the fall 
and reconquest of Barbastro. It has been argued that from 
a purely "Zaragozan" perspective, al-Muqtadir was 
attempting to use all available means, including abandoning 
a city to the attacks of a Christian expedition, to force 
the Almal of the upper march to acknowledge only his 
authority. In addition, the study has aimed to show that 
Ibn Hayyan, while understanding the local politics that 
shaped al-Muqtadir's decision to abandon the city, 
criticised al-Muqtadir's action on the grounds that it was 
al-Muqtadir's duty to protect the whole thaghr, as in the 
days of the Umayyad Caliphate. This might have been partly 
because Ibn Hayyan saw this attack, not simply as a local 
skirmish with Aragon, but as an attempt by Christendom, 
represented by Sahib Roma, to attack Muslim Spain as a 
whole. The response of the other Talifas towards the fall 
of Barbastro also shows a co-existence of both political 
views referred to above. on the one hand, we are informed 
that on hearing of the fall of the city all Talifa rulers 
strengthened the fortifications of their cities, which is 
what one would expect as a reaction from city states which 
had started to function as isolated independent units. 
However, al-Multadid of Seville, sent a force to help the 
Zaragozan forces liberate the town. It might have been a 
small force that had no more than a symbolic value, but 
this symbolic dimension is important in that it shows that 
as late as 1065, the Spanish Muslim elite still felt that 
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they should, at least in theory, present a united front 
against incursions from the north. 
By the second half of the century, most Talifas 
not only used Christian forces against their Muslim 
neighbours in inter-Ta I if a conf licts, but also paid Parias. 
This was not, as some historians have asserted, an act of 
vassalage, which was a system alien to the Spanish Muslim 
elite, but a form of protection money to ward of f the 
mounting military pressure especially, but not exclusively, 
from Castile. Nonetheless, when the power of Castile began 
to make serious encroachments into Muslim lands, the 
Ta I if as reacted in a manner more reminiscent of the pre- 
Talifa period. Whether al-Multamid of Seville actually said 
that he would rather be a camel herd than see Christian 
dominion is not as important as the fact that after the 
fall of Toledo he chose to invite the Almoravids to cross 
to Spain to defend Spanish Islam, despite a deep-seated and 
historically based mistrust of the Berbers of north Africa. 
Al-MU'tamid might have hoped to be allowed to remain as 
ruler under an Almoravid hegemony, but that in itself 
points to the fact that he was willing to revert to a 
system of government that was closer to the older Umayyad 
one than that which typified the Talifa period. 
Nor can this act of inviting the Almoravids be 
seen simply as a clear break with Talifa Politics and a 
shift back to the older system of a single Spanish Muslim 
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state. Even after the advent of the Almoravids, the Hudids 
continued to behave as independent rulers, conducting a 
Zaragozan based policy towards Castile, Aragon and the 
Almoravids. However, following the fall of Valencia in 
Ramadan 495/ June-July 1102,568 they attempted to 
establish a relationship with the Almoravids similar to 
that which had existed between the upper thaghr and Cordova 
in the days of the Umayyads. In return for acknowledging 
yusuf as the legitimate ruler of Muslim Spain, the 
Almoravid army was stopped from attacking Zaragoza and the 
Hudids held the upper march as a buffer569 against the 
Christians, receiving occasional support when faced with 
concerted attacks on them such as the Castilian campaign 
for calatayud in the following year. 570 The Almoravids 
accepted this arrangement because Yusuf was consolidating 
his own dynasty and needed to have the representative of 
the upper march as one of the witnesses for the charter 
appointing 'Ali as successor. 571 For a brief period, the 
Hudids and the Almoravids seemed as if they had re- 
established something approximating the Umayyad system. 
568 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 101. 
569 Ibn Salid: Al-Muqhrib fi Hula al-Macfhrib, vol. 2, p. 437. 
570 Ibn Idhari: Al-Bavan, vol. 4, p. 44. Incidentally, a further 
sign of Yusuf 
Ibn Tashfin's willingness to try to build support 
arnOlng the 
spanish Muslims for his dynasty at this stage was that 
a: Ete-r the occupation of 
Valencia he chose to appoint a local 
supporter, 
Abu 'Abdullah Ibn 'Aisha, as governor of Valencia, 
ratller than a north 
African commander. Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, 
part IIII pp. 
887-890 and Ibn Salid: Al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maahrib, 
vol. 2, pp. 
314-315. 
571 Ibn Idhari: Al-Bavan, vol. 4, pp. 42-43. Al-Hulla al-Sivaral 
, ts that the charter was 
drawn up by Ibn Razin. 
sugg, er 
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A similar pattern of a tension between presenting 
a united front towards the Muslim south and behaving as 
independent kingdoms with often conflicting Policies can be 
seen in the politics of the Christian elite in the north. 
After Fernando I had established a greater Castile, he 
chose to divide it at his death (perhaps partly because of 
572 the influence of Navarrese inheritance laws among his 
three sons, which led to a period of in-fighting between 
the three that eventually resulted in Alfonso VI succeeding 
to the whole kingdom after a brief period in exile. Even 
with the ascendancy of Castile to a position of dominance 
among the northern Christian states, inter-Christian 
rivalry continued to play an important part in the politics 
of the region. At the start of the century, some of these 
states, such as Castile, were in need of aid from Muslim 
states such as Zaragoza (whose ruler had helped arrange the 
wedding alliance between Castile and Barcelona). This 
pattern of Muslim involvement in inter-Christian rivalries 
was similar to that which developed later in the century 
with the Christian kingdoms being involved in inter-Talifa 
conflict. However, by the end of the century, Talifa power 
was so weakened that their involvement in inter-Christian 
conflict became much more limited. Nonetheless, the 
political manoeuvrings of Aragon, even to the extent of 
increasing Papal involvement in the peninsula, were clearly 
572 B. F. Reilly: The Kingdom of Le6n-Castilla under King 
so VI 1065-1109, pp. 14-15. 
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aimed against Castile. The north, even after the ascendancy 
of a greater Castile, and despite the profound changes in 
society which were taking place, reflected in the spread of 
cluniac reforms, a movement towards a closer alignment with 
the rest of Europe and the gradual development of a 
reconquest mentality, continued to behave not as a single 
entity, but as several independent and rival states. 
Even the nobility of Castile itself -did not 
present a single "Christian" or even Castilian front to the 
, 'Muslim" south. It has been argued above that Rodrigo Diaz, 
traditionally presented as the hero of the Castilian 
Christian reconquest, behaved in reality in the first 
instance, as a soldier of the Talifa of Zaragoza and later 
as an independent ruler who acted in the interests of his 
own "Talifall, often against the interests of Castile, and 
was to the end a better ally to the Muslim Hudids than to 
any Christian state. 
The rulers of the Talifas, with very few 
exceptions '573 have traditionally been presented as the 
villains of the period, whose selfish pursuit of personal 
power led to the fragmentation of Muslim Spain, which led, 
in turn, to the beginning of the Spanish Christian advance 
southwards. What this study has tried to demonstrate is 
that the Talifa rulers were neither villains nor heroes, 
573 Notably Dr. A. Azzam's romantic biography of al-Multamid 
O: F _qeville, 
Al-MU'tamid Ibn 'Abbad, Cairo, 1959. 
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but representatives of an elite that tried to react to a 
period of political instability caused partly by the 
actions of the 'Amirid government and partly by the growing 
powers of Castile. To this end they utilised, often in the 
most efficient manner possible, the tools of government at 
their disposal; the bureaucracy, the limited military 
forces of Muslim Spain, and diplomacy. In many profound 
ways, they came to see themselves as totally independent 
rulers, and yet in an equally important sense, their 
political outlook continued to be influenced by the belief 
that an ordered Muslim world could only exist under a 
Caliphal system of government. By the eleventh century, 
this Caliphal system was weakening everywhere in the Muslim 
world, and the actions of the Talifa rulers reflect the 
attempt of the lordly Muslim class at coming to terms with 
such. a profound ideological change. In an absolute sense, 
the Talifa rulers failed. Zaragoza and Toledo both fell by 
the end of this period, which broke the back of the 
defences of Muslim Spain. They were slow to realise the 
threat from the changes in the north, and particularly the 
growing power of Castile. However, the changes to the 
political map of the peninsula were also the result of the 
dynamic rule of Fernando I and Alfonso VI in Castile, as 
well as the actions, and occasional inactions, of the 
Almoravids when they eventually interfered. The failed 
final attempts of the Hudids at reaching an understanding, 
similar to that which they believed existed under the 
Umayyad system of government, with the new Almoravid power 
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at the turn of the century shows, that while the Hudids, by 
then the last surviving Talifa, continued to try to order 
their world in the mould of a Political structure that had 
existed in the tenth century, this structure was no longer 
appropriate for the situation in the peninsula by the end 
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